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ABSTRACT 
THE RISE OF 'PEOPLE POWER': ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE "COLOR 
REVOLUTIONS" 
Vladyslav Galushko 
Old Dominion University, 2009 
Director: Dr. Regina Karp 
This dissertation has been spurred by the surprising turn of events that took place 
in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Both countries were scheduled to 
have elections - parliamentary in Georgia and presidential in Ukraine. Though fraud, 
voter intimidation and opposition harassment were widely expected, few predicted the 
magnitude of popular response that swept away the regimes of Leonid Kuchma and 
Eduard Shevarnadze. Grappling with the unexpected, many heaped praise on the so-
called "people power" that was able to bring masses to the streets and sustain their 
involvement in what were quickly labeled "color revolutions." Civil society groups like 
Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia became the cause celebre for Western media. 
Few questions were asked as to what made the civic organizations in Ukraine and 
Georgia so effective. This neglect of deeper investigation is especially puzzling, given 
the vast array of past assessments that decried the civil societies in those and other post-
Soviet states as weak, overly dependent on Western aid and unable to relate to the local 
populace. 
The analysis that this dissertation will perform is critical not only for our 
understanding of contemporary political events in transitioning societies, but also for the 
evolution of major theoretical debates in the field. By stressing the primacy of civil 
society's involvement in "color revolutions," it lends substantive support to the 
participatory approach, confirming the leading role of ordinary citizens over domestic 
elites in democratic transformations. At the same time, because the research is focused 
on the specific features which enhance the effectiveness of civic groups, it contributes to 
the scholarly discussion (often dating to the times of Locke, Kant and the Scottish 
Enlightenment) on the merits and weaknesses of civil society as well as its connections 
to the political and societal realms. Finally, the research suggests how the particular 
circumstances of "color revolutions" can enhance our general appreciation of democratic 
transitions. 
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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research for this dissertation has been spurred by the peaceful democratic 
transitions, more commonly known as the "color revolutions," that occurred in Georgia 
and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004 respectively. Although many actors have contributed to 
the successful fall of the Shevarnadze and Kuchma semi-authoritarian regimes, the 
public attention has been fixated on civil society. Many credited civic groups, like 
Kmara and Pora, for starting the snowball of public protests and helping sustain them for 
several days, sometimes in harsh weather conditions. Others, refusing to believe that 
apathetic post-Soviet masses can do anything on their own, saw foreign-funded non-
government organizations as pawns in the geopolitical game between the West and 
Russia to delineate and control the spheres of influence. As a result, one is still left with 
the question whether, regardless of their influence, non-governmental organizations were 
an independent or a controlled player in that process. 
For all the research generated by the interest in those events, there is no answer 
what made specific civil groups, not an amorphous civil society, effective in those days. 
Most research pieces look at the domestic civil societies comprehensively, asserting that 
by 2003 or 2004 they were strong enough to be an independent actor. However, during 
the revolutions it was not the whole civil society, but specific organizations that proved 
critical in mounting and sustaining the protests. Furthermore, the abysmal performance 
of civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia in the post-revolutionary period rejects the 
This paper follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style: The Essential Guide for Writers, Editors and 
Publishers 15th edition. 
argument that they were uniformly strong. This work seeks to fill this gap in research by 
analyzing four civic groups in the two countries - their founding, growth and, finally, 
involvement in the "color revolutions." It posits that a high degree of their connection to 
the host society helped them play a critical role in those events. Such connections, 
known as organizational embeddedness, included their ability to relate to ordinary 
people, interact with and be respected by relevant political actors, and use any foreign 
financial and methodological assistance effectively. 
The primary focus of my dissertation lies at the intersection of two distinct issues 
- civil society and democratization. On one hand, the research seeks to determine the 
role of civil society organizations in the process of democratic transitions, more 
specifically peaceful "color revolutions." This task necessitates a closer evaluation of the 
available studies within the democratization literature. On the other, the dissertation's 
key hypothesis asserts that the influence of civic organizations will be dependent on the 
extent of their embededdness in the fabric of respective domestic societies. In order to 
select valid indicators for empirical testing, it is important to review the extant literature 
on civil society, too. Therefore, the main goal of this chapter is to provide a critical 
overview of scholarly research in both fields with a specific attention to how features of 
the internal organization of civil society groups impact their wider relevance in emerging 
democracies. 
To this end, the chapter will begin by reviewing the general aspects of civil 
society - the available scholarly definitions and debates on the concept, the purported 
external and internal reasons for its emergence and development, the benefits and 
challenges that civil society often generates. The second part will concentrate on the role 
of civil society in democratization. The discussion will include an assessment of 
3 
relations between civil society on one hand and democratization and foreign aid on the 
other. To illuminate several theoretical propositions, this part will draw on a number of 
available case studies from Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, as 
the dissertation's main region of interest. 
As seen from the structure of the chapter, the research intends to pursue a number 
of tasks. First, it seeks to show how the phenomenon of civil society has evolved 
historically from general philosophical concepts to contemporary civic organizations. 
Second, it describes how civil society has become linked to democratization and turned 
into a major component of Western foreign aid. Third, the review considers the available 
case studies on the former Soviet Union to underscore the impact of internal elements of 
NGOs on their overall performance and their specific influence in "color revolutions." 
GENERAL ASPECTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
Definitions and scholarly views on civil society 
From Locke and the Scottish Enlightenment to Hegel and Durkheim, the notion of 
civil society has undergone a lengthy historical evolution in the writings of classical 
philosophers. The continuing recurrence of debates on its key attributes attests to virility 
of the phenomenon. 
In the "Second Treatise" Locke was the first to devote considerable attention to civil 
society, which he defined as "the realm of political association instituted among men 
when they take leave of the "state of nature" and enter in a commonwealth."1 His 
interpretations were built on the writings of ancient Greek philosophers, like Grotius, 
and some political theorists of the Middle Age. Because of the heavy influence of the 
1
 Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York: Maxwell Macmillan Canada, 1992), 22. 
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latter, Locke's approach did not differentiate between civil and political societies. As we 
will soon see, this understanding of their unity was not uncontroversial. On the 
theoretical level, numerous authors grappled with the issue whether, and if so, then to 
what extent, civil society is both separate and distinct from the state's political life. The 
debate has had obvious practical ramifications for democracy-promoters in the field, 
who were left with the formidable challenge of drawing more precise boundaries 
between civil and political organizations that they choose to support. Locke postulated 
that the roots of civil society lied in Natural Law and Christian traditions, and its 
attributes "were derived from the nature of man himself."2 To him, it was a unique 
model for social order set out to overcome competing challenges between the individual 
and social, public and private (the theme that would be recurring in almost all future 
works). Therefore, the freedoms and equality that civil society brought with it were 
ontological, not historical in nature. Yet again, the points raised by Locke so casually 
became among the most contested issues in the discourse and practice of civil society. 
Since his rhetoric is so steeped in the tradition of Christianity, one may wonder whether 
the notion of civil society may not be applicable to those who are not Christian. This, in 
turn, spurs a larger debate about the ethnocentricity of such Western concepts as civil 
society, nonprofit organizations, advocacy groups, etc. To rephrase a set of familiar 
questions, can Western assistance produce a Chinese or an Arab civil society that, while 
being distinct, would have the same normative essence as civil societies in Canada, Great 
Britain or the United States? His other assertion also posits problems for democracy 
promoters. If, as Locke suggests, civil society is ontological in nature, is it possible to 
inculcate the habits of civicness and ultimately build a civil society in other countries? A 
2
 Ibid., 3. 
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positive answer raises only further questions. For instance, in their civil society building 
efforts, should donor states tap into the dormant civic potential of a host country or begin 
their efforts from scratch? 
Theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment deepened the problematic of the individual 
within society, and clashes between individual and public interests that are bound to 
occur as a-result of these interactions. For many of them, civil society was "primarily a 
realm of solidarity held together by the force of moral sentiments and natural 
affections."3 It was therefore not a neutral arena of exchange. Instead, all exchanges 
were derived from the nature of man himself. The finding is significant when we 
consider an ongoing debate on the impacts of civil society. Putnam describes its mostly 
positive influences (such as increased civicness, efficacy, tolerance and higher 
participatory attitudes and behaviors) on individuals and states.4 Sheri Berman in her 
analysis of Weimar Germany challenges the assumption about the inherent goodness of 
civil society. At the time, German civic organizations fell victim to the same social 
divisiveness that permeated the country. Because they tended to get members along the 
lines of social cleavages, their activities furthered, rather than ameliorated, a general 
societal fragmentation.5 Regardless of the seeming difference, the major points 
elaborated by Putnam and Berman hark back to the philosophical proposition of 
Ferguson and the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Because exchanges within civil 
society are not content-neutral, its specific impacts depend on the meaning (good or bad) 
that actors put into their interactions within civic organizations. 
3
 Seligman, 33. 
4
 Robert D. Putnam, ed., Democracies in Flux (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002); Making Democracy Work: Civic 
Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), 167-176. 
5
 Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics 49 (April 1997): 401-429. 
6 
At the same time, theorists within this school (like Adam Ferguson in "An Essay on 
the History of Civil Society") make a substantial departure from Locke in one point. 
While for the latter the roots of civil society were ontological, for the former they 
became epistemological. In other words, Ferguson regarded civil society more as a 
natural inwardly and ultimately human source of social power. Though he did not move 
far enough to cast off completely civil society' s connections to God, the departure was 
nonetheless crucial. It opened a path to closer examination of human interactions within 
the realm of civil society with the purpose of their improvement. Moreover, for the first 
time it was implied that people had a share in controlling their civic destiny. 
Kant further distances from the ontological premise behind the workings of civil 
society. Being a chief proponent of Reason, he attempts to establish a connection 
between it and the moral sphere. Thus, civil society is presented as a shared public arena, 
which validates critical discourses on Reason and equality. He asserts that "through 
participation in the civil structure of political activity that man's autonomy, and with that 
of reason, were guaranteed."6 For the first time in political theory and in a sharp split 
from Locke, Kant separates civil from political society, by pointing to its uniqueness as 
the natural province for public rational debate and critique. To summarize, his 
contribution to the discourses on civil society is critical for a number of viewpoints. 
First, Kant's writing places civil society deeper into the epistemological realm, thus 
opening it to empirical examination and research. Second, his notion of a shared public 
area elevates the stature of civil society as one of the core components in a state's 
existence and orderly functioning. Third, Kant makes the very first distinction between 
civic and political lives. It is important to know where one starts and the other begins in 
6
 Seligman, 43. 
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order to achieve a desired outcome. At the same time, he points to an important aspect in 
the operation of civil society that would become later magnified in the notion of service 
NGOs. Specifically, not all civil society organizations have to be inherently political or 
linked to politics. But all civic groups must have a link to their domestic societies (the 
notion of embeddedness, which••this dissertation advances) before they establish their 
political aspirations. 
Though Hegel echoes parts of Kant's definition by emphasizing mutuality and 
reciprocal recognition as the key features of civil society, he points to one significant 
flaw in his line of arguments. Specifically, for Kant the public sphere (within which civil 
society is located) is highly judicial, but not ethical in nature. It is divorced from the 
private sphere of morality and ethics. Hegel asserted that this constriction forecloses the 
complete realization of Reason, which seems to be one of the major preoccupations of 
Kant. Hegel (as Marx after him) sought to overcome the distinction between legality and 
morality and bring the two together. He believed both notions had been at the core of the 
original idea of civil society. In order to show that, Hegel developed the idea of ethical 
solidarity based on the unity of public right with private ethics. The concept asserts that 
the individual need for recognition is attained through the recognition of property. 
Because the essence of civil society lies in mutuality and reciprocity, it inadvertently 
helps humans fulfill their basic need for recognition. By doing this, it acquires a certain 
normative status. 
In the "Philosophy of Right" Hegel deepens the analysis of civil society in a number 
of important ways. First, the norm of mutuality contains not only an element of 
participation, but also of conflict. His observation was built on the writings dated as 
early as the Scottish Enlightenment, which claimed that exchanges within the realm of 
8 
civil society are not neutral. Second, Hegel makes a final break-away from the 
ontological basis of civil society, by noting that it is an object of historical development 
rather than a natural state. This has profound theoretical and practical implications. In the 
first dimension, it completely negates Locke's rather theological perception of civil 
society. From the practical standpoint* this means that forms of civil society do not 
emerge on their own or exist naturally, but need a conscious human effort. One may 
insist that Hegel's proposition provided a critical groundwork for the emergence of a 
future democracy promotion paradigm. It comes as no surprise that he was the first to 
emphasize the educative nature of civil society "where the individual learns the value of 
group actions, social solidarity and the dependence of his welfare on others."7 Third, 
Hegel purports that the realization of ethical life begins, but does not end with the sphere 
of civil society. His understanding of the bridge between civil and political spheres is 
close to the contemporary one. Hegel believes that civic participation prepares 
individuals for the participation in the public arena of the state, which is a true space of 
reason and universality. He further suggests the state ought to exploit civil society by 
o 
nurturing the cooperation it is capable to produce. His contribution is illustrative of the 
evolution in thinking about the relationship between political and civil spheres that had 
occurred over time. It began with Locke and theorists within the Scottish Enlightenment 
who did not separate the two realms. Then, Kant was the first to distinguish them, but 
did not draw any sort of relationship. For Hegel, the feedback mechanism seems to be 
clearer, as civil society finds its final embodiment in political one. 
7
 S. Reichardt, "Civil Society - A Concept for Comparative Historical Research," in Future of Civil Society: Making Central 
European Nonprofit-Organizations Work, ed. Annette Zimmer, Eckhard Priller, and Matthias Freise (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag flir 
Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 37. 
8
 Jon Van Til, Growing Civil Society: From Nonprofit Sector to Third Space (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 14-
15. 
9 
Marx elaborates on the nature of interactions within civil society. Taking one part of 
Hegel's observation, which noted of a possibly conflictual side to civil society, he places 
it within his own theoretical framework of class struggle. For Marx, civil society is a 
mechanism exploited by the state to enforce invisible, intangible and subtle forms of 
power.9 Like others before him, Marx supports the separation of civil and political 
societies in his famous piece "On the Jewish Question."10 However, in unison with his 
other theoretical propositions, civil society (Burgerliche Gessellschaft) is firmly 
connected to the economic aspects of social life, more specifically the needs of labor.11 
In the end, he recognizes that conflicts, which civil society may potentially harbor, will 
not be resolved either within it or in the sphere of politics, as both are manipulated by the 
ruling class for the purpose of securing, maintaining and expanding its power. Therefore, 
such struggles must be overcome in a different political body that will emerge in the 
future and unify both civil and political realms.12 
When looking at the timeframe of major theoretical debates on the concept of civil 
society, it becomes apparent that philosophical explorations of the phenomenon 
intensified especially between the 17th and the mid-19th centuries. The chief interest in 
civil society stemmed from the social crises of the 17 century and the sense of 
uprootedness that they created. European societies had to deal with the issues of land 
commercialization, labor and capital growth in market economies and consequences of 
the English and North American Revolutions. By the middle of the 18th century, the 
European civil society failed to incorporate the demands of its participants into the 
political life, which gave rise to social movements and, ultimately, powerful trade 
9
 Van Til, 14-15. 
10
 Seligman, 48-50. 
11
 Reichardt, 38. 
12
 Seligman, 52-55. 
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unions.13 At the same time, political philosophers had to look elsewhere to find real-life 
models of the civil society, about which they were so tirelessly theorizing. That place 
became the United States. The richness and vibrancy of American civic arena astounded 
such outside observers as de Tocqueville. His writings are significant for two primary 
reasons. They provide a rare empirical application of the previous philosophical 
conceptualizations as well as illuminate most significant theoretical debates on the merits 
and role of civil society and its place within the political life of a country. Our review 
will deal with de Tocqueville's practical observations on American civil society in the 
later sections. At this juncture, it is pertinent to elaborate on those experiences of his 
journey in America that relate to broader theoretical disputes. 
Similar with other European authors of his time, de Tocqueville takes the distinctness 
of civil society as a realm of social life for granted. However, his analysis goes one step 
further. While most of the previous writers saw the final resolution for numerous 
disputes of the civic arena in political society, de Tocqueville (thanks in a large part to 
what he saw in America) came to believe that civil society would be able to stand on its 
own. Indeed, his analysis was one of the first pieces that considered civic associations as 
an alternative to the growing statist movement. At several points, the French political 
scientist speaks of civic organizations as a powerful instrument of interest representation 
that can provide an answer to increasingly complex problems through people, not the 
government. Furthermore, when civil society limits itself to mere debates and delegates 
problem-solving to purely political institutions, it inadvertently increases the potential 
for abuse and tyranny.14 His voluminous book "Democracy in America" addresses 
13
 Seligman, 103,105. 
14
 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America and Two Essays (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 226-228, 598-599. 
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another contentious issue in the civil society discourse - the relationship between the 
individual and civil society. More specifically, there is a perennial two-fold question of 
how the person decides to get involved in civic activities (thus sacrificing part of her 
autonomy) and, once engaged, how she balances the achievement of her personal 
interests with the good of a larger group of which she is a member. The viewpoint that 
de Tocqueville provides is different not only because it is country-specific, but also 
because it is rooted in a particular form of governance - democracy. He proceeds to 
explain that in democracies all individuals are fairly independent as none commands the 
absolute power over others akin to traditional monarchies. At the same time, they are 
also weak in pursuing their particularistic agendas, because they deal with others whose 
cooperation they cannot order by force. This creates a certain pull-push effect. On one 
hand, people are pulled together by their own inability to achieve anything without 
external assistance. On the other, any emerging cooperation always has a potential for 
members' pull-out if they believe they have ceded too much of their autonomy and 
independence. As de Tocqueville aptly observed, "the same conditions which make 
associations so vital for democratic nations also make them more difficult to achieve 
there than elsewhere."15 Finally, his work also touches upon the interactions between 
civil and political societies. He posits that there is a direct relationship between the two -
where political associations are banned, civic organizations are also rare, as citizens are 
no longer sure which forms of association are permissible.16 Furthermore, even those 
few civic associations that manage to function are "small in number, feebly conceived, 
incompetently run, and will never engage in plans on a vast scale or will fail in 
15
 Ibid, 596. 
16
 In the contemporary language, such associations would be advocacy groups. 
12 
attempting to execute them." De Tocqueville's addition on this question is critical for 
two reasons. First, it re-iterates a previously forgotten point that civic associations pave a 
way for political ones as free schools of teaching the general theory of associations. In a 
democracy, the learning is not limited to purely political aspects of participation. It helps 
citizens take their freedoms more responsibly and avoid the dangers that many freedoms 
may pose if abused. Second, it implicitly cautions of the efforts to build a vibrant civil 
society in a setting with stifled political competition.18 In such conditions the established 
civic associations stay weak, because they are unable to embed themselves into the 
fabric of the domestic political landscape that is inherently set up to reject open 
competition. In other words, such civic organizations became a foreign (and inevitably 
temporary) body in a society where all other forms of participation are discouraged. The 
remark (as we will later see19) was somewhat lost on democracy-promoters in the 1990s, 
who sought to draw an artificial line between civil and political spheres and proceed with 
the development of the former irrespective of the circumstances in the latter. 
The concept of civil society fell out of vogue in the mid-19th and early 20th 
centuries.20 Among the most notable writings of that period, one ought to mention Emile 
Durkheim and Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci's approach espouses a dual vision of civil 
society. On one hand, he concurs with Marx in seeing civil society as one of the venues 
where the present social order (with all its' oppressive class hierarchies) is grounded. In 
this first capacity, civil society is the shaped object that helps support the capitalist status 
quo. On the other hand, civil society is simultaneously the realm in which a new social 
order can be founded. Because the process of transformation deals with social change 
17
 De Tocqueville, 607. 
18
 Ibid., 604-605,608. 
19
 See the discussion on democracy promotion efforts in Central Asia. 
20
 Reichardt, 41; Thomas Carothers and William Brandt, "Civil Society," Foreign Policy 117 (Winter, 1999-2000): 19. 
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and (as seen later) with revolutions, it is worth elaborating on it in more detail. The 
change would begin with the formation of class alliances into a counter-hegemonic bloc 
that would ultimately displace the bourgeoisie (whose interests the present civil society 
is serving). Unsurprisingly for a Marxist, Gramsci envisions the bloc including 
peasantry, working class and, to increase its strength, petty bourgeois elements.21 
Mobilization of this force would not be spontaneous. Instead, it will occur as a result of a 
combination of leadership and pressures from the below. Within the ranks of leadership, 
the intellectual plays a critical role in raising the consciousness of social groups on the 
local, regional and world levels. This individual would be able to transcend immediate 
corporate interests of his group in order to achieve a commonly shared vision of a 
desirable and feasible alternative future. It should be assumed that the contribution of 
intellectuals would become the basis of what Gramsci called the war position - a 
strategy for a long-term construction of self-consciousness of the social classes into an 
emancipatory bloc within the society. The author finds his own answers to the question 
on the relationship between civil and political societies. Under normal circumstances, the 
former supports the power structure of the latter. However, during the times of change a 
revolution would first occur on the level of civil society (making it the leading agent of 
transformation) and only then spell into the state. At the same time, Gramsci realizes 
that the change, which civil society has a potential to bring about, may not be definitive 
or final. His further qualification talks of a passive revolution, which is an abortive or 
incomplete transformation of society. In this case, changes, which are introduced by 
external actors, attract some internal support, but do not overcome the opposition of 
21
 Robert W. Cox, "Civil Society at the Turn of Millennium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order," Review of International 
Studies 25 (1995): 9 
22
 Ibid., 7,15-16. 
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other entrenched domestic forces, resulting in the revolution-restoration cycle. Another 
subcategory of a passive revolution is a stalled war where oppositional forces are strong 
enough to mount a challenge, but not sufficiently powerful to overcome it. The third 
variation may lie in transformismo - an Italian term for the cooptation of oppositional 
elements by the dominant power. The categorization offered by Gramsci carries some 
contemporary validity j especially when applied to post-revolutionary situations in 
Ukraine, Serbia and Georgia. For instance, Ukraine may be experiencing the beginning 
of a revolution-restoration pattern after in 2006 the Orange coalition proved unable to 
form a government, which returned to power the forces of the ancien regime. Serbia is 
displaying increasing features of the transformismo model as the country is struggling to 
come to grips with its past and fully embrace European demands for the independence of 
Kosovo. 
Emile Durkheim was another prominent theorist who turned his attention to the 
concept of civil society. His research agenda both echoes and expands a number of 
discourses that were previously so central in the field. The first among them is the 
question of positioning civil society. In this regard, Durkeim places it firmly in-between 
the modern state and capitalism. However, this positioning is not entirely new and falls 
in line with de Tocqueville's vision of civil society as the public sphere. What 
distinguishes Durkheim from others is the inclusion of such intimate structures as family. 
To him, "the conjugal-nuclear family ... remains a focal point for group norms and 
attachments, and a key matrix for individual moral development."24 In "The Evolution of 
Educational Thought" the reader could witness how the two terms - education and 
23
 Mustafa Emirbayer, "Useful Durkheim," Sociological Theory 14, no. 2 (July 1996): 112. 
"Ibid., 113. 
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family - come together to explain the vibrancy of civil society. Education connects "two 
kinds of moralities, the affective morality of family life and the more rigorous, 
impersonal faith that controls civic society." In other words, family plays two roles. 
First, it helps build personal trust that family members show toward each other. Second, 
by acquiring this trust, an individual is getting simultaneously socialized into certain 
norms of civicness and attitudes of participatory behavior. But without any education, 
such mechanisms will be extended only to those with whom the person is familiar 
through face-to-face interactions. In this sense, education becomes a bridge that assists 
the individual with learning about interpersonal trust and practicing it toward people who 
are not his family members. Attesting to the importance of Durkheim's insight, the link 
between personal and interpersonal trust and the role of education in enhancing the latter 
is now taken for granted. Numerous studies on civic participation conventionally 
measure the educational level of their participants with an automatic assumption that 
those with more education will display higher civic and participatory behaviors.26 The 
other important addition of Durkheim is his attention to the emotional dimension of 
social life. In his work "Professional Ethics and Civic Morals," he stresses that 
interpersonal interactions, which occur with or without institutions, have an emotional 
foundation. This theme was developed by other authors, who assert that in order to 
flourish, democratic structure and processes need to have not only cultural ideas, but also 
25
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patterns of emotional commitment. Thus, like many before him, Durkheim was subtly 
pointing toward the duality of civil society that could encompass not only conflict and 
contention, but also interpersonal trust and resultant affection. He also saw a clear link 
between civil society and the state. But his perspective was somewhat different from the 
previous authors. While others before him considered civil society as a path that helps 
citizens to connect With or get educated about political life, Durkheim placed a higher 
emphasis on the benefits of civil society for the individual. In particular, he advocated 
that intermediary bodies, such as occupational and professional groups, were the venues 
through which the moral authority of the state enters into individual life. Without them, 
such authority would be too distant from ordinary people. His point is interesting for two 
reasons. First, it re-states the usefulness of civil society as another mechanism, which 
can be used by the state to get through to its citizens. Second, it underscores (though 
rather implicitly) the benefits of participation for the individual. One of them is an 
increased sense of familiarity with the state where a person resides. Durkheim's 
observation was a precursor to more explicit theoretical and empirical assertions28 in the 
future that civic participation fosters a feeling of empowerment that the individual gains 
in the process of engaging with governmental structures. 
After WWII, academic attention toward civil society continued to be on the wane. 
The concept was rescued from the dustbin of history by the transformations in Central 
and Eastern Europe in the 1980s, most prominently the Solidanorst movement in 
Poland.29 Since then, Zimmer points to the emergence of four distinct (but we may add, 
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rather intertwined) approaches. The first is the so-called communitarian model that 
emphasizes the benefits of civil society that lie in socializing, building solidarity and 
enjoying "good life" anchored in networks. The works by Putnam and Etzioni are most 
prominent examples of this viewpoint. Putnam's comparison of the civil societies of 
northern and southern Italy offers a remarkable illustration of how a vibrant civil society 
helps advance other aspects of the social and political life in the north of the country, 
whereas the prevalence of patronage networks retards economic development and 
engenders corruption in the south. Putnam sees a very intimate connection between 
civil and political societies. Like de Tocqueville in his assessments of the U.S. civic life, 
Putnam clearly links the health of civic society to the virility of political life. He comes 
to the similar conclusions - the patterns of interactions in one will be utilized in the 
other. Therefore, political life may be stymied by the same challenges (e.g. corruption, 
patronage, lack of trust) that permeate the civil realm of activities. The second model, 
which emerged in many post-WWII writings, is a differentiation on the democratic 
theory. It states that civil society provides a means of active participation in a grass-root 
democracy and helps ameliorate an existing democratic and representative deficit. 
Because every society has a minority group whose interests cannot be represented 
through the regular channels of election and voting (as such interests are always trumped 
by the majority), civic organizations become a natural outlet where minority members 
can get together and ensure that their interests are not completely obliterated by the 
electoral will of the majority. Schmalz-Burns is one of the most prominent adherents of 
this position. The next model stems from the liberal version of civil society. It stresses 
individual competence and empowerment over state's coercive mechanisms. Similar to 
30
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the idea presented long ago by Kant, the approach presents civil society as a venue for 
upbringing and education of citizens in the provision of public goods and interests. The 
final approach comes from Habermas' discourse theory31 that regards civil society as the 
social space where communicative action takes its most distinct shape in the form of a 
non-coercive discourse and open debate. In this capacity, it serves the role of a pluralist, 
free community for communication that is not power-ridden, but operated through 
observation and reflection. Habermas' interpretation combines a liberal view of the legal 
protection for free citizens with a republic view of active participation in mediating laws 
and institutions. 
As noted before, the presented approaches share a wide range of similarities. One has 
to do with the role of civil society as an educational means to create solidarity among 
people (communitarian approach), to teach them about active participation and defense 
of their interests (democratic theory) or to provide information on how their interests can 
be defended (liberal approach). Many of these approaches assume the connection 
between civil society and the state. It can either mitigate the democratic deficit 
(democratic theory) or enhance the quality and practices of political life (communitarian 
approach), or offer an alternative and more secure route for the freedom of expression 
and debate (Habermas' discourse theory). In the end, these latest views on the role of 
civil society highlight the continuity of the theoretical debates on the concept. 
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Emergence of civil society 
It is usually much easier to describe an existing civil society than to pinpoint the 
mechanisms, processes and historical circumstances that facilitated its formation. This 
section will review and evaluate the existing approaches on how a civil society emerges 
and evolves. 
Most of the literature acknowledges (implicitly or explicitly) two broad ways of 
how civil society in general and civic organizations in particular appear on the domestic 
arena. The major distinction between them lies in whether the process is driven by 
domestic or external factors. 
Domestic sources of civil society development 
If the formation of a domestic civil society is primarily influenced by internal 
actors, it starts at the informal level and is spontaneous in its character. In that case, civil 
society derives its beginnings from individuals and their private life.32 The point is not 
entirely new, as it was Durkheim who first paid attention to the role of family in civil 
society. However, O'Connell is quick to mention that civil society usually moves toward 
other levels - the level of a community (which has the most immediate impact on our 
lives) and the level of government (where the participation of citizenry is essential).33 In 
this sense, he echoes the thoughts similar to de Tocqueville. The French political 
scientist asserted that individuals, who are independent, but weak in a democracy, band 
together to enhance their separate voices for a common concern. 
32
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The discussion raises a critical question as to what factors influence the rapidity 
with which civic action (and civil society itself) expands from the individual to the 
community and later societal levels. De Tocqueville provides a part of the answer, by 
considering the impact of political culture. His analysis underscores that one of the key 
components of a highly participatory culture is an inherent suspicion toward 
government. For instance, American culture advocates self-reliance and views the 
authority of state with distrust.34 One of their key conclusions states that civil society 
organizations are more likely to emerge in states with a participatory culture where 
public input has a greater chance of influencing systemic outcomes.35 This takes us back 
to the previously described theoretical discussion on the link between the civil and 
political societies. Understandably, political culture is not the only domestic ingredient 
that shapes a civil society. 
In his comparison of the differences between Western and Eastern European civil 
society, Zimmer (albeit implicitly) points to a number of other factors that have the 
potential of modifying the contours of a domestically-formed civil society. In particular, 
the scholar notes that Western European civil societies grew out primarily of the middle 
class, while those in Central and Eastern Europe - from nobility (like szlachta in 
Poland).36 If his observation is true, it then has a direct impact on the notion of 
embeddedness with which this dissertation is concerned. It can be speculated that civic 
groups that grow out of the middle class will generally be more aware of the needs of 
ordinary people (thus more implanted into the domestic fabric of their societies) than 
34
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those that originated within the nobility. The failure of Russian Decembrists in 1825 is 
an empirical piece of evidence that lends additional proof to this speculation. The 
informal civic group whose members hailed from Russia's most aristocratic families had 
no support of the local population and saw no need to secure such support in the first 
place. To summarize the point, civil society may become more or less embedded in the 
domestic scenery depending on the social class of its members. 
The second difference between Western and Eastern European civil societies lies 
in the sequence of their formation. In Western Europe, civil society predated the political 
one, while in Eastern Europe (and most notably in Russia) the political society existed 
long before a civil society emerged. Therefore, in the case of many Eastern European 
countries, the state had an opportunity to construct a political setting and a framework of 
rules within which its civic society would operate. It should come as no surprise that an 
inherently strong hold of the state over the realm of public life had a chilling effect on 
the emergence and development of genuine civic organizations. As de Tocqueville 
predicted, where a state heavily regulates political activity, it also generates intrinsic 
uncertainty as to what forms of associations are acceptable. The overall point that 
follows from Zimmer's comparison is as follows - in those states where the political 
society preceded the civil one, the state, not the society, would define the space and set 
the limits on civic organizations. This, in turn, impacts how well such entities would be 
able to anchor themselves on the domestic landscape. 
Finally, his analysis notes that the development of civil society in Eastern Europe 
was fueled by ethnic and religious sentiments as the mechanisms to preserve a local 
37
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38
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identity under the foreign yoke. Thus, established civic organizations may be more 
exclusive, limiting their membership (either purposefully or through the agendas that 
they pursue) to certain national and/or religious groups. When carried to the extreme, 
such membership tactics may bring about the negative effects of civil society, which 
were so vividly described by Sheri Berman in her analysis of the civic life in Weimar 
Germany.39 More specifically, instead of promoting a wider public discourse, German 
civic groups hindered it by encouraging parochialism and reinforcing existing societal 
cleavages. In the end, the civil society becomes only partially embedded in the domestic 
landscape and remains at the constant risk of decline. When religious and ethnic issues 
that rally its members can be resolved only through the political process, it has little else 
to offer. To sum up the point, it is important to consider the external circumstances (such 
as historical, national and religious factors) that shape the public platforms of emerging 
civic groups. 
Along with the influence of the abovementioned variables (i.e. as social class, 
role of the state and historical conditions), civic organizations go through two critical 
stages in their internal development. It is important to review both, as they shed some 
light on the notion of embeddedness, which is central in my work. 
In the first stage, civic organizations represent loose organizational structures that 
came to being in a spontaneous manner. Here one can see the cherished ideal of civil 
society in action - a group of individuals getting together to resolve a certain issue. At 
this point, the organization remains highly horizontal with minimal distinctions between 
Berman. 
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leaders and followers. As it is trying to form the base of followers, the new organization 
advances diffuse, value-laden and frequently non-negotiable demands.40 
At the second phase of their organizational evolution, civic associations become 
more institutionalized, shifting in their activities from the expressive (making one's 
voice heard) to the instrumental and strategic (influencing relevant policies). A formal 
organization replaces loose networks. With further formalization comes a separation 
between members and leaders. The nature of participation in organizational activities 
begins to change. Whereas at the beginning all members take part in the activities of 
their association, at later phases direct forms of participation are combined with 
representation. In reality, it means that some members choose to contribute to the 
organization indirectly (most frequently, financially), leaving the burden of 
programmatic activities (like designing public campaigns, conducting legislative 
lobbying) to the professional core of the group. 
It is important to note that the transition from the first to the second stage is not 
preordained. A host of factors influence whether a group will be able to shape itself into 
a more formal entity with wider impact. Two of them are the capacity of a group and the 
influence of the state. Unfortunately, little has been written on the organizational 
changes that ought to occur in order for a loose network to become a civic association. 
However, it is possible to extrapolate from the research done on the evolution of interest 
groups.41 The literature makes it clear that in order to get to a more organized stage, the 
group has to abandon the peripheral areas of concern and pursue a set of few, but major 
issues that would be of paramount interest to the majority of its members. Doing so will 
40
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enable not only to weed out participants with disparate demands, but also to establish an 
intra-organizational consensus on what exactly it wants to accomplish. At this point, the 
input from the state also becomes crucial. Such factors as the respect for individual rights 
(in institutional and social spheres), the ability of institutions to incorporate demands 
generated within civil society determine the establishment and evolution of 
organizational capacities.4 To put it differently, if a state's support for civil society does 
not extend beyond declarations in domestic and international documents, associations 
will not have sufficient space to evolve and assume advocacy functions. Their 
development may thus be retarded by a state that is more comfortable with unorganized 
public disgruntlement (which is much easier to quell or ignore) than with well-
articulated demands backed by specific constituencies. In this situation, two outcomes 
are plausible. Civil society groups may remain at the level of loose networks or be 
eviscerated altogether if a government begins to perceive them as a threat/competitor to 
its authority. In case of the former, further radicalization of their demands and tactics can 
be expected, as groups do not have a public outlet where the reasonableness and 
soundness of their agenda can be tested and moderated through open debate. 
If, however, a state is receptive to the inclusion of civil society, the latter 
becomes an important societal player and gains the capacity to generate political 
alternatives and to monitor the state and the government. For that to happen, its 
autonomy from the interference of a state has to be supported by the rule of law.43 
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External sources of civil society development 
The other path for civic groups to emerge on the domestic arena lies through 
external international influences, which can be grouped in two broad categories. The first 
includes impacts and interactions with foreign and international civic associations and/or 
movements. The other has to do with the efforts of other governments to promote the 
growth of civil society as a component of the larger democratization agenda. Since the 
dissertation devotes a separate section44 to the latter issue, at this point I will elaborate 
how external civic groups spur the growth of a domestic civil society. 
One of the ways that foreign associations, especially advocacy networks, extend 
their influence abroad is through a so-called "boomerang pattern."45 According to its 
logic, because the feedback loop between the society and the state is blocked for various 
reasons, domestic organizations get stuck at the first (loose) level of formation and begin 
searching for allies elsewhere in the international arena. Having found their counterparts 
abroad, they get an opportunity to exchange ideas and hone their strategies and tactics. 
The process of weeding out disparate and often radical demands, creating a coherent 
agenda and setting up an internal structure occurs not on the domestic, but on the 
international level. Different types of transnational actors provide different kinds of 
expertise. Transnational advocacy networks serve as a conduit for information exchange, 
coalitions enhance coordination and social movements contribute to mobilization.46 
More broadly, each of these actors transmits broad ideas and forms of public action, 
symbols and general cultural models. One of their central goals is to make the process of 
44
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democratic diffusion successful by replicating social structural circumstances that 
worked elsewhere.47 In the end, the "boomerang" comes back to hit a government that 
was initially dismissive of a civic association, which is now not only better organized (no 
longer just a mob of enthusiasts), but also has powerful backers on the international 
arena that can exert additional pressure on that government. 
Political entrepreneurs (sometimes labeled as external promoters48) often become 
the second source of growth for domestic civil society groups. Such individuals and 
groups have previous transnational experiences and promote the establishment of civic 
organizations in the issue areas where the growth in international contacts is the driving 
force of the movement.49 In the past, such issues included environmental, human rights, 
gender concerns, etc. 
The suggested patterns of external influence on the growth of domestic civil 
society pose an interesting question - to what extend is the level of embeddedness of 
those civic groups altered as a result of their cooperation with other foreign advocacy 
networks and/or political entrepreneurs? Stark, Vedres and Bruszt believe that 
organizations with international roots are more likely to have deeper domestic 
connections than NGOs without them. In turn, greater rootedness of such groups is 
critical for their ability to mobilize and their capacity to defend civic values against state 
encroachment.50 While Keck and Sikkink do not address the issue of embeddedness 
directly, they look at the conditions that may increase or hinder the influence of external 
47
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advocacy networks. Such include the characteristics of a chosen issue (its universality, 
causality/marketability) and characteristics of involved actors. The latter category 
represents a particular interest to this dissertation as it indirectly touches upon the 
concept of embeddedness. In particular, the authors speak of network density as an 
indicator of its influence. Strong connections between an international advocacy network 
and its domestic counterpart produce regularity in the diffusion of information and, in 
the end, create reciprocal exchanges.51 These conditions will increase the likelihood of 
success in anchoring international values into the domestic context, leading to a higher 
level of domestic embeddedness of a foreign advocacy network. Though Keck and 
Sikkink do not analyze the features of a domestic setting needed for a civic group to be 
effective,52 their criteria of network density can be extrapolated to associations operating 
purely in the local (regional or national) environment with or without cooperation from 
foreign entities in order to assess their domestic embeddedness. In this case, the notion 
of density would mean the nature of interactions among group members. Thus applying 
their criteria, a civic group will be denser (or more embedded) if it has strong 
connections among its members with regular and reciprocal exchanges of information. It 
also means that information must flow both upward (from organization's leadership to 
its base) and downward (in the form of feedback and criticism of the base to the leaders). 
To summarize the gist of the section, the emergence and development of civil 
society may be influenced by domestic and external factors. As every theoretical 
construct, the division presents itself neatly in theory, but not always in practice. In 
reality, such factors are intermingled. Therefore, it is worth speaking of one or the other 
51
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being the primary (rather than the sole) force behind such processes. With that in mind, 
on the domestic level civil society groups go through two stages - the initial (where they 
represent loose networks with multiple vaguely defined interests) and the formative 
(where they find their issue niche and pursue specific tasks of advocacy and/or service 
delivery). Their evolution is shaped by a host of critical factors, such as social class, 
historical circumstances, strength of the state. In terms of the international factors that 
influence the development of civic groups, international advocacy networks and policy 
entrepreneurs are said to play a prominent role. Finally, the review of the existing 
literature has pointed to several critical implications on the extent of embeddedness of 
domestic civic organizations that depend on the trajectory of civil society development. 
Specifically, their embeddedness may be impacted if a transition from the first to the 
second stage does not occur or is incomplete. It may also be influenced by the degree of 
external involvement in building associations' domestic structure and capacity. 
Extrapolating from the available research, it can be asserted that organizational density 
(and inevitably higher embeddedness) in the domestic context means the viability and 
strength of its membership base and strategies. 
Benefits and weaknesses of civil society 
As Van Til aptly observes, since its latest revival the concept of civil society 
became somewhat of play dough.53 The shallow infatuation makes it even more 
important to look at the supposed benefits and harms of a developed civil society. The 
literature review on this subject matter will enable not only to balance a widely spread 
Van Til, 14-15. 
and overly positive perception about it, but also to understand the inherent attractiveness 
of civil society as a key component in democracy-building programs. 
Benefits 
Social capital is often cited as the most overarching benefit of civil society that 
encompasses a range of positive attitudes and behaviors.54 Before proceeding further, it 
is important to define the concept. "The basic idea of social capital is that a person's 
family, friends and associates constitute an important asset... Those communities 
endowed with a diverse stock of social networks and civic associations are in a stronger 
position to confront poverty and vulnerability, resolve disputes and take advantage of 
new opportunities."55 Social capital is created by civil society (among other actors) as a 
result of spontaneous cooperation and increased interconnectedness. It can be broadly 
subdivided into four categories: a) informal (like civil associations at the first stage of 
formation) or formal (officially registered NGOs); b) thick (where social contacts are 
deeply embedded) or thin (where they are sporadic, irregular and shallow); c) inward- or 
outward-looking, depending on whether and to what extent civil society organizations 
are open to outside influences; d) bridging (by enabling different audiences to come 
together) or bonding (by conducting interactions within groups of same interests).56 
However, not all civil associations make the same impact on social capital. The tendency 
seems to be that the more political is an organization, the better it is able to generate 
social capital.57 The correlation begins to make more sense if we remind ourselves of the 
54
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process that civic groups undergo in transforming from loose activist networks to 
coherent organizations. As elaborated in the previous Section, when organizations enter 
the latter stage, they ought to have more specific demands as well as be able to search for 
a compromise. Because politics in a democracy is inherently about finding a consensus 
among disparate interests, civic groups of political nature tend to generate more social 
capital because the major bulk of their activities lies in engaging with various societal 
actors to achieve their interests. Therefore, they are more exposed to the diversity of 
opinions than, for instance, non-political service organizations that tend to attract and 
interact with only certain actors with the passion for one issue. 
The second most important benefit of civil society lies in its impact on individual 
trust. As we grow up, we exhibit high levels of trust to a relatively narrow circle of 
people that encompasses our family members and close friends. What civic groups help 
do is expand this circle to others with whom we may not be intimately familiar. When 
individuals interact with each other in civic associations, they develop a high level of 
personal trust toward their fellow members. These positive experiences are likely to 
make a larger contribution, by increasing their overall trust in people whether they know 
them or not. The research findings by Eric Uslaner re-iterate the point - civic 
engagement extends a link between the people we know (particularized trust) and the 
people we come to trust as a result of experiences with them (strategic trust) to the 
people that we do not know (generalized trust). As it can be expected, not all civic 
groups equally contribute to generalized trust of their members. The available research 
has confirmed that the more diverse is an organization, the higher is the level of general 
Uslaner, 14-21. 
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trust among its supporters.59 In other words, members of those civic groups that are more 
inclusive will have an opportunity to meet people from a lot of different backgrounds. 
Consequently, their positive experiences of working with such individuals on a common 
cause contribute to a perception that people in general can be trusted. This finding 
inadvertently brings us back to the central theme of the dissertation that has to deal with 
organizational embeddedness. If more diverse civic groups produce higher levels of 
generalized trust, then one can speculate that more diverse civic groups are also better 
embedded in the domestic fabric of their societies. In the end, trust is not only a 
byproduct of civil society, but also a necessary mechanism for its own development. As 
Lovell correctly notes, while trust is not necessary for establishing civil society, its 
development and deepening are critical to get the most out of civic interactions.60 
High levels of generalized trust leads subsequently to increased tolerance. It is 
frequently referred in the literature as the virtue of civility or civicness which "as a 
feature of civil society considers others as fellow-citizens of equal dignity in their rights 
and obligations as members of civil society."61 When citizens take part in larger societal 
processes and are exposed to various viewpoints and individuals of diverse backgrounds, 
their participation and attitudes become more ideologically moderate and considerate of 
others.62 It is important to note that civicness does not eliminate conflict. Civil society 
will remain an arena where issues are hotly and vigorously contested. But civility and 
tolerance help produce a belief in a democracy, which functions through increased 
horizontal interactions and robust self-enforcement of norms. Under these conditions, 
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citizens do not perceive any dispute (and for that matter, their occasional losing an 
argument) in zero-sum terms. 
The resultant levels of high trust extend not only to individuals, but also to 
institutions. Because many civic activities provide additional checks on the legislative 
and executive branches of the government, activists feel not only empowered, but also 
more trusting toward public institutions whose daily routines they are able to monitor 
and with whom they interact on a more regular basis.64 However, a higher level of 
institutional trust that members of civil society groups feel is not by any means blind or 
permissive, in terms of providing state institutions with a blank check on governance. 
The remark by Eric Uslaner draws a fine, but important distinction, "Trust in people will 
not lead to trust in government, but it may lead to a better government."65 In other words, 
civic activists with high institutional trust will be better equipped to understand complex 
institutional dynamics and will be more willing to engage into a long and convoluted 
process of reforming some institutions, because (as a result of previous interactions) they 
believe in their general utility. Therefore, in the case of civil society organizations, 
numerous disappointments and criticisms of institutional processes, outcomes or leaders 
do not lead to disenchantment or even resentment of institutions per se. 
Their willingness to improve state and societal institutions and processes is 
driven by increased personal autonomy and efficacy. In his analysis of associations' 
impact on efficacy and institutional empowerment, Warren indicates that membership in 
associations contributes to personal autonomy by honing the skills of rational decision-
making. Because these organizations serve as an important social forum and conduit of 
64
 Stuart E. Eizenstat, "Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate," Seton HallJournal of Diplomacy and International 
Relations 5, no.2 (Summer-Fall 2004): 15. 
63
 Uslaner. 
33 
information at the lowest level, participation in their processes allows an individual to 
recognize his potential in impacting the situation. Through this feeling, a person comes 
to understand the egalitarian and representative nature of power. Participation also 
assures that various viewpoints on an issue are heard and, consequently, contributes to 
the legitimation of the decision through the legitimation of the process.66 
The last, but not the least, benefit of civil society lies in its capacity to induce 
reciprocal engagement where no monitoring of the third party is required. When 
individuals interact with each other in civic groups, they come to expect that others will 
fulfill their end of the bargain. Otherwise, as de Tocqueville pointed out, their 
cooperation in a democracy, where individuals cannot be coerced into participation, 
would halt. In this regard, civic participation makes a wider societal contribution, 
because the habit of reciprocal engagement spreads beyond the realm of associational 
activity. Citizens adhere to laws, rules and regulations on a daily basis, because such 
adherence has become a mutually expected societal norm. As a result of that, societies 
with substantial social capital and developed civil societies have less reliance upon the 
forces of police and army, as monitoring and coercion are not needed to such a great 
extent. Robert Putnam emphasizes the importance of civil society and social capital at 
the current stage of global development where impersonal communication is more 
prevalent in industrial societies. 
Warren. 
Putnam, Making Democracy Work, 182-184. 
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Weaknesses 
At the same time, civil society can have its downsides. Though not commonly 
mentioned, they include two possible dangers. The first lies in contributing to further 
radicalization and internal societal divisions. The second has to do with the ability of 
civil society to push the state's political system to the breaking point by overloading with 
the amount and diversity of demands that result from wide public participation. 
Sheri Berman touched upon the two features in her seminal analysis of the civil 
society in Weimar Germany. The first one (polarization) has already been mentioned in 
this dissertation,68 so I will elaborate on it just briefly. Because the Weimar political 
system widened the existing cleavages between social classes, political parties organized 
around discrete and particularistic social groups. Disillusioned with parties, citizens 
turned to civic groups to air their grievances. Unfortunately, those proved similarly 
unable to overcome systemic constraints by attracting diverse audiences as their 
members. In the end, associations not only reinforced the existing divisions, but also 
tapped into nationalist and populist sentiments to increase their base. Berman observes 
that by 1920, Germany had a highly organized, yet vertically fragmented and 
discontented civil society. It soon became infiltrated by Nazis or Nazi-sympathizers, who 
used communal civic organizations to tailor their messages, eliminate their opponents 
and gain new supporters. It is during this period of time that the National Socialist Party 
switched from its traditional electorate (urban and working-class voters) to the middle 
class and rural groups. In essence, through a highly compartmentalized civil society 
Hitler's party was successful in bridging the existing gap between the German bourgeois 
society and party politics. 
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This might not have happened if the country's political system had been 
different, meaning more mature in its development and more inclusive in its workings. 
The observation brings us to the second danger of a civil society — its contribution to the 
collapse of a political system through overloading. The most recent debate in this field 
concentrated on what should come first - democratization or institution- and state-
building.69 Though little has been written directly on this matter, some useful insights 
can be deduced from the literature on democracy-building and promotion. Specifically, 
many authors noted a lukewarm attitude of American policy-makers toward building 
civil societies in nascent democracies during the Cold War period.70 Their reluctance 
stemmed from the fear that an immature civil society would become a safe heaven for 
leftist extremists (such as Maoists andMarxists). As a result, it would have the potential 
not only to further societal radicalization (as it happened in Weimar Germany), but also 
to lead to the crumbling of weak post-colonial governments that may not be able to 
withstand the pressures exerted by organized (and possibly well financed) leftist groups 
against the backdrop of feeble state institutions and polarized domestic societies. 
The lack of accountability is the third danger that runs concurrent to a 
functioning civil society.71 Unlike politicians, who are periodically elected, or even 
bureaucrats who can be fired by those politicians fearing for their election prospects, 
civil society groups have to please only a narrow audience that has propelled them into 
existence and/or supports their activities. This means that projects and initiatives, which 
69
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might have otherwise been dropped by the government or, through elections, by people, 
may continue to live on irrespective of their effect. In the context of democratization, the 
issue of accountability also deals with whether NGO leadership is responsive to grass-
root activists. As much of my research will show, bottom-up mechanisms of control are 
especially hard to establish in the situations when NGO leaders come from urban, well-
educated and socially advanced classes. In the end, low accountability may provoke a 
crisis of legitimacy when civic associations are no longer perceived to represent the 
interests of ordinary people. The public begins to treat them with contempt as a social 
group in itself- no different from corrupt authorities, nepotistic political parties and 
profit-hungry businesses. 
To summarize, civil society brings a vast array of benefits and a much smaller 
(though not less potent) set of weaknesses to the host society. At its best, civil society 
helps increase the society's social capital, which, in turn, brings the citizenry together to 
address common challenges. Civic activists are able to translate their personal trust 
toward fellow members into a higher level of confidence in all people and societal 
institutions. They become more empowered and tolerant. Countries with robust civil 
societies can rely less on the coercive mechanisms of governance because a conscious 
citizenry is able to monitor itself and enforce existing rules without a specter of available 
punishments. However, the perils that a civil society may bring with it are no less 
spectacular in their magnitude. In societies where the political system is not set to 
accommodate external demands in an expedient manner, civic groups can foster internal 
discord and division. They can deepen a general crisis of legitimacy, because they are 
not directly accountable to the public (or sometimes even their own members) through 
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elections. In the worst-case scenario, NGOs are capable of becoming an instigating force 
that would overwhelm and bring down a -state's political system to the full-scale 
collapse. 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
Civil society in democratic transitions 
In the late 1970s-early 1980s, three distinct occurrences highlighted the renewed 
viability of civil society. The first was the Solidarnost in Poland. The success and 
visibility of the movement proved the central argument of Adam Micnik - the challenge 
to the Soviet regime was not going to emerge from the above, initiated by liberal 
segments of the Communist nomenclature (the Prague Spring of 1968), or from the 
below through public riots (the Hungarian protests in 1956), but from the within.73 The 
agent of reforms would be a domestic civil society that Communist governments are 
never able to eviscerate completely. The second event was the transition of Latin 
American states from authoritarian regimes to democracy and the role played by civil 
society organizations. Finally, the third occurrence was widespread dissatisfaction with a 
growing crisis of the Western welfare state and a neoconservative critique of "social 
statism."74 In this regard, civil society began to embody an alternative to the overly 
protective state. 
Predictably, all of these events ignited scholarly discussions on the importance of 
civil society. One of the most contentious debates in the literature on democratic 
transitions is between supporters of elite and participatory approaches. The former 
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emphasizes the primacy of a country's ruling class. The process of transition occurs 
smoothly "so long... as the alteration in power ... and decision-making involves 
compromises among elites and acceptance by the population."75 Thus, under the normal 
conditions of power transfer civil society is accorded little role. If the compromise 
cannot be reached, a struggle between the government and the opposition begins. 
Therefore, the transitions in Poland and Latin America are qualitatively different, 
regardless of their chronological proximity. Whereas Solidarnost represented the "people 
power" of trade unions (thus confirming the assertions of the participatory approach), 
civic groups in Latin America were more public rather than mass in their membership.76 
The fact that artists and intellectuals in those states were the first to oppose a dictatorial 
rule to be joined only later by the middle class lends more proof to the elite-driven 
77 
approach of transition. 
The case for elite-driven transitions was eloquently developed by Samuel 
Huntington in his "Third Way of Democratization." Unsurprisingly, most of 
Huntington's analysis is focused on the role and interactions between and within the 
government and the opposition. The notion of civil society does not figure prominently 
in the transformation, except for massive protests that erupt at the later stages of a stand-
78 
off between the rulers and the ruled. 
Contrary to this viewpoint, the participatory approach posits that what makes for 
good leaders are good citizens. That is why, civil society, which fosters popular 
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participation, is vital in democratic transitions. For example, while recognizing the 
70 
influence of elites, McFaul underscores that masses played one of the leading roles in 
the fourth wave of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Civil society 
helped skew the domestic balance of power toward challengers of the ancien regime and 
ensured that democratization and its societal gains could not be reversed. However, 
McFaul ascribes the increased stature of civil society and its greater potency as a societal 
force to the altered nature of the international system. The unipolar system created 
permissive conditions that among many other things (e.g. normative preponderance of 
market economy and democracy) enhanced the profile of civil society.80 Furthermore, 
the successful performance of many Central European civil societies undermined a key 
assertion of the elite-driven approach that in the transitions from Communism greater 
participation would produce more non-negotiable demands and overwhelm the political 
system.81 
The debate between the two viewpoints has surfaced again after the "color 
revolutions." The adherents of the elite approach stress that such revolutions were 
successful primarily because of the split within domestic elites, which prevented the use 
of force against demonstrators. Those on the other side point to the exceptional role of 
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mass movements and civil society groups that forced the rulers in Ukraine, Georgia and 
Kyrgyzstan to acknowledge the results of fraudulent elections and step down.83 
At the same time, a middle-of-the-road position begins to emerge within the 
literature. It acknowledges the impact of civil society, but assigns its contribution to the 
specific stages of a democratic transition. For instance, in his analysis of the "color 
revolutions," McFaul puts a robust civil society along with many other indicators, like an 
unpopular incumbent, united opposition, a modicum of independent media, divisions 
within internal military forces, etc. All of them contributed to the success of democratic 
post-communist transformations in Georgia, Ukraine and Serbia, but to a different extent 
and at different points. The likelihood of civil society' s participation varies with the 
nature of a democratic transition - "the shorter and the more unexpected the transition 
from authoritarian rule, the greater the likelihood of popular upsurge and of its producing 
a lasting impact on the outcome of the transition."85 Schmitter and Whitehead consider 
past experiences and the general wealth of a domestic civil society as two indicators that 
may increase the probability of a popular, mass-driven revolution.86 Their observation 
has a two-fold importance for the theoretical and empirical parts of my work. First, it 
touches upon the notion of embeddedness, because civil society needs to be mature 
enough and sufficiently implanted into the domestic landscape to respond to unfolding 
transformations in a fairly rapid manner. Second, from the empirical standpoint both 
Ukraine and Georgia had revolution-like events (the student hunger strike of 1991 in 
Ukraine and the student protests of 1978 in Georgia). 
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Others pay more attention to the importance of civil society in the subsequent 
steps of democratization, such as the completion of transition and the consolidation of 
democratic governance. Cohen and Aratonote that "a highly articulated civil society 
with cross-cutting cleavages, overlapping memberships of groups, and social mobility is 
the presupposition for a stable democratic polity, a guarantee against permanent 
domination by anyone group and against the emergence of fundamentalist mass 
87 
movements and anti-democratic ideologies." If public engagement is low, anew 
democracy may assume hollow, procedural and formalistic forms and encounter a 
OQ 
persistent problem of consolidation. Ideally, civil society is expected to perform a 
number of roles in a democratizing state. First, it helps alter the balance between the 
state and society toward the latter. This is critical, given overwhelming state power 
during totalitarian times. Second, it serves as a transmission belt between the state and 
society, making sure that public demands are accorded proper attention. Third, it plays 
an important disciplinary role by setting and promoting the standards of morality that 
apply to the state as well as to regular citizens. Finally, civil society performs a 
consultative function by observing compliance with the rules of a democratic game.89 
In the end, it should be noted that the debate between elite and participatory 
approaches on democratization may never be definitively resolved, as many other 
theoretical battles in political science. In this case, the major reason lies in the divergent 
understanding of what constitutes an event of democratic transformation. The elite 
approach looks at a long-term picture, which naturally suits its position, because it is the 
political cream of the crop, not ordinary people, who performs day-to-day governance. 
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The participatory school emphasizes the "here-and-now" perspective that zooms on the 
role of civil society in specific events, which mark a turning point to democratization.90 
To summarize, democratic transformations in Eastern Europe and Latin America 
and the malaise about the ever-expanding welfare state not only re-launched the concept 
of civil society in the late 1970s - early 1980s, but also sparked a contentious debate on 
what is (or, in the case of state-related reforms, should be) the primary driving force 
behind such changes, how and where civil society generally fits into the process. 
Because this research is preoccupied with the role of civic groups in the "color 
revolutions," it naturally sides with adherents of the participatory approach in asserting 
the power of masses However, it attempts to step forward and fill in the gap by showing 
that it is organizational embeddedness that helps civic groups rise to the occasion and be 
an effective player during various stages of a democratic transition. 
Civil society and foreign aid 
Scholars' assessments on U.S. democracy promotion efforts during the Cold War 
present a rather consistent picture - democratization was fairly low on the American 
totem poll of priorities. Kegley and Hermann explain that by pointing to the realist 
nature of American policies, which used democracy promotion as a vehicle for the 
projection of U.S. political ideas and for the pursuit of the country's material self-
interests.91 Under those circumstances, the ideological stance of a recipient country 
constituted an important factor in determining U.S. foreign aid policies.92 
90
 Valerie Bunce, "Comparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations," Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 6/7 
(August-September 2000): 703-734. 
91
 Charles W. Kegley and Margaret G. Hermann, "In Pursuit of a Peaceful International System," in Exporting Democracy: Rhetoric 
v. Reality, ed. Peter J. Schraeder (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 113. 
92
 Peter J. Schraeder, "Clarifying the Foreign Aid Puzzle: A Comparison of American, Japanese, French, and Swedish Aid Flows," 
World Politics 50, no.2 (January 1998): 294-323; Steven W. Hook, "Inconsistent U.S. Efforts to Promote Democracy Abroad," 
43 
Reagan administration 
When the concept of civil society and its benefits became popularized in the 
middle of the 1980s, the United States and other Western providers of foreign aid were 
about to reverse their stance on supporting NGOs. Before that, civic organizations were 
viewed with a great deal of suspicion in the West. Fearing that bottom-up developments 
would enhance the strength of leftist and radical Marxist movements, American policy-
makers preferred working through governmental channels to promote democracy.93 In 
the mid-1980s, the U.S. government was growing increasingly disappointed with the 
experiences and outcomes that emerged out of providing aid directly to governments.94 
Instead of bringing long-awaited change, the funds given to some regimes in Africa and 
Latin America encouraged corruption and helped undemocratic leaders hold on to power 
without undertaking deep reforms. The first signs of a possible policy shift became 
obvious during the ouster of the Philippines' President Ferdinand Marcos. Faced with 
large-scale public protests in that country and heightened international scrutiny, the U.S. 
government and President Ronald Reagan (in what was described by James Mann as a 
rather dramatic decision95) had to withdraw their support and acknowledge the victory of 
Corazon Aquino. It was one of the first instances where a large-scale public movement 
played such a fundamental role in bringing down an authoritarian regime. More change 
was yet to follow. The Reagan administration quietly abandoned the Kirkpatrick 
doctrine, which suggested maintaining friendships with pro-American dictatorial 
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regimes, and pulled out its support from General Chun of South Korea and General 
07 
Augusto Pinochet of Chile. Soon, domestic civic movements, like Solidarnost in 
Poland, National Fronts in then Baltic republics and Rukh in Ukraine, challenged the 
dominance of the Communist party in the first allowed multi-party elections. The step 
precipitated a chain of events, leading first to the Soviet retreat from Central and Eastern 
Europe and then ultimately to the country's collapse. The latter created an urgency to 
help newly independent countries move along the transitional paradigm by installing 
democratic procedures in order to prevent the spread of radical nationalism (so widely 
predicted by such neorealists as John Mearsheimer).98 It was also seen as important for 
the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to see some 
positive signs of democratization, before tangible benefits of economic liberalization and 
the free market materialize." 
George H.W. Bush and Clinton administrations 
By the end of the 1980s, President George H.W. Bush identified democratization 
as a key element of the "new world order." Unfortunately, busy with the management of 
rapidly unfolding events (the dissolution of the Soviet Union, unification of Germany, 
the first Gulf War, to name a few) Bush senior never got a chance to spell out or 
implement his "new world" agenda.100 
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With the party switch in the White House (from Reagan-Bush to Clinton) the 
support for democratization, and civil society as apart of the process, finally got some 
traction. President Bill Clinton embraced the enlargement of the democratic community 
that served four concurrent goals: a) it reflected the reality of world politics after the 
Soviet demise; b) it promoted U.S. economic growth; c) it led to the alignment of U.S. 
policies with other international organizations; and d) it accepted the Kantian view 
behind democracy promotion.101 It was therefore during the Clinton years when the 
normative change has been completed. NGOs and their support have become a staple of 
democratization programs. Democracy and good governance have emerged as the new 
priorities for aid organizations previously focused on economic development.103 The 
normative shift has permitted advanced democracies to strengthen non-state actors (like 
NGOs) with increased legitimacy and important resources.- the actions deemed 
previously unseemly under the requirements of sovereignty.104 
The Evolution of foreign aid for democratization 
However, giving aid to civic organizations was a challenging endeavor from the 
very beginning. First, donors had to identify how and where precisely to draw a line 
between "civil" and "political" spheres of the society.105 As we discussed, the two are 
very intertwined from the theoretical and philosophical viewpoints, but have to be 
separated in order to establish a sense of impartiality behind direct foreign assistance to 
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the former, but not the latter.106 Because civil society is such an encompassing concept, 
donor countries also had to decide what exactly within the realm of civil society they 
would like to finance. Based on their domestic experiences,107 the natural choice seemed 
to be the support to the so-called "third sector." 
Civic associations of the third sector are commonly referred to as NGOs (non-
governmental organizations). They are self-organized, self-governing, private, and (an 
important differentiation from businesses) non-profit entities.108 
There are two contending opinions on the role of nonprofits. The first views them 
mostly as the product of government, market and contract failures that serve as 
alternative providers of goods and services.109 Supporters of this view acknowledge that 
nonprofits may have some advocacy functions, but those come somewhat secondary to 
service provision. The other view ascribes to nonprofits a broader and deeper role as 
assets of social capital. In this regard, Bryce's analysis offers interesting insights for this 
work, because it touches upon the concept of embeddedness. He asserts that strong 
nonprofits possess embedded social capital with a certain marketing value.110 That 
allows nonprofits to differentiate their products and services among others and even 
create brands that can be patented.111 Two benefits of embeddedness can thus be 
deduced - more generated social capital and higher public visibility. These benefits 
produce a number of contributions that encompass increased goodwill of public 
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involvement, a reduced risk of project failure (because NGO members have a shared 
mission) and an ability to attract additional resources.112 In their second role, NGOs 
monitor public expenditures, articulate and channel citizens' demands.113 
The available literature draws an important distinction between civil society and 
the third sector. As Zimmer points out, civil society is a normative concept, shaped by 
citizens' voluntary engagement, civic responsibility and participation, whereas a 
nonprofit sector refers to the so-called non-distributional constraints that are attached to 
operational activities of civic groups.114 In other words, nonprofits represent a more 
narrow manifestation of civil society.115 
Before proceeding further, it is worth specifying what we mean under Western 
donors. The group includes not only foreign governments and government departments, 
but also so-called political foundations and quasi-governmental actors. In many cases, 
Western governments are simply unable to administer directly vast amounts of assistance 
on the ground. This is when they turn to political foundations and quasi-governmental 
entities that are created to promote liberal democracy and support organizations and/or 
individuals that fall in line with this broad image. For instance, the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID) awards a large number of its grants to the 
International Republican Institute (IRI) and National Democratic Institute (NDI) that 
implement USAID projects on working with civic groups or training political parties. 
Though the nature of relations between political foundations and their host government 
is mutually reinforcing and generally cooperative, occasional rivalries and tensions 
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emerge as a result of altered domestic circumstances and colliding agendas. For 
instance, many American nonprofits that provide HIV education and prevention were 
forced to adjust their strategies because of the Bush administration ABC policy that 
placed a higher premium on promoting abstinence.117 In the end, though such 
organizations are afforded some space to operate more independently, most of their 
programs serve a purpose corresponding with national interests. 
The decision to assist new democracies with the establishment of professional 
NGOs was motivated not only by the desire for impartiality and the need to 
contextualize the meaning of civil society, but also by the preference to work with 
organizations that would ease donors' administration of and accountability for funds. 
Though usually NGOs' activities are centered on advocacy and/or service provision, 
international donors gave attention to the former, hoping that trickle-down effects would 
someday enable the latter. It is thus not surprising that supported nonprofit organizations 
did not include such traditional groups (in the American understanding of civil society) 
as sports clubs, religious charities, trade unions, etc. 
Most of the foreign aid was given for institutional and administrative capacity 
building of newly established nonprofits. Western donors provided funding, technical 
advice, training and assistance with a general legal framework.118 Their strategies were a 
combination of imported programs, which succeeded elsewhere, with initiatives to fill in 
the gaps and needs on the ground.119 Many projects attempted to create partnerships 
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among four major societal actors - the state, market forces, civil society and donors. 
Some sought to put local NGOs in touch with their likely international counterparts that 
have a similar cause. As a result, a number of domestic civic organizations learned 
various transnational strategies of persuasion and socialization, such as "frame 
alignment" to render disparate events more meaningful, "frame resonance" to connect 
those events with broader societal repercussions, etc.120 
The results of donor assistance are mixed at best. On one hand, their programs 
were helpful in starting civil society organizations in the countries that had little financial 
resources for anything else, but bare necessities. In most successful scenarios, Western 
assistance provided tangible equipment and trainings for nonprofits, increasing their 
organizational capacity and ultimately their ability to survive independently once the 
funding stopped.121 As discussed in the next chapter, Western funding priorities were 
beneficial in terms of raising certain issues (e.g. domestic violence, treatment of the 
Roma minority), which domestic government would have preferred avoiding. 
On the other hand, foreign aid brought a host of its own problems. The first 
among them lies in its restrictiveness. Donors operate with a thin slice of civil society 
organizations. As a result, they create entities consisting of non-embedded elites with 
strong knowledge and weak membership. The second closely-related issue is that of 
funding. Because the economies of emerging democracies remain weak, domestic NGOs 
are heavily reliant on international support, which in the end becomes a fundamental 
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handicap. Such organizations are usually preoccupied with donors' priorities and 
discouraged to look for domestic constituencies. It should be noted that money is an 
issue not only for NGOs abroad, but also for their funders in the West. Consistency and 
coherence of their activities are often hindered by changing political winds in Western 
capitals and fleeting policy fads in Western democracy promotion communities. In 
essence, many international and Western democracy promotion organizations also lack a 
stable financial base, aside from their governments or international bodies.123 The third 
factor has to deal with the content of foreign assistance. Quite often, the emphasis on 
certain Western practices (as we will see in the next section) ends up isolating NGOs 
from their natural communities, because such practices and campaigns to promote them 
clash with local customs and beliefs.124 Fourth, in many cases when promoting 
partnerships between nonprofit organizations and other societal actors, Western aid 
structures erroneously assumed that all sides would enter such partnerships on equal 
terms and the removal of political aspects in their relations would in fact become a 
mechanism for reconciliation.125 Fourth, from the theoretical perspective the framework 
of assistance relied on the assumptions of the transitional paradigm.126 In relation to civil 
society, it purports that as democracy gets more consolidated, the domestic civil society 
becomes more domestically embedded and less reliant on external help. Because of that, 
the proposed methods of support were often inadequate and inapplicable as some 
democracies got stuck in the gray zone of semi-authoritarianism. Many semi-
authoritarian regimes have taken advantage of lacking embeddedness by portraying their 
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civil societies as elite-driven, detached from regular citizens and unable to speak their 
language.127 Fifth, American strategies of democracy promotion (including those for 
civil society) became the dominant discourse because of substantial funding levels, but 
turned out to be rather ethnocentric. Hook asserts that the U.S. was trying to replicate its 
own systemof democratic governance, which has too much emphasis on political liberty 
at the expense of socioeconomic equality.128 As the following section reveals, NGOs 
were often prompted to adopt strategies and concentrate on the issues that were more 
relevant in the American rather than foreign setting. In another assessment, American 
governmental bodies applied a "cookie-cutter" approach in pushing the same 
compilation of best practices in entirely different environments.129 
To be fair, the learning curve has been both steep and fairly quick with the 
middle road in promoting democracy and civil society evolving by the end of the 1990s. 
Emerging analyses managed to escape the two extremes of being either naively 
exuberant130 or gloomily fatalist about the prospects of democratization. For instance, in 
their suggestions for the future, Carothers and Ottaway call for civil society realism. 
They suggest the need to abandon the assumption of NGOs being the central 
representation of civil society and encourage its other manifestations. Democracy 
promoters should also discard the illusion that NGGs are inherently nonpartisan or 
impartial and take into account the political choices that they have to make on a regular 
basis. More attention ought to be paid to the issues of NGO sustainability as well as to 
the simplification of currently cumbersome and rigid implementation strategies.131 
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Looking beyond the conventional assumptions of the transitional paradigm (which 
envisions democratization as a sequence of steps) would provide insights on how to offer 
more effective assistance to civil societies in semi-authoritarian states.132 So would the 
utilization of complimentary mechanisms, like diplomacy, especially when dealing with 
deeply autocratic regimes. 
To sum up, U.S. foreign assistance for democratization in general and civil 
society in particular has gone through a period of rapid transformation since the 1980s 
when it was brought to the forefront of American policy agenda by democratic 
transitions in Eastern Europe, Latin America and the former Soviet Union. The official 
American position has also evolved - from recognizing the need for change to becoming 
the driver behind the normative shift that legitimized external assistance to domestic 
civic groups. Western governments and Western political foundations that acted on their 
behalf poured their funds to build civil societies around the globe, based on American 
historical experiences and recently acquired practical lessons on the ground. Though a 
more moderate and realistic approach toward democratization and civil society building 
seems to be developing, it is unclear to what extent it pays attention to the notion of 
embeddedness that is central to making externally implanted NGOs successful on the 
local ground. The analysis of the available literature reveals that if present at all, the 
emphasis on embeddedness is either indirect/implicit or peripheral at best. 
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CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE 
After describing general benefits and ills of foreign assistance to civil society 
organizations, it is important to take a look at a number of available case studies to see 
emerging commonalities and the extent of divergence. Because the dissertation is 
primarily concerned with the countries of the former Soviet Union, the chapter will give 
them a primary consideration and provide a brief overview of the civil society 
development in Central and Eastern Europe (as a baseline for comparison). 
In Russia civil society "is weak, atomized, and heavily dependent on Western 
assistance for support."134 Its development has been impeded by domestic political 
factors as well as the methods of Western foreign assistance. In terms of the former, the 
Soviet legacy, the super-presidential institutional design, localism and Putin's politics 
have retarded the development of a mature civil society. In addition, for the most part of 
the 1990s, the economic climate was inimical to a functioning civil society. Thus NGO 
leaders were more interested in political careers and making a living.135 As for the latter, 
Western support is partly to blame for Russian nonprofits not being able to find their 
natural constituency, because they ".. .targeted Western funders rather than the Russian 
population as the voice that mattered."136 Foreign grants developed a cohort of NGO 
elites who are located in major cities (mostly Moscow and Saint Petersburg) and are not 
interested in fostering "civicness." Instead they hoard information from other nonprofit 
"competitors" and prefer smaller memberships to avoid sharing grant benefits.137 
Failures of many Russian civil society groups stem from the disconnect between their 
134
 Michael McFaul, Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, Between Dictatorship and Democracy: Russian Post-Communist Political 
Reform (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004), 135-136. 
135
 Peter Rutland, "Russian: Limping Along Toward American Democracy," in American Democracy Promotion: Impulses, 
Strategies and Impacts, ed. Michael Cox, John Ikenberry and Takashi Inoguchi (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
136
 Henderson, 142. 
137
 Ibid., 158. 
Westernized campaigns and the normative context of the Russian society. As Mcintosh 
Sundstrom and Mendelson and Glenn show, where nonprofits pursue issues (like 
environmental protection or domestic violence) that are in vogue abroad, but do not 
"click" with the culture at home, their impact is fleeing and uncertain.138 In the end, 
Russian civil society seems unable to find reason d'etre after the collapse of 
Communism. 
Stepanenko's analysis points that Ukraine's civil society suffers similar 
problems. Ukrainians are more likely to trust personal connections and networks. 
Especially under the Kuchma regime, the spread and persistence of clientilist political 
culture139 undermined already weak civic foundations. It fed into the Soviet stereotype 
that organizational activity was the purview of the state and should be done at its 
behest.140 Ukraine's civic groups continue to face the challenge of institutionalizing the 
norms and values of civil society by building bridges between them and the larger 
population to convert the quantity of NGOs into the quality of their impact.141 It is 
unclear whether the country's nationalist intelligencia (that was the driving force behind 
its independence) is capable of fostering basic values that underlie the respect for law 
and are so crucial for enhancing the spirit of civicness. As a result, Ukraine continues to 
witness a slow pace of self-organization, with high levels of mistrust remaining the 
greatest single impediment to developing a robust civil society. 
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In Moldova, the functioning of the domestic civil society has been influenced by 
tensions between the legislature and the executive, which both vie to consolidate control 
and undermine competing sources of power.142 The country's civic organizations have a 
hard time attracting younger populations, as economic hardships have created 
disincentives for youth participation. Moldovan NGOs achieved little success in civic 
education and human rights due to general passivity of the populace coupled with 
governmental pressures and intimidation. Based on the available analyses, the key task 
for Moldovan NGOs is to overcome internal divisions and pursue common projects 
through broad-based coalitions.143 
On the post-Soviet space it is in Central Asia where NGOs face most formidable 
challenges from the state, foreign donors, their domestic societies and internal 
organizational deficiencies. On the first count, local civil society groups are hamstrung 
by the countries' legal framework that views them as an anti-government element.144 In 
terms of the second, Central Asia was never high on the list of American priorities for 
foreign aid. As Brill Olcott rightly remarked, "Whatever money and imagination is left 
over is being applied to the Middle East rather than Central Asia."145 Geopolitical 
considerations often led the United States to tone down its democratic rhetoric and zeal, 
which did not go unnoticed by Central Asian authoritarian rulers.146 The peripheral 
principle that guided Western funding and attention was exacerbated by the initial focus 
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of donors on the formal registration of NGOs and resulted in their inability to attract 
more moderate, reformist elements within religious groups and the societies at large. "By 
assuming that civil society can be neatly added to a transitional society... donors 
underplay the historical processes that give shape to particular forms of civil society, 
some of which may be permeated with apparently contradictory modernist and 
traditionalist tendencies."147 Thirds funders did not foresee the impact of societal 
dynamics on the distribution and utilization of grants. In fact, having access to Western 
money in the times of severe economic hardships only worsened the situation with 
corruption and danism in local communities. Domestic NGO leaders feel unabashed 
about using grants for their personal benefit or that of their close relatives and family 
members. American-sponsored NGOs have also attracted the intellectual elites within 
those societies, leaving the governmental sphere drained of talent and capacity. Thus, an 
internationally funded "democracy sector" has placed itself in a precarious position in 
many Central Asian states. Without deep roots in local society and with little interaction 
with indigenous institutions, it "is in danger of exacerbating tensions between the small 
elite and the majority of population."148 Only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have more or 
less viable, though struggling, civil societies. In the rest of the countries, it is either 
nonexistent (Turkmenistan) or harshly eviscerated (Uzbekistan) or too feeble to notice 
(Tajikistan). It is unsurprising that so far the best projects in Central Asia have been 
those done on a small scale and with the involvement of local communities.149 
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The situation is qualitatively different in Central and Eastern European states that 
were formerly members of the Warsaw Pact. In Poland, Ukraine's neighbor to the West, 
the Association Law of 1989 did away with the Communist restrictions on freedom, but 
(unfortunately) excluded NGOs from the systematic assistance of the state, which 
precluded them from providing a wide array of welfare services. Foreign assistance was 
instrumental in helping the Polish civil society get on its feet. By the end of the 1990s, 
25 percent of people were active in nonprofits, half of the population acknowledged their 
donations to NGOs and 43 percent of NGOs reported using volunteers. At the same time, 
Poland could not escape someof the post-communist problems. Its civil society remains 
small (employing only 1.2 percent of the population) and woefully oligarchic (with 40 
percent of NGOs having an annual budget less than $2,500). Though many NGOs use 
volunteers, about 4 percent of people out of the whole population take part in such 
activities. 15° 
In his analysis of Romania, Dan Petrescu points that the domestic civil society 
has yet to move from being driven by donor supply to citizens' demands. In the mid-
1990s, Western funders stepped in to establish nonprofit organizations at a fast speed 
with little scrutiny, but with a lot of willingness to disburse money. Most of it went to 
advocacy groups, neglecting religious and non-political organizations as well as unions. 
By the end of the decade, it was clear that a number of American assumptions about 
NGO development in Romania did not hold. Advocacy nonprofits have not become a 
guiding light for all others to follow. Furthermore, it turned out that a group's official 
registration status does not make it more or less potent in influencing societal and 
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political change. To the disappointment of many in the West, NGOs that preached 
democracy were not democratic in their internal organizational arrangements. In the end, 
many failed to establish firm links with domestic communities or achieve long-term 
sustainability.151 
In Hungary, civil society faces many similar challenges. Its nonprofits are 
plagued by the lack of and financial capacity, low credibility among publics and a lack 
of effective access to policy-makers. 
A number of works conduct a comparative analysis of civil society developments 
in GEE and the former Soviet Union. For instance, Patrice McMahon considers the 
impact of American assistance on the development of women's groups in Hungary, 
Poland and Russia. Though their biggest success lies in attracting attention to women's 
issues (that would not have been otherwise possible), NGOs in these three states share 
the same set of problems. In particular, they are too professionalized and lack domestic 
grass-root support. Most of them have also become too de-politicized to their own peril 
as well as too enmeshed in promoting a purely Western agenda. In a separate piece, 
Badescu, Sum and Uslaner look at the civil societies in Romania and Moldova in order 
to measure how participation impacts trust. The article concludes that in both countries, 
activists are more trusting than the general public, thus affirming the classical theoretical 
proposition on the benefits of civil society. However, the authors also note that members 
of voluntary associations are not significantly predisposed to democratic attitudes than 
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nonmembers. The latter is not surprising, given Petrescu's earlier observations on the 
internal anti-democratic and non-pluralist nature of many NGOs.154 
By the way of summarizing, it is now possible to take the stock of civil society 
developments in the region. The available literature reveals that regardless of their 
shared Communist past, civil societies in Central and Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union have taken different developmental paths. Though some are more vibrant 
and mature than others,155 they all seem to face three major challenges that threaten their 
long-term survival. First, NGOs need to broaden public participation in their activities.156 
In all of the case studies, the nonprofit sector comes out too elitist,157 too urban, too 
narrow in terms of the types of pursued activities (mostly advocacy) and too grandiose in 
1SR 
regard to desirable achievements. Second, scholars frequently complain that U.S.-
funded NGOs are not sustainable.159 They are passive and lack entrepreneurial spirit with 
respect to civic engagement.160 They shop around for foreign funds, but do not attempt to 
engage possible local sources of support. Third, the majority of the covered scholarly 
works have concluded that, due to the parameters and nature of U.S. foreign assistance, a 
lot nonprofit organizations in the region have become too detached from politics in their 
drive to be "neutral" and too unwilling to engage with political actors or other 
representatives of the domestic civil society that are not normally covered by Western 
154
 Badescu, Sum and Uslaner. 
155
 Based on the evidence, it would be plausible to characterize the nonprofit sectors in Central and Eastern Europe (including the 
Baltic states) as most developed out of all, with Ukraine, Russia, Georgia and Moldova as more developed, and Central Asia, along 
with Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Caucasus, as the least developed. 
156
 McMahon. 
157
 Freise. 
158
 For more analysis of the two last points, see Kevin Quigley, "Lofty goals, modest results" in Funding Virtue, ed. Thomas 
Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 191-217. 
159
 More complete elaboration of the general point in Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway, "Toward Civil Society realism" in 
Funding Virtue, ed. Thomas Carothers and Marina Ottaway (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000), 
293-3 U. 
160
 Z. Mansfeldova, S. Nalecz, E. Priller and A. Zimmer, "Civil Society in Transition: Civic Engagement and Nonprofit Organizations 
in central and Eastern European after 1989," in Future of Civil SocietyL Making Central European Nonprofit-Organizations Work, 
ed. Annette Zimmer, Eckhard Priller, and Matthias Freise (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag fur Sozialwissenschaften, 2004), 117. 
democratization programs. This detachment continues to sap efforts to institutionalize 
the political representation of civil society.161 
Unfortunately, almost no attention has been devoted in the literature to exploring 
explicit linkages between the three problems. The existing gap brings us back to the 
notion of embeddedness. As the case studies show (though not tell), a low level of 
NGOs' embeddedness in the domestic landscape is the root cause of many subsequent 
problems. Insufficiently implanted NGOs are less likely to look for domestic support, 
precisely because their constituency lies elsewhere. They recognize (either openly or in 
private) that their organizations do not have an appeal (or a marketing value) strong 
enough to attract whatever meager financial resources are available in their countries. In 
the end, they become an isolated and foreign body within their domestic societies. If 
embeddedness is so critical, then the next question should be about the variables that 
help to enhance it. What is the difference between successful NGOs that manage to make 
a difference and the rest? Searching for an answer brings us to the "color revolutions" -
the events that are said to have shown regional NGOs at their best. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Before proceeding to the next chapter that will deal with the issues of 
methodology and research design used to collect the data for this study, it is paramount 
to take a step back and assess the critical findings that have emerged as a result of 
reviewing the extant literature as well as their impact on the concept of organizational 
embeddedness. 
Freise. 
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Though the concept of civil society has been part of the scholarly discourse for a 
long while, numerous theoretical disputes are centered primarily on four key issues. The 
first has to deal with the differentiation between civil and political societies. It began 
with Locke's interpretation, which did not separate the two, and proceeded to Kant who 
distinguished the role of civil society as a province of rational debate and critique. Those 
who followed not only took this distinctiveness for granted, but also attempted to refine 
the relationship. Hegel saw civil society as a vehicle to prepare citizens for political 
participation. Marx and Gramsci considered it to be a supporting mechanism for the 
existing power/class structure. Durkheim put it in the intermediary position between the 
state and economy. De Tocqueville asserted its ability to counter statist tendencies and 
(along with Putnam) to serve as a feedback loop between the civic life and politics. The 
second dispute is about the origins of civil society. Here the progression has been from 
ontological (Locke) to human/epistemological (Ferguson) and finally historical (Hegel) 
explanations. A lot has been said and written about the nature of exchanges that occur in 
the civic realm. Authors of the Scottish Enlightenment were the first to note that civic 
interactions are not neutral. In fact, they help validate critical discourses (Kant) or blend 
together morality and legality (Hegel). The outcome of such interactions can bring 
mutuality by building upon the emotional nature of cooperation and tapping into the 
existing reserves of trust (Durkheim) as well as conflict by relying on the existing class 
structure (Marx) and deepening the patterns of social exclusion (Herman). Finally, the 
fourth theoretical discussion addresses the relationship between the individual and civil 
society. According to it, civil society may serve as an intermediary body through which 
states's authority enters one's individual life (Durkheim). Or it may become a venue 
where an individual sacrifices a part of her autonomy to gain greater decision-making 
influence in democratic conditions (de Tocqueville). 
After reviewing the breadth and depth of theoretical developments, two 
implications on the notion of embeddedness are in order. First, because civil society is 
both distinct and connected to the political realm, the degree of organizational 
embeddedness depends on how well the civil society is able to strike a golden middle by 
being sufficiently open for cooperation with political parties and governmental bodies, 
yet avoiding the danger of turning into a party or state supplicant. Second, to assess the 
degree of embeddedness, it is important to pay attention to the nature of exchanges 
within civil society, more specifically whether they have a robust moral and legal basis 
that enables its special place in the society. As the review makes it clear, the moral 
standing can be achieved only if civic organizations have inclusive memberships and a 
high level of internal and external openness. The legal basis stems from pertinent laws 
that are put in place by the state. 
Our analysis of the literature on the emergence of civil society has concentrated 
on two critical dimensions. The first deals with domestic-level processes through which 
a loose web of activists is transformed into a structured civic organization with coherent 
positions and demands. The success of such a transformation is impacted by a host of 
variables that include country's political culture, role of the state on the domestic scene, 
prevalence of certain social classes as civil society members, and historical 
circumstances. The second dimension pays attention to the two kinds of external sources 
- political entrepreneurs and international cooperation between civic groups known as 
the "boomerang pattern" - that help foster domestic civil societies. The ability of 
political entrepreneurs to influence internal processes depends on the characteristics of 
an issue that a foreign civic group tries to pursue in a recipient country as well as on the 
nature of relationship they have with domestic partners. In the case of the former, 
international input will produce better results if an issue at hand resonates with a local 
society. As for the latter, the denser the relationship between an international 
organization and its local partner - the better the results of their cooperation. 
Therefore, in assessing the level of embeddedness of a certain civil society or a 
particular group within it, a set of factors ought to be taken into account. First, external 
involvement will be more effective in helping a civil society find its place on the 
domestic scene (i.e. become more embedded) if it deals with relevant issues and capable 
(in terms of their membership density) actors. Second, the degree of embeddness may be 
lowered by a strong state that either exhibits increasing autocratic tendencies or has 
existed long before a civil society. Third, civic groups may undercut their own 
implantedness if they do not become institutionalized into more formal organizations. 
However, even if their institutionalization does take place, civil society at large can 
remain weakly embedded into the domestic landscape. The reasons for that may lie 
either in its social composition that emphasizes members' exclusive, elite status or in the 
ethnic, religious and historical factors that accompanied the formation of civil society. 
One of the most voluminous parts of the literature deals with the description and 
analysis of benefits and (less commonly) weaknesses that civil society may bring to the 
domestic political and social life. Among the benefits, higher social capital, increased 
individual and institutional trust, better reciprocal engagement and the feeling of 
civicness figure most prominently. The rare, but quite malign, weaknesses include 
possible polarization and systemic overloading. 
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It is interesting to note a relationship that both benefits and weaknesses have with 
organizational embeddedness. In the case of the former, benefits materialize precisely 
because an organization is sufficiently embedded. For instance, the available research 
stresses that NGOs, which are engaged in political/advocacy activities, will generate 
more social capital than those, which are not. However, one of the major reasons for that 
(i.e. embeddedness) is omitted, although the theoretical literature makes it abundantly 
clear that nonprofits, which are distinct, yet connected to the political sphere, tend to do 
better. Their tighter connections with political organizations produce closer links to the 
society in general. In a different example, many authors assert that the level of individual 
trust will be higher in those NGOs with a diverse pool of members. Again, the 
observation does not link individual trust (indirectly) and diversity (directly) to higher 
embeddedness. Nonprofits, which have diverse memberships, are better connected to the 
society, since they simply "cover" more existing societal groups and viewpoints. 
Therefore, the relationship ought to be described as follows - higher embeddeness 
generates more diversity that, in turn, increases members' individual trust. As for the 
weaknesses of civil society, they come to being due to the lack (or complete absence) of 
embeddedness. For example, the polarization of organizational membership occurs with 
a low level of broad embeddedness. In this ease, a civic group does not seek to expand 
horizontally in order to encompass other segments of the society. Systemic overloading 
happens when an NGO is only partially embedded into the domestic landscape because 
its links with the political society are either cut off completely or severally strained. In 
effect, this confirms the previously stated theoretical proposition that an NGO should be 
distinct, but connected to the political system. 
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As we see, the notion of embeddedness plays a key role in bringing the benefits 
and ameliorating the weaknesses of civil society. Unfortunately, those who talk of the 
benefits take embeddedness for granted, while the ones writing about the weaknesses do 
not consider the phenomenon at all (instead concentrating on the consequences of those 
weaknesses). That is why, our research will seek to assert that in order to generate more 
benefits and avoid possible flaws, civic organizations ought to be sufficiently embedded. 
Finally, our assessment of the studies that address the role of civil society and 
foreign funders in democratic transitions has pointed to a number of observations. First, 
those who believe that civic groups play a leading role in ensuring that a democratic 
transformation occurs through the power of masses subscribe mostly to the participatory 
approach on democratization. Second, the need for Western assistance in building 
domestic civil societies in GEE and the former Soviet Union has become both a blessing 
and a curse for many newly established civic groups as well as for those societies in 
general. On one hand, such NGOs helped raise issues that would have otherwise been 
avoided or substantially under-funded. On the other, Western aid created a set of 
problems of its own. To list the most common, foreign funders have provided restrictive 
funding, covering only formally registered (and mostly advocacy) NGOs and excluding 
everyone else. In many cases, the content proved either incompatible with local practices 
or irrelevant to local realities. By attempting to remove the political aspect in NGOs' 
functioning, donors have often severed vital connections between those organizations 
and the political realm of their societies and left the former with diminished societal 
influence. There was a general failure on the part of funders to see that the transitional 
paradigm (which envisions sequential democratic transition) may not apply to those 
states stuck in the gray zone of semi-authoritarianism, thus necessitating new approaches 
to working with their domestic civil societies. Third, NGOs face a number of challenges 
as well. They need to broaden public participation, assure their financial sustainability 
(once donors have left or decreased support) and become less detached and disdainful of 
the inherently political element in their functioning. 
The challenges that both Western aid structures and local NGOs are facing 
highlight the importance of embeddedness in tackling many of the enumerated problems. 
As the review has noted, in the field of democratization a middle ground (so-called civil 
society realism) has begun to emerge. However, it is not clear whether and to what 
extent the approach considers embeddedness as one of the key components for civil 
society development. What is certain that if the challenge of organizational 
embeddedness is not addressed by Western donors, any proposed solutions will treat the 
symptoms rather than the cause of the disease. For instance, foreign grant-giving 
organizations will not be able to determine what works and what does not, unless their 
grant recipients are sufficiently embedded into the domestic landscape to possess some 
"issue sensitivity." If it is absent, donors are likely to learn about the ethnocentrism of 
their programs only post-fact. The same applies to local NGOs. None of the objectives 
(be it sustainability, broader participation or cooperation with political parties) can be 
achieved if they are not willing to assess their implantedness on the domestic scene. To 
sum it up, assuring a higher level of embeddeness represents one (by no means the sole) 
of the major solutions to the dilemmas of grant-giving faced by Western donors and the 
challenges of internal development encountered by NGOs in CEE and the former Soviet 
Union. 
The dissertation has begun with the general hypothesis that a greater level of 
domestic embeddedness made NGOs more effective during the "color revolutions." It 
has been clear from the beginning that the concept of embeddedness is vague and may be 
hard to measure. The issue is further complicated, because my research seeks a more 
nuanced approach, by asserting that NGOs should have a certain degree (not the 
maximum or the ideal level) of implantedness. This is why, the literature review has 
become helpful in delineating the notion of embeddedness more precisely. Based on the 
available findings, three propositions that refine my key concept should be put forward. 
First, the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the political society, the more 
embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. To forestall a possible criticism, it is 
critical to emphasize that this work does not advocate for NGOs to become an arm 
(hidden or visible) of the state and political parties. However, the literature also makes it 
abundantly obvious that civic groups must set up mechanisms for regular interactions 
and viable cooperation with political actors. Second, the more connections an NGO 
establishes with the society at large and its members, the more embedded it becomes. As 
noted before, such connections may take a variety of forms - from pursuing inclusive 
membership strategies to raising general public awareness of the "third sector." Third, 
the more domestically tailored is the external involvement, the more it helps NGOs 
become embedded. In the end, it should be noted that though these hypotheses provide 
better ways to define embeddedness, they continue to require much more specific 
indicators as well as the general framework to be placed within in order to yield 
meaningful results. Coming up with these is the task of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER II 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The goal of this chapter is to elaborate the research methodology that will be 
used to test our key hypotheses, gather the necessary data, establish proper causal 
relationships, and, ultimately, provide insights into the main research question. To this 
end, it will begin by outlining the major parameters of our research design that include a 
research question, key hypotheses and definitions, a number of leading sub-hypotheses, 
the indicators to measure them, and the benchmarks to evaluate their performance. The 
second part of this chapter will describe how the accumulated information will be 
presented and analyzed. Drawing heavily on the theoretical recommendations by King, 
Keohane and Verba in "Designing Social Inquiry,"1 the work aims to address the 
methodological advantages of case studies as a research tool as well as the issues of 
descriptive and causal inference. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
This dissertation has been spurred by the unexpected turn of events that took 
place in Ukraine and Georgia in 2003 and 2004. Both countries were scheduled to have 
elections - parliamentary in Georgia and presidential in Ukraine. Both were becoming 
progressively semi-authoritarian with the aging presidents willing to resort to any 
measures to maintain their hold on to power. Though fraud, voter intimidation and 
1
 Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994). 
opposition harassment were widely expected, few predicted the magnitude of a popular 
response that swept away the regimes of Leonid Kuchma and Eduard Shevarnadze. 
Grappling with the surprising nature of these events, many heaped praise on the so-
called "people's power" that was able to bring masses to the streets and sustain their 
involvement in what were quickly labeled as the "color revolutions." Civil society 
groups like Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia became the cause celebre for Western 
media and academics. The more positive were the assessments of such groups, the more 
alarmed were authoritarian rulers elsewhere in the former Soviet Union and around the 
world. 
It seems that by the middle of 2005 (after the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan and 
the bloody riots in Uzbekistan's Andijon region), the argument that civic groups are the 
driving force behind peaceful "color revolutions" has become a widely accepted fact by 
Western democracy promoters and post-Soviet domestic elites alike. The former 
concentrated on how "color" experiences can be replicated in other corners of the world, 
while the latter got serious about suffocating any existing civic groups that were even 
remotely reminiscent of Kmara, Pora or Otpor. As indirect recognition of the influence 
exerted by youth organizations, the Russian government sought to preempt any brewing 
dissent by establishing a fiercely statist and anti-Western nationalist movement "Nashi" 
(Ours).3 The efforts took such a systematic, cross-country character that in a year the 
2
 For examples see the following: Jeremy Durker and Dean Cox, Under Assault: Ukrainian News Media and the 2004 Presidential 
Elections (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2003); Carlos Pascual and Steven Pifer, "Ukraine's Bid for a Decisive Place in 
History," Washington Quarterly 25, no.2 (Winter 2002): 175-192; Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, "Needs 
Assessment Report for the Presidential Elections in Ukraine" (Kyiv: ODIHR, 31 October 2004), 
http://wwvv.osce.org/documents/odihr/2004/06/3248 en.pdf. 
3
 The name itself hints that contrary to Kmara and Pora, "Nashi" [translated as Ours] was a true domestic force. 
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American National Endowment for Democracy (NED) spoke of a worldwide backlash 
against democracy promotion.4 
At the same time, few questions were asked as to what made the civic groups in 
Ukraine and Georgia so effective. This neglect of deeper investigation is especially 
puzzling, given a vast array of the past assessments,5 which decried the civil societies in 
those and other post-Soviet states as weak, overly dependent on Western aid and unable 
to relate to the local populace. 
The analysis that this dissertation will perform is critical not only for our 
understanding of contemporary political events in transitioning societies, but also for the 
evolution of major theoretical debates in the field. By stressing the primacy of civil 
society's involvement in "color revolutions," it lends substantive support to the 
participatory approach,6 confirming the leading role of ordinary citizens over domestic 
elites in democratic transformations. At the same time, because the research is focused 
on the specific features, which enhance the effectiveness of civic groups, it contributes to 
the scholarly discussion7 on the merits and weaknesses of civil society as well as its 
connections to the political and societal realms. Finally, the research suggests how the 
particular circumstances of "color revolutions" can enhance our general appreciation of 
democratic transitions. 
4
 The National Endowment for Democracy, "The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance," A Report Prepared for Senator Richard 
G. Lugar, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (8 June 2006), 
httD://www.ned.org/publications/reDorts/backlash06.pdf. 
5
 For critical assessments, please see: Sarah Mendelson and John K. Glenn, ed., The Power and Limits ofNGOs; Stepanenko, "Civil 
Society in Post-Soviet Ukraine"; McFaul, Petrov, and Riabov, ed., Between Dictatorship and Democracy. 
6
 Burnell and Calvert, 7. 
7
 Seligman, 20-55. 
8
 Carothers and Brandt, 18-24,26-29. 
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Research question and content choices 
To rectify the discrepancy between previous assessments of post-Soviet civil 
societies and their actual performance during the "color revolutions," my dissertation 
asks a basic research question: What made the NGOs under consideration effective 
during those events? I hypothesize that the more embedded an NGO was in the domestic 
social and political landscape, the more successful it was during those events. My work 
refines the existing arguments on the impact of civic groups in peaceful democratic 
transitions, by pointing to embeddedness as one of the core ingredients in their success. 
If this hypothesis holds true, it will have significant ramifications on how the external 
and internal promotion of civil society ought to be pursued. The criteria that measure 
nascent civil societies by the number and variety of established NGOs may need to be 
abandoned in favor of assessing how many of them possess the precise characteristics 
that make nonprofits more "native" (i.e. better embedded) in their host countries.9 
Before proceeding further, it is important to explain a set of five major choices 
that the study had to make at the very beginning. The first deals with organizational 
embeddedness, as opposed to other characteristics of NGO functioning. Because 
advanced democracies have a long tradition of accepting civil society in its own right, 
the notion of embeddedness is often taken for granted. It is natural to think that those 
NGOs, which exist, are an integral part of their societies. Otherwise, they would simply 
disappear or be replaced by others. Unfortunately, this may not be the case in those 
countries where the state had been historically powerful, and citizen activism and 
initiative were greatly discouraged, if not suppressed at all. Thus, embeddedness from 
9
 For more information about the new paradigm on promoting civil society (so-called civil society realism), see Ottaway and 
Carothers, Funding Virtue. 
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being a moot point in Western democracies turns into a paramount concern for emerging 
civil societies. 
The second choice, to look specifically at the color revolutions, was dictated by 
two reasons. One was an obvious discrepancy between the theoretical analyses and the 
empirical evidence mentioned in the other paragraph - the civil societies that have been 
described as feeble and detached performed so well during the revolutions. The other lies 
in the fact that "color revolutions," as a rapid democratization event, represent a critical 
instance where the role and utility of civil society were put to the ultimate test of 
viability and can thus be assessed more precisely. 
The third choice revolved around selecting particular cases to review. By early 
2007, what can be described as a "color revolution" has occurred in at least 4 countries -
Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. The decision to focus on Georgia and Ukraine 
was based on their geographical proximity, shared Soviet past, chronological closeness 
of the revolutions and developmental similarities of their civil societies. On the first two 
counts, the two countries are neighbors, sharing the Black Sea border. This and their 
Soviet legacy mean that they are facing similar sets of economic and political 
challenges.10 The Rose and the Orange revolutions also occurred within a year from each 
other - November 2003 in Georgia and December 2004 in Ukraine. Based on the extant 
observations,11 it is more likely that these transitions will have more in common than, for 
instance, the events in Serbia and Kyrgyzstan. Hence, by studying these similar cases, 
my research will be able to test whether embeddedness was a critical variable in the 
success of civil society groups during the "color revolutions." The dissertation does not 
10
 Note that the paper asserts the similarity in the nature of their problems, but not their magnitude. 
" John O'Loughlin, Michael D. Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin S. Cohen, David S. Brown, David Reilly, Kristian S. Gleditsch, and 
Michael Shin, "The Diffusion of Democracy, 1946-1994," Annals of the Association of American Geographers 88, no. 4 (1998): 545-
574. 
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consider intentionally the instances where a "color revolution" was predicted, but either 
did not occur or would have otherwise failed. As the existing studies indicate, other 
factors that are not related to civil society development might be at play in those 
situations.1 
The fourth dilemma pertained to the type of NGOs that ought to be researched. 
The review13 of the existing works on the Orange and Rose revolutions pointed to the 
three types of organizations that were present in both states - those that organized public 
protests (Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia), those that performed election 
monitoring (CVU in Ukraine and ISFED in Georgia) and those that conducted exit polls 
(the Democratic Initiatives Foundation in Ukraine and Gorby Polling Services, among 
many others, in Georgia). Given the inherent limitations of any research, it was decided 
to concentrate on the first two groups and exclude the last one. The choice is also 
theoretically supported, because Pora, Kmara, CVU and ISFED can be viewed as classic 
civic groups, whereas DiF and Gorby are closer to think tanks than pure NGOs and have 
a host of problems pertinent only to that type of organizations. 
The final choice was made in regard to the timeframe of my study, which would 
be 1991-2003 for Georgia and 1991-2004 for Ukraine. It begins in the year when the 
Soviet Union collapsed and both states gained their independence and ends with the 
12
 David R. Marples, "Color Revolutions: the Belarus Case," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no.3 (September 2006): 
351-364; Graeme P. Herd, "Colorful Revolutions and the CIS," Problems of Post-Communism 52, no. 2 (March-April 2005): 3-18. 
13
 For more information, please see Taras Kuzio, "Civil Society, Youth and Societal Mobilization in Democratic Revolutions," 
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no.3 (September 2006): 365-386; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Post-
communism"; Jonathan Wheatley, Georgia: From National Awakening to Rose Revolution (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005); Nadia 
Diuk, "The Triumph of Civil Society" in Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough, ed. Anders 
Aslund and Michael McFaul (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006); Andrew Wilson, Ukraine's 
Orange Revolution (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2005); Cory Welt, "Regime Vulnerability and Popular 
Mobilization in Georgia's Rose Revolution," Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law Working Paper no.67 
(September 2006); Andrew Wilson, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution, NGOs and the Role of the West," Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 19, no.l (March 2006): 21-32. 
eruption of the "color revolutions" - November 2003 in Georgia and December 2004 in 
Ukraine. 
Alternative hypotheses 
At this point, it would also be useful to suggest a couple of alternative 
hypotheses. The first posits that the more financial support anNGO received from the 
West, the better it performed during a "color revolution." It merely tests the prevalent 
assumption of the post-Soviet elites that without Western assistance, domestic groups in 
Ukraine and Georgia would either not be able to emerge or simply die out. It is important 
to draw a difference between the understanding of embeddedness that this dissertation 
embraces and the relationship that the rival hypothesis asserts. As seen later, one of our 
indicators for embeddedness indeed includes external involvement (and external 
financial support in particular). However, this work believes that there is more to NGOs' 
strength than just Western funding, and other measurements of embeddedness (e.g. 
constituency, leadership, internal normative transfers) clearly emphasize this point. To 
sum it up, the first alternative hypotheses assumes that the major thing NGOs need to be 
effective on the post-Soviet space is a continuous and rather generous supply of foreign 
funds. 
The second rival hypothesis suggests that the tighter an NGO was allied to the 
political force that fought against the ancien regime, the better it performed during a 
"color revolution." As in the previous case, a distinction should be pinpointed between 
this assertion and the viewpoint promulgated by the dissertation. What the former does is 
lends support to the elite-driven approach on democratization, which believes that 
societal elites assume the primary role in ensuring a democratic transition, whereas 
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domestic civil society is given a supportive role. According to it, Pora and Kmara 
attached themselves to "Our Ukraine" and the National Movement respectively, 
becoming their youth wings. Contrary to that, the dissertation recognizes and appreciates 
the relationship between NGOs and political parties as a means to increase their 
embeddedness within the society's political landscape. However, in their relations with 
political parties embedded NGOs figure as independent (if not always equal) partners. 
Major definitions 
Because the research frequently evokes such terms as civil society, "color 
revolution," embeddedness and an NGO, it is worth to define their more precise 
meaning. 
Civil society is "an intermediate associational realm between state and family, 
populated by organizations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation 
to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their 
interests or values."15 At the same time, an NGO is a non-governmental organization that 
channels citizens' demands (interest articulation), serves as an alternative provider of 
public services and/or performs the functions of a government watchdog. NGOs possess 
five common characteristics.16 First, they are an organized entity, meaning that groups 
need to have a certain organizational structure (leadership and membership) and a statute 
(whether formal or informal) that guides their activities. Second, because NGOs are not 
an arm of the government, they are considered a private entity. However, (and this is 
14
 Paul D'Anieri and Theodor Tudoroiu, "Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions," Communist and Post-
Communist Studies 40, no.3 (September 2007): 315-342; Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist 
Revolutions," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no.3 (September 2006): 331-350; John Higley and Michael G. Burton, 
"The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns," American Sociological Review 54, no. 1 (February 1989): 17-32. 
15
 White, "Civil Society, Democratization and Development: Clearing the Analytical Ground." 
16
 The characteristics are derived from Armony, The Dubious Link, 30. 
where the third feature becomes important) they cannot be equated with businesses 
because of their not-for-profit status. All the revenues collected by NGOs from the 
public or received through charitable grants must be used to fulfill their main mission by 
supporting the issues or providing the services it was set up to do. Fourth, 
nongovernmental organizations are expected to be self-governing, which implies the 
presence of a governing or executive board that oversees a bigger picture of 
organizational activities and makes sure an NGO stays on track. Finally, membership in 
NGOs is voluntary. This substantially differentiates them from the government (where 
the right for participation is legally regulated and can be accorded or mandated based on 
certain pre-requisites, like citizenship) or the business sector (where involvement is often 
determined by contractual obligations). 
Though the provided definitions of civil society and NGOs closely mirror each 
other, a difference between the two should be illuminated. As the previous section - the 
literature review - has noted, civil society represents a broader philosophical concept 
that includes not only NGOs, but also other numerous other entities that do not have to 
possess the five NGO features outlined above. In other words, civil society in general 
may be much less formal, but much more loose and spontaneous in its structure and 
nature. On the contrary to that, NGOs are a fairly specific manifestation of civil society 
that has reached sufficient maturity to yearn for formalization. As a result, it is much 
harder to assess the vibrancy and level of development of a civil society because of its 
all-encompassing and resistant to the precise definition nature. To paraphrase the famous 
saying, you often know a vibrant civil society when you see it or when you engage in 
extensive research on its indirect indicators, such as people's attitudes that determine 
their civic participation. With NGOs, the measurement is less tricky (which is why they 
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became the preference of many donors). Mere numerical indicators can highlight 
developmental trends, if not the potential strength, of existing non-governmental 
organizations. 
An NGO is embedded when it is regarded by other major political, civic actors 
and target groups within the population as a legitimate element of the internal social and 
political landscape. Based on this definition, an NGO should meet three significant and 
inter-related standards. First, it needs to represent a specific domestic constituency. A 
group that speaks for everyone ends up speaking for nobody, because it is unable to 
fulfill one of the key NGO functions - interest articulation. Second, an embedded 
nonprofit must possess some domestic authority among influential societal actors -
politicians, fellow civil society members and, more importantly, its own supporters. Its 
level of expertise and the depth and breadth of practical experiences in a particular field 
must command respect. Lastly, a civic group should have specific mechanisms to exert 
influence. A civic organization that has members and knows its issue, but lacks the 
muscle in making a difference, will eventually lose its supporters and the clout among 
other actors. 
Finally, a "color revolution" is a peaceful experience of democratic transition that 
occurs as a result of large-scale public protests against fraudulent elections, conducted by 
a semi-authoritarian regime and resulting in its ultimate collapse. It is critical to point to 
the distinction between "color" and regular revolutions. The former are self-limiting in 
their radicalism. Though they ensure that no return to the past is possible, they (unlike 
the French or Bolshevik revolution) do not entail a complete destruction of societal 
Note that the dissertation uses interchangeably such terms as embeddedness, implantedness and rootedness. 
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foundations or undertake a total elimination of the ancien elite and its supporters.18 The 
color revolutions under our consideration also share several common characteristics. 
They took place in states with a semi-autocratic regime whose leader was not only 
unpopular* but also unable to consolidate the power and command complete authority of 
the government's coercive apparatus. The opposition was united and capable of 
mobilizing the citizenry, by conducting ambitious campaigns to register voters and 
ensure their participation on the Election Day. A modicum of freedom was given to the 
media, which made it possible to inform people about the fraud through election 
monitoring and exit poll results.19 
Sub-hypotheses and their indicators 
Because our major hypothesis talks about embeddedness in rather general terms, 
further specifications are needed to ensure adequate empirical testing. That is why, the 
dissertation is advancing three sub-hypotheses, which touch directly upon the key 
components of organizational implantedness, as well as the indicators to measure them. 
First, the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the political society, the more 
embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. To specify political embeddedness, it is 
important to consider both its formal and informal components. The formal legitimacy of 
NGOs is based on laws and legal guarantees that recognize the distinctiveness of the 
nonprofit sector, ensure non-interference by the state, provide balanced mechanisms of 
state control and create a propitious environment for nonprofit development. The other 
side of political embeddedness lies in informal legitimacy whose nebulous nature is 
18
 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, 74. 
15
 McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism": 5-19; Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik, "International diffusion and Post-
communist Electoral Revolutions," Communist andPostcommunist Studies 39, no.3 (September 2006): 289-291. 
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harder to measure. In that regard, the study will evaluate the effectiveness of joint NGO-
party and NGO-government projects. On the basis of that indicators, it will seek to 
classify the nature of cooperation between anNGO and political actors as subservient 
(NGOs function as mere attachments to a party or a state), independent (NGOs cooperate 
with parties on relatively equal terms) and epiphenomenal (NGOs' cooperation with 
parties is insignificant or meaningless). 
Second, the more connections an NGO establishes to the society at large and its 
members in particular, the more embedded it becomes. For the second sub-hypothesis, it 
is important to look at the set of four indicators on social embeddedness - constituency, 
internal normative transfers, societal influence and financial sustainability. To evaluate 
the constituency of a group, the research considers the characteristics (such as age, 
gender, social class, ethnicity and residence) of its members and leaders. It also evaluates 
NGOs' recruitment strategies, mobilization and communication capacities. Internal 
normative transfers have to deal with how an organization handles the issues of 
competency acquisition for its members. Our work reviews whether members have 
initial expertise in the field and, if not, how they are provided with in-house training and 
retraining services. The analysis will also assess the relevance of internal normative 
transfers by considering whether certain training practices and methodologies have been 
adopted, adapted or rejected. The third indicator for social embeddedness measures 
NGO's societal influence. It first looks at an organization's general relevance that 
encompasses the reasons for its emergence, the length of its operation and 
external/internal assessments of its effectiveness. Then, the inquiry proceeds to analyze 
the relevance of NGOs' goals, in particular a relationship between goals and external 
events, and their possible adjustment as a result of the latter. Appropriateness of 
activities is the next component of societal influence, which considers a relationship 
between goals and activities, between activities and external events, and possible 
adjustments of activities due to unfolding events or a change in goals. Attempting to 
capture the larger picture of an NGO within a domestic society, the study moves to focus 
on its relations with other fellow groups through joint projects. Based on their quantity 
and effectiveness, it should be possible to determine the nature of NGO-NGO 
interactions as subservient, independent or epiphenomenal. Finally, wider public 
involvement is considered by summarizing nonprofits' volunteering practices, 
interactions with the media and general public relations. The last in the set of indicators 
on social embeddeness addresses a group's financial sustainability. It employs such 
metrics as diversity, extent, longevity and regularity of domestic financial support (both 
monetary and in-kind), by identifying the number of sources, the percentage of total 
funds that they contribute and the chronological length of their availability. In the end, it 
should be possible to determine whether the nature of relationship between an NGO and 
its domestic supporters is deeply dependent, cooperative, independent or non-essential. 
Third, the more domestically-tailored the external involvement, the more it helps 
an NGO become embedded. For this sub-hypothesis on external influence, two 
indicators are reviewed. The first has to do with external norrnative transfers, which are 
attempts by foreign actors to transmit their methodology to NGO members in other 
states. Here we consider the extent of cooperation with foreign NGOs and INGOs, 
whether such organizations offer training and re-training services, how often they do so 
and what issues they cover. A step further is then taken by evaluating the relevance of 
such normative exchanges, in particular whether proposed methodologies and programs 
were adopted, adapted or rejected. The other indicator assesses the external mechanisms 
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of influence that include the diversity, extent and longevity of foreign financial support 
and its impacts on the nature of interactions between a donor and a domestic civic group. 
To specify those, the dissertation will employ the same types of measurements it uses for 
an NGO's domestic financial sustainability. 
Index of embeddedness 
As this work has noted numerous times, embeddedness is a rather ambiguous 
concept. Seeking to address this challenge, we have so far come up with the three sets of 
categories that assess embeddedness along several dimensions - societal and political as 
well as the influence of external involvement. However, the composite picture of 
organizational implantedness will be impossible to obtain without bringing all the 
utilized indicators (and the outcomes they produce) together in a meaningful and 
comprehensive fashion. To do so, the research will develop an index of embeddedness 
that provides numerical measurements for each category and, in the end, strives to 
classify NGOs as strongly, moderately, insufficiently or marginally embedded. 
Our index will consist of three broad categories that correspond with the major 
sub-hypotheses of the study. They deal respectively with societal embeddedness, 
political embeddedness and external involvement. Within every category, there will be a 
cluster of particular indicators used by the dissertation for its further specification. As a 
result of this structure, the research has to address two concurrent challenges - how to 
determine the order of the categories and how to assign weight to individual indicators. 
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When beginning to decide on the placement of the categories, the question of 
prioritization immediately arises. According to the index,20 societal embeddedness 
comes prior to political one and is accorded the highest number of points. The ranking 
decision was based on numerous theoretical definitions, which suggest that civil society 
occupies a space distinct from the state and the family. It is precisely because of its 
location within the domestic society and apart from the state apparatus that the societal 
aspect of implantedness assumes the primary role. Arguing from the reverse, political 
embeddedness cannot come ahead of societal one, as it will imply a certain degree of 
secondarity that civil society has in relation to the state. To change the order by putting 
political implantedness first is not only theoretically flawed, but also empirically 
dangerous. NGOs that place the state first inevitably turn into its informal extension (like 
GNGOs in China and Russia).21 
Among the three categories, external involvement ranks last, because it plays an 
assisting, not determining, function in anchoring NGOs in the societal and political 
contexts. Under normal circumstances, foreign advocacy groups and donor organizations 
design their involvement in a way that strengthens the domestic standing of a civic 
group, by providing it with additional normative and/or financial clout. If nonprofits feel 
more at home with external partners than their societal constituencies and domestic 
political structures, they run the risk of turning into local branches of the former. 
The second step in creating our index is to assign relative weight to the specific 
indicators that compose each of the three broad categories. The challenge is compounded 
by the requirement that a total amount of points assigned to separate indicators cannot 
20
 See Appendix I 
21
 Moises Nairn, "What is a Gongo?" Foreign Policy (May-June 2007). 
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alter the overall ranking of a category within which they are located. In other words, 
after all points assigned and added up, societal embeddedness should come first, 
followed by political embeddedness and then external influence. 
Among the indicators, constituency will be given the highest number of points 
(16). Multiple sources in the literature review note that a group will not be able to 
advance from a loose to more formal stage unless it has a clearly identified pool of 
members and leaders able to guide it. Therefore, the presence and strength of 
constituency are the backbone without which further embeddedness is unimaginable in 
any shape or form. 
Societal influence and informal legitimacy rank second and are equal in 
importance, which accords each of them with 14 points. Both indicators represent the 
pillars of different contextual dimensions when it comes to embeddedness. The first 
(societal influence) reflects the relationship between an NGO and people at large. The 
second (informal legitimacy) relates the organization to the political structure of a host 
society. To put it differently, their position is determined by the classical understanding 
of civil society, as being distinct (i.e. a part of the non-political22 sphere), yet connected 
to the political realm (thus the link to informal legitimacy). 
Formal legitimacy is next, because it sets up a legal framework, which, in turn, 
demarcates an allowable space for NGOs to function. In the index, it is worth 13 points. 
Given the importance of the rule of law in building nascent democracies, it would be 
logical to wonder why formal legitimacy has not been placed ahead of societal influence 
and informal legitimacy in terms of its vitality for civil society development. The answer 
22
 Non-political is used in a very narrow understanding of the term here - as not being a part of state political institutions and 
governmental structures. 
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to this justified concern is two-fold. First, NGOs and other types of civil groups may 
have substantial influence within their host society and among its political actors even if 
there is no sufficient legal framework for their activities. For instance, the Ukrainian 
Rukh or Baltic National Fronts emerged in the Soviet society, which viewed public 
organizations as a mere informal attachment to the Communist Party, and flourished 
before the infamous "6th Article"23 of the Soviet Constitution was abolished. The 
opposite seems also true - many post-Communist states have strong legal frameworks 
with NGOs that do not command any public influence or political respect, because they 
are inherently weak on their own or are purposefully weakened by the state from behind 
the scenes. As our literature review points out, many NGOs in Central Asia were 
epiphenomenal, even preceding the legal crackdown on civil liberties by the executive 
branch.24 To sum up the point, formal legitimacy is a necessary, but not sufficient 
condition for embeddedness. 
Domestic financial sustainability comes fourth with the total of 12 points. The 
indicator sheds light on the NGOs' ability to harness financial resources that assure their 
ultimate capacity to survive. It is located after formal legitimacy, as the latter is a pre-
requisite for a civic group to be able to raise funds legally and over a long period of time. 
However, it is also ahead of such two critical measurements as internal and external 
normative transfers. The placement thus begs a question of whether this work puts 
money before ideas, by rating funding as the issue of a greater magnitude than the 
normative ends it is used to serve. Though the research acknowledges the importance of 
23
 According to Article VI of the Brezhnev Constitution, the Communist Party was recognized as "the directing and leading force" of 
the Soviet society, relegating others to the status of mere attachments to the party. 
24
 For more see, Olcot, Central Asia's Second Chance; Stevens, "NGO-Mahalla Parternships"; Ilkhamov, "The Thorny Path of Civil 
Society in Uzbekistan." 
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ideas,25 it continues to press forward with a more pragmatic approach, which posits that 
without sufficient funds NGO's ideas - no matter how powerful - will never get 
sufficient traction. Furthermore, regardless of how effective and innovative an 
organization is in processing internal and external normative transfers, it will be helpless 
without funds to implement them through in-house trainings or inter-NGO exchanges. 
As already mentioned, in the index of embeddedness internal and external 
normative transfers weigh less (11 points each) than financial sustainability. Their 
primary importance is to indicate the capacity of NGOs to be normatively open and 
flexible. External mechanisms of influence (which deal with donors' financial support) 
are accorded the least weight on our index (9 points), since they mostly play a financially 
supportive role in NGO's existence. One can challenge our ranking by pointing to the 
discrepancy between theory and reality in this particular case. In the real life, NGOs in 
emerging democracies are far more dependent on the Western sources of funding and 
should be arguably assigned a greater number of points to reflect that fact. To respond to 
this suggestion, it is important to note that this works intends to analyze what kind of 
external involvement would help NGOs to be more embedded, not what kind of foreign 
aid and dependency patterns exist right now. Therefore, the natural attention is on how 
external mechanisms of influence should work, not how they are working. It is perhaps 
because the presently big footprint of foreign donors seems so problematic in terms of 
long-term maintenance and so troublesome in regard to its detrimental impacts on NGO 
development that we downplay foreign assistance in the index of embeddedness. 
25
 That is why, so many of our sub-indicators touch directly or indirectly upon the impact of influence. For instance, the indicator on 
societal influence looks into the goals for an NGO's existence, their relevance and their adjustment based on external events. 
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The final task in putting together any index is to determine how to match numeric 
measurements with their qualitative equivalents. In the process of doing so, the 
dissertation bases its assessments on the expectations of performance, as outlined in the 
section below. NGOs that are close to the end or ideal state of embeddedness will score 
90 percent or above and be considered highly embedded. Those organizations that meet 
the expected outcomes will get 65-89% and be classified as moderately embedded. Civic 
groups that fail one or more of the outlined expectations will receive between 40-64 
percent and should be viewed as insufficiently embedded. Finally, nonprofits with large-
scale failures will obtain below 39 percent and be categorized as weakly or marginally 
embedded. 
Both success and failure are easy to spot. What is harder to do is to estimate their 
extent and magnitude. The description of expected outcomes that is to follow will try to 
do just that through a sequence of three steps. It will portray how NGOs are expected to 
perform (something that would earn them a moderate level of rootedness). It will then 
tell what an ideal state of things would be - the situation that will make nonprofits highly 
embedded. And it will conclude by describing the process of disembeddedness, which 
catalogues the flaws and failures that, depending on their gravity, would make an 
organization moderately, insufficiently or marginally implanted. 
Expected outcomes 
Before the actual process of data gathering begins, it is necessary to elaborate 
what outcomes can be expected for each of the given sub-hypotheses and within the 
suggested indicators. Undertaking this task has a three-fold advantage. First, it will 
enable us to recognize a success when we see it. The avalanche of information, which 
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large-scale research projects like this tend to generate, brings the danger of inadvertently 
omitting serious observations. Second, the specifications of outcomes will pre-set a level 
of performance anticipated from our indicators in advance. This will diminish a possible 
researcher bias when the significance of some indicators (usually those that have 
received more confirmation) is over-emphasized at the expense of the others that were 
either rejected or scantily confirmed. Third, the description of the end condition for each 
indicator should decrease the propensity of considering the best outcome as the only one 
possible to confirm the hypothesis. 
Our first sub-hypothesis underscored the importance of political embeddedness 
and proposed formal and informal legitimacy as the indicators to measure it. In terms of 
the former, the research expects that embedded NGOs will reside in a state that has a 
separate legislation on nonprofit organizations, recognizes their differences from parties, 
businesses and governmental structures, and provides a favorable tax environment for 
their activities and clear mechanisms of state control over them. State's formal 
acceptance of NGO legitimacy will also be seen in such secondary indicators as a high 
status of civil liberties (as measured by annual Freedom House reports) and the absence 
of highly publicized instances of state-sponsored NGO abuse. The latter will be 
manifested through the evidence of common cooperative efforts (such as projects, 
programs or initiatives) that an NGO undertakes with parties and the government. Such 
efforts should also receive positive assessments from the actors involved as well as 
possible external observers. The end, or ideal, state of political embeddedness would be 
the situation when an NGO is accorded a distinct place in the society, respected and 
engaged by the state and political parties. 
26
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The sub-hypothesis on social embeddedness considers such indicators as 
constituency, internal normative transfers, societal influence and financial sustainability 
to determine whether an NGO is implanted in the environment, in which it has to 
operate. As far as the issues of constituency are concerned, an embedded NGO would 
have a diverse and inclusive membership, by allowing people of different social classes, 
ages, genders and ethnicities to join it in different capacities and at different stages of an 
NGO's existence. It will also welcome potential "black sheep" - individuals whose 
socio-economic characteristics do not match those of a typical member of that NGO. The 
leadership of a rooted civil society organization will be socially diverse, horizontal (with 
few layers of authority separating leaders from regular members) and open to feedback. 
It will be elected on a rotating basis and accountable to the organizational base through 
reports and board oversight. An embedded NGO will conduct its recruitment campaigns 
frequently, publicize them widely and offer a wide range of internal positions. In that 
group, organizational communication would usually take place through multiple 
channels with a constant and predictable frequency in exchanging information. Thus, 
ideas are able to flow effectively bottom-up (from members to the leadership) and top-
down (from leaders to members). Because of well-developed recruitment and 
communications techniques, an embedded organization is expected to have a clear plan 
for mobilization, which accounts for possible contingencies and is known to all of its 
members. In the end, such an NGO becomes an internally democratic and externally 
open entity. 
In terms of the second indicator - internal normative transfers, a nonprofit is able 
to attract people with relevant expertise and provide novices with an initial battery of 
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trainings as well as regular (once every organizational cycle ) re-training activities on 
mission-specific and general issues. This will be the evidence that trainings are 
successful as an internal process of organizational development. The evidence of 
trainings' external success envisions members having sufficient skills and knowledge to 
perform their duties with competence, as evaluated by an NGO itself and other external 
sources. To identify whether an internal normative transfer has been successful a set of 
three measurements has been put forward. If an NGO follows a methodology closely 
(with or without minor changes), it is said to have adopted the normative transfer. If an 
organization decides to alter some details (add new elements, modify or discard old 
ones) to address various local specifics, but does not change the central purpose of a 
methodology, this serves as the evidence of adaptation. Finally, if a methodology is 
discarded without pilot-testing or after initial failure, it lends proof to its rejection. 
According to the ideal scenario, a firmly embedded NGO should be able to train its own 
members effectively as well as evaluate the relevance of its methodology independently. 
Speaking of societal influence that an implanted civic group should have, five 
points ought to be noted. First, this NGO would fulfill a niche by providing absent or 
underperformed services within the host society. It has existed for a period of at least 
five years28 and received internal and external assessments29 that confirm its positive 
impacts in a qualitative and/or quantitative manner . Its goals correspond with societal 
needs and take into account unfolding events, and its pursued activities are directly 
connected to the stated goals and external circumstances. At the same time, neither goals 
27
 An organizational cycle can be either a budgetary or programmatic period of time when organizational activities start anew. 
28
 The number was chosen for two reasons: a) it covers at least one presidential and one parliamentary election, making sure that an 
NGO is not an election/political project; b) it presumes that five years are enough for a group to reach some organizational maturity. 
29
 Such as written reports, media coverage, experts', parties', government's evaluations and public opinion surveys. 
30
 Sub-indicators to measure effectivesness: framing debates, getting issues on the agenda, causing procedural change, affective 
policy, influencing behavioral change in target actors. 
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nor activities remain static. Regular adjustments of both take place to reflect changes in 
the domestic situation as well as the outcomes of previous programmatic and 
organizational experiences. An embedded civic group stays active within the NGO 
community, by taking part (as an equal partner) in domestic NGO coalitions that 
advance the same or similar issue. Furthermore, such experiences receive positive 
feedback from all participating sides and external observers. Finally, a rooted non-
governmental organization offers an ample of opportunities for wider public 
involvement. It employs volunteers and interns, conducts media outreach through a 
variety of means31 and, if needed, organizes public actions32 to attract attention to its 
cause. In the end, an embedded nonprofit is viewed as a natural participant in societal 
processes. 
The last indicator of societal embeddedness deals with financial sustainability. A 
civic group that has a considerable level of implantedness relies on several (at least 2) 
types of domestic sources, which include private citizens, businesses, government and 
NGO coalitions, for monetary support and in-kind donations in its annual activities. The 
end state would therefore be a nonprofit that has medium-term sustainability (i.e. the 
ability to survive without external support beyond one year). 
The third sub-hypothesis deals with the questions of external influence that 
comes as a result of normative transfers and financial support. It is reasonable to expect 
that an embedded NGO would cooperate with foreign non-government and donor 
organizations by participating in joint projects, international events and NGO coalitions. 
Furthermore, all the involved sides and external observers will share positive 
31
 Such encompass press conferences, press releases, a website, interviews, internal publications, attendance of media events. 
32
 For instance, meetings, demonstrations and civic events. 
experiences about such instances of cooperation. Though NGO members may be initially 
trained by foreign experts, they will show decreasing reliance on additional foreign 
training, as the organization becomes more implanted. At the same time, members' 
skills, knowledge and, more importantly, the capacity to train themselves or identify 
their training needs will be positively evaluated by their key donors. In reality, this 
capacity means that an NGO requests external training rather than is ordered to have one 
by a foreign donor. When considering the relevance of external normative transfers, such 
as trainings and seminars, the dissertation applies the same set of criteria that was 
previously used to assess the impact of domestic educational and training activities. 
To sum it up, the final state for an embedded NGO would be when normative 
transfers take place in a more natural setting, where it becomes an active partner in the 
cause, rather than a passive recipient of advice. As our literature review has shown, 
foreign funding is a thorny subject for many civic groups. It can be foreseen that an 
organization that has attained a significant level of embeddedness will use a diverse pool 
of foreign funders (at least two33) and exhibit progressively decreased reliance on 
external grants. Furthermore, even those grants, for which it applies, will seek funding 
for specific projects rather than broad organizational support as well as complement 
external grants with domestic contributions. For an embedded NGO, the donor-grantee 
relationship moves from subservient to cooperative. Ideally, foreign funding becomes 
one of the many means to support that NGO's existence. 
While all the preceding materials have described what an embedded organization 
will look like, it is also important to consider the opposite - the process or the state of 
33
 A minimum number of two is necessary to make an NGO more immune to the shocks of external funding changes. 
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disembeddedness. Doing so will help us evaluate more accurately how far- from the ideal 
or the moderate stage of implantedness anNGO under our consideration is. 
In terms of its relations with a government and state's political structure, a 
disembedded nonprofit would possess little informal legitimacy, commanding no respect 
among parties and state officials. The existing instances of cooperation, if any at all, 
would be infrequent and superficial, with the sides feeling obliged to engage for the sake 
of public relations and image rather than at their own volition. Under these 
circumstances, the existing legal framework is either insufficient in offering civil society 
an adequate space to develop or underutilized by nonprofits themselves to get enough 
strength. A marginally embedded civic group would thus be relegated to a peripheral 
status in the society and viewed by major political actors as a pariah. 
In regard to societal embeddedness, such an organization will have a small pool 
of members, most of whom derive some material benefit from their involvement. Its 
leadership structure will be hierarchical and resistant to change. Furthermore, it may 
seek to limit opportunities for expertise acquisition for the fear that its monopoly on 
power might be contested/Though a disembedded NGO is able to evaluate the relevance 
of internal normative transfers, the process of doing so will be much slower and much 
more covert. As a result of internal secrecy, many of its activities will quickly become 
obsolete and bear little connection to the original goals and/or external events. In the 
end, a weakly embedded nonprofit will not be known beyond a handful of NGOs 
working in the same field34 and will not be able to secure necessary domestic financial 
support for its activities. 
Even with those, the relations are more likely to be competitive than cooperative, because of the fight for funds. 
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Finally, the nature of external involvement will be different for a marginally 
implanted civic organization. Instead of serving as short-term assistance, foreign aid will 
become an irreplaceable crutch. Because an NGO does not have a pool of trusted 
members and responsive leaders, it is more likely to accept any ideas and pursue their 
implementation with a lot of vigor and very little critical analysis of their applicability in 
order to prove its loyalty to the funder. The result will be a slew of ill-conceived 
initiatives that retard the progress and trivialize the goals in a specific issue area. Without 
significant domestic funding sources, a nonprofit would become exclusively dependent 
on foreign grants. 
A marginally embedded non-governmental organization will have few, if any, 
connections with the political society and the domestic public within which it has to 
operate. It is also quite common for an entity like this to look down upon both, claiming 
that politics and politicians are too "dirty" and too removed from the high ideals of 
civicness to deal with and the public is too uneducated in civic manners to involve in 
NGO's intricate internal workings. A disembedded nonprofit is glad to cooperate only 
with a pool of foreign donors, which provide it with financial support and 
unquestionable normative guidance. It is thus unsurprising that in the society such civic 
groups will be perceived as "foreign agents" that come and fade at the behest of their 
overseas benefactors. 
It is pertinent to finish our discussion about embeddedness, by concentrating on 
the natural state of affairs that a regularly embedded NGO would find itself in on a daily 
basis. The necessity to do so stems from the danger of taking the index too far or 
perceiving its classification too literally. The capacity to categorize nonprofit 
organizations according to their level of rootedness may inadvertently lead one to 
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assume some statism - once the ideal state of high embeddedness is attained, an NGO 
does nothing, but rest on its laurels. This vision would be not only oversimplified, but 
also erroneous at the core. Like many social processes, embeddedness is neither final nor 
permanent. Instead, NGOs - mature and new alike - have to grapple and balance 
continuously the key dimensions of embeddedness. The dilemmas of how to interact 
with political parties without being swallowed by them or how to attract new generations 
of citizens to support an old cause (which by then has been extensively redefined), or 
how to cooperate with international partners in advancing shared goals, while 
maintaining NGO's own identity, remain at the forefront of every nonprofit's concerns. 
What makes it all different for those organizations that are significantly implanted into 
their host societies is the ability to strike the right balance (sooner, rather than latter) by 
relying on the acquired experience, innate intuition and knowledge of the local society 
and its circumstances, and never-ending feedback from all the relevant actors that is 
available in abundance in highly participatory societies. 
Defining success 
Since the second part of the main hypothesis ties greater embeddedness to more 
success during the color revolutions, it is important to specify what success means in this 
particular case. 
The dissertation advances two indicators of success - function and contribution. 
In the first case, we will evaluate whether the four organizations under analysis 
performed the function that was expected of them by others and defined by the 
organizations themselves during those events. For instance, an election watchdog (like 
ISFED or CVU) is supposed to monitor elections, announce the results of its efforts and 
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distribute its assessment among relevant political and societal actors. A youth group (like 
Kmara or Pora) is expected to mobilize previously passive segments of the population to 
vote and to defend their choice. The second indicator deals with an NGO's specific 
contribution to the revolutionary process, which may come in four different forms 
(which also coincide with the stages of a revolution) - initial mobilization of protestors, 
organizing and sustaining large-scale demonstrations, helping to resolve (through legal 
or political means) the impasse that generated the revolution. 
After assessing embeddedness for each organization, the dissertation evaluates 
their performance in the color revolution to determine their success based on the two 
indicators outlined above. 
Anteceding variables 
As the dissertation's first chapter makes it clear, civil society never emerges and 
develops in a vacuum. It is, therefore, not possible to analyze the embeddedness of 
specific civic groups without considering broadly the variables that shape the milieu for 
civil society in general. Based on the review of the extant literature, two of them should 
be distinguished. 
The first one is political culture that is defined as "the specifically political 
orientations — attitudes toward the political system and its various parties and attitudes 
toward the role of the self in the system" as well as "the particular distribution of 
patterns of orientation toward political objects among the members of the nation."35 The 
importance of a specific political culture for organizational embeddedness lies in a set of 
35
 Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1963), 12-13. 
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behaviors that either encourage or discourage citizens to be involved in wider societal 
processes. 
Within the three types of political culture, which Almond and Verba identify, the 
participant one provides most features that are conducive to wider public involvement. 
Its members are oriented both toward input and output mechanisms of the system and 
see themselves in the "activist" role. The least amicable to participation is the parochial 
culture where people hold no expectations of the political system and/or are deeply 
unaware of the political aspects of life. For this culture, most participatory activities 
occur within a narrow range of one's family or most proximate community settings. The 
subject culture occupies the golden, but rather unhappy middle. Though its members are 
aware of specialized governmental authority, they have either a generally passive 
attitude toward the system and their role within it or, worst of all, perceive the whole 
structure as illegitimate. 
The outlined categories enable us to hypothesize that NGOs will be best 
embedded in the participant political culture, which encourages various forms of 
engagement and draws strong links between civil and political societies. On the other 
hand, NGO's embeddedness will vary from moderate to low in subject cultures with the 
range being dependent on the extent of people's estrangement from the system or the 
strength of their perception that the government is illegitimate. Finally, civic groups will 
not be embedded in the states with parochial political cultures, because traditional 
societies are prone to expunge any external influence. 
Our research will test these hypotheses by looking at the political culture in 
Ukraine and Georgia. Using public opinion surveys, we will consider the following set 
of indicators - people's attention to politics, their discussion of politics in social settings, 
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national pride, trust in government and other state institutions, sense of efficacy, voting, 
social/general trust, education, tolerance, a belief in democracy, self-assessment of 
government's impact on one's life and strategies to influence it. Citizens in a participant 
culture are expected to be more concerned about politics and discuss political matters on 
a regular basis in common settings, such as family, friends and work. They believe 
government plays a great role in their daily life. They also have a high feeling of national 
pride, greater trust toward the state and its institutions (note - institutions, not specific 
individuals who may head them at present) and a greater feeling of efficacy. Because 
politics matters to them and they believe they can matter in politics, such people have a 
belief in democracy and are more likely to vote. Aside from voting, they employ a wide 
range of other participatory strategies, like civic involvement, meetings, demonstrations, 
legislative petitioning, etc. As a result of civic actvitism, they meet a great variety of 
people and become more tolerant of diverse political, social views and lifestyles. 
The second critical anteceding variable is the role of the state. Our previous 
analysis has noted numerous times of the link that exists between civil and political 
societies. It has also been mentioned that where the state historically precedes civil 
society, it has the power of shaping the legal, social and political settings within which 
the former will have to operate. The hypothesis that comes out of this historical 
analysis can be summarized as follows - the more powerful the state, the harder it is for 
an NGO to get embedded. In other words, a potent state will not only subsume the space 
normally taken by nonprofit organizations, but will also seek to use the mechanisms to 
36
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ensure control over such entities. The dissertation intends to look at two types of 
indicators to determine the state's strength. 
The first deals with its coercive capacity, more specifically the scope and 
cohesion of suppression. If a state is highly repressive (i.e. responding with toughest 
instruments to most minute incursions on its authority), the scope is said to be high. If it 
is relatively tolerant (i.e. preferring not to interfere unless the absolutely vital interests 
are at stake), then the scope is determined as low. The cohesion of coercive powers 
depends on whether and to what extent the state is able to induce compliance with its 
apparatus. Such powers are high if groups comply immediately (or even preemptively by 
not pursuing certain actions) with state demands. However, if individuals and groups are 
able to resist and/or successfully avoid the state attempts of coercion, then the level of 
cohesion is deemed low. 
The second indicator of strength assesses the role of the governing party 
organization, by looking at the scope of its infrastructure and its internal cohesion. A 
state will be Strong if a governing party has a highly developed infrastructure that is able 
to penetrate all layers of societal functioning. Here the analogy with the Communist 
Party is pertinent. During its seventy-year hold over millions of Soviet citizens, the party 
had legendary omnipresence that included Communist cells in villages, schools, 
kindergartens, as well as party supplicants, like Communist pioneers, Komsomol and 
obedient trade unions. Wherever you were and whoever you were, the Communist Party 
made sure it was somewhere close to you. The example goes to illuminate the 
importance of state infrastructure in controlling its populace, observing its mood and 
forestalling possible dissent. The opposite is also true - if the government is absent in 
37
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certain areas, the vacuum of authority will soon be filled by other actors, including civil 
society groups. At the same time, it is not enough for the governing party to be widely 
present. It also needs to be internally coherent, by offering significant rewards to party 
members and other loyalists to support and promote its policies in their localities. Going 
back to the Soviet example, one of the reasons for the country's collapse was a split 
within the Communist Party between hard-liners (represented at different times by Yegor 
Ligaehev and Vladimir Kryuchkov) and reformers (led by Mikhail Gorbachev). The 
high-level divisions manifested themselves at all echelons of the party. In the end, it was 
weakened and unable to remain the mechanism of repression it used to be in the past. To 
summarize, in reviewing the cases of Ukraine and Georgia, the research will consider to 
what extent the regimes of Kuchma and Shevarnadze relied on coercion and how 
effective such repression was. It will then assess the role of governing party 
organizations in shoring up support for these regimes. 
While political culture and the state's role can be labeled as background variables 
(because they determine the setting within which NGOs have to seek embeddedness), 
Western leverage and domestic elite responsiveness often become ongoing anteceding 
factors in the process of embeddedness. Unlike in the previous cases, Western leverage 
does not play an unambiguously positive role. On one hand, the presence of Western 
pressures can ensure that civil society is given a chance to emerge and develop. Fearing 
Western economic and political retributions, state leaders may choose to ease their 
pressure on domestic civic groups. On the other hand, too much Western attention and 
leverage can isolate NGOs from the rest of their society or, even worse, make them look 
as foreign stooges. Though there is a positive correlation between Western leverage and 
elite responsiveness, the impact that foreign governments can make is obviously not 
limitless. It depends on three sets of variables. The first includes such leverage factors as 
state's economic and political vulnerability, the consistency of Western attention and 
pressures, and the existence of countervailing powers. The extant research asserts that 
the state will be more vulnerable if it possesses any of the five following characteristics: 
recently acquired statehood, a hybrid form of democracy, heterogeneous population, 
indicators of poor economic performance and post-communist structural deficiencies. 
Western impact will be amplified if it is both consistent (i.e. it happens on a regular basis 
around predictable issues) and credible (i.e. Western assessments and observers are seen 
as not openly supporting a specific domestic constituency).39 However, it may be 
severely undercut if it occurs in the region with one or more countervailing powers, 
which can offer alternatives to Western support. The second set includes a wide range of 
linkages, such as shared history, interconnected economic development and close 
geographic proximity.40 All of them will undoubtedly enhance Western impact. Finally, 
whether or not national political elites choose to respond to external pressures from the 
West depends on their internal cohesiveness, domestic popularity, political upbringing 
and a country's previous experiences of domestic unrest.41 If elites are divided from 
within, they will be more susceptible to foreign pressures in order to placate the internal 
group of moderates. Unpopular governments are also more likely to be responsive, as 
they try to avoid giving their domestic rivals another issue to rally around.42 
Furthermore, leaders who have matured politically during the Soviet times are more 
sensitive to Western criticism because of their intention to be seen as "democrats" 
38
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39
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abroad. In the end, domestic leadership will base its responses on the past record.43 If the 
instruments of coercion were once used without Western reproach, they have greater 
chances of being utilized again on the assumption of a similar Western reaction. 
To conclude, the dissertation will consider three anteceding variables - political 
culture, the role of state and the influence of Western leverage. The first two set the stage 
for NGO's embeddedness. The last frequently intervenes in the process of an NGO 
getting rooted within the society. In terms of expected outcomes, the research anticipates 
that states with highly participant political culture and restrained mechanisms of coercion 
will provide a more favorable climate for NGOs and enhance their chances to become 
embedded. It is also speculated that the presence of several leverage factors, the specifics 
of elite composition and its domestic standing, and a country's tight linkages to the West 
will increase the responsiveness to Western pressures, which aim at helping NGOs to 
survive and thrive. 
Addressing causality: civil society and embeddedness 
It is important to elaborate on the causal link between civil society and 
embeddedness in order to avoid making a circular argument, thereby a strong civil 
society contributes to greater embeddedness and greater embeddedness contributes to a 
strong civil society. In civil societies of developed democracies, there is indeed a strong 
inter-linkage between the two phenomena because of the long record of embedded civic 
entities (ranging from trade unions to groups on social causes, like the Mothers Against 
Drunk Drivers). Such circularity is, however, absent in developing democracies because 
NGOs do not have a long record of existence. In many of such states we still deal with 
43
 Bunce and Wolchik. 
nonprofit organizations of the first wave that were set up in the mid-1990s. Therefore, 
the natural mutual enrichment - where strongly embedded NGOs make the whole civil 
society more in touch with the domestic landscape and a firmly rooted civil society will 
push NGOs to become more implanted simply to stay afloat and be competitive with 
others - is absent in the former Soviet Union because most nonprofit groups are still 
weak and the civil society in general does not have a history of being truly independent 
from the state. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The reliance on case studies to investigate the notion of domestic embeddedness 
brings a number of methodological advantages to our analysis. First, as a research 
approach, case studies are believed to be better suited for exploring complex phenomena 
that are difficult to model statistically.44 It has been previously noted that embeddedness 
managed to escape a careful research scrutiny, precisely because it is so elusive in its 
manifestations. When NGOs are well implanted in their prospective domestic societies, 
embeddedness is implicitly assumed. When they are weak and detached, researchers 
choose to pay attention to other more perceptible problems (such as NGO's weak 
fundraising strategies, bad relations with parties, or an apathetic public), which are easier 
to track down. Second, the ease study approach is useful in studying embeddedness as a 
conceptual innovation, because the engagement of theory and a close analysis of cases 
bring an unusual capacity to see the general in the particular.45 From the theoretical 
perspective, this dissertation brings together the accumulated knowledge of two fields -
44
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democratization and civil society. It combines them to flash out the hypotheses on how 
embedded civic organizations fit in democratic transformations. On the practical side, 
this research takes a step further by looking at the two events of rapid democratic 
transition to see to what extent embeddedness, as a theoretical construct, impacted the 
role of NGOs in the Orange Revolution in Ukraine and the Rose Revolution in Georgia. 
In the end, the insights gained from these cases will be used to refine the initial 
theoretical speculations on NGO embeddedness and democratization, thus enriching 
both scientific fields from which they were derived. 
Method and data collection tools 
The dissertation will use the method of controlled comparison that collects data 
on the same variables across units with a small number of cases.46 For this purpose, it 
has defined the concept of embeddedness and developed a specific set of indicators that 
will be tested separately, but consistently, for two non-governmental organizations in 
Georgia and Ukraine. The following four data collection instruments would be utilized in 
the process of data gathering. 
First, the research will conduct participant interviews with leaders and members 
of the NGOs under consideration to get first-hand perspectives on their experiences as 
well as their views on the NGO's embeddedness and the stature of the domestic civil 
society in general. Second, expert interviews will be undertaken to obtain independent 
evaluations that would serve two concurrent purposes. On the one hand, they would 
supplement the information available from primary participant interviews, by providing 
additional detail. On the other, they may serve as a means to diminish the interviewer 
46
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bias, by offering alternative viewpoints and interpretations on the same issue. Third, the 
study will perform extensive content analysis of relevant NGO materials (such as 
websites, public statements, interviews, press releases, etc.) to see whether the private 
responses of NGO members and external experts match with the image that anNGO was 
projecting in public at the time. Fourth, a wide array of secondary sources will be used to 
fill in the gaps that emerge as a result of the interviews and the analysis of primary 
sources. Among qualitative secondary sources, the research will rely on reports and 
assessments by domestic governments, civil society watchdog groups, foreign and 
international donors that consider the performance of our NGOs and/or the civil society 
in general. The quantitative instruments will encompass public and NGO surveys that 
offer numerical data to strengthen our assessments. It should, however, be noted that the 
dissertation will not perform any statistical analyses of its own. 
To emphasize, the complementarity of data collection tools is designed to 
achieve two critical goals. The first relates to the ultimate task of case studies - "to bring 
as much information to bear on our hypothesis as possible."47 Thus, the reader should be 
presented with a richer, multi-dimensional and highly nuanced picture of organizational 
embeddedness. The second seeks to ameliorate one of the inherent weaknesses of any 
qualitative methodology - the possibility that individual biases will greatly skew the 
obtained responses. To this end, the dissertation makes it a specific goal to consult 
several sources, juxtapose their responses and (in the process of collecting data) pursue 
on inconsistencies through additional interviews or subsequent clarifications. Secondary 
sources will become another valuable (though mostly indirect) check on the validity of 
the acquired information. Therefore, in the end the dissertation should combine a 
47
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richness of detail and vividness of personal accounts with the reliability of a scientific 
inquiry that provides empirical and theoretical contributions to the field and enables 
future replicability. 
Research structure 
The research structure of this dissertation is a three-pronged approach that closely 
follows the model suggested by King, Keohane and Verba in their seminal writing 
"Designing Social Inquiry." It begins by summarizing the historical detail. The goal at 
this stage is to focus on the outcomes (i.e. the background that led to the success of the 
"color revolutions") that I wish to explain and to condense the information at our 
disposal. In the process of doing so, the research will review the general development of 
civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia and the legal framework that regulates NGO 
activities in the two states. 
The second step conducts descriptive inference, which is "the process of 
understanding an unobserved phenomenon on the basis of a set of observations."48 The 
key objective in this undertaking is to distinguish between systematic and nonsystematic 
components of embeddedness as the phenomenon under analysis. In order to do that, the 
research will gather data on the set of specific indicators (e.g. constituency, societal 
influence, external and internal transfers, etc.) that have been outlined earlier in the 
chapter. 
The third and final step is about making causal inference. The aim here is to 
establish a causal effect, by showing "the difference between the systematic component 
of observations made when the explanatory variable takes one value and the systematic 
Ibid., 55 
component of comparable observations... takes on an other values." It is worth 
mentioning that this stage is fraught with difficulties and frequently avoided by 
researchers for the fear that presented evidence will not amount to a compelling case of 
causality. In our case, the challenge is further complicated by the choice of case studies 
as the research methodology, because qualitative techniques are thought to be more 
elusive (than their quantitative counterparts) in establishing apparent causal links. To 
evaluate whether there is a positive causal relationship between embeddedness and an 
NGO's performance in a "color revolution," the dissertation will rely on the index of 
embeddedness, which assigns weight specifications to each of our indicators. Therefore, 
when summarizing NGO's performance, it will be able to conclude whether an 
organization is strongly, weakly or moderately embedded based on a cumulative 
weightedc score it obtained on all the indicators. 
Design of the case studies 
Each case study will consist of two profiles. The first one describes a domestic 
civil society in general features. The second looks at the four non-governmental 
organizations (two in each country) that are the focus of this dissertation in Ukraine and 
Georgia. 
Though the primary theoretical reasoning (i.e. the importance of summarizing the 
historical content) for putting the portraits of Ukrainian and Georgian civil societies first 
has been already presented, a couple of arguments ought to be further highlighted. 
First, the composite picture of a national civil society and its members allows 
developing a certain background against which the embeddedness of our organizations 
49
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can be better judged. For instance, it is not surprising that a more mature civil society is 
likely to produce a greater number of highly or moderately embedded nonprofits, 
because it provides more propitious conditions that help NGOs connect to people and 
political actors. Whereas in weak and underdeveloped civil societies, nonprofits may 
need to go an extra mile to achieve the level of embeddedness that their counterparts 
elsewhere take for granted. 
Second, civil society profiles will enable to make a future descriptive inference as 
to whether our NGOs are typical, as compared to the general parameters of a nonprofit in 
that country. Furthermore, if they are not typical, the study will be able to pinpoint the 
specific features make them stand out in their host societies. 
Data will be collected along two lines of inquiry. The first deals with overall 
characteristics of a nonprofit sector and looks at such variables as a number of registered 
NGOs,50 their regional distribution, average size,51 issue orientation, longevity,52 and 
sources of funding. The second seeks to identify general socioeconomic and normative 
qualities of NGOs members. For the former, it pays attention to their age, income, 
gender, and length of membership. In the latter, the research looks at whether members 
of civic groups have a set of pro-democratic attitudes (like a belief in democracy, high 
general and institutional trust, patterns of volunteering, voting and greater tolerance as 
well as more civic-minded reasons for involvement). 
The second part of each case study will deal with two non-governmental 
organizations in Ukraine and Georgia. The first type of NGOs includes those that 
50
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organized public protests and received the greatest amount of attention from the Western 
media and policy-makers - Pora in Ukraine and Kmara in Georgia. The second group 
encompasses such nationally famous election monitoring groups as the Committee of 
Voters of Ukraine (CVU) and the International Society for Fair Elections and 
Democracy (ISFED) in Georgia. 
Their description will be divided into two large parts. The first delivers in-depth 
evidence of their background and activities that relate to the key indicators of 
embeddedness. The other details how organizational implantedness works in practice, by 
showing the ways in which the NGOs under consideration have exercised their influence 
on a regular basis and during the critical days of a "color revolution." 
Therefore, in the first part data will be gathered along four areas - organizational 
background, constituency, legitimacy, and external and internal normative transfers. In 
the second one, the information will be collected on two dimensions. The first will 
include the description of NGO's general programs and activities and how well they 
have been able to penetrate the domestic political system and reach the ordinary public 
in order to produce the desired outcomes. The second scrutinizes the initiatives that the 
NGOs pursued during the color revolutions and their influence on the overall course of 
events. 
Each case study will conclude by summarizing the state of the national civil 
society in Georgia and Ukraine and bringing together the major findings related to the 
performance of the four NGOs on the indicators of embeddedness. 
CHAPTER III 
CASE STUDY: UKRAINE 
My dissertation seeks to provide its own answer on what it takes to build a 
functioning civil society in a nascent democracy. As Chapter I describes, civil society is 
a broad theoretical construct that consists of a variety of formal and informal elements. 
Civic groups, which represent interests of diverse constituencies, are the most prominent 
formal manifestation of civil society. They are especially important in the former Soviet 
republics where a historically produced lack of genuine civic structures is combined with 
mass apathy and withdrawal from the public into the private realm of life.1 
Under these conditions, in order to strengthen civil society as a whole, it is 
necessary to create successful civic organizations. In turn, my work asserts that NGOs' 
success is determined by the extent of their embeddedness in a host society. Deeply 
rooted civic groups will enhance the capacity of civil society to become a relevant and 
independent actor. Such NGOs will be more pro-active and flexible in regard to 
changing political and social circumstances. They will also serve as a magnet for 
individuals and other elements of civil society to get involved in public life. 
With the goal to assess whether embeddedness contributes to the success of civic 
groups, this chapter considers how two Ukrainian organizations - Pora and the 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) - participated in the Orange Revolution. The 
narrative begins with an overview of the event and the contribution that each group has 
made to its success. The description of Pora's and CVU's performance during the 
1
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revolution answers the question - "What did they do at that critical juncture for their 
domestic societies?" 
However, limiting the analysis to just that would provide only half of the picture. 
The other half lies in finding out how those groups became so influential and why they 
decided to be (or not to be) involved in the revolution in the first place. Therefore, the 
research will proceed to a detailed assessment of the formative period for both civic 
associations. Enlarging the scope of inquiry beyond the timeframe of the revolution will 
accomplish two goals. First, it will set the context within these organizations had to 
operate in 1991-2004 by sketching the profile of the national civil society. Second, the 
evaluation of the groups' formative years will trace the process of getting domestically 
implanted, which occurs over time. 
The final section of this chapter will consider the failures and successes of Pora 
and CVU in the Orange Revolution, thereby setting the stage for a more comprehensive 
analysis of their embeddedness. 
ORANGE REVOLUTION 
Stakes and candidates 
In 2004, Ukraine was scheduled to have the fourth presidential elections since its 
independence in August 1991. Though voters were offered a plethora of contenders, two 
Viktors - Yanukovych and Yushchenko - stood a real chance of winning. 
The election was significant in marking the end of a decade-long and 
increasingly authoritarian rule by President Leonid Kuchma. Having finally decided not 
I l l 
to seek another (and dubiously legal2) term in office, the Ukrainian president anointed 
Viktor Yanukovych as his successor. Hailing from Donetsk in Eastern Ukraine, 
Yanukovych represented the interests of the region's and the country's richest oligarch 
Rinat Akhmetov and became prime minister in November 2002. He endeared himself to 
Kuchma by showing a ruthless style of governance as well as an ability to deliver results, 
more prominently an astounding victory of the pro-governmental party "For a United 
Ukraine" in the 2002 parliamentary elections in his region. As a presidential candidate, 
Yanukovych emphasized the continuity of economic stability and growth that ensued at 
the end of Kuchma's second term.3 
On the opposite side of the battle, there was Viktor Yushchenko. In 1992-1999 he 
served as the Chairman of Ukraine's Central Bank and later in 1999-2000 as prime 
minister. Widely credited for a successful introduction of hryvnia (the national currency) 
and an economic upturn in the late 1990s, Yushchenko was extremely popular in 
Western and Central Ukraine. With Yulia Tymoshenko, a colorful and boisterous critic 
of Kuchma, agreeing not to run in favor of Yushchenko, he had no competitor within the 
usually fractious pro-democratic camp. His appeal among voters attracted second-tier 
oligarchs and former regime loyalists,4 like chocolate baron Petro Poroshenko. 
Election campaign 
"Dzerkalo Tyzhnia," an influential weekly newspaper, once compared President 
Kuchma to the sun that commanded every single object in the Ukrainian political solar 
2
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system to revolve around his interests. From this perspective, the presidential campaign 
became the ultimate solar eclipse. 
In summer 2004, authorities were anxious about their inability to control the 
campaign narrative.5 Yushchenko's rallies were attracting increasingly large crowds, 
regardless of media boycott. Foreign and domestic civic groups proved to be a noisy 
bunch that was hard to silence. Pora sent jitters with its public protests and recurring 
street posters. CVU reports were well read in foreign capitals, particularly in Washington 
and Brussels. Few independent media, like the already mentioned "Zerkalo Nedeli," 
online website "Ukrainska Pravda" and small TV station "5 Kanal," were outposts of an 
endless critical coverage of the regime.6 President Kuchma felt pressured by foreign 
delegations that descended upon the Ukrainian capital to emphasize the link between fair 
elections and the international recognition of a future Ukrainian president.7 
The campaign took a decisive turn for the worse when on September 5, 2004 
Viktor Yushchenko was allegedly poisoned during his dinner with the head of Ukraine's 
security services (SBU) Ihor Smeshko.8 Demonstrations erupted throughout the country. 
Both campaigns ratcheted up their rhetoric - Yushchenko with the famous slogan 
"Prisons to the Bandits!" and Yanukovych with the description of his opponent as 
"BUSHenko." 
Voting 
5
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The first round of presidential elections took place on October 31,2004 and revealed that 
the government had greatly improved its vast expertise in fraud from the 1999 and 2002 
campaigns. 
Thousands of employees were coerced into voting in advance with absentee 
ballots, which were collected by employers to verify the "correct" vote. Ballots of those 
who voted at home (often the elderly and the physically handicapped) were switched on 
the way to a district polling station. Discrepancies in voter lists were staggering. Citizens 
stood hours in line only to find out that their name did not appear on the list. Authorities 
relied heavily on the use of "dead souls,"9 who predictably supported the government 
candidate. In a massive effort to skew the results, bus tours transported thousands of 
people from Eastern Ukraine who used their "absentee coupons"10 to vote several times 
at several polling stations. Finally, large-scale irregularities occurred during the vote 
count by district commissions and most importantly by the Central Election Commission 
(CEC) in Ukraine. A suspension in counting was frequently announced when 
Yushchenko threatened to take the lead. The announcement of official results was 
delayed by more than a week. On November 10, the CEC informed that with 74.9 
percent of the turnout, Yushchenko won the first round by 0.61 percent. He received 
39.87 percent and Yanukovych got 39.26 percent of the total vote.11 
The campaign continued for another month and a half. However, the tactics of 
campaigning and the methods of conducting elections only worsened.12 In the end, on 
9
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November 21, 2004 78.7 percent or 29,291,744 Ukrainians voted, surpassing any 
previous records of participation. On the night after the elections, extra 1.1 million votes 
were thrown in via computer manipulations. The results produced a Soviet-like turnout 
and voting in Yanukovych's native Donetsk region. Additional 871,402 votes also tilted 
the victory in his favor by 2.9 percent.13 
Orange Revolution 
By the end of the Election Day, first tents appeared on Khreshchatyk (Kyiv's 
central street), and about 25,000-30,000 activists gathered at the Maidan of 
Independence (the location of future protests). On November 22, the crowd grew up 
between 150,000-300,000 protesters who were mostly from Kyiv.14 Others were arriving 
continuously from western and central parts of the country. Demonstrators demanded the 
recognition of Yushchenko's victory. During first two nights, a violent crackdown on 
demonstrations by authorities was possible. As the New York Time revealed, the option 
was hotly debated inside the Kuchma circle. By November 23, the number of people 
downtown Kyiv was so large that any use of force was unfathomable. The 
announcement of official results by the Central Election Commission the following day 
had an opposite effect, by adding the oil of anger and determination to the fire of the 
revolution. Sensing a breaking point, Pora activists staged protests at major government 
buildings, including Preident Kuchma's dacha. On November 25, international mediators 
arrived to Kyiv to monitor negotiations between Yushchenko and Yanukovych. That day 
major Ukrainian TV channels lifted state-imposed censorship to cover demonstrations. 
13
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By the end of the week, Ukraine's parliament - the Verkhovna Rada - recognized the 
second round as unconstitutional and ordered a re-vote. The situation remained tense as 
sides were haggling over precise details of the compromise, and Yanukovych's Party of 
Regions attempted to instigate the partition of Eastern Ukrainian oblasts into a Severo-
Ponetsk Republic.15 On December 3, the Supreme Court of Ukraine ruled on 
Yushchenko's appeal, by invalidating the results of the second round and ordering a re-
vote on December 26. The Orange Revolution has achieved its main goal. The 
demonstrations began to dissipate after December 8 when the Ukrainian parliament 
approved a package of legislative and constitutional changes that enabled the third round 
of voting. 
Pora and CVU in the Orange Revolution 
Both Pora and CVU participated in the Orange Revolution, but did so in a 
different manner. Whereas Pora's input was direct and visible, CVU preferred to provide 
informal analytical assistance and strenuously maintain public neutrality. 
Pora made three critical contributions. First, it enabled the revolutionary cascade 
by brining initial protesters to the streets. The magnitude of immediate support and its 
seemingly high level of logistical organization tilted the public perception and persuaded 
hesitant politicians to join Yushchenko. The organization showed an astonishing ability 
to persuade and mobilize a large student population of the capital. Guided by Pora 
activists, young people from Kyiv's two largest schools - Kyiv Shevchenko and Kyiv 
Polytechnic Universities - marched downtown to the Maidan of Independence.16 The 
15
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growing crowd of students was quickly joined by Kyiv residents and began producing a 
ripple effect elsewhere. 
Second, Pora was crucial in sustaining the demonstrations and the level of public 
involvement. By setting up and manning the Orange tent city downtown Kyiv, the group 
provided a focal gathering point for protestors and ensured that the demonstrations could 
not be crushed at night when mass participation dramatically decreased. In the end, 
Pora's tent city signified the endurance of protestors, determined to have their grievances 
finally addressed.17 
Third, thanks to coordination with Yushchenko's bloc "Our Ukraine," Pora's 
well-attended and noisy protests at key government buildings instilled a sense of the 
opposition's inevitable victory. The national government was brought to a standstill 
when the group picketed the Cabinet of Ministers, Central Election Commission and the 
Presidential Administration.18 At his own dacha President Kuchma had to bear with a 
continuous drumbeat organized by Pora activists who were determined to sap his 
confidence. The tactics achieved their main goal - the recognition of the second round of 
voting as illegitimate and scheduling a re-vote. 
In answering my question about the influence that the Committee of Voters of 
Ukraine exerted on the course of the Orange revolution, its Chairman immediately 
demanded a qualification on what is meant by the revolution. In his opinion, if one 
considers mere protests at Kyiv's central square as the revolution, then the impact was 
17
 Aslund and McFaul, 96; Tetyana Soboleva, NDI Political Officer in Ukraine, interview with the author, June 2007. 
18
 Ukrainska Pravda, "Yushchenkivtsi zablokuvaly vsi vhody do Kabminu ta AP" [Yushchenko supporters blocked all entrances to 
the Cabinet of Ministers and the Presidential Administration], 25 November 2004, http://pravda.com.ua/news/2004/ll/25/1413S.htm. 
117 
minimal. If, on the other hand, one looks at the contributions to the revolution as a social 
event, then CVU can boast two achievements.19 
One, its long-term observation reports kept Ukraine in the news on the Capitol 
Hill and became a powerful tool to exert influence on the Kuchma regime. The other, 
CVU was critical to the legal resolution of the revolution's conundrum - i.e. how to 
legitimize the ordering of a re-vote. By providing the factual dossiers to Our Ukraine, the 
Committee provided much needed substance for the case that the voting on November 
21,2004 was manipulated to such an extent as to completely alter the will of Ukrainian 
people.20 
To sum up the influence of both groups, Pora was crucial in empowering the 
politically disenchanted youth, organizing and sustaining its involvement in general and 
specific events that occurred during the Orange Revolution. Thanks to the media 
coverage, its activists became the face of the protests. Through the meticulous work of 
its activists, the Committee of Voters of Ukraine provided a critical coverage of the 
election campaign as well as a basis to legally challenge the outcome of the vote. 
FORMATIVE YEARS 
The majority of available research on the Orange Revolution usually stops at this 
point. Even the best analytical pieces do not go further than analyzing general trends and 
factors, which contributed to the successful performance of civil society as a whole. 
However, such analyses do not reconcile the discrepancy between previously negative 
Ihor Popov, CVU Chairman, interview with the author, June 2007. 
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assessments of civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia and a surprisingly strong 
performance of specific civic groups in color revolutions. 
The assessment below is designed to redress this problem. Its approach is two-
fold. The first part will sketch a composite portrait of the Ukrainian civil society, thereby 
helping to understand the milieu within which groups like Pora and CVU had to operate. 
More importantly, the diagnosis of Ukrainian civil society's pathologies and strengths 
will provide a baseline to compare whether (and how) the civic associations under 
analysis differed from the rest of non-governmental organizations. The second part will 
trace the organizational evolution of Pora and CVU before the Orange revolution in 
order to provide evidence on the groups' political and societal embeddedness as well as 
the role of external influences. 
In the end, both parts are key to answering the dissertation's main hypothesis on 
the contribution of embeddedness to the groups' performance in the revolution. If indeed 
groups were different from the rest of Ukraine's civil society and the differences can be 
attributed to their greater connections with ordinary citizens and political parties, then it 
would be possible to assert that embeddedness plays a critical role in facilitating the 
maturation of nonprofit organizations in nascent democracies. With this purpose in mind, 
we begin by evaluating how the Ukrainian third sector developed in thirteen years since 
the country's independence. 
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NONPROFIT SECTOR IN UKRAINE 
Legal framework and NGO growth 
Though Ukraine has a generally liberal legal framework in key areas of nonprofit 
activities, some remnants of the Soviet system persist. In the first decade of 
independence the growth of new non-governmental organizations was vigorous. 
However, their sheer number did not translate into potency or longevity. 
The domestic legislation offers a fairly broad definition of a civic organization as 
"an association of citizens to satisfy and protect their legal, social, economic, creative, 
age, national-cultural, sport and other Common interests."21 NGOs are allowed "to 
organize the collection of charitable donations and contributions from individuals and 
legal entities, foreign states and international organizations."22 The reasons for NGO 
dissolution encompass such widely accepted postulates as calls for violence against 
specific societal groups and activities to undermine state sovereignty.23 
One of the legislative loopholes is the requirement for NGOs to undergo, what in 
fact amounts to, a double registration process. An organization has to be registered by 
the Ministry of Justice to confirm its legality and obtain an approval from local police to 
qualify for a not-for-profit tax status. The redundancy is obvious - a group has to seek 
authorization from two state bodies where one (local police) is a subordinate of the other 
(the Ministry of Justice), which has already permitted NGO's existence. 
Soviet suspicions about any entrepreneurial activity also permeate the laws that 
regulate financial aspects of civic organizations. The Law on the Taxation of Enterprises 
is both convoluted and restrictive (if applied unfavorably). First and foremost, under the 
21
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concept of "public organizations" it lumps together different types of entities. In the past, 
the ambiguity allowed states authorities to sponsor disproportionately state-funded 
groups, while claiming credit for supporting civil society as a whole. Second, the 
legislation imposes same reporting requirements on small civic groups and big 
businesses, even though the former may often have no funds to employ a full-time 
accountant.24 Third, most confusion and frustration arise from the legal clause, 
prohibiting NGOs to engage in commercial activities without establishing a business 
sister entity, unless such activities support an NGO's core statutory goals. This 
ambiguity leaves many nonprofits at the mercy of local tax inspections that have the 
discretion to classify NGO services as serving their statutory goals (thereby non-
commercial) or revoke their nonprofit status. It is not surprising that under these 
circumstances 50 percent of organizations wishing to register as not-for-profit were 
denied the status by Ukraine's tax authorities.25 Finally, the legislative base before the 
Orange Revolution substantially limited the ability of NGOs to receive private donations 
from individuals and businesses to 4 percent of their total taxable income. 
As a consequence of the abovementioned issues, 50 percent of nonprofit 
organizations see legislative obstacles to NGO development and 43-46 percent claim a 
lack of experience in implementing the pertinent legislation appropriately.26 
When speaking about the growth of the Ukrainian civil society, it is hard to 
imagine the striking magnitude of developments. The country began with merely 319 
registered civic organizations at its birth in 1991 and accounted for over 23,000 NGOs 
24
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and charity foundations by 1999.27 The State Committee of Statistics reveals a 
progressive growth rate of civic groups, with Ukraine's Ministry of Justice registering 
between 1,006 (in 1996) and 2,069 (in 2004) new organizations.28 
Unfortunately j the official data is less helpful in determining how many of the 
registered organizations were able to survive. Because the government tracks only 
"birth," but not "death" of nonprofits (when they do not submit their financial reports 
and lose their nonprofit status), it is impossible to establish either mean longevity or 
survival rate. However, cross-regional evaluations from civil society experts offer a grim 
picture - only 10-15 percent of the legally set-up organizations function in the real life.29 
Their comments also point to a great level of fluidity within the sector when NGOs 
mushroom in the fields favored by foreign donors at the time. To sum up the situation, 
by 2004 Ukraine's civil society was only statistically strong.30 
Public participation and attitude 
The research on civil society development in Ukraine has spoken at length about 
low public participation as a powerful impediment to greater civic activism.31 In 1994-
2004, over 80 percent of Ukrainians were not members of any civic group.32 Explaining 
their apathy, almost equal portions saw either no need in civil society or indicated being 
busy with other problems, or simply not interested. 
27
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A big part of public apathy stems from a deep resentment of organized 
participation that dates back to the Soviet times. That is why, even among those who 
were active, apolitical modes of involvement dominated over political activism. For 
instance, almost twice as many people took part in clubs than in civic organizations and 
social movements.33 
Lack of participation also informed a dubious public attitude toward NGOs. In 
2004 (the year of the Orange Revolution) one half of Ukrainian citizens were, to a 
varying degree, distrustful of civic groups, and over one-third found it hard to determine 
their attitude at all.34 While the number of people who had no information about civil 
society dropped from 24 percent to 14 percent between 2002 and 2004, the percentage of 
those who felt uninvited to join NGOs stayed the same at 11 percent. 
It is possible to speculate that these predominantly negative sentiments might 
have stemmed from either insufficient awareness or the feeling of being excluded from 
nonprofit activities. The attitudes change rather dramatically when similar questions are 
asked of Ukrainian elites and the informed public. The two groups have a shared 
understanding on the proper role of civil society as a government watchdog (for the 
public) and as a tool for democratic development (for elites).35 
NGO landscape: distribution, structure and capacity 
The survey of key indicators for NGO sustainability reveals the picture of a 
sector that is going through the pains of growth. That is why, a string of positive 
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developments in one area of organizational management is often countered by a 
persistent failure in another. 
There are some apparent and hidden disparities in the geographical location of 
civic groups. Kyiv, the capital, accounts for 15 percent of all organizations. Though at 
first blush its share does not appear as large as in other post-Soviet states, like Russia or 
even Georgia, it can be suggested that there are more functioning NGOs in Kyiv, 
because of their proximity to funding sources (i.e. foreign donors and domestic capital) 
and much more propitious economic conditions in the capital. As another confirmation 
of this assertion, most NGO projects are implemented at the national and regional levels, 
but do not have any local presence.36 
In terms of their internal structure, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian 
NGOs are permanently established operations with salaried staff. 87 percent employ 
from 1 to 7 people, 57 percent have a permanent staff of five individuals on average.37 
The majority of NGOs are membership-based organizations that rely on volunteers. 
However, their use is disproportionate among different organizations. For instance, 77 
percent report working on average with 18 volunteers who spend 8 hours helping their 
nonprofits. But, if the outliers (i.e. nonprofits with the highest number of volunteers) are 
taken out, the average drops to eight volunteers per organization who contribute 2-3 
hours per week. The profile of a typical Ukrainian volunteer includes traditional suspects 
- students (56 percent), who seek new experiences, NGO clients (30 percent), who are 
invested in the success of their helpers, unemployed (15 percent) and the elderly (11 
percent) both of whom, for obvious reasons, have free time.38 NGOs' access to modern 
36
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technology is rather modest. Though most organizations have an office phone, only a 
small minority (11 percent) was connected to the Internet in 2004.39 
In general, nonprofit organizations maintain a medium level of internal 
capacity.40 Over a half of Ukrainian civic groups survive on the modest budgets that 
range from $500 to $5,000. The available information also dispels the myth about a 
generously funded nonprofit sector. Only 5-8 percent of organizations in 2002-2004 had 
budgets over $50,000. And an extremely thin layer of civic groups (7-10 percent) 
enjoyed a comfortable living (by Ukrainian standards) on $20,000-49,000 per year.41 
When these statistics are combined, only between 12-18 percent or less than one-fifth of 
NGO can be considered financially well off. 
As the third sector grew and nonprofits became more mature, their budgetary 
priorities began falling in line with the inherent logic of their existence. Whereas in 1996 
NGO salaries constituted the largest identifiable expenditure, trailed by service payments 
and only then charitable expenses, in 2004 the difference in expenses for charitable 
activities and remuneration constituted about one percent, and service payments jumped 
to 22.5 percent of the total budget. In another positive development, NGOs became more 
transparent by cutting almost half of unidentified "other" expenses, which in 1996 
constituted 65 percent of their budgets. Regardless of these improvements, overall 
financial auditing for nonprofit organizations remains weak, as over a half of them do 
not (or are not able to) release their reports.42 
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The analysis further confirms previous assessments on the dependence of post-
Soviet civil societies on foreign funders.43 Most well financed groups admit that they get 
72 percent of money from international NGOs, only 11 percent - from domestic 
businesses and merely 4 percent - from citizens' donations.44 Unsurprisingly, the largest 
number of organizations (60 percent) considers funding shortages as the most significant 
threat their survival. Domestic studies have also determined that NGOs, which combine 
international and domestic funding, have more capacity than those that rely 
predominantly one type of support.45 
Finally, long-term capacity and sustainability of many organizations is dependent 
not only on finding money and supporters, but also on having an office space. In this 
regard, 13 percent of NGOs that own their offices have a secure future. Other 40 percent 
depend on the mercy of entities that donate their facilities for free. And almost one half 
relies on administrative expenses (i.e. grants and donations) to rent a space.46 
To sum up, most functioning Ukrainian NGOs are modestly funded, staffed and 
equipped organizations that are located in the capital or regional centers. While their 
financial practices have improved, future sustainability remains problematic because of 
the dependency on foreign funds and the lack of long-term financial planning. 
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NGO members and inter-NGO relations 
Because the internal capacity of any civil society depends directly on the type of 
members it is able attract as well as the nature of cooperation among those members, it is 
worth looking at both variables in greater detail. 
Demographic and normative characteristics of NGO members in Ukraine present 
an interesting picture. The nonprofit sector attracts people who are in the prime of their 
life and professional careers. Between 1994-2004, the share of those aged 30-55 years 
old increased from 48 percent to 52 percent. Considering the fact that 87 percent of 
NGOs employ between one and seven people, it is possible to speculate that over one 
half of Ukrainian civic activists get paid to be active. 
In the decade since its independence, Ukraine has begun to catch up with other 
developed states in attracting retirees to civic work. Their involvement rose from 18 
percent to 23 percent. Civil society engages slightly more women than men. However, 
the gender disparity is not large and varies greatly by regions.47 
Large majorities of civic activists acknowledge that they are driven to join NGOs 
by the desire to help others or an opportunity to influence societal development. Over 
one-third wants to achieve personal self-fulfillment or assist fellow NGO members in 
their tasks. Merely 16 percent report being interested in obtaining funding. 
In 2004 inter-NGO cooperation was high. 88 percent of groups exchanged 
information, 70 percent conducted joint activities and 57 percent had partnership 
projects. Many organizations found it advantageous to work with their civic counterparts 
to use additional experiences (68-70 percent) and increase their own reach and 
effectiveness (66-73 percent). At the same time, obstacles to greater collaboration 
47
 Counterpart Creative Center, 92. 
included (in decreasing importance) rivalries over formal leadership, competition for 
funds and resources, and insufficient awareness about activities of other groups.48 The 
Ukrainian third sector was more oriented on domestic than overseas interactions. One-
fifth of all civic groups pursued contacts with foreign counterparts and international 
governmental organizations in a partnership capacity.49 
To conclude, Ukrainian civil society is composed of mature individuals who are 
cognizant of the reasons for their involvement. They tend to be middle-aged, female and 
more philanthropic in their beliefs. The majority of civic activists are also positively 
predisposed to cooperation with other fellow members. However, through years of 
experience they remain clear-eyed about the obstacles that any joint efforts are likely to 
generate. 
NGOs and other societal actors 
The essence of embeddednes lies in the ability of NGOs to connect with other 
societal actors outside of the civic realm, thereby enhancing their overall relevance as 
one of the players on the domestic scene. From this perspective, interactions between 
civic groups on one side, government authorities, political parties and the general public 
on the other must be properly assessed. 
In Ukraine, the intensity of civic cooperation with government authorities 
increases as one moves down the chain of governance. Specifically, only 6 percent of 
non-governmental organizations thought they had a high level of cooperation with the 
national government, whereas 52 percent believed it was low and 32 percent perceived it 
Ibid., 54. 
EU Commission, 32. 
as medium. The majority of NGOs blame the situation on the lack of understanding (68 
percent) or awareness about civil society (60 percent) on the part of national state 
structures. The picture was somewhat brighter at the regional level where 47 percent saw 
NGO-government collaboration as medium and 8 percent believed it was high. One of 
the greatest obstacles to a greater partnership with civil society lies in the state's 
budgetary constraints. In 2004 (the year of the Orange Revolution), 60 percent of civic 
organizations received up to $500 of government money. Domestic observers note that 
state funding did not have any regularity or predictability in terms of disbursement 
targets and amounts.50 
While state funding is scarce and sporadic, the support from businesses is 
reluctant. About one half of entrepreneurs complain that they do not have sufficient 
funds to contribute to civil society and charities. The argument is valid when applied to 
small and medium-size businesses suffocated by tax inspections during the Kuchma era. 
However, the major concern of businessmen seems to be a larger purpose for which their 
donation will be used. That is why, legislative and taxation hurdles worry only small 
minorities, whereas one-third fears their financial contributions will be misdirected 
toward a non-charitable purpose - a delicate euphemism for embezzlement. In fact, of 
those that donate, 80 percent give to the issues of social protection (e.g. feed the hungry, 
shelter the homeless and help the poor) rather than civic activism. My interviews have 
revealed that businesses do not consider advocacy NGOs as those whose causes require 
urgent support.51 The mode of interaction between the business sector and civil society 
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remains mainly financial, with 77 percent providing money and only 5 percent 
volunteering for civic activities.52 
As for the Ukrainian public, nonprofit organizations interact with their target 
audiences on a regular basis, but do so through impersonal methods of communication. 
On a positive side, 47 percent of civic groups reach their supporters/clients on a daily 
basis, 31 percent - weekly and 13 percent - monthly. However, the effect of these 
outreach efforts remains dubious for two reasons. First, the prevalent means of 
establishing contacts do not assure that organizations get the attention of their specific 
audience or that informational materials convey the right impression. 81-85 percent raise 
awareness about their activities through the press and over a half relies on booklets and 
brochures.53 Second, impersonal methods of outreach are unlikely to change a utilitarian 
manner in which many ordinary citizens perceive civic organizations as distributors of 
charitable goods and services. My interviews with NGO leaders and experts and an 
external assessment of the European Commission further confirmed a strong presence of 
this misconception as well as a negative impact it has on people's trust toward those 
NGOs, which simply by the nature of their work (i.e. advocacy) fail to offer free material 
benefits.54 
To summarize, Ukrainian nonprofit organizations cooperated more effectively 
with regional and local, rather than national, state authorities. They struggled to establish 
a better relationship with new businesses that did not perceive advocacy as a charitable 
cause. Most importantly, the prevalence of impersonal methods of outreach made it 
difficult for many groups to secure support among ordinary citizens. 
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Fundraising practices 
The review of nonprofit fundraising practices produces a number of critical 
observations, which confirm the dependency of NGOs on external support and a lack of 
domestic contributions to their activities. 
According to different estimates, charitable donations (which include donor 
grants) constituted 32-37 percent of NGOs' budgets in 2004.55 The figure has increased 
by more than 10 percent since 1996, thereby confirming the assertion of foreign donors 
that maturation of the Ukrainian civil society would not have been possible without 
external aid.56 Over this period of time, the state support for NGOs was cut in half from 
12.6 percent in 1996 to 5.9 percent in 2004.57 
In a surprising finding, the economic growth of the past decade did not increase 
the capacity of NGOs to raise funds by selling their services. The percentage of income 
derived from commercial activity dropped two-fold - from 33.2 percent to 14 percent.58 
Combined with another statistic, which shows an almost two-fold increase in funds from 
other unidentified sources (from 17.4 percent to 32.7 percent),59 the dynamic suggests 
that civic groups might have become more adept at hiding their sources of income for the 
fear of taxation or state harassment of contributors. A survey of NGOs by a fellow 
nonprofit group lends further proof to this claim. Because organizations felt at ease to 
give approximate estimates of their financial support to a non-government source, the 
percentages of donations from businesses (19-21 percent) and citizens (11-12 percent)60 
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roughly match the figure, which they submit to the State Committee on Statistics as 
under the rubric of "other sources." 
Next, the lack of substantial variation in the share of membership fees indicate 
that in 2004 Ukrainian civil society organizations did not perceive members as potential 
providers of financial support. 
Finally, the dismal fundraising performance of many nonprofit groups could have 
been predicted, given their happy-go-lucky attitude to financial sustainability. Only 40 
percent of NGOs relied on any written plan to secure funds, and 69 percent of those that 
had a plan looked no farther than one year ahead.61 Under these circumstances, as one 
Western donor aptly summarized, "you had a lot of groups chasing a lot of money 
without any real, concrete results." 62 
To conclude, the Ukrainian nonprofit sector remains significantly dependent on 
foreign assistance for charitable donations. While covert support from business sources 
has increased, contributions from the state or NGO members remain dismal. The 
inability of many civic groups to attract funds stems not only from unpropitious political 
and economic conditions, but also from nonprofits' own lack of financial planning and 
management. 
Ukrainian civil society: strengths and pathologies 
My portrait of the Ukrainian civil society will not be complete without outlining 
its strengths and pathologies. I classify these factors based on whether they contribute or 
hinder NGO embeddedness. 
Counterpart Creative Center, 27. 
Western NGO representative. 
Strengths 
The Ukrainian third sector has a number of advantages that help domestic civic 
groups to become better rooted in the host society. First and foremost, it possesses a 
sense of vibrancy and freedom that many civil societies in the former Soviet republics 
lack. The rate of NGO growth indicates that people are given sufficient freedoms to 
register such organizations with relatively few obstacles. 
Second, the notion of civil society has an overwhelmingly positive connotation 
among the knowledgeable public and elites. This further strengthens the viability of the 
third sector as an independent societal actor, at least among those who are informed 
about NGOs. 
Third, a set of organizational features, such as membership composition, internal 
interactions and technological capacity, facilitates better connections between civic 
groups and the society in general. Most NGO members are mature individuals who 
espouse (at least publicly) noble reasons for their involvement. Cooperation among 
nonprofit organizations is driven by pragmatic concerns of improving the effectiveness 
of performance and the efficiency of resource utilization. The civil society by and large 
has sufficient organizational structures and technologies to support its daily operational 
and programmatic activities. 
The key strength in terms of political embeddedness lies in the liberal domestic 
legislation that regulates crucial political aspects of civil society functioning, such as 
registration, state control and dissolution. Our research has indicated that even during its 
most repressive years, the Kuchma regime did not move to change the framework that 
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enabled the proliferation of NGOs.63 This fact further proves that the norm, regarding 
non-governmental organizations as a staple of any democracy, became firmly embedded 
in the domestic political discourse. 
Finally, external involvement played a critical role in deepening both societal and 
political embeddedness of Ukrainian civic groups. Foreign funding provided a launching 
pad for most nonprofit organizations. Without seed grants from Western (primarily 
American) donors, the civil society would not have developed a base for continuous 
(though often struggling) existence. The attention of Western governments and donors 
to civil society raised its profile among Ukrainian intellectual and political elites and 
prompted the country to adopt and maintain a liberal framework for NGO activities. 
Pathologies 
In 1991-2004 societal embeddedness of the Ukrainian civil society was hampered 
by three sets of factors. The first stemmed from social conditions and resulted in low 
funding. The other lies in political and legal deficiencies, such as the inadequate 
regulatory base for NGO activities and limited cooperation with political parties. The 
final one includes negative externalities of foreign aid that manifested themselves in high 
dependency on donor funds and low accountability for their proper use. 
First, like many post-Soviet states, Ukraine suffers from low public involvement 
in civic organizations. The majority of ordinary citizens are unaware of the benefits of 
participation and thus suspicious of civil society. As the compiled evidences shows, 
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those members of the public and elite who are cognizant of civil society were unable to 
spread their knowledge or pass their optimism to the rest of the population. 
Two major reasons for this failure lie in the limited methods of NGO outreach 
and their predominantly urban concentration. Civic groups continued substituting 
meticulous (but largely unglamorous) grass-root work with impersonal forms of message 
delivery. Though the initial concentration of NGOs in urban centers was a result of 
discrepancies in urban-rural development during the Soviet Union,64 newly emerging 
civic organizations further contributed to that divide. Trying to avoid grass-root work in 
general, they were even much less likely to spread the message and look for supporters 
in the depressing living conditions of non-urban areas. 
As a result of these problems, the Ukrainian third sector was not implanted 
enough into the fabric of the host society to derive sufficient support from three possible 
stakeholders - t he public, the business or the government. Funding from state authorities 
was meager, because of budgetary deficits and low interest in civil society. The support 
from businesses was limited and reluctant, for many of them either did not view 
advocacy as a charitable cause or feared that their donations would be misused. 
Combined with a low public appreciation of the sector, this left many organizations 
chronically dependent on Western support and continuously struggling for survival. 
Second, in 2004 societal embeddedness of the country's NGOs was hampered by 
two political factors. One was related to the domestic legislation on taxation that 
severely constrained the opportunities for fundraising and survival, by limiting the rate 
of non-taxable donations and circumscribing entrepreneurial activity. Furthermore, 
Such developmental patterns relegated small towns and villages to the technological, social and intellectual periphery. 
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during President Kuchma's second term, legal ambiguities provided an ample room for 
the government to harass unfriendly civic groups through tax inspections.65 
The other factor had to do with the cooperation of NGOs with political parties. It 
is revealing that none of the domestic studies, which were reviewed in this work, asked 
civic groups about their contacts with political actors, besides the government. My own 
interviews with civic and political activists revealed a lack of understanding and interest 
in civil society on the part of politicians.66 Mirroring the artificial delineation between 
parties and civic associations established by foreign donors,67 politicians did not consider 
NGOs as a serious partner in the political transformation of the country. Their purview 
was believed to be "soft politics" (i.e. social and humanitarian issues), whereas parties 
were to deal with "hard politics," like wrangling over laws, constitutions and authority. 
Moreover, whenever politicians dealt with nonprofits, they were likely to apply the 
instincts acquired during political battles - to negotiate with the strong and to crush or 
subsume the weak. Having an uncertain base of support within the domestic society, 
many nonprofits were not enthusiastic to pursue this kind of cooperation. 
Third, in the environment where societal roots were weak and unsystematic, 
formal collaboration with political actors was, at best, feeble, external involvement 
assumed a skewed importance, thereby resulting in two pathologies. One was a high 
reliance on foreign funds. The problem is not new and has been widely discussed in the 
previous studies about civil societies in the former Communist states. However, it 
acquires a special meaning when placed in the framework of embeddedness. 
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Organizations that rely for their survival on external actors can never become a full 
participant in their host societies. Their loyalties will stay divided as long as foreign 
support continues to have at least an equal say in their organizational existence. 
The other had to do with low financial accountability that NGOs exercised in 
regard to their funding. The issue is two-fold. On one side, foreign donor organizations 
are not accountable to the Ukrainian public, even though their funding is used by 
domestic NGOs to meet allegedly public needs. On the other side, the situation is made 
worse by the fact that the majority of organizations did not have transparent reporting 
procedures and/or did not release their financial audits to the larger public. 
These pathologies undermined social and political embeddedness of NGOs and 
weakened the positive impact of foreign assistance. Instigated by the Kuchma 
government, the campaign against "grant-eaters" alleged that many third sector 
organizations were either embezzling foreign funds or were used by donors as a 
"destabilizing agent."68 Because the Ukrainian civil society had shoddy financial 
practices, the accusations could never be denied decisively. In the end, the campaign was 
partially successful, by tarnishing the image of NGOs among ordinary citizens and 
further complicating their cooperation with political parties. 
To sum up, by 2004 Ukrainian civil society had a strong physical presence, but 
limited societal and political influence. Non-governmental organizations, as the most 
frequent practical manifestation of civil society, were sprouting everywhere, assisted by 
the liberal legislative base and continuous foreign support. However, the rapidly 
developing and vibrant civic community proved unable to locate and secure its niche 
68
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within the larger society for it lacked support from the public and acknowledgement 
from politicians. Its chronic dependence on outside assistance amplified many of its 
internal weaknesses and the rift of estrangement from other societal actors. 
PROFILE: CVU 
Launch 
The Committee of Voters of Ukraine was established in 1994 and had been 
operational for ten years prior to the Orange Revolution. The idea of launching an 
election watchdog emerged at the Ukrainian office of the National Democratic Institute 
(NDI).69 That year the country was to hold its first parliamentary and second presidential 
elections as an independent state. Though it had no shortage of political parties and 
candidates to run for office, there was no visible public group that would monitor the 
election process. Election observation itself was a novel idea in a former Communist 
republic where voting had been a formality in the past. Thus, NDI sought to fill the void 
as quickly as possible and urged local activists to establish an association of voters who 
were concerned about fairness of elections and people's ability to vote. 
At the beginning, CVU tasks were fairly straightforward - to recruit and train 
Ukrainian citizens as observers, send them to as many polling stations as possible on the 
Election Day and then compile a report on the conduct of elections. Thus, CVU 
developed and followed the same routine since its inception in 1994 and until 2000. 
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Maturation 
In 2000 the organization faced two challenges. First, it was coming of age as a 
civil society association. With the growth of its staff in Kyiv and in twenty-five regions 
(known as oblasts) of Ukraine, it confronted the question of what should be done 
between election cycles. CVU needed a more expansive reason d'etre in order for NDI to 
continue funding activities that were more meaningful than paychecks for dozens of 
activists waiting for a next election. Therefore, the Committee made an argument to the 
Institute that funds were necessary for CVU not to lose its regional network and 
capacity.70 It also started looking for new programs. One of them was a public hours 
initiative that enabled the Committee to work with ordinary citizens, by collecting their 
complaints and advising on possible solutions. 
Second, the 1999 presidential election became the first omen of increasingly 
authoritarian tendencies within the Kuchma regime. The election might have been free, 
but it was definitely not fair.71 To ensure Kuchma's victory, the government employed a 
number of methods - from skewing TV coverage, using administrative resources, 
coercing/bribing dependent voters to firing Ukraine's ambassadors who failed to secure 
the "correct" outcome in their embassies. CVU recognized that if a major bulk of fraud 
were committed long before voting, then the group's activities on the Election Day 
would become meaningless. That is why, it decided to complement its usual monitoring 
efforts with a long-term observation (LTO) program that would begin at the early stages 
70
 Botsko, Popov. 
71
 For more see Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), "Ukraine Presidential Elections 31 October 
and 14 November 1999. Final Report," 7 March 2000, http://www.osce.Org/documents/odihr/2000/03/l 299 en.pdf. 
of an election campaign and monitor the fairness of the political playfield for all -
participants.72 
To summarize, a greater level of organizational maturity as well as a more 
complex political landscape helped CVU pass the first critical test on embeddedness. It 
was able to adjust its focus from elections to election-related matters. In doing so, it was 
ahead of its major funder in understanding domestic realities. As late as 2002, many at 
the NDI-Washington office expressed doubts as to whether additional activities, such as 
public hours and LTO, were a distraction from the CVU's original mission to do solely 
election monitoring. 
Mission 
CVU mission crystallized as a result of successful programmatic experiences. Its 
issue-specific but fairly expansive nature was grounded in the organization's expertise in 
election monitoring as well as the certainty of foreign funding. 
As many sources within and outside of GVU tell, the first conscious discussion of 
the organization's mission took place only after the 2002 elections. It was spurred in part 
by the group's successful performance, especially the notoriety that the Committee's 
long-term observation reports gained in the international community.73 Activists were 
keen to build on that success without departing from the initial mission of election 
monitoring. 
As a result of internal deliberations and an active involvement from NDI, three 
goals were identified as complementary to the mission. The first one was to provide 
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democratic monitoring of elections. For this purpose, CVU employed its traditional 
programs that included election observation and parallel vote tabulation. The second 
goal was to foster active citizenship through public office hours and various community 
development projects. The third goal - to raise citizens' awareness and education - left 
enough room for the organization to include many miscellaneous and auxiliary projects. 
The latter were resource centers for communities, exit polls, support of international 
observers, election monitoring in other countries and lobbying to reform the domestic 
election law.74 
The presented list of goals and activities to accomplish them shows a growing 
level of sophistication and maturity on the part of CVU leaders. Unlike many Ukrainian 
nonprofits, which left their goals purposefully vague to assure that they can respond to "a 
theme de jour" of foreign donors, CVU presented them with sufficient precision. It put 
first the areas (i.e. election monitoring) where it performed best, having possibly no 
national competitors. It then outlined the second- and third-tier goals, which carved 
some niche for operation in-between election cycles as well as enabled it to look for 
supplementary projects. At the same time, the nonprofit was in a unique position when 
developing its goals and the mission. Unlike the majority of Ukrainian NGOs, it had one 
main sponsor, which, it was certain, would not renege on CVU. Therefore, the second 
and third goals were perceived at the time to be not a safety valve, but an opportunity to 
explore what else it can do, having the financial support of NDI. 
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Fundingand sustainability 
Though internal and external (mostly with NDI) discussions about CVU' s 
financial sustainability were constant, until 2002 real progress in this area was hampered 
by three factors. 
First, CVU had the same challenge as many other Ukrainian NGOs - difficulties 
in fundraising from sources other than Western donors in an economically unpropitious 
environment. Frank assessments from domestic civic experts admit that financial support 
from local businesses, not to mention the ordinary public, was not possible until an 
economic turnaround in late 1999 - early 2000. After that, the nonprofit sector was 
caught in a conundrum. Businesses did not perceive the causes promoted by advocacy 
groups as truly deserving their assistance, whereas advocacy groups adopted a somewhat 
"holier than thou" attitude, reluctant to make their case to entrepreneurs, whose wealth 
was dubiously acquired. CVU was not different in this sentiment, in large part due to the 
second factor. 
While other NGOs were forced to make compromises either with businesses, 
parties (by often becoming their "pocket" groups) or donors (by rapidly shifting their 
priorities to satisfy another issue de jour), CVU had the luxury of NDI support. The 
relationship between the two entities vacillated from a bond of parents with their 
adolescent child to a long-term courtship on ill-defined terms. In fact, the dependency 
worked both ways. On one hand, the Committee relied on the Institute for support and 
survival. On the other, by 2002 NDI could not have backed out of cooperation with CVU 
and let the organization languish without admitting its own failure of over-committing 
resources to one group. Therefore, the Committee's sustainability was harmed not by 
over-reliance on one donor, but by the particular contours that this interaction assumed. 
Specifically, the core leadership of the Committee understood that bureaucratic reasons 
for supporting the group (which, to be fair, was good, but far from perfect) had long 
surpassed in importance the conceptual reasons for continued support. 
This brings us to the third reason for CVU's lackluster funding record. Other 
grant-givers reported caution in cooperating with the Committee too vigorously for the 
fear that this "dancing with another's wife" would upset NDI.76 In addition to not being 
clear on the terms of CVU-NDI relationship, they also felt little need to sponsor a group 
that had been already so well funded. 
When all the three reasons - bad economic conditions, skewed dependency on 
one donor and the caution of other grant-givers - are combined together, the outcome 
was not promising. Initial attempts to secure external funding took place during the 2002 
parliamentary elections when CVU got money from the Adenauer Foundation.77 
However, fundraising began in earnest in 2004 when many donors demanded matching 
funds for their grants. Only then CVU opened a bank account, which individuals and 
businesses could use for donations. 
To summarize, the Committee was rather forced to fundraise rather than did so 
voluntarily or out of need. Its aversion to one of the core aspects of nonprofit existence 
stemmed from unpropitious economic and social conditions. It was further amplified by 
the presence of a financial safety net provided by NDI. 
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Donor influence 
The previous discussion raises the natural question of donor influence. In regard 
to CVU, three distinct stages should be outlined. 
The first took place in 1994-2002. At the time, the influence of NDI, as the sole 
driver and financier behind the establishment and functioning of CVU, was supreme. All 
initiatives were donor-driven.78 The CVU leadership discussed and wrote all the projects 
under a watchful eye of NDI. Having access to the American donor scene in 
Washington, the Institute closely monitored the Committee's proposals to make sure that 
they fit into the framework of priorities designated for the former Soviet republics by the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the United States Agency for 
International Development (US AID). This pattern of cooperation brought clear 
advantages - CVU was always guaranteed foreign funding and entered a small pool of 
Ukrainian NGOs that did not need to worry about survival. The price tag was hefty, too. 
The Committee had to cede quite a bit of authority in internal matters. NDI 
representatives were omnipresent in CVU daily activities. Until 2002, an NDI Civic 
Program Officer attended CVU weekly staff meetings (to much consternation of all 
staffers). 
The second stage occurred in 2002 and lasted well past the Orange Revolution. 
Recognizing the Committee's growth, NDI began to loosen its reigns. However, the 
arrangement lacked clear terms of engagement, and its dynamics were formed on a case-
by-case basis. The group was more likely to bow to NDFs requests on the issues of its 
core competency - election monitoring. For instance, CVU was once requested to train 
ten thousand observers and refused to do so, citing a lack of capacity. When pressed by 
78Botsko. 
NDI, it relented, because the donor began questioning the effectiveness of its long-term 
investment into an organization that cannot meet its main goal.79 When it came to 
internal politics, NDI refused to play an arbiter between the CVU central office in Kyiv 
and its regional branches, thereby relegating any decision-making power to the former.80 
Therefore, the Institute exerted strong influence in external matters where a danger of 
CVU missteps would impact the NDI's'own reputation, but preferred a hands-off 
approach in usually messy office politics. 
The third (at this point last) stage of donor relations is beyond the framework of 
this study. It began in 2006 when NDI pulled out institutional support behind CVU 
because of the clashing priorities between the two organizations. As a CVU regional 
supporter aptly remarked, "NDI could no longer digest us in the new form, while we did 
not want to go back to the past."81 
In sum, the Committee of Voters made a one-hundred-eighty-degree turn in its 
donor relations - from complete dependency on NDI to a complete and almost hostile 
disengagement from it. Like in a relationship that goes sour, the two entities matured at a 
different pace and resented each another for not being on the same page or at least trying 
to be sensitive about newly found concerns. Whereas CVU wanted to continue receiving 
funds, but with fewer conditions and day-to-day oversight, NDI preferred having a 
mature and financially accountable grantee that would still heed its advice. 
Western NGO representative. 
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145 
Membership 
Membership is the cornerstone of any civic group. As Chapter emphasizes, a 
civic organization without true supporters is hollow at its core and doomed for a quick 
demise. In 1994 NDI recognized that when it launched the Committee of Voters of 
Ukraine and encouraged members of the newly formed group to look wide for possible 
supporters. 
The recruitment strategies at the time were quite vigorous. CVU activists put 
together street presentations, distributed leaflets and the organization's newspaper to 
attract supporters. The emphasis on visibility and grass-root methods of recruitment 
reflected the influence of NDI and its understanding of how civic groups make 
themselves known in the domestic environment.82 
The recruitment proved to be successful for a number of reasons. One of which 
was certainly the feeling of novelty. Merely three years past the independence, civic 
groups (like patriotic Prosvita) still had a reputation for being a niche for high-level 
intelligencia, not the masses. The other lied in the funding that permanently employed 
activists would receive. In the environment of a dire economic crisis, a Western-
supported organization provided a stable salary that neither the bankrupt government nor 
the feeble, mafia-infused business sector could not offer. 
By 1999, the core of CVU leaders was stable, and a rather rigid organizational 
hierarchy emerged. Twenty-five regional centers (each with a director and an assistant) 
were subordinate to the headquarters in Kyiv run by a tightly knit circle of 5-7 activists. 
Due to the internal hierarchy, the number of key paid positions was inherently limited. 
The situation was exacerbated by the slow staff turnover. Being part of the exclusive 
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group of leaders created a sense of personal comfort that CVU key activists cherished 
and thus were not eager to abandon. 
That is why, new membership strategies were adjusted to satisfy a two-fold goal 
- to have enough members to do fieldwork, but not to pose a challenge to the present 
leadership. With that purpose in mind, CVU recruited people for temporary positions 
(such as election monitors), but limited any outsider's access to leadership posts. 
Established in 1998, the Committee's youth wing was also supposed to be a good outlet 
for those activists who showed future promise but could not enter the main track within 
the organization.83 
Leaders and members 
Nowhere were the apparent deficiencies of the Committee's recruitment 
approaches more visible than in relations between leaders and members. First, they 
restricted an influx of fresh blood. By 2002 NDI recognized that the grip on power by 
the present leadership became too strong and encouraged (to no avail) most senior 
activists to move to other organizations.84 Recognizing that opportunities for professional 
growth and meaningful decision-making were almost non-existent, most young members 
moved quickly to jobs with political parties or other NGOs. Those who stayed accepted 
their temporary role - from one election to the next - and small monetary benefits that it 
brought. 
Second, the arrangement did not promote efficient cooperation among CVU 
leaders. Since personal loyalty played a critical role in earning top positions, it gradually 
Botsko, Soboleva. CVU regional activist. 
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became a substitute for professionalism. As a result, during the 2004 presidential 
campaign (most crucial in Ukraine's history) half of the CVU regional offices were so 
disorganized and weak as to unable to function properly.85 
Grievances at the regional level could not be addressed properly, because 
external and internal channels for their resolution were blocked. Few regional leaders 
dared complain about matters directly to NDI for the fear of being viewed as a pariah 
within the NGO. Internally, the organization did not have effective mechanisms of 
feedback. It substituted an independent advisory board with a forum of leaders from the 
central office and regional branches, who were likely to rubberstamp decisions because 
of their financial dependence and personal loyalty. 
The top-down approach to management and program execution constrained 
contacts among regional branches. Oblast leaders felt more comfortable interacting with 
their most geographically close peers (East, West, South) rather than CVU 
representatives elsewhere the country.86 Frequent neighborly cooperation on difficult 
election cases built trust and gave certainty that privately voiced complaints would not 
be reported to the headquarters in Kyiv. 
Finally, rigidity and elitism in the organizational structure led to increased 
secrecy. CVU refused to establish a formal membership or release its membership lists 
for the fear of possible government repercussions. The rationale was dubious at best, 
since two of its regional branches in Lviv and Luhansk adopted an exactly opposite 
policy. Sources in the donor community speculated that the Committee's reluctance in 
this matter stemmed from a completely different concern. With a membership/observers' 
Soboleva, CVU regional activist. 
CVU regional activist. 
148 
database at hand, NDI would be able to cheek its validity, thereby undermining the CVU 
claim of a vast network of activists.87 
To summarize, CVU membership strategies were so narrowly conceived as to 
limit the pool of potential leaders and imperil its future viability. A clear separation 
between leaders and members and within the leadership ranks diminished internal 
coherence and external effectiveness. 
Normative transfers 
When it comes to normative transfers, CVU has passed through two periods, in 
which increasing organizational maturity determined the nature and content of normative 
transfers. 
Between 1994 and 1997, NDI took an active part in ensuring the competency of 
its domestic offspring. Katie Fox, the Institute's Civic Officer in Ukraine, conducted 
initial trainings on election monitoring techniques.88 In April 1995 fifteen CVU senior 
activists were brought to the United States to learn from American experiences. They 
attended a short-term seminar at the Midwestern Academy for civic leaders and were 
able to observe the mayoral elections in Chicago. As the organization's press report 
indicates, "a special attention was paid to the role of civic groups in election campaigns 
and to specific activities which are applicable for Ukraine."89 
From 1997 and on, the organization was able to handle its own training needs 
when it came to its core competence - elections. Between 1997-2000, the Committee 
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made sure to educate its key activists in the regions. With that purpose, three national 
trainings were held in October 1997, and one seminar was conducted for leaders of CVU 
regional branches in December 2000.90 In these and other events, CVU applied 
successfully the postulates of election monitoring (e.g. Why is it needed and what goals 
should it pursue?) to the local context. It tailored trainings to the domestic election 
legislation and political circumstances. For instance, all CVU observers were accredited 
as journalists of the CVU newspaper "Tochka Zoru" (Viewpoint). Trainings for 
monitors, when conducted at their best, were accessible in terms of context for those 
volunteers who did not have a deep understanding of the political scene as well as 
provided enough information for people to feel comfortable at a polling station during 
the day of voting. 
In the second phase, the Committee also became strong enough to initiate its own 
programs that were based on local needs. The long-term observation initiative (LTO) 
reflected an increasing complexity of the methods to rig elections prior to the voting day. 
Its other initiative, public hours, was established to respond to the lack of accountability 
that became pervasive at all levels of government in Ukraine. CVU activists and external 
observers acknowledge that the organization's most successful ideas often came from the 
regions that sought to counteract a particularly egregious type of violation in the future. 
At this stage of CVU development, the majority of external normative transfers 
were focused on the problems of nonprofit management. CVU requested trainings on 
fundraising and grant writing from Western donors in Ukraine. NDI also pushed the 
group to seek assistance on conflict resolution and mediation. 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine, "KVU Hronika Podij" [CVU, The Chronology of Events], www.cvu.org.ua. 
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There are strong grounds to conclude that the nature of normative transfers and 
their content has evolved substantially throughout the fourteen years of CVU's 
operation. First, external normative assistance moved from primary to secondary issues -
from election monitoring to organizational management. Second, the dynamic of 
external transfers has changed - CVU requested, rather than was mandated, to have 
certain educational opportunities, thereby becoming at least an equal partner, if not a 
driving force, in assessing its needs. Third, the prevalent mode shifted from external to 
internal. Since 1997, the major task was not to assure the competency of the CVU 
leadership core, but of its rank and file. 
Inter-NGO cooperation 
A theoretical discussion on the sources of societal influence in Chapter II has 
noted that cooperation among NGOs is one of the best opportunities to amplify their 
domestic impact. Collaborating nonprofit groups bring together their distinct target 
audiences, thereby promoting interactions among different segments of the population 
and facilitating the emergence of a broader civil society. In the world of limited 
resources, these NGOs are able to avoid duplication of some efforts and complete 
neglect of others. 
However, as our portrait of Ukrainian civil society shows, cooperation among 
civic associations is easier said than done. While many nonprofits understand the 
benefits and speak positively of their experiences, they are also cognizant of the 
obstacles that make any joint projects a difficult endeavor. 
It is thus unsurprising that CVU's performance in this regard is not 
straightforward. At the national level, the group was a willing, but cautious partner in 
working with other nonprofit entities. Though all interviewed CVU leaders recognized 
151 
the appeal of coalitions to foreign donors and greater effectiveness of joint actions, they 
were unwilling to cede their organizational autonomy to any joint initiatives.91 CVU 
never delegated the task of making election assessments to any entity and earned the 
respect for being independent and assertive of its interests in the nonprofit world.92 
Whatever cooperation occurred, it was limited to informal, non-binding coordination of 
activities, occasional joint meetings, and, at most, some specific short-term assistance. 
For instance, CVU second-tier representatives attended meetings of many election-
related NGO coalitions (including Vlad Kaskiv's "Freedom of Choice," a precursor to 
Pora). CVU regional observers said to have kept an eye on exit poll staffers of other 
groups, like the Democratic Initiatives Foundation.93 
At the regional level cooperation between a CVU branch and other groups was 
always more liberal chiefly for two reasons. There were too few strong organizations to 
compete with CVU in the election field. And any regional collaboration with other 
groups could go only so far due to the Committee's centralized organizational structure. 
The Committee's semi-detachment within the nonprofit world can be explained 
by three factors. First and foremost, it had the money and, with it, the degree of freedom 
for an independent action. Unlike many NGOs (especially election-related coalitions), 
CVU was not a short-term project looking to strike the iron of foreign funds allocated for 
elections while the issue was hot. It could pick and choose its partners as well as be leery 
of free riders on CVU resources. Second, throughout its long-term existence CVU 
earned the reputation of a "diplomatic criticizer." It would always outline numerous 
violations, but confirm overall legality of the parliamentary elections. That is why, the 
91
 Popov, Chernenko, CVU regional activist. 
92
 Botsko. 
93
 Dr. Iryna Bekeshkina, Democratic Initiatives Foundation, interview with the author, July 2007. 
152 
group could not take the risk of having its image ruined by a coalition whose judgment 
was unknown. Third, even in the best of the worlds (i.e. a long-term coalitions, with their 
own funding), CVU would have been a wary partner, concerned that an effective NGO 
coalition would overshadow its own work and undermine its appeal for international 
donors. 
To summarize, when it came to working with other NGOs, CVU was an 
independent and rather demanding actor. Influenced by the considerations of autonomy, 
reputation and influence, it chose informal and non-binding means of collaboration to 
formalized agreements on the national and regional levels. 
CVU and political parties 
CVU's cooperation with political parties was hampered as a result of weaknesses 
in political party development that Ukraine was experiencing as a nascent democracy. 
First and foremost, its ability to reach out to parties was limited by the latter's ideology. 
Some, like the Communist Party or the Progressive Socialist Party, rejected the whole 
idea of civil society and nonprofit organizations as a Western invention.94 Others, like the 
Social Democratic United Party or the bloc of parties "For a United Ukraine," were 
allied with the Kuchma government. Because the administrative system was working in 
their favor, they had little interest in an election watchdog whose goal was to expose the 
abuses committed by that same system. Cooperation with pro-governmental parties was 
generally inhibited after the 2001 anti-Kuchma protests, when the government viewed 
any dissent as a sign of personal disloyalty and opposition. 
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Second, when it came to opposition parties (like Yushchenko's Our Ukraine or 
the bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko), CVU commanded informational, but not persuasion 
authority. Unlike their retrograde opponents, these parties were likely to take CVU 
reports into account and treat them as good piece of analysis, but neither of them would 
consult with CVU or treat the organization as an equal.951 specifically inquired whether 
foreign support made CVU reporting less credible and the organization in general less 
attractive for political parties. Contrary to Georgia, CVU's standing among oppositional 
parties and in the Ukrainian society was not undermined by external sponsorship. The 
CVU Chairman noted that trust toward the organization among party activists was 
strongly correlated with the quality of its reporting. That is why, the group had more 
respect from political leaders in 2002 after its long-term observation program than in 
1994 96 Opposition parties were unlikely to see it as a drawback, because many of their 
own members received trainings from the same Western institutions. The Ukrainian 
public was unaware of the sources that supported CVU, and government's attempts to 
discredit the Committee's image through Internet publications or the war against "grant-
eaters" in 2003-2004 did not get any traction.97 
Third, the lack of more systematic institutional cooperation between oppositional 
parties and the Committee stemmed from the pathologies of party development in 
Ukraine. Many parties had their own youth wings or closely affiliated civic groups. This 
created the expectation directly opposite to the one in developed countries. Instead of 
political parties catering to the interests of civic organizations, which represent a larger 
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spectrum of the population, civic groups were expected to follow the party line because 
of provided financial assistance.98 Other parties continued to suffer from the old Soviet 
habit of low tolerance for criticism. Because CVU was trying to be as non-partial as 
possible and because in Ukrainian realities, all sides commit election violations (it is 
their extent that matters), party activists would see CVU reporting of their mistakes as a 
sign of betraying friendly relations." Little understanding of election observation 
mechanics generated misconceptions about its results. Most oppositional parties would 
expect CVU reports to uncover the evidence of a politically explosive "smoking gun" 
that could be used to booster their own agenda.100 
To summarize the situation, even within the pro-democratic opposition few 
political activists understood the essence of civil society. Many rushed to apply 
erroneously the same laws of "with-or-against-us" behavior from politics to civic groups. 
Depending on their ideological orientation, Ukrainian political parties either treated 
CVU as a Western nuisance or a source of useful analytical information. Neither 
informal contacts between CVU and party leaders nor occasional trainings performed by 
CVU for election commission members from political parties altered this arrangement. 
Influence in the public 
CVU had moderate influence in the Ukrainian mass media and nominal impact 
on the Ukrainian public. It could not sustain media publicity and long-term public 
interest toward itself for a number of reasons. 
Western NGO representative. 
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First, most media remained oriented toward political parties and political life in 
general, thereby relegating CVU to the second tier of news. Its press conferences 
attracted a wide range of media outlets and its experts were always in demand for 
commentary.101 But in both cases they served as an additional touch to the plethora of 
already unfolding events. The situation was not a fault of either the Committee or the 
press. The Ukrainian political life between 1994-2004 was marked by the predominance 
of two factors - an overwhelming influence of President Kuchma and the inherent 
instability of a highly hierarchical system of power relations that he built.102 That is why, 
the media fixation on politics at the expense of other news was based on a possibility for 
radical change that any shift in the system might have brought. 
Second, CVU's inability to attract long-term public attention was due to its mode 
of operation, which lacked a strong advocacy component. The organization was diligent 
in reporting problems, but less aggressive in pushing for their solution. With time, the 
list of concerns became repetitive, yet it was not clear what else the civic group could do, 
besides rehashing them.103 Because the CVU leadership avoided radicalization and a 
possible loss of neutrality, it pursued evolutionary, non-confrontational means of 
addressing election deficiencies. 
Third, my interviews made it clear that the longer the same group of CVU leaders 
stayed in power, the stronger were its relations with key government players.104 The 
Committee in no way "sold out" to the authorities, but it was definitely unwilling to pick 
up fights with powerful stakeholders, like the Central Election Commission (CEC). What 
in fact occurred is somewhat similar to the situation that radical political parties 
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experience when they first come to power. Faced with a stark choice of moderation or a 
loss of power (and an internal split), many choose to drop most extreme demands. As the 
Committee of Voters was becoming more mature and the Ukrainian regime was growing 
more repressive, it faced a choice of either to work within the system or to become its 
harsh critic (and risk ostracism and repressions). By 2002, it was obvious that CVU 
leaders chose and CVU members acquiesced with the former. 
Fourth, CVU was well known among Ukrainian and Western politicos, but had a 
vague recognition among ordinary people. Ukrainian politicians had to pay attention to 
the Committee because its LTO reports were well received and read in Washington.105 
Through its Congressional liaisons, the National Democratic Institute ensured that top-
ranking members of the appropriate committees, like the late Congressman Tom Lantos, 
would read assessments of the election situation in Ukraine. NDI Chairman and former 
State Secretary Madeleine Albright was familiar with reports and mentioned them in her 
meetings with high-level Ukrainian officials and national public forums.106 
When it comes to ordinary citizens, there are continuous disagreements in the 
assessment of CVU influence. As usual, the devil is in details - in particular, how one 
defines the extent of public awareness of the Committee's work. Some Western donors 
claim that CVU was better known in the power corridors and think tanks of Washington 
than on the streets of Kyiv. Ordinary Ukrainians were likely to have no clue what CVU 
was doing.107 The Committee's greatest optimists (including its own activists) view 
familiarity within a larger society simply as "name recognition." This means that if 
people have a vague association about the group, then it is doing fine in terms of public 
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influence. At the same, their own estimates of this recognition provide diametrically 
different figures - from 93 percent as the highest to 5 percent as the lowest.108 Their 
anecdotal examples reveal that at best an average person may associate CVU with the 
vague notion of elections or may recognize the group's "public faces" (like CVU 
Chairman Popov or Press Secretary Oleksandr Chernenko). 
To summarize the discussion, at best CVU had a visually, but not normatively 
recognized brand. It appears that neither donors nor the organization itself relied on any 
instruments to find out how popular it was. The CVU leadership frequently implied that 
public visibility or recognition automatically translated into public influence. Absent a 
critical event, this statement cannot be falsified. That is why, considering the group's 
role in the Orange Revolution is important in evaluating the validity of this and other 
claims of its influence. 
CVU AND THE ORANGE REVOLUTION 
On the eve of the Revolution, the Committee of Voters was a well-established 
nonprofit organization. It has been active on the Ukrainian civic landscape for the past 
ten years. In that time, it developed a well-tested repertoire of programs and gained 
recognition within the Ukrainian political and civic establishment, if not the general 
public. Its intimate connections with NDI enabled CVU to project its influence in the 
United States. From the financial and methodological standpoints, it was one of the 
best-equipped groups in the country to handle any electoral contingency. CVU had the 
capacity to influence events, and do so decisively. 
These are the assessments provided to me by Ihor Popov and Oleksandr Chernenko. 
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Planning 
CVU's goals for the 2004 presidential campaign were similar to those during 
previous elections - to organize independent observation and inform voters whether 
elections took place in a democratic manner. The group's Chairman Ihor Popov indicates 
that prior to the campaign, the Committee conducted a situational planning to account 
for possible contingencies and threats to a free election process and recommended a 
number of programs to tackle potential issues.109 After my discussions with activists and 
review of the organization's materials online, it remains unclear how this process 
occurred and who, besides the top echelon of leadership in Kyiv and in the regions, was 
involved. 
Though CVU should be credited for sticking to its original mission and core 
activities, in 2004 it had little reason to re-invent the wheel. Unlike many smaller NGOs, 
which had to re-craft their goals to get foreign grants, CVU had its repertoire of well-
known programs and the certainty of NDI sponsorship. Popov himself noted that the 
pool of available foreign assistance at the time was sufficient to shift funds in accordance 
with unfolding priorities. Therefore, by being one of the top civic groups (in terms of 
both expertise and access to donors) in the country, the Committee of Voters had a 
considerable freedom in preparing for the elections as it saw fit. 
Funding 
Traditionally, CVU was funded by the National Democratic Institute through 
grants, received from the National Endowment for Democracy and the United States 
Agency for International Development. The 2004 elections were different in two aspects. 
""Popov. 
CVU secured some funds from the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The evidence 
of that project was a round table meeting organized under the sponsorship of the German 
institute after the first round of presidential elections on November 8, 2004.no The 
breakthrough is significant because European donor institutions are usually 
overshadowed by American grant-givers, most notably US AID. 
In addition to that, for the first time CVU attracted support of the Ukrainian 
middle class who provided its in-kind contributions or volunteer services for monitoring 
purposes. The demonstrations at the Maidan of Independence resulted in collapse of the 
Kuchma regime. Throughout the country people became aware of the government's 
actions to falsify the elections and saw the potency of their power in forcing a re-vote. 
Driven by this newly acquired awareness, many contacted the Committee of Voters to 
offer their services for the third round of voting. 
Ihor Popov likes to describe somewhat surreal images of this assistance. On the 
Election Day, one would see a new Mercedes driving through deep potholes of rural 
roads to a problematic polling station. Its owner was fired up and ready to film any 
violation on his family video camera.111 The appearance of this group had a shellshock 
effect on commissioners. No longer were they dealing with the usual CVU crowd of 
pesky, but infirm retirees and enthusiastic, but inexperienced college students. Having 
survived the criminal chaos of the 1990s and the tax inspections of the early 2000s, the 
Ukrainian middle class could not be easily ignored or bullied. 
It is unclear whether the burst of civic activism was a byproduct of the 
revolutionary events or a lucky conflation of a heightened awareness about the 
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importance of elections and the public knowledge about CVU (as its activists tend to 
suggest112). In either case, the group should be commended for thinking on its feet and 
taking advantage of a new pool of human resources. 
Regardless of the assistance from Ukrainian medium and small-size businesses, 
CVU still had to rely on donor support to carry out its major programs for the 2004 
elections. This raises the sore question on the extent to which foreign funding impacted 
the CVU's ability to perform. Predictably, there are different opinions on this matter. 
CVU activists tend to see external grants as one of the formative variables, which 
shaped the contours of activities, but was not decisive for the group's involvement in the 
campaign. Its spokesman, Oleksandr Chernenko, said the importance of grants varied by 
the sphere of activities. CVU leader, Ihor Popov, went further by suggesting that because 
of the overwhelming domestic support, foreign money in 2004 did not play as great of a 
role as it used to in the previous elections. However, donors - both inside and outside of 
NDI - tend to emphasize almost unanimously the cumulative effect of supporting CVU 
(and the Ukrainian nonprofit sector in general) for the previous decade as a factor that 
enabled its effectiveness.113 
These disparate observations can be summarized in three points. One, foreign 
funding in 2004 was important for CVU programs that were large in scope (i.e. election 
day monitoring) or technical in implementation (i.e. exit polls). Even with public 
enthusiasm, the organization would have been unlikely to find sufficient financial 
backing for these initiatives. Two, support from the Ukrainian middle class provided an 
unexpected, but welcome and important relief to monitor the additional (and previously 
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unforeseen) round of presidential elections. It boosted credibility of the monitoring 
effort. Three, it was not the immediate external assistance, but rather its long-term nature 
that built the infrastructure and capacity of the Committee, so it could fare well in the 
2004 campaign even with modest grant support. 
Activities 
CVU implemented numerous initiatives that targeted various audiences and 
approached the central goal of election monitoring from a multidimensional 
perspective.114 
First, the group calibrated its monitoring capacity to accommodate the 
peculiarities of the Ukrainian election cycle. It re-launched its long-term monitoring 
program on June 25, 2004 to assure that authorities did not rig the election outcome 
through unfair campaigning strategies. Based on the monitoring results from the first 
round of voting, the group correctly identified the main opportunity for fraud - voter 
lists.115 To address the issue, in October 2004 CVU launched a medium-term observation 
program to uncover irregularities and mistakes in voter registration. Its short-term 
monitoring initiative deployed observers at polling stations on the Election Day to assure 
compliance with voting and vote tabulation procedures. 
Second, the Committed conducted a parallel vote tabulation. By collecting ballots 
from regular precincts, it sought to catch any manipulations with results at the district 
and national levels. CVU assumed that the pressure to "re-distribute" votes would be 
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greater at the level of district commissions where aggregate results are put together, and 
a general picture of winners and losers is beginning to emerge. 
Third, CVU expanded training activities to new populations. In addition to 
training new members of precinct election commissions, the group identified two new 
target audiences - rural teachers and young voters. The former was the most frequent 
target of government harassment and intimidation. Because they command respect 
among rural residents and depend on village authorities for elementary needs, rural 
teachers were often coerced to campaign on behalf of pro-governmental candidates and 
assure a high turnout and a "correct" vote among parents of their students. CVU 
organized a number of trainings and distributed several brochures that outlined not only 
teachers' rights as voters, but also stipulated punishments for violating the basic norms 
of fair elections. For young voters, it organized a national training of trainers as part of 
the "You Vote for the First Time!" project. The initiative ended up serving two purposes 
simultaneously —educating first-time voters about their rights as well as recruiting them 
to be election observers. 
Finally, CVU tried to reach ordinary Ukrainians by opening an election phone 
line. The "Voter Protection Service" project started in April 2004 and involved four 
attorneys and twelve defense lawyers providing pro bono advice in twenty regions of the 
country. The hotline became not only an important source of distributing relevant 
information, but also an outlet to gather complaints about violations of the Election Law. 
To summarize, in the 2004 presidential elections the Committee implemented a 
compilation of its regular programs as well as sought to launch new activities in order to 
accommodate changing circumstances and engage new target groups. Most importantly, 
the content, timing and nature of initiatives reveal that the norms of election conduct had 
been deeply internalized by CVU activists. Elections were no longer viewed as a one-
day event, but as a process. It was not even the outcome (fair and free) that was 
important for the nonprofit, but the manner in which it was arrived. 
Cooperation with NGOs 
Prior to the demonstrations at the Maidan, CVU maintained its usual "friendly, 
but cautious" stand on working with other NGOs. The Committee's most visible 
partnership effort was the "New Choice 2004" coalition of NGOs. Formed on October 
31, 2003 (less than a year before the presidential elections), it included a star cast of 
Ukraine's best-known civic groups, such as "Democratic Initiatives" (the nation's 
strongest public polling think tank), the Laboratory for Legislative Initiatives (a 
brainchild of the national Soros foundation), the Europe XXI foundation (known for its 
fiercely pro-Western orientation) and others. From the information available about its 
activities, it seems that the coalition was designed to facilitate information sharing 
among the organizations and attract media attention to the civic aspect of elections. For 
instance, on November 4,2003 its members petitioned President Kuchma to include a 
civil society representative to the Central Election Commission as a permanent observer. 
CVU Deputy Chair, Evhen Radchenko, was suggested for the position. On February 23-
29,2004 three coalition members (including CVU press secretary Oleksandr Chernenko) 
visited the United States and briefed the American policy community on the course of 
Ukrainian elections. To prove that eagerness of the "New Choice 2004" did not go 
unnoticed, in January 2004 the coalition was invited to meet with Valeriy Mishura, who 
was appointed by the Ukrainian parliament to investigate the role of foreign funding in 
supporting Ukrainian NGOs. The coalition remained active throughout the campaign. It 
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organized an NGO forum between the first and second rounds of elections. The event 
was sponsored by the Soros foundation in Ukraine.116 
In advance of voting, CVU also assisted international observation missions (i.e. 
OSCE, ENEMO and CIS-EMO) that came to Ukraine to monitor elections. As its annual 
report notes, the organization did not favor any mission in particular, instead preferring 
to exchange information and provide reasonable assistance with training, assigning 
monitoring locations and offering mechanisms for gathering and analyzing the data in 
the 17 regions where such missions were deployed.117 The assistance in deploying five 
hundred Canadian observers (most of whom were ethnic Ukrainians and came to 
Ukraine after the Orange revolution made international headlines) shows that the group's 
position on cooperation with other nonprofits was tactical and flexible. When it felt there 
was a niche and need for its involvement, it provided such. 
My interview with the CVU Chairman makes it clear that Popov preferred 
informal methods of cooperation. For instance, he noted that during the election 
campaign meetings of civic leaders with U.S. Ambassador John Herbst were most 
helpful for him. They became a venue for otherwise busy NGO activists to come 
together, share information and compare notes.118 
While Popov deemed such examples of inter-NGO collaboration sufficient, some 
CVU regional activists were interested more in joint activities than simple information 
sharing. However, because regional branches of many national nonprofits were unevenly 
developed, cooperation on equal terms was not always achievable. According to a CVU 
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activist in the East of Ukraine, the capacity of Pora branch there was so appalling that 
CVU had to stop any interactions or risk doing all of Pora activities.119 
Whatever disappointments and personal tensions might have existed between 
various civic leaders and groups, they receded to the background on November 22, 2004. 
As many activists and observers noted, when the demonstrations at the Maidan began 
unfolding, civic groups started coming out from every nook and cranny.120 People, who 
have been working on joint projects for years or met together at a long forgotten Western 
workshop, would call each other, asking to get involved. Some went together to the 
Maidan in Kyiv to bring people food. Others signed up to be election observers in 
Eastern and Southern Ukraine - the regions with the highest incidence of fraud. 
To summarize, in the 2004 presidential elections the Committee of Voters 
worked with many domestic and international nonprofits by coordinating activities and 
providing sporadic assistance. In the course of the Orange Revolution, informal 
interactions among NGOs increased exponentially, because civil society in Ukraine, 
however feeble and dormant, still existed. All it needed was a pivotal event to get 
activated. 
Cooperation with political parties 
The dynamics of the 2004 presidential campaign made it challenging for CVU to 
sustain cooperation with oppositional parties, while maintaining its formal neutrality as a 
civic organization. 
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On one hand, authorities treated any criticism as part of some ubiquitous foreign 
ploy to humiliate Ukraine and subvert its achievements. The President and his staff 
insisted that the country was already a democracy and did not need anyone to monitor its 
compliance with democratic norms.121 Because CVU observation efforts were bound to 
reveal some irregularities (if not outright violations of the Election Law), the 
organization was counted as "unreliable" and blacklisted from all media appearances.122 
On the other hand, as the spiral of revolutionary events started to unravel, CVU 
was coming under increasing pressure from several sources to side openly with the 
opposition. First, it was the Ukrainian public that was both activated and radicalized by 
the events. As Popov remarked, in the heat of the revolution people were unwilling to 
listen or read dry, factual reports, enumerating violations. The public yearning for action 
exerted implicit pressures on CVU to provide an indisputable proof that Yushchenko 
won overwhelmingly123 and the victory was simply stolen from him. Then, there was 
NDI that believed this was the time for CVU to pay off the years of investment by 
becoming an indispensable ally of the revolution. And finally, the opposition forces, 
willing to build upon popular resentment of the Kuchma regime, were pushing CVU to 
join in the task. 
Under these circumstances, it was only CVU Chairman Ihor Popov who could 
manage a semblance of impartiality, by making the organization's support of the 
opposition parties indirect, diplomatic and highly nuanced. 
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 As the third round results revealed, this was not the case. Victory was always closely contested between the two candidates with 
one leading over the other by 4-5 percent. 
In the course of the 2004 campaign, CVU trained Our Ukraine members to be 
election observers and commissioners as well as collected complaints from local party 
activists for its long-term observation reports.124 As demonstrations at the Maidan were 
taking place, the task of separating political and civic activity became especially tortuous 
for the Committee of Voters. On one hand, CVU provided Yushchenko's party "Our 
Ukraine" with a dossier of specific violations that became the factual basis for his case to 
the Supreme Court to invalidate the outcome of the second round. The information 
proved especially crucial, because Our Ukraine activists failed to collect comparable 
data on their own.125 At the same time, Ihor Popov turned down the request by Petro 
Poroshenko, one of the most powerful members of Our Ukraine, to speak from the 
Maidan's tribune. Justifying his decision, he stated that the atmosphere of righteous 
anger did not make people predisposed to listen to objective statistics, which he would 
deliver. 
To summarize, the events of the Orange revolution have highlighted an eternal 
dilemma that each civic group has to address in its own way - how to be involved in the 
political life without crossing a blurred line that separates political and civic worlds. 
When working with parties during the revolution, the CVU leadership stuck to 
impartiality and neutrality to the displeasure of some activists, public and foreign donors. 
Mobilization 
Regardless of the extensive re-writing of history, done by Ukrainian politicians 
of all colors, almost nobody anticipated how well attended and well sustained the 
CVU 2004 Annual Report. 
Popov, Chernenko. 
demonstrations at the Maidan would turn out to be. Therefore, like many ordinary 
Ukrainians, CVU had to make an urgent decision on whether to join or stay out of the 
demonstrations. 
Among those skeptical about long-term viability of the Orange demonstrations 
were CVU's Popov and Chernenko, who believed that at most the protests would be 
another "Ukraine without Kuchma" - a series of failed uprisings that were violently 
crushed in the wake of the "Tapegate" scandal in 2001.127 
As the Committee's leadership was trying to make sense of this unexpected turn 
of events, whispers for direction were getting louder in its regional offices and calls to 
take a stand became incessant from NDI. At a hastily assembled CVU board meeting, 
the discussion on joining the protests produced an internal split.128 
A faction of "radicals," populated by activists from some Eastern Ukrainian 
oblasts and the CVU press secretary, suggested siding with Yushchenko and fielding a 
CVU representative to the Maidan podium. 
The "moderates," headed most prominently by Popov, insisted on remaining on 
the sidelines. This time, their reasons had nothing to do with the concern for impartiality. 
Instead they boiled down to the instinct of survival. In the first days of demonstrations it 
was clear that the turn-out was impressive and the durability was surprisingly long, but 
until at least November 25,2004 (the arrival of international mediators) nobody could 
have predicted whether the government would use force to disperse protestors or order a 
re-vote. Popov asserted that if the peaceful uprising had failed, the repercussions would 
have been much more severe than at the failure of the 2001 protests. He pointed to the 
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case of the Freedom House office in Ukraine that endured harsh harassment of tax 
inspections for its involvement in the "Ukraine without Kuchma" action. At worst, CVU 
offices would be closed and CVU activists jailed for real and imaginary tax violations. 
In the manner of internal decision-making emblematic of CVU, the discussion 
was soon dropped and a board vote on the matter never took place. Though the 
Committee issued a press release that welcomed "the civic activity of Ukrainian citizens, 
a peaceful nature of meetings and demonstrations, a balanced position of the majority of 
law enforcement officers, and an honest civic position of some journalists,"129 Popov 
personally forbade CVU activists to participate in the demonstrations on behalf of the 
organization. 
The situation with activist mobilization provides an important insight into CVU's 
deeper organizational problems. First, the decision to abstain from protests was a top-
down order rather than a consensus-driven compromise, which explains why three years 
after the revolution some activists still feel bitter about sitting out the event. Second, the 
outcome showed the leadership too comfortable with the status quo - to be oppositional 
enough to get foreign funds, but not too adversarial to provoke a government retaliation. 
As one observer aptly put it, CVU put too many eggs in too many baskets, which made 
the act of juggling them impossible.130 Thus, casual friendships turned into enduring 
obligations. Finally, the situation highlighted another sore point for many Ukrainian 
nonprofits - financial transparency. While CVU's worries are understandable given the 
repressive nature of Ukrainian politics, the organization that was involved in such a 
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sensitive area as election politics should have made certain that accounting practices of 
its regional branches were beyond reproach. 
To summarize, as the Orange Revolution was unfolding on the streets and 
squares of Kyiv, the Committee of Voters was internally divided and chose to stay out of 
limelight altogether. While some CVU activists joined the ranks of protesters as ordinary 
citizens, their participation as civil society members was neither visible nor decisive at 
that point. 
Assessment of the performance 
The previous section leaves us with the most difficult question to answer - how 
did CVU perform during the Orange revolution? Because the resultant picture is so 
multi-layered and contradictory, the subsequent assessments also diverge, depending on 
the position of observers and their approach to the task. 
If one is to consider purely quantitative indicators (which often end up in donor 
reports), the general picture comes out positive. As a result of its monitoring efforts, 
CVU produced seven long-term observation reports, submitted 5,168 legal acts, 2,826 
notifications about violations of the election legislation, 176 complaint letters to district 
election commissions and courts of different jurisdiction. The voter hotline produced 
1,208 complaint letters to election commissions, 290 - to prosecutor's office and 
provided 1,319 regular consultations. The service became so popular that lawyers from 
Ernst&Young, one of the most well known firms in Ukraine, offered their pro bono 
assistance. The "You Vote for the First Time!" program held 200 lectures in 125 
educational establishments and involved 10,000 young people.131 
When asked whether and why GVU was successful in the Orange revolution, its 
activists point to a number of reasons. Among the most frequently mentioned is public 
awareness about the group's brand that attracted a large number of observers from the 
Ukrainian middle class for the third tour of elections. The Committee's Chairman 
focused on institutional expertise and leadership continuity that made CVU activists 
respected figures in the media and civic circles.132 Lastly, national and regional members 
agree that CVU had a lot of activists who were mission-driven. Instead of hunting for 
funds, they concentrated on improving what they did best - election monitoring. As a 
result, even a normally critical NDI representative acknowledged that CVU's civic and 
political analyses became more mature and sophisticated.133 
Those critical of the Committee's performance during the Orange Revolution 
believe its aversion to risk taking and predisposition to status quo diminished its impact 
in three key areas. First, its Parallel Vote Tabulation (PVT) program failed to anticipate 
the change in government tactics. While CVU thought territorial election commissions134 
would be most likely sites for fraud, authorities manipulated the results at the level of 
ordinary polling stations. So when the Committee collected election protocols from 
regular polling stations, they merely confirmed officially fraudulent results. In the first 
round of voting, CVU reported a statistical tie with 39.6% going for both Yushchenko 
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and Yanukovych. Unsurprisingly, the group's PVT for the second tour showed 
Yanukovych's victory and created so much argument between CVU and NDI as to be 
embargoed for public release. In addressing the issue, Ihor Popov whether PVT admitted 
some methodological flaws and too much NDI meddling in the process, but flatly denied 
any lack of oversight on the part of the Gommittee.136 
Second, the group's short-term observation program (STO) was financially and 
logistieally mismanaged. Sources within NDI claim that CVU did not deploy as many 
observers as it promised, especially in the critical eastern and southern regions of 
Ukraine137 where official harassment and fraud produced a Soviet-like ninety-some 
percent outcome in favor of Yanukovych. The crisis brought to surface the issues of 
accountability and transparency that existed between the Committee of Voters and the 
National Democratic Institute in the past. Some openly blame CVU for not being able to 
predict another twist in government tactics. With hindsight from the 1999 and 2002 
elections, the authorities sought to ensure that local commissions would be staffed with 
"right members," and people vote "the right way," by casting their vote at home or 
through absentee ballots. So in many regions of Ukraine monitoring on the day of 
elections turned into watching a carefully staged spectacle.138 
Finally, CVU erred by choosing to sit out the events on the Maidan - the 
sentiment shared by many activists and foreign donors. The decision seems even worse 
in the retrospect not only because the Orange revolutionaries won, but also because it 
confirmed CVU's organizational pathologies - overly powerful leadership and a 
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preference to influence events indirectly. A review of its public statements shows a 
protracted exercise in diplomacy that threaded an increasingly shrinking line between 
admitting the truth and actively joining the public protest. In the statement on November 
1, 2004 "CVU demands to indict those responsible for falsifying voter lists in the first 
round."139 The question is who "those" are, and why they cannot be named by the group 
that has monitored the process for so long and must know "them." In another press 
release, the group says to be "disturbed by the information about an organized trip of a 
great number (16,000) of citizens from Eastern Ukraine with the goal to observe 
elections."140 Though the report proceeds to suggest there was no need for these people 
to do the work of CVU, it shies away from calling the practice for what it was - a forced 
busing of Eastern Ukrainians to vote multiple times using so-called "leave coupons."141 
To summarize, the evaluation of the CVU performance against our two indicators 
of success reveals that the organization only partially fulfilled its core functions of 
providing quality election monitoring. Its pre-election reports attracted much needed 
international attention to Ukraine, thereby increasing pressure on the already isolated 
government of President Kuchma. However, due to conventional thinking, the 
Committee proved unable to predict changes in state behavior and increased 
sophistication in rigging the election, which rendered a number of CVU Election Day 
programs not just meaningless, but potentially harmful as a tool to boost fraudulent 
results. When it comes to the issue of contributions to the revolution itself, the NGO had 
no direct impact on any stage of the event, preferring to keep a generally low profile 
139
 Committee of Voters of Ukraine, Press release, 1 November 2004, 
http://www.cvu.org.ua/elections.php?lang==ukr&mid=pres&eid=82&lim_beg==0. 
140
 Committee of Voters of Ukraine, Long-Term Observation Report, 13 September - 3 October 2004, 
htrp://www.cvu.org.ua/elections.php?lang==ukr&mid==pres&eid=82&lim_beg==0. 
141
 "Leave coupons" (yidkripni talony'rii Ukrainian) allowed those on a business trip to vote outside of their residence district. The 
major problem was that if an election commission did not take such a coupon from a voter, it could be used for voting several times 
at different locations. 
174 
until it became clear whether the revolution would win. By providing the evidence of 
election fraud to Our Ukraine representatives, it indirectly helped resolve the political 
impasse created by the second round of voting. In the end, the organization fared poorly 
on both indicators (function and contribution), and its involvement in the Orange 
Revolution did not become "a firing cannon" that would further strengthen the spirit and 
spiral of protests.142 
PROFILE: PORA 
Launch 
The idea of Pora was a product of simultaneous and uncoordinated deliberations 
within Ukrainian political and civic circles. On the civic side, it was verbalized during 
brainstorming sessions of the "Ukraine for the Truth" coalition of NGOs, whose activists 
believed the upcoming presidential elections would be most brutally fought to maintain 
the existing power structure.143 A group called "Youth Resistance" piloted the concept of 
youth mobilization and educational outreach in Lviv, a heavily pro-democratic city in the 
West of Ukraine.144 The experiences of Kmara and Otpor also proved to many domestic 
activists that, if organized and united, civil society could make an impact. 
On the political side, three leading figures within Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" 
bloc - Taras Stetskiv, Roman Bezsmertnyi, and Volodymyr Filenko - recognized that if 
large-scale fraud occurred and an election outcome were falsified, Yushchenko's victory 
would come about only as a result of active public pressure. However, they also had a 
lingering doubt whether traditionally passive and private Ukrainians were ready to stand 
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up for their rights. Since January 2004 Stetskiv took the lead in elaborating possible 
options to address this issue.145 
The events took a lucky turn for "Our Ukraine." On March 9, 2004 some young 
activists were arrested in Kharkiv, while celebrating the birthday of Taras Shevchenko146 
and protesting against the Kuchma regime. Among them was Evhen Zolotariov, a MP 
representative for Volodymyr Filenko, who carried a Kuchma dummy during the 
event.147 The demonstration and arrests showed that the Ukrainian youth - a previously 
apathetic electoral segment - might be ready to get involved. Furthermore, the 
resentment of the Kuchma regime must have spread far and deep to make protests 
feasible in Kharkiv, a historically pro-Russian city in North-Eastern Ukraine. 
Vladyslav Kaskiv, Pora's informal leader, did not need to conduct extensive 
recruitment to get the group off the ground. He knew many potential activists through 
trainings that were conducted for youth organizations since 2002 by the Network of 
Social Democratic Funds of Europe.148 So merely a month after the demonstration in 
Kharkiv, Pora conducted its first seminar in Uzhhorod149 and launched the first campaign 
- "Kuchmism is...?" The organization's name and its literary associations immediately 
put it on the societal radar.150 As if the message of change could have been missed, 
posters, asking people to define what living under the Kuchma regime meant for them, 
appeared on the weekend when Ukrainians moved their clocks one hour forward. 
Kuchma's winter was over, the summer time has brought a welcome change. 
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19th century Ukrainian poet Ivan Franko. Titled as "Ne Pora," it called upon people to rise and actively protest against oppression and 
foreign dominance. 
The second campaign earned Pora nationwide recognition as a force to be 
reckoned with.151 It organized noisy protests during brutally falsified and violent 
mayoral elections in a small Carpathian town of Mukachevo. The contest between pro-
opposition Viktor Baloha and pro-government Emil Nuser became widely viewed as a 
rehearsal for the presidential elections in November 2004.152 
To sum up, from the very beginning the organization represented the duality of 
political and civic involvement. First, its two leaders - Vlad Kaskiv and Evhen 
Zolotariov - came from the NGO sector and party work respectively. The fact that the 
idea about Pora did not originate at once and could not be attributed to a particular 
source indicates that civic and political activists were thinking along the same lines for 
some time. Therefore, the group became the embodiment of a consensus rather than a 
top-down initiative or a donor project. Second, Pora was able to put itself quickly on the 
political map because it was starting to tap into previously under-involved target 
audiences through grass-root methods that caught attention of an average Ukrainian. 
Mission 
As one Pora activist aptly put it, its mission was to engage the disenfranchised 
and the angry.153 It sought to fight public apathy, especially among young voters, 
through large-scale awareness campaigns and (if elections turned out to be fraudulent) 
mass mobilization. 
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By 2004, Ukraine continued to have low levels of public efficacy and 
participation. Political experts speculated that reasons for the estrangement from politics 
varied by age. Whereas older generations were skeptical of their influence due to Soviet 
experiences, those in their twenties learned to rely on themselves and disengaged from 
the politics, which did not impact their daily living. 
By learning from previous successes and failures of civic activism in Ukraine, 
Pora sought to break this pattern of behavior. From the 1990 student hunger strike, Pora 
activists took the importance of grass-root work to recruit participants and visible actions 
to attract media and public attention. Based on the failed anti-Kuchma protests in 2001, 
the group decided that its focus should be on non-violent methods of resistance.155 In 
March 2001 the government was successful in sparking clashes between demonstrators 
and the police. The footage of massive unrest prompted ordinary Ukrainians to stay at 
home and undermined the image of protesters in the international community. As a 
result, public statements from foreign governments adopted a neutral stand and called for 
both sides to resolve their differences peacefully.156 Pora was determined not to repeat 
any of those mistakes. 
Between April and October 2004, Pora defined its mission very broadly as 
spreading awareness about importance of the campaign through its posters and public 
actions. However, after the first round of the presidential elections in September 2004, 
the civic group had to adjust its goals according to the situation. Shocked by the scale of 
fraud and its blatant nature, Pora activists realized that they were trying to accomplish 
too much in a short period of time.157 Instead they decided to re-focus their efforts more 
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narrowly to fight state propaganda through mass actions and placed a greater emphasis 
on recruiting people for possible mobilization. 
To summarize, because of the proximity to its target audience, Pora instinctively 
found a niche among those who yearned for change, but were either shut out or 
disaffected by the political process. It began tapping into this audience with a wide array 
of methods that relied on its core principle of nonviolence and sought to attract public 
attention. The shift in the mission from awareness to mobilization and protests speaks 
positively of Pora's ability to assess the situation after the first round of voting and sense 
the changing public mood. 
Funding and sustaihability 
Pora and its leaders were able to overcome the usual pathologies of the Ukrainian 
nonprofit sector by successfully securing funds from numerous domestic sources. 
However, in the matters of financial accountability and transparency, the group 
continued to display problems similar to other NGOs. 
At the beginning, the organization survived on some seed money that was 
available from the Freedom of Choice coalition, headed by one of the Pora leaders Vlad 
Kaskiv.158 Because his NGO was well known from previous election cycles, Kaskiv 
could secure some funding from the Marshall Fund and the Freedom House to begin 
initial training activities, like the summer camp in Crimea/However, all talk about 
sustained American support for the group seems to be just a myth. Both foreign donors 
in Ukraine and Pora activists indicated how wary the former were of being perceived to 
Zolotariov 
have any close association with the group. Any institutionalized contact became 
especially radioactive after the government started pursuing a vigorous campaign to 
portray Pora as extremist and violent. 
Lacking access to external funds, Pora had to turn inward and focus on possible 
domestic sources of support. Its financial base consisted of contributions and in-kind 
donations from medium and small businesses as well as ordinary citizens who contacted 
Pora activists through the phone numbers provided on street leaflets.160 Each group was 
drawn to Pora for different reasons. Businesses sensed that a large-scale effort to 
redistribute property in favor of the Donetsk oligarchic clan was already underway. Its 
ruthlessness and breadth offered a preview of what would yet to come, if Viktor 
Yanukovych won. Middle-class Ukrainians understood that their cosmopolitan ambitions 
would be cut short if Ukraine obtained the image of a European pariah, akin to Belarus. 
Many also suspected that under the new regime, they would have to become serfs to 
oligarchs to maintain any semblance of good living standards. 
What pushed all these social groups to help Pora was the government's zeal in 
besmirching the civic organization. The surreal tales of Pora activists being trained by 
former Vietnam War veterans on urban warfare only further confirmed the opinion that 
Pora was the real thing. Otherwise, the Kuchma regime would not have wasted so much 
airtime and propaganda talent on something it deemed benign (e.g. the traditionally 
"oppositional" Communist Party).161 
At the same time, the evidence provided by Pora activists makes it clear that the 
group did poorly in terms of planning their funding. The initial intention was that Vlad 
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Kaskiv would use his connections within the donor community to generate grant money. 
By summer, it became apparent that foreign support was not forthcoming for a number 
of reasons. While in July-August the organization was so cash-starved that activists 
had to pay for cell phones from their own money, by the end of the election campaign 
(October-December 2004), it was overwhelmed by donations from citizens and 
businesses. It was then when Pora acquired a powerful financier, David Zhvania, who 
openly defected to join Yushchenko and began sponsoring the group. In the wake of the 
demonstrations at the Maidan, the group opened an improvised office at a local cafe 
downtown Kyiv where supporters of the Orange revolution could stop by and donate 
funds for residents of the Orange tent city. Evhen Zolotariov, the other Pora leader, 
acknowledged that soon they had more money than they could use.163 
Like many Ukrainian NGOs, Pora's leaders also did not institute clear fund 
allocation and reporting procedures. At first, this did not seem to be a problem since 
there were no funds to report about. The situation turned one hundred and eighty degrees 
in the fall with the deluge of public and business support. To this day, it remains unclear 
what the extent of contributions from each sector of the society was and, more 
importantly, where it went. The lack of financial transparency continues to provide a 
propitious ground for conspiracy theories, alleging clandestine foreign backing of the 
group by the Soros Foundation in Ukraine and the United Nations Development 
Program.164 In addition, the group's domestic foes, especially among former 
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disenchanted members, assert that the top leadership (including Kaskiv and Zolotariov) 
might have appropriated the leftover of the funds donated during the demonstrations.165 
To conclude, though the potential of Pora to fundraise among the Ukrainian 
public powerfully attests to its broad appeal, the inability to manage money in a 
transparent and responsible manner underlies a bigger problem. Pora's strong rootedness 
in the Ukrainian society also brought a cavalier attitude toward money that many 
Ukrainians continue to carry from the Soviet times - "everything that belongs to a 
collective belongs to me." 
Donor influence 
Regardless of the widely held assumption about the West funding the Ukrainian 
revolution by supporting Pora, the influence of international donors on the group was 
limited and sporadic. Three reasons can be provided to explain that. 
First, as the government was ratcheting up its rhetoric against Pora, many donors 
decided to stay away from the group. Their decision was driven by multiple factors. 
They feared that any cooperation might provoke the Kuchma regime to suspend their 
own activities and presence in the country. Some observers in Ukraine and Georgia point 
out that donors were able to recognize the benefit of citizen-driven protest groups only in 
retrospect.166 Pora (like Kmara in Georgia) was a completely new creature on the 
domestic civic scene. It did not quite fit the standard understanding of an advocacy NGO 
with its sedentary emphasis on education and glossy publications. Neither could it be 
branded as a political party, because it did not run for office. Pora's edgy, "in-your-face" 
tactics of work made international funders even more leery to get involved with an 
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organization that was so volatile and unpredictable. It represented people's power at its 
raw and produced the same cautiousness with which donors treated "people movements" 
during the Cold War.167 On one hand, they were willing to support a genuine display of 
citizens' participation. On the other, they were wary of its larger political consequences 
(i.e. large-scale regional instability). Another factor had to do with priorities. Many 
donors admitted that they (and their headquarters in Washington, DC) felt it was time to 
throw support behind Viktor Yushchenko who was the first viable oppositional candidate 
in a long time. Spending funding and political capital on Pora was seen as both 
dangerous and wasteful. 
Second, because of the previous rationales Pora developed a different pattern of 
relations with donors. Since any donor funding would come with strict conditions, the 
group sought exclusively methodological and technical assistance.169 For instance, it 
used grants from the Marshal Fund and the Freedom House to conduct activist 
training.170 If donors could not provide direct financial assistance, it participated in their 
joint activities. Seeking to enhance its cooperation with Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine," 
especially at the regional level, Pora turned to NDI to organize an informal training 
where members of both organizations could meet and get to know each other.171 
Otherwise, for its major programmatic activities the group relied almost exclusively on 
domestic funds, which vitiated possible foreign leverage. 
In the end, many Pora activists and outside observers suggest that the lack of 
heavy donor involvement made a number of unexpectedly positive contributions. It 
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provided an early test of survival, thereby pushing the group's ability to come through to 
the limits. Whereas many Ukrainian civic organizations spent years in the greenhouse of 
foreign funding and ultimately never made it to the outside alive, Pora was forced to face 
a post-donor reality fairly quickly. The absence of foreign grants made the group's 
activists think harder of how to appeal to ordinary citizens and be more persistent in 
seeking public support. 
With no financial backing, it also had no content-related strings attached. 
Therefore, many of Pora's activities, which mocked the Ukrainian authorities 
mercilessly,m would not have been imaginable if it had any foreign funding for they 
were too risky and provocative for donors to finance. 
Finally, as mentioned before, Ukrainian civil society was a developed sector. 
Thanks to the previous years of infrastructural investments and seed grants, Pora had 
some fellow organizations (most prominently the Freedom of Choice coalition) to help it 
weather financial dry spells. 
To summarize, though Pora received some donor funding for training purposes, it 
failed to secure any continuous foreign support for its edgy programmatic activities. The 
lack of donor enthusiasm stemmed from the political atmosphere on the ground, Pora's 
non-conventional nature and a limited pool of grant resources. In the end, having no 
foreign backing proved to be a blessing, for it enabled the organization to seek domestic 
support. 
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Membership 
Members of the organization can be broadly divided into two groups, which 
encompassed "little Ukrainians" (as Viktor Yushchenko lovingly called the ordinary 
folk) and urban would-be elites. 
The first group was older, mostly male and over 35 years old. Its participants 
came from small towns in Central and Western Ukraine and had some previous 
"combat" experience by taking part in the 2001 protests of "Ukraine Without 
Kuchma." They joined Pora mostly for two reasons. The first had to do with the sense 
of patriotism. Sociological studies widely confirm that inhabitants in these regions of 
Ukraine are more patriotic than those from the heavily Russified East and South.174 
Many of them never perceived Russian-speaking Kuchma as a true steward of the 
Ukrainian nation. Extensive spread of the Russian capital throughout Ukraine left little 
doubt in their mind that Ukraine was heading for another period of colonization. Fueling 
the feelings of patriotic indignation was the gut sense of injustice. Living deep in the 
Ukrainian heartland, they were far away from the glamour of Kyiv or other financial 
hubs (like Donetsk or Dnipropetrovsk) where ordinary people could get spillovers of the 
economic growth. Instead, all they saw during the Kuchma decade was impoverishment, 
unemployment and massive labor migration of their family and relatives to the European 
Union in search of a better life. This group, mostly known as Black Pora, became the 
working horse of the organization. It made up the crowd during demonstrations, 
populated the Orange tent city and stood in freezing temperatures on the Maidan. Their 
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tenacity and grit came from one simple fact - the life was so bad that they had little to 
lose. 
Contrary to them, the second group had a lot at stake in 2004. It consisted of 
urban and highly educated young professionals who matured in already independent 
Ukraine. Though each articulated a different reason for joining Pora (i.e. a concern for 
the fairness of elections, the state of Ukrainian democracy, and support for 
Yushchenko's ideals), underneath it all was a basic worry about their future in a would-
be authoritarian Ukraine.175 Like Pora's middle-class supporters, they realized that no 
good would hold for independent-minded, career-oriented individuals in a country where 
success is doled out based on oligarchic connections and loyalty. Known as Yellow Pora, 
this group became the core of leadership and generated ideas and activities that formed 
the public image of the organization. 
Pora began recruiting members long before it emerged. The initial wave of 
recruitment relied on a simple principle of networking. Those interested in the ideas of 
civic activism took part in a series of seminars on leadership skills that were organized 
and funded by the Westminster and Alfred Muller Foundations in October 2003 - April 
2004.176 At these events, future Pora members identified people who shared similar 
opinions and values about the political situation. Though, as the interviews reveal, the 
selection was informal, it was also fairly rigorous. Olha Aivazovska says Pora usually 
picked one to three people out of thirty participants in a seminar. She asserts that 
selectiveness reflected not simply elitism, but an intention to choose real believers 
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among those who often go to donor events because they are free of charge and provide a 
break from the work routine. 
The second round of recruitment relied heavily on grass-root organizing. 
Borrowing the term from the 17th century Ukrainian Cossacks, Pora activists divided 
Ukraine into 78 "kushs" (translated as a bush) and proceeded to establish a small cell in 
each of them.177 Later on, this regional division became blurred. Trying to attract as 
many students as possible, Pora allowed a group of activists to form a "bush" in a 
university, as long as it had enough people. 
The government's over-reaction to the civic group produced a powerful counter-
effect. The aura of danger, secrecy and adventurism, which infused its public image, 
became a magnet for the previously disaffected and passive youth.179 By September 
2004, when Pora was rolling out its most popular initiatives, like "The Tour in Stripes," 
joining the group gave one the ultimate status of being "cool." It is estimated that Pora 
had between 20,000 - 30,000 active members throughout the 2004 presidential 
180 
campaign. 
Given the seeming ease with which it was able to attract participants, one 
wonders how many of them joined for either superficial reasons of being fashionable or 
for practical considerations to advance their career (should Yushchenko win, of course). 
Persistent inquires on the issue provide a positive result that further strengthens the 
argument of Pora's societal embeddedness. 
Because Pora did not pay its activists, the monetary incentive (which usually 
persuades a lot of unhappy NGO members to stay) was moot. Though being in the group 
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was considered cool among peers, university and law enforcement authorities, not to 
mentioned concerned parents, did not share the same opinion. Pora activists were 
regularly harassed by the government and often had to support financially their 
membership related activities, Diuk accounts that about 355 activists were arrested 
throughout the campaign,181 and on October 15 Pora's office and private apartments of 
its activists were raided by the police. 
So why did they stay? One of the reasons has to do with the intensity of 
involvement. Unlike other civic groups, which often turn into debating societies, Pora 
1 83 
leaders sought to retain people by keeping them busy. Immediately upon joining, new 
members became engaged in small, but publicly visible activities. As if to confirm their 
expectations of danger, they were asked to post anti-government leaflets in public places 
at night. The other reason for members' retention lay in the internal workings of the 
group. For many activists, Pora's lateral structure made it possible to have their voices 
heard for the first time. This point brings us to the relationship between members and 
leaders. 
Leaders and members 
If there was a point in my interviews that members were insistent on me getting 
right, it was about a special pattern of relations between Pora members and leaders. The 
group's organizational structure, they emphasized, was fundamentally different from that 
of a typical Ukrainian NGO. According to the sketched profile of the Ukrainian 
nonprofit sector at the beginning of this chapter, many civic groups were strong at the 
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top, but weak at the bottom. Recognizing this drawback and the fact that mobilization 
would be impossible without strong grassroots, Pbra leaders proceeded to establish a 
new pattern. 
First, the organization had no formal leadership, meaning that no internal 
hierarchy was established. The decision produced double benefits. On one hand, it 
prevented endless fights over titles and ladders of subordination. Instead the focus was 
placed on what specific tasks each person (or a group of people) would have to 
accomplish. On the other hand, it significantly decreased the danger of Pora's collapse 
under possible repressions. Had it adopted a traditional hierarchical internal structure, a 
quick arrest of the top echelon of its activists would have meant a severe loss of 
institutional capacity. At best, the group would have taken weeks to recover. At worst, it 
would have descended into the chaos of succession battles for the leadership "crown."184 
Second, even with the lateral structure Pora managed to establish a clear division 
of tasks thanks to a massive devolution of responsibilities. While the core group of 
twenty activists in Kyiv was in charge of developing thematic messages and activities, 
their implementation was placed completely on the shoulders of regional and local 
members. Each region would have a group of 10-12 people. They each knew another 
five people in the "bushes" to pass down the message and the strategies to implement it, 
who, in turn, relied on a similar principle of communication. This method assured a 
number of things. The most important of them was, of course, a sense of ownership and 
individual responsibility. Activists felt it was incumbent upon each of them to make sure 
that the message would be communicated and that Pora members would show up for a 
planned event. The principle helped expand organizational ranks as people further down 
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the communication lane would seek to bring new activists who could recruit others. The 
fact that each activist knew personally a limited number of people ensured that a) 
regional "bushes" would remain intact, even if one or several members are arrested and 
forced to reveal the names of all Pora activists they knew and b) government 
provocateurs would have a more difficult time penetrating the organization.185 
In the end, what Pora members called fancifully the "network" principle is 
reminiscent more of a "snowballing" method, used by many researchers to conduct 
participant recruitment in unpropitious environments. Like a social scientist, who studies 
a politically or culturally sensitive issue, Pora knew that to get involved in acts of civic 
protest and disobedience in a semi-authoritarian Ukraine, people would have to be 
approached by someone they knew - their close friends. 
At the same time, the lateral organizational structure presented a number of 
problems. First, the core group of activists in Kyiv had little control over the 
implementation of their messages and strategies. As it turns out, they worked great in 
some places and failed in others, particularly in the East and Donetsk (where Pora did 
not even have a branch).186 Second, with members being so loosely connected, gathering 
feedback and making improvements was almost impossible. That is why, in my 
interviews some activists found it hard to suggest what should have been done 
differently in terms of activities, because they did not have an idea what went wrong in 
the first place. 
To conclude this discussion, Pora was right to rely on "snowballing" to expand 
its membership ranks. Since equality among current and would-be participants is a key 
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prerequisite for the method to work, the group managed to ameliorate significantly both 
leadership contestation and threats to its survival from authorities. Regardless of the 
weaknesses that a highly lateral and loose organizational structure creates, it seems to 
have been the proper approach for a short-term campaign, such as the 2004 presidential 
elections. 
Normative transfers 
While Pora activists learned extensively from domestic and foreign experiences 
of democratization, they received little formalized or systematic training from foreign 
donors or groups. The group's normative transfers can be divided into three categories -
from fellow civic organizations outside of Ukraine, from international donors and from 
interactions among its own members. 
First, a lot of media and public attention has so far been paid to Pora's 
cooperation with Georgia's Kmara and Serbia's Otpor. The attention proved so 
overwhelming as to create a worldwide backlash against civic groups and democracy 
promoters in authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes.187 The inclination to 
exaggerate links between these groups is natural for both supporters and critics of "color 
revolutions." While the former attempt to uncover the evidence of effective norm 
transference, the latter seek to bolster their case of these events being a Western 
orchestrated conspiracy.188 
In reality, the record does not match the hype. In August 2004, Otpor members 
came to the Crimean summer camp, provocatively titled "Pora [It is time] to Wake Up," 
National Endowment for Democracy, "A Backlash Against Democracy Promotion." 
Democratic Initiatives Foudnation, "Political Portrait of Ukraine No. 31" (Kyiv: DIF), 24. 
to teach three hundred activists the techniques of non-violent resistance and talk about 
their experiences in prevailing against the regime of Slobodan Milosevic.189 Some 
members of Black Pora, a more radical wing of the organization, stayed in contact with 
Kmara, frequently soliciting its friendly advice. At least two activists from Otpor and 
Kmara were in Ukraine during the Orange revolution.190 
However, Ukrainian activists indicate that the main contributions from both 
groups were methodologies and an inspiration for change. Otpor and Kmara acted as 
classic political entrepreneurs. They sensed that a set of factors191 created propitious 
conditions for their skills and knowledge and brought them to Ukraine. The interviewed 
Pora members harbored no illusion that Otpor's or Kmara's friendly advice was no more 
than a toolbox, which would have to be adapted to the domestic reality. They recognized 
that Ukraine's size, population and national mentality presented a unique set of factors 
that vitiated any literary replication.192 One activist was keen to note that along with 
young people from Serbia and Georgia, members of Belarus' "Zubr" and Russia's 
"Smena" came to Ukraine during the Orange demonstrations to see first-hand how 
"Ukrainians were making democracy." 
Casual statements from Pora and Kmara leaders further diminish the claim about 
a closely-knit web of cooperation and a mutual understanding that existed among these 
civic groups. When asked about ties with foreign civic groups, Evhen Zolotariov of Pora 
mentioned that the group relied a lot more on the experiences of Polish Solidarnost than 
Serbian or Georgian activists, because of Poland's proximity to Ukraine and shared 
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features of the national character.194 He also added it was clear to him that both Kmara 
and Otpor were externally conspired, while Pora was self-organized. Levan Ramishlivi, 
Chairman of the Liberty Institute and one of the co-founders of Kmara, noted that, 
because Pora was propped up and financed by Orange oligarchs (like David Zhvania), its 
freedom of action was limited. The fact that the leaders of these organizations were so 
profoundly misinformed about the other group attests that any contacts between them 
were rather limited. 
Second, immediately after its launch in April 2004, Pora turned to representatives 
of international donor organizations for trainings. Because the response was lukewarm 
(for the reasons already mentioned), it had to train the first wave of activists in summer 
2004 partially with the help of Otpor and partially through its own capacity. At the early 
stages of the presidential campaign, the group received a seminar on communication 
strategies from the National Democratic Institute that in practical terms was aimed at 
brining together regional activists of Pora and Our Ukraine. However, further assistance 
from NDI had to be quickly suspended after pro-governmental newspapers ran stories of 
Americans training Pora.196 
Third, after the heightened government scrutiny had made Pora an "untouchable" 
among foreign donors, the organization relied on its own capacities to train activists. 
Here again the overall level of development in the Ukrainian nonprofit sector was a 
helpful factor. Having been a beneficiary of consistent Western funding in the first 
decade of independence, it had many activists who have previously received trainings 
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from the National Democratic Institute or the Counterpart International Alliance. Thus, 
Pora could rely on the existing domestic pool of expertise. 
Most internal trainings were focused on a set of skills and attitudes that members 
should have before fieldwork. In this regard, the group's normative background was 
shaped by Gene Sharp's book on democracy and non-violent resistance.197 Its cult-like 
status provides a perfect illustration of how a norm, advocated by an external source, 
was quickly absorbed, because the conditions for its domestic acceptance were ripe. 
Driven by the recognition that Ukrainian society would never accept violent resistance, 
Pora activists were looking for an alternative path to victory and Sharpe's book offered 
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just that. It became such a must-read for any activist that some Pora members jokingly 
compared it to Mao's "Red Book." Other components of member trainings usually 
offered details on how activities and communication would be organized logistically as 
well as some helpful advice on interacting with law enforcement and state authorities. 
All content-related ideas were generated domestically either through internal 
brainstorming or by developing previously successful projects of Pora activists.199 This 
made them original and appealing. For instance, Pora's manifesto combines pragmatism 
and patriotism and reads like a piece of literary work. Engaging in a wordplay with the 
group's name (Pora, meaning "It is Time"), it proclaims, "Pora to stand straight or fall 
down. Pora to believe or forget. Pora to love or hate. Pora to fight or betray."200 The text 
provides a perfect illustration of the ideological core of the group - an emphasis on 
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action and change, disdain for ambiguities and compromises, and a penchant for 
radicalism. 
To summarize, while Pora's interactions with foreign donors and civic groups 
were not as dense or consistent as previously believed, the norm of nonviolent resistance 
still managed to become the group's overarching normative paradigm thanks to a fusion 
between external inputs and internal dynamics. Secondary norms of Pora's structure and 
activities were determined solely by its own members. Because many of them were 
experienced civic leaders, these internal normative transfers were much richer, much 
more intensive and much more successful in the end. 
Inter-NGO cooperation 
Pora's major NGO partner was the Freedom of Choice coalition, which enabled 
the group to weather financial dry spells in summer 2004. As for other civic 
organizations, Pora preferred ad hoc cooperation on complementary initiatives to 
formalized NGO coalitions that would inevitably invite a fight over a division of 
responsibilities. 
The arrangement worked especially well on the regional and local levels. 
Because Pora had a loose structure and did not pay the majority of its members, it was 
able to attract a wider audience of civic activists from other organizations. Many of them 
decided to join Pora to add a more edgy part to the "desk" activities of their NGOs. They 
were also able to pull their resources to assist with the group's "fieldwork."201 
In general, Pora's allies in the nonprofit world can be divided into three broad 
categories. The first and ideologically closest encompassed friendly youth-driven groups, 
201
 Aivazovska. 
* 195 
such as the "Student Wave" and student unions in colleges and universities. The second 
was patriotic organizations, like the "Clean Ukraine" and the "Young Prosvita." They 
supported Yushchenko and were attracted to Pora because its activities aimed at raising 
national self-consciousness. The last category consisted of "professional" nonprofit 
organizations that had a different target audience or focus, but shared a similar goal with 
Pora. For instance, Znau (Know) was a darling of Western projects on election assistance 
and education. Like Pora, it wanted to tell Ukrainians about their rights. However, it did 
not want to cross the bridge from education to active advocacy. In another example, 
GVU and Pora activists in the regions cooperated because they shared the same political 
space and were concerned about the same subject - violations of people's constitutional 
rights. Unsurprisingly, many Pora members acted as CVU observers on the day of 
elections. 
To conclude, there were a number of reasons that contributed to Pora having such 
a diverse range of informal partners. One was the nature of its membership. The "come-
as-you-please" approach meant that members were free to get involved whenever they 
felt their help was needed.202 As a result, activists of other nonprofits did not view their 
participation in Pora as a threat to their organizational loyalty. The other reason is in its 
broadly defined goals that made them complementary to other NGOs. Finally, both Pora 
activists and external experts acknowledge that the overall level of civil society 
development in Ukraine helped the group net a lot of partners. In the decade since 
independence, Ukraine experienced a boom in the quantity (but not always quality) of 
civil society groups. Given the sheer number of civic associations, Pora had a large pool 
of nonprofits within which it could attract a few that were ideologically similar and 
202Soboleva. 
organizationally capable. In addition, it was inadvertently assisted by the gradual 
radicalization of Ukrainian civil society as a result of increasing authoritarian tendencies 
in the Kuchma government. 
Pora and political parties 
At the beginning of Pora's existence, there was little formalized cooperation 
between the group and oppositional parties, most prominently Yushchenko's "Our 
Ukraine" and the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko. Cognizant of this reality, the National 
Democratic Institute organized a joint training session to introduce activists from Pora 
and "Our Ukraine" to each other. Due to the publicity generated by this event, NDI could 
no longer play a facilitative role, and most inter-organizational contacts between Pora 
and "Our Ukraine" became confided to the level of regional members who exchanged 
information and political gossip.204 
With few exceptions among "Our Ukraine" rank and file, oppositional leaders 
(including Yushchenko and Tymoshenko) saw Pora at best as a promoter of their ideas 
(which had to be subsumed in order not to waste scarce resources) and at worst as a 
noisy distraction from the real campaign (which had to be neutralized). It is not 
surprising that after the first round of voting, Viktor Yushhchenko met with Pora 
activists and suggested they demote their tent city downtown Kyiv and instead "go into 
the masses" to encourage people to vote. 
During the course of events between the first and second tour, Pora had to give 
up any pretense of civic neutrality and openly ally itself with the opposition. On October 
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15, first attempts to coordinate activities between Pora and the opposition bloc "Syla 
Narodu" (backed by Yushehenko) began. Defending this decision, Pora activists 
argued that the magnitude of violations, their blatant execution and government 
harassment of critical voices left the group no choice.207 In order to fulfill its raison 
d'etre - free and fair elections, they had to support Yushehenko whose victory 
represented the will of Ukrainian people. 
It took the second round of voting to challenge the attitude to Pora at least among 
leading "Our Ukraine" officials. Yushehenko's political bloc needed to generate the first 
wave of protests in order to forestall the impending legitimization of Viktor 
Yanukovych's fraudulent win through domestic and international acquiescence.208 Time 
was a precious commodity. It was then when "Our Ukraine" leaders began to act in close 
coordination with Pora and divided responsibilities over most critical projects (e.g. 
mobilization, picketing, etc). My interviews with Pora activists further undermine any 
suggestions of the "plan" that was allegedly available to either (or both) side to start 
public unrest immediately after the presidential elections (no matter what an outcome 
was). As it turns out, neither Pora nor "Our Ukraine" members planned any actions after 
the voting on 21 November. Confirming this finding, other accounts note of a small 
gathering by Pora activists at the Maidan of Independence that day, which quickly 
dissipated by nightfall.209 Most active regional members purchased train tickets and left 
for Kyiv, merely wishing to be at the center of any future events. Lacking funds and 
instructions, the rest stayed home.210 
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To conclude, the cooperation between Pora and "Our Ukraine" did not take any 
systematic character until the final stages of the campaign. The prevalent view among 
political party leaders and members that regards civil society as ancillary to politics 
prevented deeper institutional collaboration. For some Pora activists, the situation did not 
present a problem because the group and the party targeted different audiences. Others 
believed it diminished possible joint effects as well as persuaded most ambitious Pora 
activists to set up a separate political party shortly after the elections. 
Influence in the public 
There are continuing disagreements on the influence and recognition of Pora 
among ordinary Ukrainians, which cannot be decisively resolved due to the dearth of 
supporting statistical data. In a very conscious attempt to diminish the narrative of the 
Western media, some international donors assert that at most 5 percent of Ukrainian 
911 
citizens knew about Pora. They suggest that the attribution of the revolution's success 
to Pora came as an after-thought. In public forums, TV talk shows and elite parlors, 
many were wondering how the regime that was so seemingly strong and firm in its grip 
on power as Kuchma's could collapse so spectacularly. In search for answers, Pora was 
quickly identified as the main culprit, because of its colorful identity. In reality, the 
skeptics insist, the group's influence on the course of events was minimal. To buttress 
their position, they cite the organization's performance during the 2006 parliamentary 
elections. Immediately after the Orange revolution, one of Pora's founders, Vlad Kaskiv, 
decided to patent the group's trademark and organize a party under the same name. His 
intention was clear - to capitalize on the popularity and name recognition that the 
21
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Orange Revolution provided to Pora. The outcome was a crushing defeat. Pora, as a 
party, garnered a mere 1.47 percent of voters, falling far below the required 5 percent 
threshold to get into the Parliament.212 This result, the skeptics insist, proved that Pora 
was not a household name as the Western media claim. 
Optimists interpret the group's election performance differently. Pora got 
i n 
373,478 votes - not a paltry amount for an organization that emerged in 2004 and 
landed the 10th spot among political parties, whose leaders have been permanent fixtures 
on the Ukrainian political landscape for the past decade. One thing, they say, is obvious. 
Pora was no ordinary civic group, because few of those attempted to enter the political 
arena in their own right. The amount of gathered votes is even more impressive given the 
fact that in 2004 Pora did not have any positive publicity in the media. Furthermore, Pora 
members point to their own research that showed 93 percent recognition of the group.214 
To summarize, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Previous media reports in 
the West and conspiracy theorists in Russia overplayed the influence of Pora in 
Ukrainian society. Even Pora activists do not deny that their societal penetration was 
rather low in the East and South of Ukraine - the core constituency of the Party of 
Regions. At the same time, the group's performance during the 2006 parliamentary 
elections (as the only quantitatively available indicator) shows that it had quite a lot of 
supporters. The number of votes Pora received is especially impressive given the 
competition it faced from such political giants as "Our Ukraine" and the Bloc of Yulia 
Tymoshenko fighting for the same constituency of Ukrainian voters. It shows that the 
group successfully dealt with the main problem of Ukrainian nonprofit organizations. 
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The majority of them are widely known only in narrow circles of NGO leaders and 
experts. It is without doubt that Pora's role in the events on the Maidan turned it into 
from a simple civic group a visible actor on the domestic scene. 
POPvA AND THE GRANGE REVOLUTION 
On the eve of the Orange Revolution, Pora was a very young, but promising civic 
group. Established only in April 2004, it managed to attract attention within various 
segments of Ukrainian society through provocative and eye-catching activities. Though 
Pora was certainly energetic and enthusiastic, its potential and capacity were not well 
tested by time. It also stood out from other Ukrainian organizations because of its loose 
organizational structure and non-conventional advocacy methods that were reminiscent 
of those used by popular social movements rather than traditional nonprofit 
organizations. Finally, what outweighed the relative short-term existence of Pora was its 
impressive ability to tap into the dormant resources of Ukrainian civil society. 
Pre-election goals and activities 
Pora's goals were two-fold - to increase activism and political awareness among 
Ukrainians, in particular young people, and to be prepared to defend the fairness of 
elections if large-scale violations occurred.215 
In appealing to the broad audience of Ukrainian citizens, the group was not alone. 
It had to compete with political parties and other civic organizations. However, because 
of the non-conventional nature of its activities and its clearly crafted message of protest, 
Pora succeeded in finding its own niche, which included "the disenfranchised and the 
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angry." The former came from the educated, urban youth who stayed aside from 
domestic political processes in the past. The latter consisted of the former middle-class 
who had to subsist in small towns throughout central and western Ukraine. 
To emphasize its preference for grass-root activities and difference from regular 
"programs" of other nonprofits, Pora called its initiatives "fieldwork."217 A team of 10-
12 activists in Kyiv was put in charge of generating ideas. However, thanks to Pora's 
horizontal structure, it was not alone in this task. Many good suggestions were often 
picked up from regional or local "bushes."218 
The organization faced peculiar challenges in implementation. Its colorful 
initiatives had to be tested informally and implemented simultaneously throughout the 
country. Any overt pilot testing would alert authorities to act preventatively elsewhere. 
Though the main challenge was for an idea to work well the first time, the biggest 
reward was an element of surprise and shock (at how well organized Pora was) 
experienced by authorities. If the content of Pora's actions and posters could be 
summarized in one word, it would be - originality. Their messages wisely combined 
popular folklore images, caustic humor with memorable slogans. 
The obstacles in implementation and a complete media boycott generated a 
curious blending of most rudimentary and most advanced strategies of outreach. Street 
activities became the first tool to attract attention of inadvertent by-standers who would 
then spread the word to their friends and relatives. The second was a return to the archaic 
methods of publicity. Instead of glossy brochures that often became the benchmark of 
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NGO development, Pora posted leaflets on buildings and in public transportation. The 
task required persistence and dedication. Activists faced a continuous battle with local 
police that was ordered to take off any provocative material during the day only to find it 
91Q 
re-appear in the morning. Finally, the third tool was the Internet where the group 
provided an instant response to the daily flow of the campaign in the manner to which 
people could relate. 
To achieve its first goal of raising political awareness, Pora sought to undermine 
990 
the government narrative. Its first activity was designed to poke holes in President 
Kuchma's argument that his regime brought a welcome economic stability. Posters 
appeared on many streets asking people to define what living under Kuchma meant for 
them ("Kuchmism is...?"). By leaving the question open, Pora challenged people to 
think independently and raised their curiosity about possible answers. Within a week, 
new posters proclaimed, "Kuchmism is Destitute, Unemployment, Corruption, 
Crime."221 
Another activity, "The Tour in Stripes," and a series of posters "Ukraina v. 
Urkaina" pointed to the criminal past of the pro-governmental candidate Viktor 
Yanukovych and a prison-like future of Ukraine under his regime. "The Tour in Stripes" 
became an immediate hit. Borrowing its title from one of the most beloved Soviet 
comedies, Pora activists marched on main streets of many cities wearing a prison 
uniform (with vertical black and white stripes). A series of posters soon appeared that 
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contrasted a folkloric image of Ukraine with what it could become under would-be 
President Yanukovych.222 
Finally, Pora websites223 proved effective in combating government propaganda 
and official censorship. They became one of the key sources for an alternative narrative 
about the presidential campaign with stories about official abuse of resources or 
incidences of opposition harassment throughout the country. Most importantly, they 
turned into an outlet for people to make fun of the regime. By sharing anecdotes and 
jokes about Kuchma or Yanukovych, people were able to express their frustration and 
see that the authorities were not omnipotent. For instance, the footage of the prime 
minister "sustaining injuries" after eggs were thrown at him at one of the campaign 
stops became the butt of Internet jokes, which soon found their way into the public. 
The second goal of Pora activities was to emphasize the importance of the 
presidential elections as a turning point for Ukraine. Therefore, between August 1 and 
November 21, 2004 Pora pursued a vigorous multi-step informational campaign.225 
Its message was simple, yet appealing. By framing the fairness of elections in 
terms of human dignity, the group pointed to the disrespect that the government showed 
for ordinary people, by believing they were stupid enough to buy the falsified election 
outcome as their own will. The theme stroke a cord with Pora's target group, who felt 
hoodwinked by post-Soviet privatization, aggrieved by economic injustices and angered 
by their political marginalization. Furthermore, the organization was successful in 
increasing the urgency and the categorical tone of its message with each step of the 
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election campaign - from "Pora to Wake Up!" in August to "Vote or Lose!" in 
October.226 
In addition to Pora's work, government tactics and rhetoric were reinforcing the 
group's message, by adding the fuel of arrogance to the fire of public frustration. In 
interviews, President Kuchma said, because of their inherent passivity, the Ukrainian 
people would not be able to mount resistance similar to Georgians in 2003. The pro-
government candidate, Viktor Yanukovych, compared any opponents to silly goats (a 
Ukrainian pejorative for an idiot). Pora immediately responded with a poster, asking 
people to prove him that they were not "goats."227 
Recognizing a high probability of fraud, the group distributed materials that 
called upon people to come together at specified locations after voting. Such gatherings 
would set in motion the initial stage for mobilization and would deter authorities from 
proceeding brazenly and hastily to acknowledge the results as legal. 
To summarize, Pora's pre-election work provided one of the few visible outlets 
for criticism and open dissent, thereby forestalling official efforts to frame and structure 
the presidential campaign to the government's liking. Its outreach strategy was built on a 
sequence of steps designed to activate public consciousness and stir public activism for a 
possible action. 
See Appendix III.2. 
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Mobilization 
Contrary to the widely held assertion that Pora' s sole goal was to foment 
revolutionary unrest, the group did surprisingly little in terms of drawing up specific 
plans for mobilization as well as forecasting scenarios of post-election responses. 
Some activists and external observers have noted that the attempt to cover too 
many areas (i.e. awareness-raising, campaign response, street "fieldwork") during the 
election campaign spread its resources too thin and ultimately distracted it from properly 
99 o 
preparing for active mobilization during the revolution. For instance, the organization 
had very few opportunities to test its general framework of civic participation during 
four local by-elections. 
Furthermore, Pora was discouraged from pursuing overt mobilization strategies 
by the opposition. After the first round of elections, Viktor Yushehenko called upon its 
activists to disband their tent city at Kontraktova Ploshcha - the location of Kyiv Mohyla 
Academy, one of the oldest and most liberal universities in Ukraine. His concern was 
that an overly antagonistic behavior would give the government a pretense to cancel 
elections altogether or provoke violence. Still sensing the need to respond to the 
unfolding political crisis somehow, Pora organized a campaign to monitor voter lists and 
later started its famous "Orange Wave" - a large-scale action to distribute orange-
colored ribbons, scarves and other symbols of the Yushehenko campaign.230 
The belief that the Kuchma government would honor the will of voters was dying 
hard. In my interview, Olha Aivazovska, a Pora activist, acknowledged a somewhat 
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bipolar perception on a possible course of events. On one hand, large-scale fraud was 
seen as inevitable, especially after the violent mayoral elections in a Carpathian city of 
Mukachevo. On the other, many members kept holding on to the idealist hope that the 
government would not dare falsify the election or use violence under "the watchful eye 
of the international community." Because of these mutually exclusive opinions, neither 
Pora nor Our Ukraine was completely prepared for the reality and the aftermath of the 
second round of elections. 
In the evening of November 21, Ukraine's Central Election Commission 
produced Soviet-like percentages of support for Viktor Yanukovych in the East of 
Ukraine, which tilted the victory in his favor. Under these circumstances, the ability to 
launch protests became necessary to attract a critical mass of fence sitters among 
politicians and ordinary citizens, produce a chain reaction within the larger society and 
ultimately disrupt a quick legitimization of results. 
At that point, Pora and "Our Ukraine" began working together to mobilize their 
supporters and stage demonstrations at the country's main square - the Maidan of 
Independence. The lack of prior preparation was soon apparent. Neither group had a 
sufficient number of people whose participation would give the demonstrations 
necessary credibility. Though some Pora activists went to Kyiv at the end of the election, 
the majority stayed at home either having no instructions on what to do or having no 
money to buy train tickets.232 As Diuk recounts, five thousand people gathered at the 
Maidan that day, but went home by nightfall.233 
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The first wave of protesters would not have been able to get to Kyiv on time 
anyway, because the government delayed all trains going from major regional centers to 
the capital. To save the situation, Pora turned to university students and university strike 
committees, many of which were set up a short while ago.234 The strategy worked well 
because of the previously established system of communication. On Monday, November 
22, 2004 Pora activists were leading thousands of students from Kyiv's largest National 
Polytechnic and National Shevchenko Universities to the Maidan of Independence where 
they met a growing number of Kyivites. As the day went on, the crowd increased to over 
two hundred thousand people. This was the beginning of the Orange Revolution and an 
early sign of the end to the Kuchma regime. 
To summarize, in the immediate aftermath of the election Pora was not 
logistically prepared to mobilize its supporters because of discouragement from "Our 
Ukraine" and its own widely focused pre-election activities. However, the group was 
able to change the situation thanks to its connections and popularity among Kyiv 
university students who were able to mobilize quickly and sustain the nascent 
demonstration at the Maidan. In addition, because Pora had a strong presence in other 
regional universities, its activists in major student hubs began organizing their local 
"maidans," thereby turning the Orange Revolution into a nation-wide event.235 
Assessment of the performance 
The emerging evidence on the influence of Pora produces a two-dimensional 
picture. On one side, during the Orange Revolution Pora on its own was not as 
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paramount of a player as its public reputation led many to believe. On the other, the 
group found a unique niche for civil society in quickly unfolding revolutionary events by 
having dedicated activists who were able to recruit others, organize and sustain their 
involvement for general and specific purposes. As my previous evaluation of CVU 
revealed, it is important to distinguish between involvement in actual events and general 
contributions to the revolutionary process. From this perspective, Pora performed well 
on both counts. 
First, its deep roots within the student community of Kyiv and close relations 
with "Our Ukraine" enabled an expedient mobilization of the former and an effective 
coordination of activities with the latter. By housing a readily available pool of 
demonstrators, Pora's tent city on Khreshchatyk (near the Maidan) was a physical 
remainder of unrelenting public pressure on the Kuchma government to give in to 
Yushchenko's demands for a new election.236 Pora's well-attended and noisy protests at 
key government buildings instilled a sense of the opposition's inevitable victory. The 
national government was brought to a standstill when the group picketed the Cabinet of 
Ministers, Central Election Commission and the Presidential Administration. At his own 
dacha, President Kuchma had to contend with a continuous drumbeat organized by Pora 
activists who were determined to make his life unbearable.237 
In effect, the group contributed to the two factors critical for success - the breadth 
and depth of support for the revolution. In regard to the former, a sheer number of 
demonstrators persuaded many fence sitters in the public and political establishment to 
join Yushchenko. Kyiv major Oleksandr Omelchenko admitted that previously unseen 
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crowds were a sign of the change in public attitude and prompted him to side with the 
• • 238 
opposition. 
As for the latter, the prevalent opinion was that large-scale demonstrations could 
not be sustained over a long period of time. The sentiment was definitely shared by the 
government. Conversations released by the New York Times showed the Ukrainian 
political elite in panic. Realizing that demonstrators could no longer be ignored or 
neutralized, President Kuchma grew so anxious as to seek advice from his equally 
perplexed counterpart, Vladimir Putin.240 This piece of evidence serves to further 
confirm the extent to which the perseverance of demonstrators proved surprising for all 
political actors. 
Second, speaking of the larger contribution of Pora to the revolution as a social 
event, the group reawakened the generation of young Ukrainian who came of age since 
the country's independence. Asking how they did it, Pora activists and external 
observers give four reasons. First, from the beginning the organization had an open 
mindset and actively searched for ideas that could attract young people and make them 
active. In order to "click," it had to be oriented toward the external world and glue itself 
to the host society. Second, the absence of organizational hierarchy helped avoid internal 
rivalry and automatically created a lot of free space for diverse individuals and interests. 
Third, Pora went right about choosing the content of their message (which had to do with 
human dignity and liberty) and the methods to deliver it (which were nonviolent and 
creative). Fourth, because Pora did not complete for donor funds, it also did not get 
trapped in organizational mechanisms of the nongovernmental sector where the penchant 
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for process often overwhelms the sight of goals. In the end, all these factors made Pora 
and its story more accessible and more believable to people. 
An opposite argument can be made that Pora was simply lucky to fall in the right 
place (the semi-authoritarian Ukraine with public discontent) at the right time (critical 
presidential elections). This is a true, but incomplete view, as it misses another critical 
variable. When falling in the right time and at the right place, Pora was also of the right 
shape in terms of its content and composition. In case there is any doubt that the group 
represented "people power," former President Kuchma, no fan of Orange 
revolutionaries, pejoratively labels it as the "lumpen resource."241 However, even he 
cannot deny the role of civic activism in those events - "After the revolution, nobody 
can tell that a Ukrainian is all about 'not in my backyard.' Civic institutions have been 
activated. The country has matured." 242 As far as the content is concerned, Pora's 
statement of principles243 and its supporting actions resonated with the society's mood 
for fundamental changes, rejection of moral compromises and a willingness to cleanse 
the Ukrainian power structure. 
The organization was by any means not perfect. Because so much in Pora was 
driven by passion, too little room was left for planning. This led to a number of other 
mistakes. Qne of them had to do with fundraising strategies, which were driven at first 
by the conventional wisdom among Ukraine nonprofits - to ask for money from donors. 
Only when that approach failed, the group decided to target medium and small 
businesses. The other drawback was the group's overly ambitious thinking. Formed at 
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the beginning of 2004, it tried to do a variety of activities instead of concentrating on the 
specifics of the 2004 elections. Narrowing the focus on those problems would have 
brought better results, most importantly in terms of mobilization. The third mistake was 
about its initial appeal, Founded by patriotic and pro-Ukrainian youth, it had a hard time 
adjusting its image to appeal to Russian-speaking Ukrainians.244 The group did not have 
a branch in Donetsk oblast (the homeland of Viktor Yanukovych). Some of its branches 
in the East (the stronghold of the Party of Regions) were weak and disorganized. Finally, 
Pora in its pre-revolutionary and revolutionary forms was suitable for short-term goals. 
Its internal mechanics did not always assure control over the message and its 
implementation. In its advocacy, it blurred the line between being a purely civic group 
and a political party. Being at the borderline of civic and political societies, it was soon 
forced to make a choice to which world it wanted to belong. As a result, immediately 
after the revolution the group split into two - those who thought it was time to exert 
influence in politics and those who thought Pora should continue engaging the 
movement of the disappointed in peaceful and constructive civic activism. 
To summarize we need to evaluate Pora's performance based on the indicators of 
success - function and contribution. In terms of function, Pora did what it said it would 
be - it empowered two previously apathetic audiences to defend the choice of Ukrainian 
voters and made sure that the will of people could not be ignored. The group's 
contribution to the Orange revolution was most critical in two stages - the initial 
mobilization of protestors and the ability to sustain demonstrations around the clock, 
mainly by setting up an Orange tent city. By this, it carved a niche for genuine political 
participation of civil society during those important events. None of these achievements 
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would have been possible if Pora had not been successful in establishing deep roots 
within the Ukrainian society. 
CHAPTER IV 
CASE STUDY: GEORGIA 
The goal of this chapter is to assess the degree of embeddedness for two 
Georgian nonprofit organizations - Kmara and ISFED. For this purpose, it will begin by 
providing a general overview of the Rose Revolution as well as the contribution that 
each group made to its success. It will then offer a detailed description of the formative 
period for both organizations. In this section, a specific attention will be given to 
Georgian civil society, as the knowledge about it will enhance our understanding of the 
environment within which both NGOs were formed and had to operate. After offering a 
composite portrait of the civil society, the research will trace the evolution and 
maturation of Kmara and ISFED. The chapter will conclude with the successes and 
failures that they had during the Rose Revolution, thereby setting stage for a more 
comprehensive analysis in the last chapter. 
ROSE REVOLUTION 
Stakes and candidates 
At the end of 2002, Georgia was gearing up for another parliamentary election. 
The country already had four of them since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. While 
change may not have been in the air, the sentiments of stagnation and frustration were 
quite powerful. The disapproval of President Eduard Shevarnadze was staggeringly high 
at 83 percent.1 Having lived under his rule for almost twenty-five years, many Georgians 
1
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felt a palpable "Shevarnadze fatigue."2 And although the elections were not about his 
performance (the next contest for presidency was not till 2005), the conduct and content 
reflected the political reality that Shevarnadze built after bringing Georgia from the 
abyss of the civil war in the early 1990s. By the end of his presidency, the country was 
"a neo-patrimonialist state, in which notions of public accountability, constitutional 
review and normative rules and standards of government played little role."4 
Political forces that were running in the 2002 parliamentary election could be 
divided (rather conditionally and broadly) into oppositional, pro-governmental and 
neutral. The United National Movement, led by Mikheil Saakashvili, belonged to the 
first camp. After parting ways with President Shevarnadze in 2001, Saakashvili 
burnished his already strong credentials as a reformist. His work through the Tbilisi 
City Council brought visible improvements to the nation's capital and unsubtly hinted at 
his capacity to do similarly great things for the whole country.6 Then, there was a 
coalition of Burdjanadze-Democrats, pulled together by the extremely popular Speaker 
of the Georgian Parliament Nino Burdjanadze and David Zhvania, who (just like 
Saakashvili) represented the breakaway faction of young reformers nurtured by 
Shevarnadze. Regardless of personal tensions and leadership ambitions, both political 
parties coordinated major activities during the campaign and in the course of the Rose 
Revolution. 
2
 Shevarnadze was the first Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party in 1972-1985 and then the president of Georgia in 1992-
2003. For more see Ivlian Haindrava, "Georgia: Through Elections to the Rose Revolution," Election Assessment in the South 
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3
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4
 Laurence Boers, "After the 'Revolution': Civil Society and the Challenges of Consolidating Democracy in Georgia," Central Asian 
Survey 24, no. 3 (September 2005): 333. 
5
 He served in the Shevarnadze government as the Minister of Justice, making the fight against corruption his public crusade. 
6
 Irakly Areshidze, Democracy and Autocracy in Eurasia: Georgia in Transition (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 
2007), 92-93. 
215 
The government put forward "For a New Georgia" bloc, led by Avtandiv 
Jorbenadze and later by Vazha Lortkipanidze, both prominent and long-term members in 
the Shevarnadze administration, and the Democratic Union for the Revival of Georgia, 
backed by powerful leader of the country's Adjara region Asian Abashidze. Though the 
former did not become a visible player until March-April 2003, it quickly earned itself a 
bad reputation through affiliation with the unpopular president as well as unsubstantiated 
statements, which accused the Georgian opposition of having Russian backing. 
Abashidze's party never truly campaigned outside of Adjara, certain of an easy victory 
in his own heavily controlled region. 
The third group included such contenders as the Labor Party of Georgia, which 
espoused populist and anti-globalist slogans,7 and the New Rights Party, which tried 
hard to position itself as an alternative to the leftist National Movement. Both forces 
preferred to play an independent role, resisting domestic and foreign attempts to form a 
larger coalition of democratic parties. 
Election campaign 
At the beginning of the campaign, the opposition had very modest expectations -
to gain sufficient political visibility in a new parliament that would translate into a 
momentum before the critical 2005 presidential elections.9 Recognizing the danger of 
this opportunity, the government took numerous steps to foreclose it. 
7
 Zurab Karumidze and James V. Wetsch, ed., "Enough": The Rose Revolution and the Republic of Georgia (New York: NOVA 
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9
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The first of them was a battle over the composition of the Central Election 
Commission. The official policy would effectively neuter the body with the majority of 
members appointed by the President and delegated by Ajara leader Asian Abashidze.10 
The issue gained such international prominence that the Georgian government received a 
letter from Senator John McCain and a visit from former Shevarnadze's interlocutor Jim 
Baker in July 2003. As a result of that visit, the Baker formula11 proposed a more fair 
division of seats, but was later quietly discarded by the regime.12 In the end, the dispute 
did more harm than good to the pro-governmental forces, by pushing Speaker Nino 
Burdjanadze to side openly with the opposition. 
Throughout the summer, the government continued to create obstacles to a fair 
voting process. In August, it announced that the CEC would not have to provide a total 
turnover of voters for several days after the elections. Soon it was discovered that 30-40 
percent of voter lists had significant discrepancies that would in effect disenfranchise 
large segments of the population. Though it is not clear whether the authorities were 
completely at fault, the situation underscored a general state of the government's 
weakness. Furthermore, it played into the hands of Saakashvili's National Movement 
that sought to radicalize the discourse and broaden participation, especially outside of the 
capital.14 
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Last months of the campaign witnessed a predictable sharpening of rhetoric on 
both sides. The government was increasing pressure on local oligarchs to stop funding 
the opposition and independent media outlets.15 Badri Patarkatsishvili, a Georgian 
businessman with strong Russian connections, defected from the New Rights Party to 
support Shevarnadze's "For a New Georgia."16 Rustavi-2, a vocal media critic of the 
president, was denied a permit to broadcast on the open "ORT frequency"17 that would 
ensure its national reach. On his end, Saakashvili tried to challenge authorities by 
campaigning in such government strongholds as Kvemo Kartli and Adjara. The attempts 
sparked unrest and beating of Saakashvili's supporters in Bolnisi and Batumi,18 thereby 
showcasing the regime's desperation to control the campaign narrative. 
Voting 
The Election Day was marred by large-scale irregularities and outright chaos in 
certain parts of the country. Polling stations in Kutaisi, Georgia's second largest city, 
were so unprepared that they could not open on time. In response to a public outcry, the 
Central Election Commission had to extend the elections there for additional two hours. 
International observers reported unrest in 15 percent of polling stations, tensions in 21 
percent and 22 cases of open violence.19 The voting process was completely controlled 
in the areas populated by Georgia's two largest national minorities - Armenians in 
9ft 
Javakheti and Azeris in Kvemo Kartli. The elections in Adjara were a Soviet-like 
15
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"Georgia: Chaos, Enthusiasm and Hope," Transitions Online, 28 October - 3 November 2003. 
spectacle of people coerced by the Abashidze regime to come to polling stations with the 
full knowledge that their choice would never be recognized. Numerous reports indicate 
that government supporters (particularly state employees) were forced to establish a 
voting "merry-go-round" where an individual may vote at several polling stations.21 
At the end of the day, it was becoming clear that official results would not match 
the parallel vote tabulations done by TV channel Rustavi-2 and the International Society 
for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED). The discrepancies were not minor. 
According to the emerging official count, "For a New Georgia" was strongly in the lead, 
followed by Abashidze's Revival Party and only then the oppositional National 
Movement.22 ISFED and Rustavi posited that the National Movement gained 26.26 
percent, followed by "For a New Georgia" (18.92 percent), the Labor Party (17.36 
percent) and Burdjanadze-Democrats (10.15 percent).23 
These competing realities could not be easily reconciled. President Shevarnadze 
felt he did not have to justify himself or the results. In conversations with close aides, he 
dismissed possible Western objections as a noisy nuisance that would eventually 
subside.24 At the same time, the Georgian opposition was not prepared to give up its 
rightful victory. The elections for many summarized everything that was wrong with the 
regime - utter corruption that was suffocating the nation. Thus, the stage for collision 
was set. 
21
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Rose Revolution 
The Rose Revolution began quietly and did not reach culmination until the very 
end. In the days that followed the election, Shevarnadze and its government 
inadvertently helped the revolutionary cause, by backing falsified results and refusing to 
call for a fraud investigation and a new election. What the Georgian President seems to 
have miscalculated badly was the mood of his own society. 
On November 3, protesters first gathered around the Philharmonic Concert Hall 
and then walked down Rustaveli Avenue. Because their numbers were relatively small, 
nothing predicted any public unrest. Four days later, on November 7, the results from 
Adjara were announced. Abashidze's party received an overwhelming victory - 269,000 
out of 284,000 votes cast. Shevarnadze accepted the results and decried any 
international involvement. Sensing that the victory may be snatched from their hands if 
more votes were added from Kvemo Kartli and Javakheti, the opposition and its 
supporters set in motion a series of protests that started on November 8 and lasted until 
the end of the Revolution. 
At the same time, numerous attempts to reach a compromise continued to fail 
when key opposition leaders met with Shevarnadze on November 9 and when alleged 
negotiations between Saakashvili and Jorbenadze broke off on November 12.27 Trying to 
shore up support, President Shevarnadze went to Adjara and accepted Abashidze's offer 
to send his supporters to Tbilisi to help with restoring order in the capital. Many 
Georgians were furious at the comment for it exposed what everyone long knew -
Shevarnadze allowed the Adjara leader to establish his own fiefdom in return for 
25
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political loyalty. On November 14, the opposition had one of its largest rallies that 
included 20-30 thousand protestors. 
Things began to unravel precipitously after Shevarnadze's televised speech on 
November 19 in which he promised to convene a new parliament three days later. 
Seeking to enhance his following beyond the capital, Saakashvili went to the Western 
city of Zugdidi, which was known for its nationalist sentiments. As a long line of buses 
from Western Georgia was moving toward Tbilisi, the showdown seemed all but 
inevitable. 
The following day, the Georgian president addressed the new parliament. "The 
speech said volumes about the extend to which Shevarnadze did not understand, or did 
not wish to acknowledge, the level of unrest on the streets."28 At the Liberty Square, the 
largest crowd between 50 and 100 thousand protesters was demanding his resignation. 
As the opposition entered the parliament, chanting, "Resign," Shevarnadze was whisked 
away by his security. Saakashvili overtook the podium and invited Burdjanadze to take 
up the position of the acting president. Later that day, protesters took over the state 
chancellery, thereby incapacitating any functioning of the old government. 
The regime was in agony when Shevarnadze announced the state of emergency 
in the evening. Mediation efforts by Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Ivanov could no 
longer salvage the situation. On November 23, relieved that he managed to bring all 
parties to the table, Ivanov left Tbilisi for Adjara. Like many others, he was surprised to 
find out the outcome of that meeting. When Shevarnadze emerged from his official 
residence in Krtsanisi, he announced his immediate resignation. In later interviews, he 
28
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suggested he did not want any bloodshed, which he felt would be inevitable if tensions 
continued. Other sources indicated that Shevarnadze could not count on the support of 
the army or police. Thus, fearing the fate of Caucescu or Gamsakhurdia, he opted out for 
a somewhat graceful exit on his own terms. In any case, the revolution succeeded in 
ending his controversial tenure as Georgia's leader - the tenure that brought much 
needed stability at first, but at the end became the obstacle to further development. 
Kmara andlSFED in the Rose Revolution 
Kmara began to mobilize its activists immediately upon the announcement of the 
election results. The message to gather for protests in the center of Tbilisi quickly spread 
thanks to the power of email and cell phone. Growing numbers of Kmara activists helped 
create a snowballing effect among the general population who was persuaded that the 
protest had reached a sufficient level not to be easily dispersed. During revolutionary 
days, Kmara worked in close cooperation with Rustavi-2, an independent TV station, 
that helped spread the word about on-going and future protests as well as showed large 
crowds in order to attract more participants. The group's contribution to the Rose 
Revolution was two-fold. First, it helped generate grass-root level activism in the period 
preceding the elections. This empowered the young generation previously disenchanted 
with the political process. Second, it incited and helped sustain the first wave of protests 
that mobilized the rest of Georgian society. 
If Kmara was the public face of the revolution by providing its foot soldiers, 
ISFED gave the event its substance. The NGO's two Election Day initiatives -
monitoring and, most importantly, parallel vote tabulation (PVT) - gathered ample 
evidence that the process was falsified to the extent that would substantially alter the will 
of voters. ISFED vigorously publicized its findings, which enabled others to call for 
public protests. Its PVT numbers were immediately printed in thousands of leaflets and 
distributed all over Tbilisi. Furthermore, the organization launched a series of legal 
challenges that resulted in invalidation of the voting results on party lists. Thus, even 
without participating directly in demonstrations, ISFED became one of the unsung 
heroes of the Rose Revolution. Through quiet, professional data gathering and advocacy, 
it delivered a lethal blow to the regime by exposing its fraud. 
FORMATIVE YEARS 
The discussion of the formative years is important because most of the literature 
analyzing the involvement of civic groups in the "color revolutions" reminds of a fairy 
tale. It captures the events themselves, showing NGOs as powerful, if not omnipotent, in 
facilitating the rise of people against evil and corrupt authoritarian leaders. Then there is, 
of course, a happy ending of victory over these rulers. And the story usually stops at this 
point, assuming, like in a good fairy tale, that all of them lived happily thereafter. The 
narrative is unhelpful because it simplifies the complexities of civil society's role in 
democratization and raises expectations of a brighter future ahead. That is why, the 
dissertation will first sketch a portrait of Georgian civil society to understand the milieu 
within which the civic groups under analysis had to operate. It will then trace the 
organizational evolution of both NGOs. This research is critical to answering the central 
hypothesis of my work - whether the groups' success can be explained by their 
embeddedness. It will also help illuminate how different they are from their domestic 
civil society and whether such differences may predict any future challenges for that 
society and the organizations under study. 
NONPROFIT SECTOR IN GEORGIA 
Legal framework and NGQ growth 
Georgia's legislation on nonprofit activities in 1991-2003 can be considered 
liberal. One of the reasons for that lies in active civic involvement in the design of 
pertinent laws. The other is about the political situation at the time. In 1997-1998, the 
Shevarnadze regime sought to improve its external image and obtain Western support to 
cement control over the country. Therefore, "allowing certain liberal freedoms was 
more of a political calculation than a commitment to an open society."32 
Three key documents regulated activities of Georgian not-for-profit groups - the 
Law on Grants, the Civil and Tax Codes. For legal purposes, NGOs were broadly 
divided into two categories - unions/associations and foundations. The former were 
required to consist of at least five individuals and be registered by district courts. The 
latter did not have to have any members and needed to be registered by the Ministry of 
Justice.33 The registration process was simple, quick and inexpensive, albeit 
inconsistently applied. 
The Georgian legislation stipulated that grants, membership fees and donations 
were exempt from income tax. The same regulation applied to auxiliary entrepreneurial 
activities that served to accomplish nonprofits' statutory purposes.34 On a positive side, 
the national Tax Code did not require civic groups to maintain a certain level of 
expenditure to remain legal. Doing otherwise would have severely undermined the sector 
where many organizations re-surge based on donors' priorities. However, neither did it 
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encourage active giving, by providing no deductions on charitable donations for 
individuals or legal entities. As in many post-Soviet states, the implementation of legal 
provisions remained a weak spot. Whereas grant recipients were entitled to a refund on 
any VAT (value added tax) on goods and services purchased within the framework of a 
grant, few were persistent enough to go through a procedure of claiming the money 
back.36 Like in Ukraine, NGOs were subjected to the same extensive requirements on 
accounting and reporting to tax authorities as commercial structures.37 This placed an 
undue burden on small groups with limited funds and personnel. 
Over the period of twelve years (between acquiring independence in 1991 and 
the Rose Revolution in 2003), Georgia's civil society underwent three stages of growth. 
Its first stage was significantly delayed as a result of the civil war that engulfed the 
country during the presidency of Zviad Gamsakhurdia,38 When the war ended in 1994, 
Georgia was in ruins, a shadow state that lost two large chunks of its territory (Abkhazia 
in the south-west and South Ossetia in the north) and where the government could not 
effectively manage any territory past Tbilisi. At that time, emerging civic groups became 
an employment venue for a vast group of Soviet-educated Georgian intelligencia. 
Viewed with suspicion as second-class citizens by the Soviet regime and completely 
neglected during the civil strife, those people managed to find a new niche that would 
generate some income.39 In terms of the level of NGO growth, the period was marked by 
rather moderate achievements. The country began with 19 associations and 10 
foundations in 1995 - the first year when the National Statistics Committee started 
35
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recording the data. In 1996, merely 6 new associations and 6 news foundations were 
registered. The following year, that number tripled for both types of nonprofit entities. 
The real proliferation of NGOs did not occur until 1998. By the end of the year, 
Georgia accounted for 559 associations and 252 foundations. Without a doubt, the 
country's third sector entered a new stage of development that lasted until 2001. During 
that time, the Georgian government proceeded to institutionalize key elements of civil 
society, by establishing a proper legal framework. Domestic civic groups became more 
professionalized and more apt at securing funding from a quickly expanding pool of 
international donors.41 Many of them also managed to attract a young generation of 
Western-educated Georgians. In essence, the NGO sector became one of the most 
vibrant spheres at home and among other former Soviet states.42 By the end of 2001, the 
country registered 2,599 associations and 714 foundations. In the meanwhile, the regime 
of Eduard Shevarnadze was turning increasingly corrupt. Aimed with the motto, "Do 
everything, just don't fight against me," it tapped into the "coping strategies" of the 
Georgian society that rejuvenated informal family and crony networks and disregarded 
common societal objectives for the sake of their own goals.43 The divergent paths of 
development were bound to set the government on the course of collision with civic 
associations. 
It is hard to tell the precise beginning of the third stage in the development of 
Georgian nonprofits. Certainly, the emergence of a strong media outlet, "Rustavi-2," 
which provided airtime to civic activists and opposition leaders, contributed to the 
40
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change in official attitudes. In 2001 the murder of a popular Rustavi-2 anchorman Giorgi 
Sanaia underscored the government's recognition that civil society groups posed a real 
danger to the stability and continuity of the Shevarnadze regime.44 Even if one 
disregards the strength of NGOs (always a subjective judgment45), their sheer number 
(4,082) in 2002 made them a formidable presence in such a small country as Georgia. 
Thus, the Shevarnadze government proceeded with a set of attempts to curtail an active 
role of civil society. In 2002, the Ministry of Finance put forward a bill, which 
envisioned a government review of foreign funds. A year later, the Parliament 
strengthened the legislation on libel by extending a possible term of imprisonment up to 
five years.46 Pandering to public apprehension about evangelical groups in Georgia, the 
Ministry of Security proposed to suspend foreign militant and other organizations. All of 
these actions were complemented by a government propaganda campaign against NGOs, 
accusing them of "grantchamia" (grant-gobbling) and dissemination of anti-national 
values. Because of a harsh and very vocal response from the domestic civil society, the 
Shevarnadze administration had to withdraw the legal initiatives.47 The clash showcased 
two points. First, though the Georgian government was growing increasingly 
authoritarian, it could not muster an effective clampdown on NGOs, because it did not 
have the material capability to do so without alienating critical foreign support that was 
necessary for its own survival. Second, the seeming prosperity of the third sector in 
44
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 Broers. 
Georgia was fragile and illusory for it depended on the state's weakness and donors' 
generosity. 
To summarize our discussion, pushed by dire domestic circumstances, the 
government of Georgia sought to establish a liberal legal framework for registering and 
operating civil society groups. Unpropitious economic conditions and the availability of 
foreign funding persuaded a sizeable segment of the country's educated class to start up 
nonprofit associations. Between 1995-2003 Georgian civil society grew at a staggering 
rate, adding on average 510 organizations per year.48 Regardless of all this success, high 
and low-ranking officials in the legislative and executive branches had little 
understanding of the concept of a nonprofit and its role in society.49 Furthermore, the 
government attitude to NGOs began to change dramatically when the independence of 
strongest civic groups threatened to challenge the existing political status quo. It is only 
thanks to the weakness of the state and its reliance on foreign assistance that President 
Shevarnadze was not able to suppress non-governmental organizations as dramatically as 
his Russian and Central Asian counterparts did later. 
Public participation and attitude 
Georgian society is known for a volatile combination of public passivity and a 
dormant, bellicose sentiment to conflict resolution. Due to bad economic conditions and 
distrust in state institutions, "the confrontational model is used overwhelmingly... to 
deliver ultimatums to the government."50 
48
 State Department for Statistics of Georgia. 
49
 Nino Saakashvili, "The Nonprofit Sector in Georgia," International Center for Not-for-Profit Law Journal 1, no. 2 (Washington, 
DC: ICNL, December 1998). 
50
 Gigi Tevradze, "Development of a Democratic Political Community: Civil Society Organizations," Building a Democratic 
Community in Georgia, Discussion Paper 7 (Stockholm: Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, May 2003), 34. 
Available public surveys show low levels of efficacy. For instance, in Tbilisi -
the biggest city and the center of national power - 64.1 percent of residents believe they 
exert no influence on key decisions in the country.51 It can be speculated that the level of 
apathy is even higher in provincial areas that were often neglected by the government 
over the period of independence. While majorities throughout the country (71 percent in 
2001 and 73 percent in 2003) continue to believe in democracy as the best form of 
governance, they are profoundly disenchanted with the Georgian state. 91.7 percent 
think the government is corrupt, 62 percent distrust politicians and 53 percent -
courts.54 Given this reality, 57.3 percent of Tbilisi residents are ready to join a protest 
rally and only 36.2 percent would appeal to local authorities.55 
The Georgian public remains ambiguous and divided in its attitude to civic 
organizations. One of the reasons for that lies in low or skewed awareness. 81.2 percent 
admit being poorly informed. 92.3 percent derive any knowledge about nonprofits from 
the media. Thanks to television, 55.6 percent know about the Liberty Institute (the key 
founder of Kmara), 18.8 percent have heard of the Georgian Association of Young 
Lawyers, and 15.2 percent are aware of the Soros Foundation.56 Therefore, most people 
perceive civil society as a whole through a dozen of NGOs that appear on TV talk 
shows. Think tanks and social nonprofits are much less known.57 
This brings us to the second reason - many people harbor a bipolar attitude on 
the proper role of nonprofit organizations. On one hand, the majority (56.9 percent) 
51
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wants most problems to be solved by the government, leaving very little space for civic 
activism. On the other, many believe civic groups should address their most immediate 
concerns. For instance, 48.7 percent think civil society should deal with the issue of state 
corruption. Almost one quarter of the population suggests NGOs ought to provide 
humanitarian assistance or charity. As a result, people frequently approach civic groups 
with the "What have you done for me lately?" question and want to know their output in 
kilos of meat distributed for free. 
Needless to say, when such expectations are not met, bitterness and distrust 
ensue. In the general population, the margin of difference between those who think 
positively and those who are negative about civil society is about 6 percent in favor of 
the former.59 While 42.3 percent believe NGOs promote progressive notions, 32.3 
percent think they spread foreign ideas and a quarter of the population cannot provide 
any answer. 60.2 percent believe the existence of civic groups makes no difference and 
37.4 percent suggest the only thing they do is give out promises.60 
Finally, Georgian society has a powerful isolationist streak that is supported by 
the Orthodox Church.61 It purports Georgia's uniqueness among nations - a claim easy 
to sustain for the ethnicity that uses its own alphabet. Emphasizing the Christian 
Orthodox faith as the guiding light that helped preserve the national identity through 
decades of foreign subjugation, Georgian isolationists despise non-governmental 
organizations as one of the mechanisms that is designed (this time by the West) to 
weaken and conquer the country. 
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To summarize the point, the Georgian society suffers from the usual post-Soviet 
apathy and resentment toward polities and politicians. However, the veneer of passivity 
hides powerful sentiments of frustration and despair that are ready to spill over if pushed 
to the brink. Few people are aware of civil society at the level deeper than provided by 
television. Thus, they approach it in the manner similar to other state institutions. They 
expect NGOs to address their daily concerns - from pervasive corruption to the lack of 
materials goods. Because most Georgian civic groups are focused on advocacy, they are 
not able to tackle these issues. The resultant public attitudes are divided between those 
who know little of and see no utility in NGOs, those who perceive them as a beneficial 
societal element and those who regard them as a pernicious element of Western 
intrusion. 
NGO landscape: distribution, structure and capacity 
As in other states of the former Soviet Union, the majority of Georgian NGOs 
was first set up in Tbilisi and later established regional branches. Based on the available 
data, 60 percent of all registered NGOs are based in the capital where only one-fourth of 
the country's population lives.62 There are divergent expert assessments on the extent of 
robustness of NGO activities outside the capital. Khatuna Nachkebia of the Civil Society 
Institute notes that there are fewer social service nonprofits outside of the capital. 
However, those that exist perform much better as a result of the natural survival process 
that sharpened their capabilities. 
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The rural-urban divide is most acutely felt in the area of funding and 
sustainability. The comparison of budgets between regional and Tbilisi-based NGOs in 
2000-2002 revealed great discrepancies. For instance, the percentage of Tbilisi 
associations whose budget was 50,000-100,000 dollars increased from 21 percent (2000) 
to 29 percent (2003). Outside of the capital, the percentage grew by merely 2 percent 
during the same timeframe. Whereas 34-36 percent of regional civic groups had to 
subsist on 500 dollars or less, only 4-6 percent of their Tbilisi counterparts had to live on 
the same budget.64 In a different survey, 65.2 percent of capital-based organizations 
acknowledge having had no funding interruptions. Only 32.3 percent of groups outside 
of Tbilisi had the same experience. 
In terms of issue orientation, the majority of NGOs remains heavily focused on 
public advocacy. About 30.4 percent of organizations work in a watchdog capacity, by 
protecting human rights, monitoring the government or conducting civic education. 
Another 35.4 percent engage in a specific aspect of the democratization agenda (i.e. 
children and youth problems, women issues, and media development). Unfortunately, a 
disproportionately small share of groups deal with daily concerns of Georgian people, 
like poverty alleviation. Only 3.9 percent of NGOs help internally displaced persons 
(mostly refugees from Abkhazia and South Ossetia) and handicapped (a social pariah in 
many traditional societies), 2.2 percent are preoccupied with economic development and 
employment issues.66 The answer for the disparity in the causes pursued by Georgian 
civic groups lies in how civic groups see their role. The majority believes that poverty 
will be better addressed by the state within the context of larger political and economic 
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reforms. Therefore, purely social issues are wrongly perceived to be out of the purview 
of civil society. 
Speaking of internal composition, the reliance of NGOs on permanent staffers, 
part-time employees and volunteers is greatly influenced by their location. Civic groups 
in the capital tend to have more salaried personnel and fewer volunteers. On the contrary 
to that, regional organizations rely less on paid staffers and more on volunteers. The 
differences are truly striking. In Tbilisi almost one third of all groups employ eight or 
more people. Outside of the capital, only 9 percent of associations do that. Whereas 48 
percent of NGOs in the capital hire eight or more temporary workers, 10 percent of their 
regional counterparts use that type of human resource. The situation is reversed when 
accounting for volunteer use. 38 percent of groups in Tbilisi recruit volunteers, 
compared to 51 percent in the regions. The available statistics make it clear that the 
access to funding greatly impacts NGO recruitment practices. Unfortunately, it does so 
not in a positive manner. The more money capital-based nonprofits get, the less likely 
they are to entice people to contribute rather than pay them for work. 
The evaluation of financial sustainability shows an overwhelming degree of 
dependence on foreign sources.69 80 percent of civic groups rely for 50 to 100 percent of 
their budgets on international donor organizations. Only one-third of NGOs charges 
symbolic membership fees that constitute merely 5 percent of their total income. The 
7ft 
issues of financial transparency remain a concern. According to the data, Tbilisi-based 
groups seem more accountable than those in the regions, partially because their 
continued access to external funding is dependent on their reputation among donors. In 
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2002, 69 percent of NGOs in the capital conducted an external audit, compared to 31 
percent in the regions. However, the atmosphere of secrecy in financial and 
programmatic efforts continues to prevail, as only 13 percent of nonprofits made their 
71 
annual reports public. 
Finally, it is challenging to analyze the overall capacity of Georgian NGOs. If 
one judges it by a mere presence of civic groups, then civil society and civic values seem 
to be well established.72 With a scarcity of domestic assessments on NGO strength, the 
most consistent analysis has so far been provided by the United States Agency for 
International Development. Out of seven indicators used to evaluate NGO sustainability, 
two pertain to capacity characteristics - organizational capacity and infrastructure. In 
regard to the former, the country's civil society has scored consistently around 4 points 
on a seven-point scale where 1 is advanced and 7 is least developed. Between 1998-
2003, the sector did not make any significant improvements. In 2002-2003 its 
organizational capacity was slightly worse than that of neighboring Armenia and on par 
with Ukraine. In the other indicator, infrastructure, the country continues to hover 
between 3.5 as the lowest in 1999 and 4 as the highest in 2002. Though it has the 
strongest infrastructural capacity in the Caucasus region, it falls in the medium tier of 
civil society development in the former Communist bloc. Overall, the classification 
provided by USAID would place Georgia at the low end of the mid-transitional stage.73 
In other words, the capacity of Georgian civil society is higher than that of Central Asian 
states, but significantly lower than that of Central and Eastern European countries. 
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To summarize, in 1991 -2003 the internal development of Georgian civil society 
was impacted by a host of issues that included a predominance of capital-based NGOs, 
significant discrepancies in funds and human resource use among civic groups based on 
their location and a high degree of dependency on foreign grants. 
NGO members and inter-NGO relations 
The Georgian nonprofit community cannot find a common theme that would 
unite its worthy, but often disjointed efforts. As a result, inter-NGO relations are 
impacted by a set of the following problems. 
First, though the majority of organizations operate with the similar type of issues 
that pertain to either general or issue-specific advocacy, the shared agenda often 
generates not cooperation, but rivalry, which is instigated by a continuous competition 
for funds. While the USAID 2002-2003 assessment reports relatively high percentages 
of inter-NGO cooperation and coalition-building experiences in Tbilisi, the same 
statistics are very modest in other parts of the country.74 The discrepancy can be 
explained by the lagging development of regional groups as well as the privileged status 
of organizations in the capital. Like civic associations in Moscow or Kyiv in the 1990s, 
their Tbilisi-based counterparts used the proximity to foreign funds to create an elite 
community of civic leaders. Even if there is cooperation among various organizations 
(regardless of their location), one wonders how genuine it is. In the same survey, all 
groups reported that NGO-coalitions were established primarily at the initiative of a 
donor. 
74
 Ibid., 34. 
235 
Second, Georgian civil society does not apply the democratic principles it 
preaches to its internal practices. 50 percent of groups in Tbilisi and 78.2 percent of 
regional NGOs do not have a separation of the organization's board from its executive.75 
In practice, this means that the group leader both implements projects and evaluates his 
own performance. When coupled with the fact that most groups work in the same area, 
this breeds the insularity of thinking that impedes prospects for cooperation with other 
NGOs. Nodia rightly summarizes, "An undue focus on common agenda and values 
within civil society sometimes leads to a low level of pluralism and tolerance toward 
different opinions within the NGO community itself."76 
Third, the dearth of information that is available on the socio-economic 
characteristics of civic activists paints the picture of a rather elite segment of the 
77 
population. A typical Georgian NGO member is likely to be young, well educated, and 
reside in the capital. "It can be presumed with a certain amount of confidence that they 
genuinely share the values of liberal democracy, including trust, tolerance and public 
spiritedness."78 Members of low-income classes, those with less education and rural 
dwellers are much less like likely to hold NGO leadership positions, due to the lack of 
70 
social connections and education. As a result of progressive values being predominant 
within Georgia's civil society, women are better represented as civic leaders 
(approximately 29 percent of organizations) than in other spheres of social life.80 At the 
same time, ethnic minorities lead only those NGOs that are focused on ethnic issues. The 
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limitation attests not only to how far the progressive values of Georgia's civil society can 
go, but also to the overall weakness of Georgia in integrating national minorities.81 
In the end, the country's third sector continues to be dependent on specific 
leadership figures within organizations, who run around searching for money without 
bothering about higher conceptualizations. There are no large umbrella organizations 
that would bring together numerous NGGs in different areas of activities.83 On a wider 
scale, civic groups failed in their ultimate mission - to deepen social networks and create 
social capital. 
NGOs and other societal actors 
Cooperation of Georgian nonprofit organizations with four main societal actors -
the government, the business sector, media and the public - has been uneven and mixed 
at best. What one often finds is a civil society hampered in its outreach efforts by 
unpropitious external conditions and its own unwillingness to step out of the comfort 
zone and engage with groups that may hold different views than its own. 
Interactions with government authorities have assumed peculiar contours. On one 
hand, civic groups that do not work with governmental agencies constitute an absolute 
minority - 6-7 percent. On the other, the patterns of collaboration seem either superficial 
or one-sided. For instance, 39 percent of associations outside Tbilisi exchange only 
information with relevant governmental actors. 27 percent of groups in the capital 
engage with the government by offering their assistance or services without a prior 
request. At the same time, working with the Shevarnadze regime was not an easy thing. 
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The president was not genuinely interested in civil society as an independent actor. Nor 
was it an endeavor that would always earn a civic group new friends among fellow 
nonprofits. The highest level of NGO-government interactions occurred naturally in 
Tbilisi. 50 percent of capital-based groups reported the experience of implementing joint 
projects, compared to 24 percent in the regions.85 While the statistics can be seen as a 
positive sign of civil society trying to find its' niche, some oppositional elements among 
non-government groups begged to differ. In his own assessment of the situation, Levan 
Ramishvili, the Chairman of the Liberty Institute, pointed that extensive cooperation 
often created cooptation. Once civic groups became deeply embroiled in joint projects 
with the government, they could no longer criticize it as freely. They were also much 
more willing to favor the political status quo that would bring change through a slow 
evolutionary rather than revolutionary transformation. In the end, it seems, many 
nonprofits found themselves caught between two fires - the Georgian state that had to 
pretend to be cooperative to maintain its international image and "purists" within civil 
society that chastised others for getting too cozy with that state. 
In reaching out to ordinary citizens, Georgian civic groups relied on highly non-
personal strategies, which could not assure that their target audience had been properly 
contacted. In 2002, among the most frequent means to spread the message were 
newspaper articles (61 percent), media presentations (53 percent) and booklets (51 
j)*7 
percent). Only 29 percent of organizations conducted presentations. However, the 
picture is not all bleak. In reporting on their activities the same year, 77 percent indicated 
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doing trainings and seminars, 74 percent pointed to consultations, and an overwhelming 
majority (86 percent) spoke of collecting and disseminating information.88 The question 
remains to what extent these activities were self-serving (i.e. seminars for civic activists 
who are already involved) or purposefully exaggerated for the survey. Other assessments 
only further such doubts. For instance, only 12.7 percent of the public reported receiving 
NGO services and 5.8 percent cooperated with nonprofit organizations. 94.2 percent said 
they had never collaborated with civic associations. The problem here might be two-
fold. Its one side has to do with strategies used by organizations to communicate with 
people. Many civil society members are often too comfortable with foreign funding to 
avoid reaching out to the "unenlightened masses." The other side deals with the problem 
over which civic groups have little immediate control - namely their issue orientation. 
Ordinary people are unwilling to cooperate on NGO projects, because they perceive a 
civic need for "policy input" to be self-serving. In other words, all they see are well-
educated, relatively well-off civic activists who seek information from them to fulfill 
their project requirements and, in the end, get paid. Unsurprisingly, 23 percent think 
NGOs are inefficient, and 16.8 percent believe they are self-serving.90 In the end, 
attempts at cooperation between civil society and the public are often stifled because the 
lofty and progressive agenda of the former can never satisfy the literal appetite of the 
latter. 
Compared to other segments of the society, interactions between Georgian civic 
groups and businesses are fairly insignificant.91 On average, almost 50 percent of 
organizations have never cooperated with the private sector. About a quarter offered 
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their services to businesses, and around 10 percent actually implemented joint projects. 
The meager record of cooperation is lamentable, especially because the private sector 
has a relatively positive view of civil society. In 2002 61.4 percent reported having 
positive and rather positive attitudes toward NGOs. The problem was about finding the 
right modes of cooperation. On one hand, businesses in Georgia were generally weak. 
Medium and small-size enterprises were barely getting on their feet and had no money to 
splurge. Large businesses did not want to support a group whose radical ideas would get 
the private sponsor in trouble with the government and, more importantly, tax services. 
In addition, the biggest oligarchs were already heavily committed to supporting key 
political parties.94 On the other hand, NGOs were leery of working with so-called 
oligarchs - a class of nouveau rich who acquired their wealth through thuggish business 
practices and close relations with the ruling elite. Furthermore, because of the readily 
available foreign money, they did not have to make any hard compromises between 
accepting business money and their own integrity 
To summarize, Georgia's nongovernmental organizations tried to work with 
other societal actors. Their degree of success in such endeavors was determined by the 
willingness of both sides to collaborate as well as external circumstances. When it came 
to working with the government, NGOs (mostly in the capital and to the chagrin of their 
radical fellow groups) usually initiated cooperation. In case of the media, it was 
television stations that sought out nonprofit experts to comment on daily issues. While 
interactions with ordinary citizens were complicated by their misperceptions of civil 
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society, joint projects with businesses were hard to come by because of civic reluctance 
and economic hardships. In the end, many of these patterns were shaped by the funding 
and fundraising patterns, which bring us to the next section. 
Fundraising practices 
Georgian non-governmental organizations had a hard time securing funding 
because of the domestic environment and their own weaknesses. Before the revolution, 
many nonprofits were caught among three forces - a bad state, a poor populace and an 
abundance of foreign donors. 
Between 1991-2003, government support of civic groups remained both low and 
non-transparent. Few available estimates indicate that for instance, in 1997 the state 
allocated 0.0002 percent of the overall budget expenditures to civil society. Even this 
money was distributed through presidential "reserve funds," which made any open 
competition for it impossible. This comically low level of funding is a result of two 
factors. One is the lack of interest on the part of the Shevarnadze regime that did not 
appreciate the meddling of NGOs in public affairs.95 The other is the magnitude of 
economic collapse that Georgia was experiencing in the post-civil war decade. A brief 
review of the budget data for 2001-2003 reveals a growing domestic and foreign debt as 
well as increasing debt service payments.96 The government was simply unable to 
finance nonprofit organizations when it struggled to pay for essential public services. As 
a consequence, only 15.5 percent of organizations relied on state support.97 
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The support from public was lukewarm. Though almost a quarter of NGOs 
OR 
reported receiving private donations, the population did not understand the purpose of 
the third sector. Here the problem is again two-fold. On one hand, many people believe 
if civic groups are charitable, then they are supposed to be free." When this 
understanding is combined with mixed public feelings about civil society, nonprofits 
become less inclined to solicit money from the general population or charge 
membership/service fees.100 On the other hand, the ability of an average citizen to 
contribute was severely limited by economic circumstances. The unemployment data 
available from the National Statistics Office indicates that in 2001-2003 between 11.1 
and 12.6 percent of the population did not have a job.101 The figure reflects only those 
who were officially registered to collect unemployment benefits and is likely to be much 
higher. Given this reality, few would be willing to support groups whose purpose they 
cannot comprehend in the first place. 
The contribution of domestic businesses to civil society was negligible. The 
blame for this situation is shared equally between the two parties. Like in Ukraine, many 
businesses were leery of engaging with NGOs because of past scandals that involved 
money laundering and grant embezzlement. This feeling was only fueled by the fear 
of possible state reprisals against those who would contribute to known anti-government 
groups, like the Liberty Institute. As another expert in civil society noted, Georgia had 
very few capable and well-off entrepreneurs and those knew who [meaning the 
government of Shevarnadze] they had to be thankful for their continued wellbeing.103 
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Similarly to Ukraine, the specter of political oppression and the Byzantine tax system 
pushed NGOs to hide the real level of contribution from businesses. Thus, the available 
estimates show great divergence-from 9 to 20.3 percent.104 At the same time, many 
nonprofits were unwilling to engage with domestic entrepreneurs for their support may 
come with a lot of string attached as to the content of their activities. 
Under these circumstanceSj foreign funding proved an easy and readily available 
solution. As donors and locals acknowledge, Georgia never experienced a lack of 
international support.1 5 The country's position as the hub of regional assistance in the 
Caucasus,106 its previous history of civil violence and a worldwide reputation of Eduard 
Shevarnadze as the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs during the "perestroika" 
contributed to the heavy presence of American donor organizations. The United States 
government was the largest bilateral donor. Since 1991, it spent 1.1 billion dollars on 
assistance programs in Georgia. In 20G2, 23.5 million dollars was spent on democracy 
programs.107 Though not comparable with American grant giving, the European Union 
also spent a hefty sum of 385 million euros between 1991 and 2003.108 With this amount 
of money, it is understandable that 84 percent of NGOs said grants constituted their 
major source of income.109 
To summarize, when it comes to fundraising Georgian nonprofit organizations 
were caught in a tough spot that made an addiction to foreign grants much easier to 
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acquire and much more difficult to give up. They had little chance of receiving support 
from a weak state, a destitute public and a feeble business sector. The scarcity of money 
from domestic sources was compensated by the heavy presence of foreign donors. 
Having gained the taste of grant support, many were unwilling to engage with public or 
businesses for fundraising purposes. 
Georgian civil society: strengths and pathologies 
Strengths 
In the first decade of independence, formal political embeddedness remained the 
strongest aspect that facilitated the birth and tremendous growth of Georgian civil 
society. Upon assuming power, the government of Eduard Shevarnadze established a 
liberal legislative framework that regulated registration and activities of civic 
organizations. Furthermore, driven by the concerns for his international image of a 
reformer, Shevarnadze was unwilling to launch open repressions against non-
governmental organizations that grew increasingly critical of his regime in 2000-2003.no 
As a result of this policy, Georgia experienced a boom in newly registered civic groups 
and acquired an image of the state with one of the most vibrant civil societies in the post-
Soviet space. 
The second strong feature of Georgia's third sector was its ability to attract young 
people who were educated in the West. Many of them were lured to join civic groups as 
a way to implement their idealist vision for the country. It of course did not hurt that 
compared to other sectors of the national economy employment at nonprofits provided a 
steady and fairly decent income. 
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This brings us to the third strength - external involvement. Because of the 
country's strategic location in the Caucasus, its previous history of violent conflict and 
Shevarnadze's stature in the international community, Georgian civil society never 
experienced a shortage of international attention. Thus, the presence of foreign donors 
created propitious conditions not only for NGOs' registration, but also for their survival. 
Many organizations, especially those located in Tbilisi, were able to set up a permanent 
infrastructure, attract qualified staff and develop valuable initiatives only thanks to the 
continuous support of foreign grant-givers. It has been noted before that without 
international assistance, civil society in Ukraine would not have been the same in terms 
of strength and capacity. This point is even more pertinent when applied to Georgia, 
which after the civil war and two ethnic conflicts was thrown back in development by 
several decades. Under those circumstances, there were no other (but foreign) sources 
that could afford the luxury of supporting abstract democratization projects. 
In the end, Georgian civil society made it alive and well through the decade of 
hardship thanks to the willingness of the state to allow its existence, the appeal of NGOs 
to Western-educated youth and intelligencia, and the financial support of foreign donors 
(primarily the United States). 
Pathologies 
In its struggle to survive, the Georgian not-for-profit sector has developed three 
critical weaknesses - inability to fit in politically, inability to connect socially, and 
inability to sustain itself financially. With all of them, the blame for failure ought to be 
shared between civil society and other relevant actors with which it tried to engage. 
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On the political front, convoluted taxation policies and overly extensive reporting 
requirements have prevented many groups from taking advantage of the otherwise liberal 
legislative framework. Most importantly, neither the Shevarnadze government nor 
officials at the regional and local level saw the utility of civil society. For them, it could 
be compared to a strange garnish that had to be added to a dish to make it attractive for 
the viewing by outsiders. Once the latter were satisfied, the government could brush the 
garnish aside and proceed with governance as usual. As a result, the NGO sector had a 
hard time fitting into the political life as an independent actor. Only by the end of the 
1990s, a small number of NGOs from the capital managed to establish their own 
reputation and voice through mass media. However, their impact on the political course 
of development remained minimum. 
From the perspective of societal embeddedness, Georgian civil society had a 
difficulty connecting with its population due to four distinct factors. First, the national 
public mood was a combustible mixture of passivity and confrontation. People were 
unwilling to get engaged unless they were cornered by desperate economic and political 
conditions. Second, the lack of awareness about NGOs determined a low level of public 
involvement or interest toward them. Many thought of civic groups based on the few that 
appeared on television talk shows. In this regard, they came out looking no better than 
politicians who talk a lot, but do little. The predominant advocacy orientation of 
nonprofits at the expense of social and humanitarian issues only confirmed that opinion. 
Third, because of rural-urban discrepancies non-governmental groups outside of Tbilisi 
were much less stronger and thus less capable to engage with the local public. The 
uncovered differences in terms of funding, sustainability and personnel use confirm that 
the post-Soviet reality applied to the nonprofit sector, too. Thus, NGOs that were closest 
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to regular people were also least able to help them. Fourth, a combination of insufficient 
accountability and an elite composition of many civic organizations made them seem 
even more out of touch. A pervasive impression painted by internal and external 
observers was of a civil society operating in its own universe. Not seeing any way how 
civic groups, focused on abstract democratization causes, can bring practical resolutions 
to their daily problems, people became unwilling to help with NGO projects. In their 
mind, well-educated civic leaders were working for their own benefit - to imitate civic 
activism that would allow them to meet grant requirements, get well paid and lead a 
relatively prosperous life in Tbilisi, while the rest of the population had to endure 
provincial subsistence. 
Finally, though foreign funding seemed abundant, especially for groups that were 
in Tbilisi, pathological dependence on external support eroded the ability of civic 
associations to secure venues that would sustain them financially in the long term. The 
fault of Georgian NGOs is only partial for other domestic actors were either unwilling or 
enable to collaborate. The state did not have a clear idea as to what to do with nonprofits 
that were emerging like mushrooms after rain. Neither did it have the money to support 
their growing appetites, spoiled by foreign grants. Ordinary Georgians were too 
preoccupied with their own struggles to make ends meet to even think of donating 
elsewhere. Big businesses, known as oligarchs, considered NGOs as chump change, 
preferring to support political parties that yielded real influence. In the end, foreign 
grants became the default option for organizations that wanted to survive with their 
mission and integrity intact. 
To conclude our discussion, while Georgian civil society had the advantages of a 
liberal legislative framework, the energy of young activists and the interest in the 
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country from foreign donors, it struggled to become part of the domestic society. The 
process of its embeddedness became imperiled by the inability to secure its own place in 
the political sphere, appeal to ordinary Georgians and loosen the reliance on external 
help. 
PROFILE: KMARA 
Launch 
The Liberty Institute was at the roots of Kmara's emergence in Georgia. Founded 
in 1996, the Institute focused on key human rights issues, such as the freedom of speech 
and religion, access to a fair trial and prevention of arbitrary detention. 
Since 1999 it had been working with numerous student self-governance groups. 
One of the strongest among them was located at Tbilisi State University (TSU) - the 
most elite higher education establishment in the country. In 2001 one-third of TSU 
students, who were also members of the student government, took part in the university-
wide elections. Their demands were modest in scope. They wanted to curb corruption at 
TSU, improve the level of instruction and bring interactive teaching methods into the 
classroom.111 
It would likely have taken years for the group to step outside the boundaries of its 
school, had it not been for inadvertent help from the Shevarnadze regime. In October 
2001 the government attempted to suspend a broadcasting license of Rustavi-2, an 
independent television station that was growing increasingly critical of the ruling regime. 
In response many TSU students launched public protests and promptly transformed their 
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group into the Student Movement of Georgia. The demonstrations became a huge 
success. The government was forced to back down and allow Rustavi-2 continuing its 
broadcast. Furthermore, as an implicit recognition of the debacle, President Shevarnadze 
had to sack several government officials responsible for letting the situation get out of 
control.113 
BUoyed by it newly found voice and power to influence events, the TSU student 
government realized that it needed to extend the movement to other universities in 
Georgia.114 It recognized that instead of battling specific issues of higher education, it 
had to look at their root cause - corrosive corruption within the Shevarnadze regime.115 
The key figures within the Liberty Institute, like Giga Bokeria and Levan Ramishvili, 
acknowledged that on the eve of the 2003 parliamentary elections the balance of forces 
between the government and the opposition remained equal. Thus, a third actor was 
needed to tilt an election outcome in favor of the latter. This actor would also have to 
position itself very differently from other student unions, which were artificially set up 
by Shevarnadze to confuse the public.117 This is how the idea of Kmara (in Georgian 
"Enough") emerged. 
Its first protest took place on April 14,2003. The group's highly non-
conventional tactics, which clashed with the conservative Georgian society, put it 
immediately on the map. That day "Kmara" sprayed its name on numerous public 
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buildings and burned a flag portraying Shevarnadze and his entourage in front of the 
State Chancellery.118 
Maturation 
Kmara's maturation, as a civic organization, was marked by three factors. The 
first was a trip that occurred even before the group was actually set up. In February 
2003, Giga Bokeria went to meet with Otpor leaders to see how useful their experience 
may be in Georgia. It was in Belgrade where "he learned the value of seizing and 
holding the moral high ground and how to make use of public pressure."120 Therefore, by 
the time Kmara began putting its first activities in place, it already possessed a rather 
clear vision not only of what it wanted to achieve (i.e. Georgia without Shevarnadze), 
but also of how it would go about it (i.e. by espousing the Otpor model121). 
The second factor was Kmara's inseparable ties with its "founding father" - the 
Liberty Institute. Seeking to differentiate itself within a large pool of advocacy groups, 
that NGO was known to adopt more radical approaches and seek confrontation to get its 
point across.12 When it came to street activism, it had one of the most experienced 
cohorts of civic leaders in the country. It meant that Kmara did not have to go through a 
steep learning curve, which was usually experienced by all new civic organizations. 
The final factor was a series of events that pushed Kmara to further 
radicalization. One of them was a conflict over the composition of the Central Election 
Commission, which was not resolved satisfactorily even after the involvement of Jim 
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Baker. The other was a trip of its activists to observe the presidential election in 
Azerbaijan on October 15,2003. Kmara members were stunned by the weak and muted 
Western reaction on what in fact amounted to the coronation of Ilham Aliyev. Both 
occurrences provided empirical support to their suspicions that Western responses to 
election fraud would be the same m Georgia. 
To summarize, compared to an average NGO Kmara matured very fast. The 
reason for that was not only a limited timeframe (from April to November 2003) within 
which the organization had to fulfill its goals, but also the level of preparedness among 
its activists. By the time Kmara was ready to launch itself, its key leaders had already 
gone over the planning stage, thus sparring the group from the need to learn through its 
own mistakes. Participating in the unfolding election campaign in Georgia and observing 
one in neighboring Azerbaijan provided a useful reality check as to what can be expected 
on the Election Day. 
Mission and its evolution 
Kmara's initial mission emerged as a result of successful protests against the 
closure of Rustavi-2. A group of student activists from Tbilisi State University saw that 
once united, student organizations had the capacity to expand their demands from mere 
improvements in the higher education system to fundamental political and social 
changes. 
A widely held conspiracy theory that Kmara was set up by Americans with the 
only goal of toppling the Shevarnadze regime in the 2003 elections does not hold on a 
closer examination. At least two Kmara activists confirmed that the group's mission at 
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the beginning was much more modest. It wanted to demythologize the Shevarnadze 
rule.124 By exposing flaws of the existing government, it sought to alter the perception 
(formed after the civil war) that Georgia could not do better, that given the internecine 
nature of domestic politics Shevarnadze was the only hope for stability. Thus, one part of 
Kmara's mission was to achieve a change in the discourse. 
The other was to prepare for the 2005 presidential elections. That year 
Shevarnadze would no longer be eligible to run because of the constitutional term limits. 
However, like in Ukraine and other post-Soviet semi-authoritarian countries, Georgian 
opposition expected attempts either to change the constitution or to manipulate the vote 
for the victory of a successor anointed by Shevarnadze. From this perspective, Kmara 
viewed its activities as a dress rehearsal before 2005. 
As the election campaign unfolded, Kmara's mission became more radical for it 
saw the government weakness as an opportunity for large-scale change. President 
Shevarnadze badly overplayed its hand, by refusing to address the conditions that were 
ripe for change. So instead of waiting till 2005 Kmara decided to capitalize on the 
moment that produced a unique constellation of forces - an increasingly weak regime 
and a progressively strong opposition. By the middle of summer Kmara activists, like 
Ramishvili and Bokeria, seemed intent to remove Shevarnadze even through non-
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constitutional measures. 
To summarize, Kmara's vision was borne out of frustrations with daily 
corruption in the Georgian education system. Thanks to initial successes, it expanded to 
include a more comprehensive political change, albeit in a somewhat distant future, in 
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2005. However, the group's mission soon underwent another alteration as a result of the 
shifting external circumstances. The blunders committed by the Shevarnadze 
government, the unity of Georgia's fractious opposition achieved by the defection of 
Speaker Nino Burdjanadze and the brewing public discontent gave a valuable opening 
for Kmara to push for change in 2003. All of these factors, not an American conspiracy 
plot, turned a student government of a Tbilisi university into a radical advocate for a 
revolution. 
Funding and sustainability 
Kmara derived all of its funding from the Open Society Georgia Foundation 
(OSGF).128 The group consciously did not attempt to seek other sources of support. One 
of the most widely spread misconceptions holds that the local Soros Foundation almost 
manually set up Kmara and fed it from its hand. The reality looks a bit more 
complicated. In fact, legally Kmara never received any direct support from Soros for one 
simple reason - it was not yet registered as a non-government organization. So when at 
the beginning of 2003 OSGF (the Open Society Georgia Foundation) announced a grant 
competition for election monitoring projects, Kmara was not eligible to apply. Most of 
its financial assistance came directly from a sister-NGO, the Liberty Institute.129 
It was never clear why the Liberty Institute decided not to register Kmara. 
Perhaps, it knew that authorities would not process Kmara's papers anyway. And if that 
had happened, the group would have become explicitly illegal. Operating without 
registration relegated Kmara to a certain twilight zone where its assets could not be 
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seized. If the government had decided to attack viciously, the unregistered group would 
have had an easier time vanishing, just like it appeared. 
Though funding amounts are usually hard to obtain, a number of reputable 
sources reported thatKmara received about 500,000 dollars for a start-up grant in April 
2003.130 This was not a paltry amount. Based on my analysis of funding levels for many 
Georgian NGOs, Kmara was definitely in the top of the top tier of civic associations in 
the country. One of the group's activists, Levan Ramishvili, insisted that Kmara was 
much more effective and frugal in using this amount of money than many other 
Georgian NGOs because it operated like a Protestant church. By shaving off luxuries and 
adopting a simplified organizational structure, it was able to focus 95 percent of funds on 
programmatic activities instead of administrative expenses. 
Kmara did not seek funding from the general public or the business sector. In the 
course of interviews with the group's activists and external observers, I heard a number 
of explanations for such passivity. One of them was the recognition that contrary to 
Ukraine in 2004, Georgia did not have an expansive middle class. Asking money from 
the already poor populace was something unimaginable.131 In addition, in Georgia 
political or advocacy fundraising carried an inherently negative stereotype of being self-
serving. A Kmara activist told me that the group had much more success in hosting a 
charity event for a local orphanage than in approaching citizens about donations.132 In 
the end, Kmara was successful getting some in-kind assistance from its own members 
who provided accommodation and food for the group's activists outside of Tbilisi during 
the revolution. 
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Asking for donations from businesses carried some perils, too. One was the 
anxiety about Kmara in the business community. Georgian businesses, like their 
counterparts in many post-Soviet states, were dependent on the government for their 
continued success. Fines and court summons produced by a series of "uncovered" tax 
violations could drive into the ground any nascent enterprise. Knowing that, Kmara did 
not even pursue that direction. The other was a fear on the part of Kmara activists that 
funding from oligarchs would limit the group's freedom of action. Many pointed to 
Ukrainian Pora and the Orange Revolution in general that fell victims of a heavy 
involvement from so-called "Orange oligarchs," who hampered the impetus for change 
after the revolution.134 
In summary, Kmara relied exclusively on financial support of the local Soros 
Foundation to sustain its activities. Though a number of independent factors (like general 
poverty, corrupt business sector and a skeptical public) objectively prevented the group 
to diversify its funding base, it is also clear that Kmara did not try too hard to do so. 
With the Soros grant making it one of the most well financed groups in the country, it 
saw little need to step out of its comfort zone. Its message of radical change definitely 
did not extend to altering the perceptions of ordinary Georgians about the nonprofit 
sector. In fact, based on the following section, the group seems to have been in the best 
of the worlds - it had enough funding and enough creative freedom to use the money as 
it saw fit. 
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Donor influence 
Given Kmara's overwhelming dependency on a single foreign donor, the issue of 
its influence and the perception of such influence become paramount. In this regard, the 
obtained information posits that there was no programmatic interference from the 
national Soros Foundation. However, the group's association with George Soros 
damaged its credibility among certain segments of the Georgian population. 
Similarly to Ukraine, both domestic civic activists and foreign donors on the 
ground play down the importance of foreign support in the actual success of foreign-
funded nonprofit organizations. A representative of the International Republic Institute 
noted that it would be a mistake to think of foreign money as the driving force behind 
Kmara.135 While the support came from overseas, without the impetus within the 
Georgian society it would not have had any impact. The same opinion is echoed by the 
Executive Director of the Georgian Soros Foundation. He said his organization had been 
supporting election observation projects and NGOs since 1994, and none of them had the 
kind of effect that Kmara did. Thus, it was something different about the group rather 
than the money pumped into it. 
Kmara activists also denied the influence of grants. For instance, Levan 
Ramishvili dismissively noted that the Liberty Institute got the money for the purposes, 
which were "typical NGO bull...," but used them for meaningful activities, like thematic 
trainings of activists.137 His statement implies that there was little monitoring on the part 
of OSGF over the implementation of grants. The relaxed supervision may be explained 
by the fact that the foundation itself espoused anti-Shevarnadze views. 
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However, to the detriment of Kmara, the majority of Georgians were not aware 
of these fine nuances in the relationship between the group and the Soros foundation. 
Because of Kmara's noisy reputation, its financial links to Soros became soon exposed 
by the government and alienated the conservative part of the population. Georgian 
Orthodox groups, which strongly objected to any external intervention, used Kmara's 
foreign funding to undermine its credibility among nationalist and isolation-minded 
Georgians. As a result, Kmara activists were derogatively labeled "rentier democrats" 
and gasorosebuli ("Sorosized" in Georgian). 
At the same time, the scope of overall damage remains unclear. Many observers 
and activists acknowledged that irrespective of Soros funding, Kmara would not have 
been able to attract some Georgians due to their status quo orientation.140 The criticism 
of Kmara's foreign links produced a positive side effect, by enhancing its iconoclastic 
image and fueling its appeal to the youth. The group gained the necessary counter-
culture status to be a magnet for those young people who were most radical and adamant 
about change.141 
To summarize, in the months preceding the 2003 parliamentary elections the 
goals of Kmara to bring about change and the intentions of the national Soros 
Foundation to assure fair elections coincided. Thanks to the experience of the Liberty 
Institute, which secured grants for Kmara, the group received little supervision for its 
activities. The association with George Soros produced diametrically opposite reactions, 
by alienating religious and traditionally-minded Georgians and attracting young 
progressives - the precise target audience for Kmara. 
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Membership 
Kmara's pool of members consisted mostly of university students and young 
professionals who were recently out of school. At its peak, the group accounted between 
2,000-3,000 participants.142 Though divided on the specifics of political arrangements 
and preferences, they shared a common understanding of the need for fundamental 
reforms.143 
Regardless of age similarities, Kmara was by no means homogenous. Its core 
membership in Tbilisi included the first post-Soviet generation of Georgia's Westernized 
youth - those who either worked in Western NGOs or studied abroad.144 From the 
beginning, leading activists at the Liberty Institute realized that in order to win the fight 
against social apathy, Kmara had to become more than a group for off-springs from 
Georgian elite families. Thus, its two concurrent goals were to broaden the base by 
expanding onto new student populations and to energize its members by establishing an 
unequivocally activist identity for the group.145 Kmara activists went to different 
universities in the capital and outside Tbilisi to persuade students to join them. They 
turned the group's biggest disadvantage - its lack of political experience - into its 
strongest selling point among young audiences who felt tired of compromised leaders 
and politics as usual.146 
Their efforts proved successful because they correctly identified their target 
audience and were able to get its attention. Kmara members reasoned that other young 
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people would be attracted to the group because youth wings of political parties were 
notoriously weak.147 So politically active young people had often no place to go to air 
their concerns. At the same time, Kmara's horizontal structure and its snowballing 
methods of expansion, when new members were recruited through friends and very 
informal visits to other universities, would create the sense of ownership. The group 
was able to tap into the traditionally high desire within the Georgian society to protest, 
especially among young people who see this method as a means for self-assertion.149 
Like Ukraine, the group's recruitment was made easier by the government whose over-
reaction kept Kmara continuously in the news and helped fuel its popularity.150 In the 
end, the second sub-group of Kmara members emerged. While they were also young 
(19-20 years old), they did not have much of an urban and upper-class flair, coming from 
outside of Tbilisi and speaking no language other than Georgian. How could then they 
relate to their much more privileged counterparts in the capital? For different reasons 
both groups felt equally disenfranchised from political processes and distressed about 
their future. Having lived overseas, sophisticated urbanites were appalled by the state of 
their country and the direction it was moving. After seeing the bleakest sides of life in 
the 1990s, young people outside of Tbilisi felt things could no longer get worse. David 
Kikalishvili, a prominent journalist from Rustavi-2, half-jokingly told a story that many 
teenagers in Zugdidi (a city in the West of Georgia) did not know why there were 
electric posts along roads for their town almost never received any electricity.151 
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Like Ukrainian Pora, Kmara also recognized the need to move people from 
words to action rather quickly. Therefore, in order to test the seriousness of its new 
members, they were immediately asked to take part in demonstrations, protests and other 
activities. This way, the Kmara leaders told me, they were certain that people came to 
Kmara because of the ideological affinity, not for material reasons.152 
Regardless of generally progressive and inclusive recruitment strategies, Kmara 
faced a significant problem that it decided not to try to overcome. In particular, it proved 
unable to attract participants from other age groups. After probing this matter, three 
distinct explanations were collected. First, Kmara's controversial campaign strategies ran 
against the conservative nature of ordinary Georgians. And while the group had to be 
aggressive to sap the confidence of the regime and attract the attention of people,154 
tearing portraits of political leaders and embarrassing them in public could not be 
tolerated by the nation where maintaining one's honor is taken very seriously. Second, 
the group had a very limited timeframe and resources to implement its goals - from 
April till November 2003. Soon any attempts to attract members outside of university 
circles were abandoned for they would bring little yield for a lot of distraction.155 
To summarize, Kmara was successful in bringing together young people 
throughout the country regardless of their social background. It succeeded in overcoming 
both apathy and resistance of the youth who benefited from the system of bribery and 
corruption.156 Where it performed much less effectively was in expanding its ranks to 
other demographics. Scared by Kmara's radicalism and scarred by Georgia's experience 
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with violence, Georgians of other ages might have supported the group, but were 
unwilling to join it for the fear of uncertainty any change might bring to the existing 
fragile peace.157 
Leaders and members 
Like Pora, Kmara had a very horizontal internal structure that brought its own 
benefits and flaws. Because relations between members and leaders were very informal, 
it was hard to pinpoint who was exactly in charge. On one hand, as one of the leaders 
Giorgi Kandelaki notes, it "encouraged a greater feeling of ownership and participation 
among activists that would have not been possible within a hierarchy."158 On the other, it 
was not always clear who was speaking on the behalf of the organization. Seeking to 
enlarge its cadre, Kmara was admitting many members who were not disciplined. Some 
of them chose to give interviews on behalf of the group to without being authorized or 
aware of the "party line."159 Thus challenges with message control resulted in several 
instances of outright public embarrassment. 
From the programmatic standpoint, the lack of hierarchical relations was a 
blessing to a free flow of brainstorming sessions that several members described as long 
and heated.160 Kmara was able to overcome one of the biggest weaknesses of many 
Georgian NGOs when as a result of group-think ideas are never vigorously challenged 
by those members who are not socialized into the internal nonprofit discourse. 
Furthermore, with Kmara's main principle - "Democracy in planning, but dictatorship in 
Losaberidze. 
Kandelaki, 6. 
Tutberidze. 
Sanidze. 
261 
execution," the group was able to implement decisions rather coherently once tactical 
details and budgets were worked out. 
While a loose organizational composition encouraged creativity and challenged 
the potential of each member, it also complicated the mundane tasks of organizational 
management and activist mobilization. One activist acknowledged that because Kmara's 
internal structure was rather weak and rudimentary it struggled to manage all of its 
members. In the end, it compiled a database of most active supporters to be called upon 
to spread the world to others in ease of urgent events.161 
In sum, non^hierarchical relations between members and leaders seemed to have 
brought more good than harm. Although having no clear lines of authority often meant 
little control over members and protracted decision-making, the absence of the leaders-
versus-members schism enabled greater creativity in generating ideas and more intense 
involvement in their execution. The structure suited well in achieving the short-term goal 
of Kmara - to weaken Shevarnadze's grip on power before the November elections. 
Normative transfers 
From the very beginning, Kmara espoused the methodology of nonviolent protest 
and selective public pressure as the major tool of fighting against the Shevarnadze 
government. Its key normative tenets were successfully borrowed from Otpor - a 
Serbian youth organization that was instrumental in bringing down the regime of 
Slobodan Milosevic. 
Even before launching the group publicly in April 2003, members of the Liberty 
Institute became interested in the tactics used by Otpor and conducted a preliminary 
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Internet search on the Serbian group.162 To obtain more information, in February 2003 
Giga Bokeria and two representatives from other organizations163 went on a fact-finding 
mission.164 The visit made such an impression on the Georgian activists that they invited 
Otpor members to come and conduct trainings in Georgia in summer. As a result, three 
large summer schools were held for over 1,000 participants.J 5 
Asked what they learned from those trainings, Georgian activists mention two 
points. The first has to do with content. Otpor emphasized repeatedly the need to 
abandon the use of violence and do so explicitly in order to earn the trust of people and 
forestall government provocations. An openly stated preference for nonviolent tactics 
was especially important in Georgia where a fear of another civil war continues to loom 
large in the public consciousness. The second point is about presentation. In order to 
catch public attention, Kmara could not be an ordinary NGO whose protests were feeble 
and boring to watch. As some interviewers noted, every public action had to have some 
theatrical element - be it "Kmara" graffiti sprayed on the walls of government buildings 
or protesters tearing up a portrait of Eduard Shevarnadze. More importantly, the group 
had to make sure that its activities had a large physical presence (whether real or 
imaginary) and took place simultaneously to make an impression of a potent and well-
coordinated civic movement.166 
External normative transfers were predominant at the beginning of Kmara's 
establishment. Kmara used Otpor's symbol (a clenched fist) and defined itself as a 
movement rather that a traditional NGO.167 However, external influence was not decisive 
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throughout the group's whole existence. It is important to dispel a widely popular myth 
that Kmara was a puppet whose strings were aptly pulled by Otpor and the American 
government. While it is true that Bokeria' s trip to Serbia and the summer seminars 
were fully funded by the Open Society Foundation Georgia,169 it was up to Georgians 
(not Serbian activists or American consultants) to decide what shape Otpor's 
methodological help was going to assume in the country. 
Kmara leaders understood that if they were to succeed, external norms had to be 
married to domestic realities. Most Kmara members outside of Tbilisi spoke little 
English and, more importantly, were not socialized into the Western civil society 
discourse. Thus, the group had to find an overarching issue that would stir emotions and 
rally young people to the cause of change in an Otpor-like nonviolent manner. They 
correctly identified that general problem to be corruption, which "had become the 
dominant metaphor explaining state incapacity."170 Furthermore, Kmara aptly appealed 
the values of Georgians, especially younger generations, who identified the country with 
Europe, the West and Western democracy. All of these factors logically tied external 
and internal normative transfers - Georgia could not become a European country (which 
it was destined to be) because of corruption. The only way to overcome the system of 
corruption was to get rid of the Shevarnadze regime that was at its core. Dismissing 
Shevarnadze ought to be done through civic and peaceful disobedience in order to gain 
wider public support. 
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As another proof that Kmara did not simply copy-cat Otpor' s strategies, 
interviews with its activists made it clear that there were vigorous debates on the content 
of its activities throughout the group's existence. The obvious division was between 
those who argued for embracing more positive messages that would not only criticize 
Shevarnadaze, but also help attract audiences from other demographic groups.172 
Because the group decided to stick to a negative tone of campaigning, its activities 
generated a vicious and contradictory reaction by the government. This, in turn, helped 
unite the opposition by showing the extent of authoritarian degeneration within the 
173 
regime. 
Finally, when it came to specific initiatives, Kmara activists relied extensively on 
the Georgian tradition of direct action that persevered through the Soviet times in 
1978174 and during the struggle for independence in the 1990s.175 Similarly to Pora, most 
ideas had to be tested among friends and families to see the initial response.176 Here we 
note once again a blending of external advice and domestic realities. From Otpor, Kmara 
took the importance of public visibility. Based on the media market in Georgia, its 
members knew that the only way to get publicity was to appear in the news on Rustavi-2, 
a prominent oppositional channel. Therefore, it designed its activities to be 
newsworthy. 
To summarize, the normative input of Serbian youth group Otpor proved critical 
in providing Kmara with the general framework for civic activities that included the 
emphasis on nonviolence and publicity. However, Georgian activists deserve most of the 
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credit for successfully adapting that methodology for local activists and translating its 
abstract tenets into specific activities that in the end enabled the regime change. The 
effectiveness of internal norm sharing was proved by the high level of participants' 
retention after summer schools. The fact that many people chose to stay with Kmara 
showed a genuine interest in its work rather than a simple desire to spend a free of 
charge week in the capital. 
Inter-NGO cooperation 
Cooperation between Kmara and other Georgian NGOs was limited in scope and 
strained in breadth. The reasons for that lie in the attitudes that both sides had toward 
each other. 
On one side, Kmara activists claim that they failed to establish cooperation with 
other NGOs because the latter were interested in maintaining a status quo. Since many of 
them partnered with the Shevarnadze government on implementing Western-funded 
projects, they could no longer criticize it without ruining productive relations.179 The 
deep-seated opinions that leading Kmara activists had about the Georgian traditional 
third sector also did not help foster cooperation. For instance, Giorgi Kandelaki asserts 
that most civic associations remained fundamentally elitist, never winning the support 
and participation of the masses.180 Levan Ramishvili seconds his opinion and adds that 
they had little accountability to the public and spent most of their time writing reports or 
Sanidze. 
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applying for grants. Born out of frustration, Kmara espoused a black-and-white 
strategy in selecting civic partners. 
On the other side, Georgian nonprofit groups were perturbed and angered by 
Kmara's attitude, actions and even its mere existence. Many of them had a hard time 
taking it seriously. How could a group of youngsters take down a government or bring a 
revolution? NGOs, both domestic and international, were dismissive of its influence until 
after the Rose revolution when attempts of historical revisionism quickly proliferated.182 
Even more sensible voices within civil society, who credited Kmara for its audacity, 
questioned its "take-no-prisoners" approach toward campaigning.183 Two of them 
compared Kmara to the Chinese Red Guards during Mao's Cultural Revolution who 
were bent on destroying and humiliating everything and everyone from the past. Finally, 
many NGOs were secretly irked by the group's success for it exposed their own 
organizational weaknesses and handicaps.184 It showed that many of them lacked 
stamina and, most importantly, guts to fight for their goals. 
As a result, Kmara cooperated with a very few civic groups (e.g. ISFED and the 
Georgian Association of Young Lawyers) that consisted of demographically similar 
audiences. Their help, Kmara leaders acknowledge, was very important, especially at the 
beginning. By supplying their members, they enabled Kmara to boost the number of 
participants at its protests and fulfill the group's second goal - publicity. Its events 
seemed better organized and attended than they were in reality.185 In turn, ISFED could 
count on a lot of Kmara members to serve as election observers.186 
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To wrap up the discussion, there was little formalized cooperation between 
Kmara and other Georgian NGOs because of mutual apprehensions. While Kmara 
believed other nonprofits have sold out civic activism in the process of cooperating with 
the government and securing Western grants, the latter felt annoyed and sometimes 
jealous by the group's self-righteousness and its non-conventional, aggressive methods 
of Work. In the few instances where collaboration existed, it covered similar target 
audiences and was highly informal. 
Kmara and political parties 
Kmara's cooperation with political parties was extensive in scope, yet limited in 
the number of actual partners. The group worked most actively with the National 
Movement led by Mikheil Saakashvili. A host of factors facilitated this unusually close 
type of cooperation. 
First, leaders of both entities had much in common. They were close in age 
(mid- to late-30s at the time), came into the political arena in the decade since 
independence, and grew eventually disenchanted with the Shevarnadze rule. Saakashvili 
was recruited by David Zhvania to enter Georgian politics as a promising young man 
with Western education. Ramishvili joined politics as a student in Georgia's liberation 
movement against the Soviet Union and later authored several laws. Thus, when several 
Kmara activists spoke about the unity of minds and almost familial relations about the 
two organizations,187 their words were easy to believe, especially since after the Rose 
Revolution many Kmara members moved to work for the Saakashvili government. 
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Second, both organizations had the same message (i.e. the need for change), but 
realized that each would be better at delivering it for its own target audience. Kmara, as a 
group borne out of university self-governance, would fare well among younger and more 
radical audiences. In turn, the National Movement could attract older Georgians who 
would not listen to "green teenagers." Their approach was successful in both cases, 
because they reached out to populations (whether students or provincial residents) who 
were shut out of the political life after the demise of Gamsakhurdia.188 
This brings us to the third, larger point - each saw the utility of cooperating with 
the other. The National Movement needed young idealists that Kmara was bound to 
1 &Q 
recruit as voters and its loyal political supporters. Kmara recognized that good 
relations with a key political actor gave it an opportunity to impact the course of political 
developments, by pushing for more radical solutions.190 
Finally, the top tier of the National Movement (i.e. Bokeria, Saakashvili and 
Zhvania) not only understood the role of Kmara (which many of their rank and file 
members did not grasp191), but also succeeded at establishing practical mechanisms for 
cooperation. Civic and political activists from both organizations held biweekly meetings 
where they coordinated strategies and compared notes. 
The benefits of this cooperation were obvious. Each side could build upon the 
strengths of the other to achieve its own goals more effectively. In a rare exception for 
post-Soviet civil societies, where civic groups and political parties inhabit two parallel 
universes, Kmara and the National Movement were actively working on a goal greater 
than merely a victory in an election or the fulfillment of grant requirements. At the same 
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time, this cooperation carried one significant problem. In working closely with the 
National Movement, Kmara had to give up any pretense of impartiality. This raises 
questions of whether and to what extent Kmara has crossed a thin and very blurred line 
that separates civic and political worlds. 
Influence in the public 
Though Kmara acquired worldwide popularity thanks to the international media 
coverage of the Rose Revolution, questions about its influence in the Georgian public 
have not been properly addressed. The evaluation of existing data and interviews with 
civic and political activists reveal bipolarity in public views about the group. 
On one hand, the Kmara had a plenty of admirers. A survey in Tbilisi shortly 
after the revolution indicated that 59 percent of the capital's residents had a positive 
opinion about Kmara, 25.6 percent found Kmara useful and approved its conduct.192 
Ordinary citizens felt natural respect toward Kmara activists because of their high level 
of education. As one observer noted, Georgians tend to scrutinize the education of those 
in positions of power. In this regard, many Kmara members definitely stood out having 
studied in the West. In essence, this segment of the population treated Kmara 
supportively for it represented an opportunity to end stagnation that has come along with 
stability of the Shevarnadze regime. 
On the other hand, there were many who liked Kmara's lofty goals, but despised 
its methods of implementing them. 33.4 percent of Tbilisi residents shared this opinion 
after the revolution. As mentioned before, much of the group's work was geared toward 
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attracting public and especially media attention. However, with that attention came the 
embarrassment of high-level officials, in particular President Shevarnadze. In a country 
where a man's honor is a perennial theme of national folklore, Kmara's crassness made 
people cringe-
Finally, there was a sizeable segment of people who held negative views of the 
organization. In Tbilisi, 15.3 percent thought badly of Kmara and its role in the 
revolution. In my interviews, two reasons figured prominently. The first was, of course, 
foreign funding, which was regularly used by Shevarnadze to sway the opinion of 
conservative Georgians against the group.' By implicating Kmara in receiving outside 
assistance, the government was able to tap into a rich well of existing xenophobic 
sentiments. Myths about Jewish-Masonic conspiracies to subjugate Georgia painted 
Kmara as an agent of foreign influence.195 The group's affiliation with the Liberty 
Institute did not help allay the fears. The Institute earned a reputation for promoting 
zealous secularism.196 The second factor was a deeply hidden fear that Kmara's actions 
would produce radicalization, which pushes the Georgian society into another civil war. 
Polling by domestic and international organizations reveals that one of the constant 
concerns of many Georgians was a risk of escalating instability. Many remembered 
how Gamsakhurdia's radicalism and unwillingness to compromise plunged the country 
into years of infighting and massive impoverishment. To them, hotheads in Kmara did 
not realize that by playing with matches of public discontent, they could ignite the fire of 
a bloody rebellion. Kmara tried to change the perception of its radicalism and non-
conformity by distributing leaflets about its purpose and becoming more structured in 
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delivering its message. In the end, many of its activists acknowledged that they had little 
chance of breaking through to the most conservative segments of the society. 
Though the data from a public survey in Tbilisi provides a glimpse into popular 
attitudes, it cannot objectively tell the whole picture without examining samples in other 
parts of the country. However, based on my interviews and external sources, two 
speculations can be made. First, the recognition of Kmara was lower outside of the 
capital, because of the limited reach of Rustavi-2 beyond Tbilisi.198 Second, negative 
attitudes toward Kmara could have been much higher in rural areas where conservative 
and religious attitudes are much more predominant than in the capital. 
To summarize, Kmara was a well-known player on the domestic scene. However, 
public attitudes on its impact were split between those who thought it was useful, those 
who liked its goals, but not their execution, and the ones who despised Kmara as a 
externally propped up entity. To the group's credit, it recognized its key shortcomings 
and how they limit its appeal. But, given the polarization of the Georgian society, it is 
not clear what it could have done (short of giving up its radical message) to appease the 
ones displeased with its conduct and to convert its skeptics. Thus, the only option it had 
was to use its leverage to the maximum during revolutionary events and (as numerous 
activists told me) hope that people would join it in the process. 
Kikalishvili. 
KMARA AND THE ROSE REVOLUTION 
Planning and pre-election activities 
Kmara's planning for the 2003 parliamentary elections concentrated on two 
concurrent goals - to increase public participation in elections and civic life and to sap 
the confidence of state authorities in their omnipotence. 
Through their numerous anti-government protests, Kmara activists sought to 
attract the attention of ordinary Georgians to the importance of elections as an 
opportunity to change the country's trajectory of development. Some of Kmara actions 
were filled with symbolism. For instance, its first demonstration took place on April 14, 
2003 and Commemorated the anniversary of the 1978 student protests against the Soviet 
attempts to introduce Russian as the state language in Georgia.199 Later in summer, the 
group actively embroiled itself in major political controversies. It demonstrated against 
Shevarnadze's attempts to stack the Central Election Commissions with his loyalists and 
spoke up against the government's campaign to bully international grant-giving 
• -.- 200 
organizations. 
Recognizing that public protests in Tbilisi were not sufficient, many activists 
embarked on a grass-root campaign to spread the message among Georgian university 
students and young people in the capital and throughout the country.201 During these 
personal meetings, Kmara members explained not only the importance of voting to 
increase the turnout, but also the necessity to be ready to stand up against fraud. The 
group was able to gain supporters from different parts of the country who later joined the 
protests in Tbilisi. As a result of these efforts, Kmara crushed the prevalent government 
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view of NGOs as the sector small m number, disconnected from the public and 
vulnerable to cooptation, intimidation and defamation.202 It also created a powerful 
official backlash against its activities. For instance, on October 10 police forces 
dispersed an attempted Kmara protest near the State Chancellary in Tbilisi, and thirteen 
days later its office was ransacked at night.203 
While in many interviews with the press Kmara activists repeatedly spoke about 
following the Otpor model, little post-election planning occurred in reality. In fact, just 
like with the theatrical nature of protests, references to Otpor were part of the bluffing 
strategy that the group used to intimidate the government. Assessing the situation now, 
many of them acknowledge that they did not expect anything revolutionary. For 
instance, both Zurabishvili and Ramishvili assert that it was the tenacity of Shevarnadze 
(i.e. his unwillingness to compromise) that doomed the deal worked out between him 
and the U.S. Embassy in Tbilisi.204 Tea Tutberidze says until the very last moment 
(possibly Saakashvili's trip to Mingrelia, the Western part of Georgia) she was not 
certain that enough people would join the protests. 
At the same time, it would be wrong to suggest that Kmara activists watched the 
unfolding events from the sideline. Several sources confirm that in the days after the 
election, Kmara was urging a radical line.205 Its activists approached Mikheil Saakashvili 
with the proposal to organize a "march of the million angry voters" and bring people 
from the countryside, which he rejected. This fact confirms two points. One, mentioned 
before, is that negotiations over a possible compromise with the Shevarnadze 
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government were really underway. The other is that in those revolutionary days 
Kmara did a lot of things on the spur of the moment rather than as a consequence of 
deliberate planning. 
To conclude, Kmara's involvement in the election campaign added a distinct and 
very loud civic voice to the political debate. The group established a necessary grass-root 
infrastructure in Tbilisi and outside of the capital to be called upon for post-election 
activities. In regard to the latter, it seems that Kmara did not conduct extensive planning 
for contingencies. Instead the leading role in this area was given to the opposition, 
mainly Mikheil Saakashvili and his National Movement.207 While negotiations among 
various parties were underway, Kmara and its activists were holding protests merely to 
remind the government of what was in store. 
Cooperation with NGOs and media 
Due to Kmara's radical profile, its cooperation with NGOs was initially limited. 
As its spokesperson tersely remarked, "we worked with people when our interests 
coincided and we moved on in cases when they did not." Thus, Kmara's cooperation 
with NGOs and other actors was most effective when it was spontaneous, need-based 
and mutually benefiting. 
In the months before the revolution, Kmara relied heavily on the support from the 
Liberty Institute that provided technical and logistical resources, assisted with regional 
outreach, training and coordination with oppositional parties. The second closest group 
was the Georgian Association of Young Lawyers (GYLA) that gave pro bono legal 
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advice when Kmara activists were detained by authorities.209 Realizing that they need 
help in implementing one of its key goals of monitoring election, Kmara turned to the 
country's oldest election watchdog ISFED. Both ISFED and Kmara members reported a 
positive record of cooperation in deploying civic observers (many of whom came from 
Kmara) to monitor elections throughout the country.210 
It remains unclear whether and to what extent Kmara was active in NGO 
coalitions. One thing is obvious that international donors favored building such 
coalitions as a way to amplify the power and voice of civic groups. Kmara activists that I 
interviewed said they avoided formalized agreements and preferred to cooperate with 
other civic groups on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, some of the leaders noted (not 
without disdain) that many nonprofit groups leaped to help Kmara only when it was 
becoming increasingly clear that Shevarnadze's days in power are numbered.211 Contrary 
to these claims, Areshidze asserts that in September 2002 the Open Society Georgia 
Foundation sought to put together a coalition of six NGOs, including Kmara's founder, 
919 
the Liberty Institute. The effort did not last long. It is speculated that because the 
Liberty Institute, GYLA and CIPDD held more radical positions, other members were 
91 ^ 
either excluded from further meetings or left on their own. Whatever the case might 
be, the project did not go anywhere as informal patterns of cooperation prevailed over 
more formalized initiatives. 
At the same time, collaboration was much more extensive and genuine with TV 
channel Rustavi-2. Founded by many civic leaders and employing many journalists with 
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Western training in news reporting, the media outlet was an open critic of Shevarnadze. 
While there was no formal deal, an implicit understanding existed between Kmara and 
Rustavi-2 that whenever the former would speak up, the latter would come to cover a 
demonstration.214 In essence, it was Kmara's protests, their coverage by Rustavi-2 and 
angry government reactions (covered again by the media) that gave the group the biggest 
exposure and boosted its cause. 
Mobilization 
Like many Kmara activities, its mobilization during the events of the Rose 
Revolution occurred spontaneously and was assisted by other factors and events 
happening at the time. 
While the membership pool of the group was significant (2,000-3,000 people) 
compared to other NGOs, it was not nearly enough to create the kind of public protests 
that would be treated seriously by the government. Recognizing this, the leadership of 
Kmara and the Liberty Institute sought to educate a larger public about the message of 
peaceful resistance. Several days before the elections, they provided a popular 
oppositional channel (and a not so secret admirer of Kmara) Rustavi-2 a documentary, 
produced by a small independent studio in Washington DC, with an activist social 
stand.216 "Bringing Down A Dictator" was a story of how ordinary Serbs removed from 
power one of the bloodiest leaders in Europe, Slobodan Milosevic. The film was replete 
with references that immediately resonated among ordinary Georgians. Kmara looked 
and acted just like Otpor. The Georgian political opposition reminded of its Serbian 
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counterparts - disunited and always bickering within, it seemed only recently to have 
come together. At one point, the documentary shows Otpor activists cutting a cake where 
each piece represented a part of Serbia split away as a result of Milosevic's militant 
policies. Georgians immediately thought of the territorial losses that the country suffered 
since becoming independent - South Ossetia, Abkhazia and half-independent Adjara. 
The main message was clear - if the vote is stolen, you must come to the capital (Tbilisi) 
and press for the real results to be recognized. In the end, showing the documentary 
became an important moment for rallying Kmara activists and educating ordinary 
citizens about the peaceful nature of possible demonstrations. 
As the result of exit polls and ISFED parallel vote tabulations were broadcast on 
Rustavi-2, Kmara recognized that the showdown was inevitable. It began to mobilize the 
core of activists by email and cell phone.217 Soon, the "snowball effect" kicked in, as 
Kmara members started text-messaging their friends, relatives, friends of friends and 
relatives of relatives to join the protest near the State Chancellary and then at the Liberty 
Square. 
Kmara's mobilization effort was inadvertently assisted by a number of other 
factors and events. The first was a continuous support from Rustavi-2 that broadcast 
unfolding protests and informed the public where future events would take place. 
Furthermore, the TV channel showed mostly close-ups of the demonstrations to create a 
perception of large public events and skew a cost-benefit analysis of ordinary people (i.e. 
the larger the crowds - the less likely the use of force). The other was the formation of 
the ArtCom - a public group consisting of famous Georgian artists, singers and actors.219 
Jones, 8. 
Wheatley, 187. 
Jones. 
The involvement of intelligence in a country where the public reveres its educated class 
persuaded many ordinary citizens to step into the fray of revolutionary events. The final 
factor was the force of a revolutionary cascade.220 As teachers went on strike and cars 
drove honking their horns in protests, more and more people joined Kmara students to 
defend their vote. 
To conclude, Kmara's mobilization effort was successful as a result of its lateral 
strategies and inadvertent support from other forces. Taking advantage of modern 
communication technologies, it was able to mobilize its enlisted members. Assisted by 
the media attention, it tapped into extended social networks of its members. Most 
importantly, Kmara was able to build on its own success, its popularity and its 
connections within the student and youth community in Tbilisi and around the country. 
Had that not been the case, the first wave of demonstrations would have taken much 
longer to materialize. 
Assessment of the performance 
Kmara's performance in the revolution should be divided into two parts - pre-
election activities and participation in the revolutionary events. On the first count, the 
group was successful, because it produced "quality activism."221 What this means in 
practice is Kmara was able to attract people to its cause by making them feel 
empowered. This was not NGO activism as usual. Students and young Georgians joined 
Kmara not because of material rewards (e.g. an all expenses-paid seminar in Tbilisi or a 
small monthly stipend), but because of the genuine concern about their country's future. 
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Since their involvement was much more spontaneous arid genuine, it was also more 
appealing to others. As a result, the organization ended up playing the role that civic 
groups are supposed to play in pre-election campaigns - a noisy observer and a restless 
watchdog of the government. 
As far as the revolutionary events are concerned, Kmara's contribution was two-
fold. First, it incited and sustained the first wave of mobilization. In the morning 
following the election, Kmara activists plastered Tbilisi streets with the results of parallel 
vote tabulation that differed dramatically from the official record.222 The group's 
members made up the crowd for small-scale, but continuous demonstrations that lasted 
from November 8 till November 14. By mobilizing up to 10,000 students, Kmara created 
a visible presence that was hard for the government to ignore. Second, through close but 
informal cooperation with Rustavi-2, the group helped fuel larger mobilization of the 
Georgian population. Having Kmara protesters in place, Rustavi-2 used media 
techniques (e.g. camera angles) to make demonstrations seem larger and better attended 
than they were.224 In this effort, both assisted Saakashvili's National Movement that 
sought to bring people out to the streets after failed negotiations with Shevarnadze. 
In the end, the questions of whether Kmara was consequential and decisive 
enough loom large. The answer is yes to the first and no to the second. Kmara's 
participation defined the public image of the Rose Revolution as a youth-driven event 
and radicalized the discourse about possible solutions by framing election fraud into the 
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larger narrative of overall corruption that permeated the Shevarnadze regime. If initial 
demonstrations had not been well attended, the opposition would have been pushed into 
an unfavorable compromise. Given the American concern about regional stability in the 
Caucasus, both sides might have been pressured to sign a pact that would have left the 
Shevarnadze regime mostly in tact. However, the presence of street protesters (many of 
whom came from Kmara) gave Saakashvili and other oppositional leaders enough 
backing to insist on the cancellation of election results as a nonnegotiable demand. Had 
the discourse been shaped differently, the outcome might have failed to achieve greater 
mobilization as it happened in 1999 and 2002.227 
This brings us to the second part of the question. Contrary to the impression that 
many media reports gave at the time, Kmara was not the decisive force for the 
revolution's success. Many, including Saakashvili himself and U.S. Ambassador Miller, 
claim that Rustavi-2 proved much more important as the megaphone of the revolution.228 
The role of opposition was certainly important in facilitating the political process. In 
fact, most observers openly acknowledge that contrary to Otpor in Serbia, Kmara took a 
backseat in the revolutionary cascade. 
As a summary of the discussion on success, it is important to evaluate Kmara's 
performance against the suggested indicators of function and contribution. In terms of 
the former, Kmara fulfilled its key stated function by energizing a specific part of the 
Georgian electorate about the elections. Its contribution to the revolution was two-fold. It 
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helped to initiate the first wave of protests that persuaded many others to join the 
revolutionary cause, and it sustained the demonstrations when the public enthusiasm 
seemed to be waning or when political negotiations between the government and 
opposition were taking place. Thus its input to the initial stage of the revolution and the 
management of protests is without any doubt. In essence, as many observers note, 
Kmara's great success in fulfilling its mission of voter mobilization and regime change 
became the cause for its demise. Once those goals were accomplished through the 
revolution, there was no place for Kmara in its old shape and form in the Georgian civic 
life. 
PROFILE: ISFED 
Launch 
In 1995, after several years since the return of Shevarnadze into the war-torn 
country, Georgia was acquiring a modicum of stability. The president managed to 
consolidate power and neutralize his powerful opponents, like Tengiz Kitovani and Jaba 
Ioseliani. As a sign of stabilization, Georgia ratified its new constitution on 24 August 
1995. Several days later, the Georgian parliament adopted the electoral code and 
scheduled the first post-war parliamentary and presidential elections for 5 November 
1995.230 Like Ukraine in 1994, Georgia desperately needed an independent civic group 
that would monitor elections. Thus, the International Society for Fair Elections (ISFE) 
was established at the initiative of several existing local NGOs that lobbied foreign 
donors to provide funding for election-related projects.231 Set up specifically in advance 
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of the 1995 elections, ISFE deployed 1,300 observers during its christening 
experience. However, the organization got its first taste of Georgian rough politics 
only a year later when in September 1996 Ruslan Abashidze, the authoritarian ruler of 
Ajara, denied ISFE the right to monitor election of the Ajara Supreme Council. 
Maturation 
ISFE recognized the limitations of its primary focus on elections early in its 
existence. In 1996 it sought to expand the field for its activities by adding an advocacy 
component - Citizens' Public Dialogue Meeting and Citizens' Advisory Committees that 
were designed to solicit feedback from regular people and incorporate it in decision-
making processes of local officials. A year later on 22 November 1997 the group decided 
to add democracy to its title, thereby making overall democracy promotion a definitive 
component of its work. 
Though the organization tried to expand its operation beyond election 
monitoring, on a closer look a clear difference emerges between what it aspired to do 
and what it did or could do in local circumstances. In 1996-1999, ISFED activists 
identified four priorities - governmental transparency, civic participation and self-
governance, education and empowerment, and advocacy. In the first area, the group 
launched a series of monitoring initiatives aimed at increasing accountability for 
budgetary processes of Sakrebulos (local councils), enhancing transparency of 
governments and police authorities at different levels and promoting the observance of 
"sunshine" laws. As for civic participation, the group accounted for 18 Citizens' 
Advisory Committees (CACs) in different regions of the country. It also established 
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neighborhood associations and student governments in three Georgian cities (Tbilisi, 
Kutaisi and Gori). ISFED''s efforts seemed to be most prolific in the areas of education 
and advocacy where it developed and distributed numerous educational materials for 
voters and election observers, created the Civic Education library and produced its own 
publication "Civil Society." The organization's leadership engaged in extensive lobbying 
efforts to improve the status of Sakrebulo members, discuss legislative drafts and amend 
the national election legislation. 
While the mere enumeration of activities may paint the picture of an extremely 
busy and vibrant organization, in reality ISFED struggled to adjust to its self-proclaimed 
mission. Several outside observers noted that before 2003 the group never managed to 
make a leap from being a purely election watchdog (which got activated from one 
election cycle to the next) to acting as a more permanent civic entity. Of course, it 
would be natural and thus easy to assign some blame on ISFED activists who should 
have tried harder to overcome the difficulties of organization building. However, their 
fault is only partial. Indeed, the attempts to establish a more stable shop might have been 
doomed from the start given Georgia's economic realities and a relatively limited pool of 
international funding. Mark Mullen, NDFs Country Director in Georgia, indicated that 
in-between elections ISFED had nothing more than a group of staff members in the 
capital and a few coordinators of rayons (counties) who had small, but regular salaries. 
So whereas it was possible to attract people for election monitoring, the group struggled 
to retain its participants on a volunteer basis after elections. The economic situation 
outside of Tbilisi was such that many people could not even fathom donating their time 
for free. 
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Mission and its evolution 
The group's gradual maturation is clearly depicted in its mission. The review of 
ISFED mission-related documents shows that, unlike many NGOs in the former Soviet 
Union where mission writing was seen as a formality to satisfy foreign donors, the 
organization was both thoughtful and idealistic about its tasks. The normative 
framework, which guides organizational activities, is a predictably pithy statement of 
goals as well as an elaboration of espoused values and ideals, including a reference to 
international documents. 
Between 1995-1996 the organization did not have an extensive view of its role. 
In this nascent stage it was mostly concerned about voter education, election monitoring 
and some basic elements of advocacy. Having gone through a set of formative 
experiences (both the 1995 parliamentary elections and the 1996 elections in Ajara), 
ISFED sought to define its place in Georgian civil society and its own view on the 
country's developmental trajectory. 
It borrowed the central motto from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
which states, "Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country... The 
will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government: this shall be 
expressed in periodic and genuine elections." Though some of its espoused values 
consisted of usual civic buzzwords (e.g. human rights, open civil society), others showed 
a genuine concern for the country (e.g. independent, democratic Georgia and its 
constitution). 
In the end, ISFED's mission statement settled for generalities that were slightly 
modified to show the group's inclination to work in the election field. More specifically 
it indicated that ISFED would promote democratic practices through citizens' 
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participation^ civil society development, election and general government monitoring, 
advice, advocacy and civic education. 
To simmiarize our discussion, two points should be noted. First, it is clear that the 
leadership of the organization was aware of the international normative framework234 
that guided activities of election watchdogs in other countries. Second, ISFED also 
shared (at the very least rhetorically) the core assumptions and principles of this 
framework, which explains why it sought to embrace and elaborate upon them in detail. 
Funding and sustainability 
From the founding and till the Rose Revolution, ISFED was completely 
dependent on NDI in terms of funding and organizational support. While the group made 
regular attempts to secure grants from other sources, the level of support did not amount 
to any significant diversification of its financial base. 
Numerous sources interviewed for the dissertation provide different reasons for 
this situation. ISFED activists indicate that the group consciously chose not to approach 
local businesses, perceiving them as biased and threatening to the NGO's image of 
impartiality. Whenever ISFED applied for donor funding, it engaged NDI to lobby on 
its behalf or provide assistance with developing a grant proposal together. Thus, the 
group was able to get money from such top-notch grant-providers as the British Council, 
Soros Foundation in Georgia (OSGF) and US AID. Unlike many other nonprofit groups, 
especially outside of Tbilisi, ISFED acknowledges that it never had to go through real 
The framework emphasizes human rights, democracy and equality. 
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"dry spells" when funding was not available for basic operational expenditures. The 
main problem was how to put funds to good use rather than how to get them.236 
The issue of financial sustainability came up frequently in discussions with NDI 
representatives who, as the most significant funder of ISFED, felt a special responsibility 
for its survival. However, even in this case the positions of two sides diverged rather 
sharply. Mark Mullen, who spent a long time in Georgia, believes that NDI was not 
genuinely interested in letting ISFED expand its roster of funders. The Democratic 
Institute recognized that if ISFED became truly independent, it would undermine the 
extent of NDI's control over the NGO, especially its ability to influence post-election 
statements.237 One of the former Executive Directors of ISFED, Tamar Zhvania, shared 
at least part of that assessment when she expressed displeasure at the constant NDI's 
meddling in daily operations of the group.238 Another NDI representative, who worked 
in Georgia, disagreed. Lincoln Mitchell remarks that accusations of sinister motives on 
part of the Institute are usually a face-saving technique. In reality, there were always 
talks in both organizations to give more space for ISFED to operate on its own or to 
remove the NDI safety net. However, when it came to action, both entities recoiled 
because they were not sure if ISFED would be able to make it on its own. Thus some 
ISFED activists might have created the perception that "they are not being let go" as a 
justification for organizational weakness. 
As usual, the truth is somewhere in the middle and it is much more nuanced. 
Depending on specific circumstances, ISFED preferred to act independently during some 
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times and run for help from NDI during others. Though the group was able to secure 
occasional grants from other funding agencies, it was nowhere near achieving the 
diversification of sources that would enable it to distance itself from NDI on a more 
permanent basis. The interviews with activists and donors made it clear that the task of 
getting money and assuring financial sustainability was doubly complicated in the 
Georgian context. It seems that both activists and donors gave up on the attempts to 
secure money from the government or the business sector (not to mention the destitute 
population). In this case, the only hope for ISFED to have a more stable financial future 
was (and is) to have several donors with substantial and long-term contributions to its 
budget. By the time of the Rose Revolution, ISFED did not achieve that goal. 
Donor influence 
Financial dependency of ISFED on external assistance poses a natural question 
about the extent of influence that foreign organizations, in particular NDI, exerted on the 
group. The accumulated evidence shows a complex picture of donor-grantee relations 
where interdependence between the two parties was not as one-side (i.e. the donor 
dominating the grantee) as it might have seemed from afar. 
On one side, NDI tended to be bossy. According to the ISFED former director, 
until 2003 there was a tacit agreement that the group would not fundraise from other 
sources, solely relying on NDI. The ISFED leader was required to make weekly reports 
at the NDI office in Tbilisi.240 For the first two years, NDI reviewed and approved 
ISFED's post-election statements. However, neither ISFED nor NDI was internally 
united in its approach to the other side. As it happens in many organizations, those 
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divisions were greatly influenced by interactions among specific individuals and their 
ability to get personally along with each other. For instance, the relationship was 
definitely frosty between NDI and Ms. Zhvania, who sought to discontinue the practice 
of weekly reporting. On the other hand, Kakhaber Sopromadze, ISFED's current deputy 
director and long-term activist, spoke more gratefully about the Democratic Institute, 
calling it an extremely strong ally of ISFED that supported it through most difficult 
times.241 At NDI, differences in how to treat the Georgian election watchdog emerged 
between the Institute's office in Tbilisi and its headquarters in DC. For instance, Mark 
Mullen did not hide his opinion that NDI-DC was a meddlesome, "bad cop" with 
ISFED. He sought to discontinue the practice of approving the NGO's post-election 
reports and fought hard, but unsuccessfully to publish the ISFED parallel vote tabulation 
report in 1999, which presented the leading pro-governmental party CUG (Citizens' 
Union of Georgia) in a bad light and was consequently embargoed by NDI for public 
release.242 
On the other side, ISFED became the premier election civic group thanks to NDI. 
Having the backing of the Institute allowed the civic group to win a lot of political 
battles and get heard at the highest levels of government. It is also clear that the Institute 
had to be protective of ISFED for two other closely related reasons. First, the group often 
tended to exaggerate its capacity to act independently or to perform program-related 
tasks.243 For instance, Lincoln Mitchell, who worked at NDI-Tbilisi, believed ISFED 
would not have been adequately prepared to conduct a critical parallel vote tabulation in 
the 2003 parliamentary elections if it had not received the external training set up by 
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NDI.244 Second, because of the Institute's long-term commitment to the group, NDI felt 
that its own image and stature were tied to ISFED. The Democratic Institute was under 
intense pressure from the regional office of US AID to spread donor funding for elections 
among several groups and set up NGOs that would perform tasks similar to ISFED.245 
The precarious situation was not helped by the fact that left to its own devices, the 
leadership of ISFED showed a propensity for self-destruction. In the years preceding the 
Rose Revolution, Zurab Tchiaberishvili (the then Executive Director of the group) 
registered another nonprofit, called the Fair Elections, and transferred all the property 
and technical equipment possessed by ISFED to his own organization. The case 
eloquently demonstrated to NDI that the Georgian NGO was not yet ready to enjoy full 
independence. 
To summarize the discussion, NDI exercised a great deal of influence over 
ISFED's programming and development. Both organizations developed an interesting 
pull-and-push dynamic. ISFED liked to play up its experience and readiness to act on its 
own, especially since its leadership recognized that NDI would always come to rescue. 
NDI was torn between two extremes as well. On one hand, it wanted to have a genuinely 
Georgian election group that was not seen as an American puppet. On the other, it 
gradually invested its own reputation into the wellbeing of ISFED and was not willing to 
have it compromised by the group's rash statements or actions. In the end, the extent of 
donor influence continued to depend on personalities in both offices and specific events. 
If people found a common language and managed to establish trust, NDI's meddling did 
not seem so intrusive. By 2000, NDI was willing to give ISFED for autonomy for events 
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of a lower magnitude. Most importantly, this relationship demonstrates one critical point 
- the pattern of dependency between foreign donors and their grantees abroad is not as 
one-sided as often assumed. Indeed, as seen with NDI and ISFED, the longer the funder 
supports the organization, the more dependent it becomes on the grantee's continued 
survival and performance. As a result, the implicit recognition of this reality changes 
profoundly how democracy-promoting organizations interact with their foreign 
beneficiaries. 
Membership 
From the very beginning, ISFED pursued multiple strategies to recruit its 
members throughout the whole country. As a positive outcome of this approach, the 
organization was able to get a diverse pool of individuals who still met the selection 
criterion of being nonpartisan. However, the long-term tradeoff was that ISFED 
members, who were so different from each other, had a lower level of personal loyalty 
and organizational identity.246 
In 1995, ISFED sought to establish a broad governance structure that widely 
dispersed responsibilities between the central and regional [rayon] offices. Under the 
scheme, membership recruitment was outsourced to regional branches, and the 
headquarters in Tbilisi never attempted to conduct a serious recruitment campaign.247 
ISFED had two categories of members - regular staff and election volunteers. For 
regular members, the organization worked hard to get individuals who were 
professionals and had a stature in their communities. The ranks of volunteers included 
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the usual suspects - retirees who were mad at the previous Communist system and had 
time on their hands and students who were passionate and fearless about the task. The 
biggest in ISFED's recruitment strategies was their dependence on particular branch 
coordinators. Because Georgia is a very small country, personal relations played a great 
role in persuading ordinary citizens to volunteer for ISFED. The major problem came up 
after elections. While the organization maintained an extensive database of members, 
most of them were not involved in non-election activities. In reality, each branch had a 
smaller cohort of activists who could be counted to mobilize a larger crowd.249 However, 
this mobilization technique became useless when a branch coordinator left his position, 
thereby effectively dissolving the smaller cohort that formed around him. As a result, 
many regional branches lost a lot of institutional memory and experiences with any 
leadership changes. 
It becomes clear from the interviews with ISFED activists that in terms of 
recruitment they were concerned with two issues - impartiality of their members and 
organizational diversity. Many of them emphasized laborious mechanisms that the group 
utilized not only to check the initial background of permanent staffers and volunteers, 
but also to monitor their interactions with political parties. In this regard, the task was 
made much easier by the size of the country, which encompassed 75 election districts 
and 3,000 polling stations.250 As for diversity, both external observers and activists 
emphasized how the group tried to ensure some gender balance251 among members (an 
arduous task in the country where female politicians were few and far in-between). The 
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headquarters in Tbilisi sought to bring people outside of the capital in a meaningful 
manner, by assigning them to the positions of program coordinators and board members. 
The strategy had its own advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, it made the 
organization look more credible, because voters saw real activists who could emphasize 
with their problems. By being visible members in their communities, those people 
proved to be extremely dedicated, brave, unspoiled by the excesses of Tbilisi and very 
hard-working. Many of them had to deal with real clashes of interest and harassment.252 
On the other hand, the recruitment strategy decreased the group's political clout, because 
(unlike such famous NGOs as the Liberty Institute), ISFED had a lot fewer well-known 
and politically connected activists who had made their name in Georgian politics.253 
Though the organization did not charge membership fees, by 1999 it had six 
regional subdivisions and most developed branches in Batumi and Kutaisi.254 Overall, 
ISFED could boast a fairly successful set of recruitment strategies. As a result of those, it 
was able to attract different audiences to the cause of fair elections and ensure a 
continuous blood flow within the organization. The practices were not without their 
flaws. One of them was the group's inability to involve significant numbers of "middle-
aged" Georgians (those in their late 30s-40s). The other was a comparatively lower 
attachment of activists to the organization, which was dictated by their relatively short 
tenure in the group. The situation comes back to the familiar points on how an NGO 
should try to embed itself while balancing two conflicting impulses - an openness to 
newcomers and the strive for professionalism. 
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Leaders and members 
ISFED's open internal structure ensured a close interaction between leaders and 
members. Drawing parallels with certain types of government systems, ISFED was more 
of a parliamentary republic where the executive board (composed of a lot of regional 
members) had a greater say in the running of the organization. Like any state with an 
immature parliamentary system, ISFED rescued itself from creeping authoritarianism of 
some NGOs where a strong leader crowded out potential competitors and turned a group 
into his own fiefdom. However, the multiplicity of voices often resulted in 
organizational volatility where leaders, who could not get along with the board, were 
quickly pushed out. 
ISFED's initial leader Nugzar Ivanidze was quietly relieved of his duties by the 
board at the end of the 1990s. Board members saw a need for change when Ivanidze was 
becoming more authoritarian and allegedly corrupt.255 In 2000-2001, theNGO went 
through a period of organizational uncertainty where two other executive directors had to 
leave after failing to establish their authority successfully. By the end of 2001, Zurab 
Tchiaberishvili assumed the reins and sought to re-make the organization. 
Tchiaberishvili's plan included bringing a group of young English-speaking 
activists into the headquarters in Tbilisi, attracting high-profile political figures to the 
ISFED Executive Board and raising public awareness of the group. Needless to say, the 
changes of this magnitude created discontent among ordinary members. In 2002, a clash 
of cultures emerged between the central and regional offices. Regional activists were 
grumbling that Tchiaberishvili was more interested in the big picture rather than the 
minutia of office administration and supervision. There was also resentment of the fact 
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that Tchiaberishvili was a member of the Georgian elite NGO class in the previously 
egalitarian ISFED. Sensing the tensions and trying to upstage possible challenges to his 
leadership, he secretly established the "Fair Elections" foundation.256 In doing so, 
Tchiaberishvili took advantage of the convoluted legislation on NGOs, which did not 
require the presence of co-founders for nonprofit foundations. 
In the end, it seems, the group was able to pull itself together and do a great job 
with its election programs before the Rose Revolution. It is also clear that 
Tchiaberishvili's fast-paced and ambitious approach was necessary to take the 
organization up to a higher level of operations. At the same time, his tumultuous tenure 
exposed a significant weakness that existed in the interactions between regular activists 
and the group's leadership. While the organizational was democratic internally (a rare 
example in the former Soviet space), it did not have more formal mechanisms for 
auditing programmatic errors, gathering feedback and incorporating otherwise rigorous 
informal discussions into future decision-making.257 
To conclude, the review of leader-member interactions in ISFED emphasize two 
important points. First, the more open are the mechanisms of governance for an NGO, 
the less likely it is to succumb to authoritarian tendencies of particular leaders. Second, 
openness is not a cure in itself. Unless accompanied by sufficient formal mechanisms of 
feedback gathering and analysis, it may lead to excessive organizational volatility and 
internal strife. By 2003, ISFED was learning both lessons the hard way. 
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Normative transfers 
ISFED provided a wide range of training activities to assure that its activists were 
competent in relevant election-related activities and aware of the organizational norms 
and values. At the early stages of its existence, ISFED conducted a general training for 
all members of the organization on election management and administration, a legal 
framework and media relations. For every election, the group set up a plethora of 
trainings that were calibrated for specific capacities of observers. For instance, there was 
a separate seminar for long-term monitors, since they began their efforts very early in the 
election campaign. A week before an Election Day, there was a training for those who 
were involved in parallel vote tabulation. At that point, participants did not know which 
polling station they would be observing - a precaution taken to avoid possible 
harassment or corruption of monitors.259 It was only the night before election when 
observers were assigned a specific polling station. The NGO sought to maintain the 
competency of its regional leaders and regular activists by assuring that those who join 
the organization in-between election cycles would get eventually trained through its 
seminars on citizen participation and other on-going projects.260 
Domestic trainings for activists focused heavily on the requirement of 
impartiality that would sustain ISFED's reputation for being an independent force. 
Trainings that the group received abroad or from foreign consultants were tailored to 
specific skills that would enable better project implementation. For instance, in 2003 
NDI invited an expert that worked with ISFED to design and implement a reliable 
system of parallel vote tabulation. The group's successful performance in this area 
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helped make a critical normative shift within the larger Georgian society. Since 2003 
when ISFED publicly released the results of PVT, the procedure and its results have 
become the golden standard to measure the veracity of election results. 261 
In general, ISFED members talked little about external normative transfers. 
However, it is clear from the interviews with NDI that those were significant especially 
at the beginning and in critical projects. Some at the Democratic Institute complained 
about the Institute's fixation on bringing Western assistance rather than letting local 
activists to take field trips to the countries of the former Soviet bloc where civil society 
groups were most successful. Regardless of these deficiencies, ISFED proved good in 
two things. First, it was able to assure that its members were trained in methodology and 
cognizant of the group's key emphasis on impartiality. Second, the NGO was 
sufficiently open to effectively absorb international normative assistance, especially in 
the area of parallel vote tabulation. 
Inter-NGO cooperation 
ISFED's cooperation with fellow non-government organizations was short-term 
and specific in nature. The group made an effort to avoid getting entangled in NGO 
coalitions and alliances. On the surface, ISFED interacted with a wide variety of 
Georgian and foreign institutions that included such titans on the domestic scene as 
GYLA, the Liberty Institute, Open Society Foundation, UNDP and the British Council. 
However, as ISFED members acknowledge, these interactions were not deep, because 
each of the mentioned organizations had its segment of work. Therefore, most genuine 
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cooperation began only in advance of a specific election campaign when tasks (and with 
them the available money) became clear for every actor. Until 2002 ISFED coordinated 
very little with other NGOs, partially because (unlike CVU) the group was much less 
advanced in its organizational development. The other reason was certainly the position 
of the National Democratic Institute. Fearing that ISFED may be dragged into dubious 
coalitions, NDI was weary of ISFED's cooperation with others. It insisted that if ISFED 
were to cooperate with others, they should divide election-related tasks rather than assign 
different parts of Georgia to different groups for monitoring. The latter, quite reasonably, 
would undermine efforts to produce a comprehensive and credible election report. 
Since 2002 ISFED has tried to establish informal mechanisms of cooperation that 
would include mostly information sharing and in rare cases exchanges of human 
resources. For instance, the group came to rely heavily on members of the Georgian 
Young Lawyers' Associations (GYLA) to provide law students as observers. 
Two other aspects significantly complicated efforts to work with other civic 
groups. One, Georgian civil society was highly polarized. Thus, engaging with new and 
unknown NGOs promised a minefield of guessing whether they were truly impartial. So 
ISFED preferred to avoid asking for assistance at all for the fear of damaging its 
reputation for neutrality. The other, the group had little to offer to other organizations in 
the period between elections, because its activities never took off the ground to the 
extent that would make it an attractive partner. 
To summarize, within Georgia's civil society ISFED stood out for it was not 
eager to engage with other NGOs. Strengthened by continuous funding from NDI, 
ISFED sought help from a very few organizations, whose political leanings were known 
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and who could help it with very specific tasks (e.g. providing monitors and observing 
their compliance with the rules of impartiality); 
ISFED and political parties 
ISFED had extensive cooperation with Georgian political parties and 
governmental authorities. However, throughout all of these interactions, the organization 
had to exercise extreme caution, trying to genuinely engage various political actors 
without becoming embroiled in their partisan squabbles. 
The testimony from ISFED regional activists reveals that direct cooperation with 
parties and state authorities was the purview of the NGO's central headquarters in 
Tbilisi. Thus, regional branches acted as a conduit to pass information from ordinary 
activists to decision-makers in the capital. The lack of official cooperation at the lower 
levels of the organization can be explained by several factors. One, of course, had to deal 
with the internal cohesion of ISFED. Unlike regional branches of the Committee of 
Voters of Ukraine, regional offices of ISFED were much weaker in their capacity. As 
mentioned before, changes of the top personnel often resulted in the loss of institutional 
memory and previously established connections. Because of the size of the country, 
centripetal tendencies were much stronger in Georgia than they were in Ukraine. 
Political parties were also too weak to work effectively beyond the capital and a handful 
of big cities. Therefore, everyone understood that problems could be addressed only in 
Tbilisi. 
In the capital the organization was well known among the government and 
political parties for its seriousness and impartiality. ISFED rebuffed several attempts to 
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buy its observers, thereby passing, the-political litmus test that enabled it to earn the trust 
of political leaders.264 In 2001, it cooperated with the government on the 2001 Election 
Code that was a comprehensive bill for all types of elections.265 Because of the group's 
stature as an expert in election-related matters, it worked productively with the Central 
Election Commission where it even had an accredited representative.266 Overall, the 
record of working with the state is mixed. In the areas where the government knew what 
it wanted or desired real action (like election legislation), ISFED was effective and 
visible. Where the state preferred an imitation of activity (like the Inter-Agency Task 
Force to which ISFED was invited), the outcome was dismal. 
By 2002 the relationship between ISFED and political parties has taken more or 
less set shape - ISFED would equally engage with all actors, by providing them with 
information on election developments.267 In turn, political parties would share the data 
on the violations they observed in the field, betting on ISFED's impartiality to report 
them in the media. 
ISFED seems to come closest to striking the golden middle in working with 
political parties and government authorities before the 2003 parliamentary campaign. On 
one hand, it lobbied state authorities for election reforms and sought information from 
political parties on legal violations. On the other hand, it managed to maintain its 
neutrality and implemented several mechanisms to assure that activists on the ground 
would not become "double agents" willing to overlook violations for the sake for their 
party. ISFED was unconsciously assisted in these tasks by external circumstances. For 
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instance, Georgian oppositional parties were always more willing to talk to the group 
because they could dump facts about violations that would have been otherwise ignored 
by the authorities. The other important factor that many authors frequently mention is the 
inherent capacity weakness of the Georgian government. Unlike Ukraine, where state 
authorities had enough muscle to cajole and coerce, the Shevarnadze administration had 
limited resources and a seemingly greater willingness to show that it could work with 
civil society. All of these amplified the leverage of ISFED election statements and its 
stature in the national Central Election Commission. 
Influence in the public 
Despite a variety of strategies pursued by the group, ISFED remained unknown 
to the majority of Georgians who lived outside the capital or who were not deeply 
interested in politics. Since its establishment the group tried a number of ways to reach 
out to the public. It organized education meetings, trainings, seminars and conferences. It 
published and distributed brochures and leaflets through its Civic Education Library 
series. It produced its own newsletter, "Civil Society," with the circulation of 5,000 
copies.268 The efforts were a complete failure. Several activists acknowledge that the 
organization was only known to people who followed politics closely through the 
media.269 
The organization can be blamed for not trying harder. It never did any targeted 
research to make sure that its publications got to the people. Nor did it step outside the 
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usual toolbox of impersonal outreach strategies used by the rest of Georgian NGOs. 
ISFED recruitment strategies were de-centralized and relied on personal connections. 
Fortunately, ISFED's public image was not affected by the perception of its 
foreign funding. One of the reasons for that was the length of existence. Because the 
group had been functioning since 1995, it was considered part of the civic landscape.270 
While Kmara was treated as an annoying mosquito, which appeared out of nowhere, 
ISFED had a wide range of established partnerships and a very well known agenda. The 
values it advocated (i.e. organizational neutrality, emphasis on a free and fair election) 
had long been accepted. Whereas Kmara adopted agitating, "in-your-face" tactics to 
reach out to people, ISFED preferred more conventional methods of gaining publicity. 
Finally, the fact that ISFED received support from NDI rather than the Soros Foundation 
made it less susceptible to attacks. NDI represented an amorphous structure, somehow 
related to the U.S. government. It lacked a specific individual who could be turned into a 
target. Not to mention that so many Georgian political and civic actors (including the 
971 
government) took the money from the American government. Therefore, the blame 
was harder to assign and more difficult to sustain for it would have implicated many 
others. The fact that the Open Society Georgia Foundation was supported by one person 
(George Soros) made it easier to turn him into a puppeteer and portray the NGOs, funded 
by OSGF, as the blind followers of his will. Therefore, ISFED might have lost some 
support on the fringes of Georgian society, but its reputation remained in tact. Both 
external observers and ISFED activists admit that the Rose Revolution gave the biggest 
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boost to ISFED's popularity. One week in November 2003 did what all the years of 
public outreach efforts failed to achieve - they made the organization a household name. 
ISFED AND THE ROSE REVOLUTION 
Planning 
For the 2003 parliamentary elections, ISFED mounted a serious preparatory 
campaign that included elements of previous activities as well as new components to 
promote the group's first-time initiatives. 
In terms of the former, the nonprofit updated and developed manuals and 
instructions for observers. It held numerous trainings for its own monitors.273 Though it 
did not have an extensive long-term observation program (like CVU), it still managed to 
monitor the pre-election period and keep the public informed about the course of the 
campaign. For instance, ISFED produced a blistering statement after the failure of the 
Baker formula to resolve the dispute between the government and the opposition on the 
composition of the Central Election Commission. In the statement, it "concluded that the 
government had little if any intention to use the expertise and enthusiasm of civil 
society"274 to assure a more honest and transparent election process. This was a key 
moment that pushed ISFED closer to the opposition. As Tamar Zhvania put it, the 
organization had to be guided by the principle of choosing the best of the two evils.275 
In the course of the election campaign, the organization did not give up attempts 
to assist the government. Its activists prepared electronic voter lists, which were 
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supposed to diminish the likelihood of fraud. Unfortunately, this effort bore little fruit 
as the national Election Commission decided to use only handwritten lists.277 
Finally, the leadership of ISFED, and especially its Director Zurab 
Tchiaberishvilij should be credited for doing an enormous amount of awareness 
campaigning and educating key political actors and the public about the role and 
intricacies of parallel vote tabulation. This was a truly monumental task, given the 
complexities of PVT and the difficulty of explaining its difference from an exit poll.278 
Cooperation withNGOs and political parties 
Preceding the election, ISFED worked closely with civil society and political 
parties. However, the approach to cooperation with each of these actors was 
fundamentally different. Among nonprofit groups, ISFED collaborated most closely with 
the Georgian Young Lawyers' Association (GYLA). Though the relations with GYLA 
were both informal and very specific, they provided a perfect example of how civic 
groups can establish a mutually useful partnership without placing themselves in the 
shackles of formalized coalitions. ISFED needed to recruit as many observers as possible 
to cover all polling stations in the country. Ideally, those individuals had to be well 
educated, so they could be easily trained as well as be receptive to the values of impartial 
election monitoring. There was no better audience for ISFED to ask for than law 
students, many of whom harbor ambitions of a political career. On its end, GYLA 
needed to be more than a professional guild for youngsters from elite schools and 
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families. It wanted members to be involved in politics, and monitoring national elections 
provided a perfect opportunity to acquire political experience. Therefore, it was a natural 
match for both groups. The closeness of the two and their ability to divide tasks and be 
mutually helpful explains why each one was so successful in retaining its original profile 
after the revolution when many other NGOs faced a profound identity crisis.279 
In working with political parties ISFED had to tread carefully. Since 2002 
relations with the government began to deteriorate. It was clear that the Shevarnadze 
regime was not interested in a genuinely open election. In addition, ISFED could not but 
be swayed by widespread popular dislike of the Georgian leader.280 After its initiative of 
working with election authorities had miserably failed in April 2003, the organization 
became viewed as anti-government. In that sense, unlike many popular Georgian NGOs 
(such as the Liberty Institute), it held out the longest in avoiding that label. At the same 
time, the group did not turn into a cheerleader for the opposition.281 Tamar Zhvania, then 
the ISFED representative at CEC, explained that the organization was always leery about 
newly minted fighters for people, since all of them (including Mikheil Saakashvili) came 
from the moderate wing of the Shevarnadze regime. ISFED managed to use the equal 
leverage that it had previously established with all political actors to its advantage. The 
organization established a media center where various political and civic groups could 
come and report violations.283 This initiative further strengthened its image of being an 
impartial observer of the process and enhanced the trust among the public and political 
actors to ISFED reports. 
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Activities 
On the voting day, ISFED deployed almost 3,000 of its own observers to polling 
stations throughout the country. It also assisted in assigning 600 foreign representatives 
to critical locations.2 As a result of this effort, the organization was able to collect 
numerous testimonies about the compliance with voting procedures. This feedback laid 
the ground for the ISFED election report and further legal challenges. More importantly, 
the presence of observers proved critical for the group's second project - parallel vote 
tabulation (PVT). 
The NGO placed its PVT monitors in 20 percent of all the polling stations to 
assure that the margin of error for reported results would be no greater than two 
percent.285 The organization went to great lengths to get a national statistically valid 
sample that would enable it to make a reliable projection. Unlike CVU, ISFED did not 
accept all the results that it received within its sample. Based on the analysis of voter 
turnout and the quality of election-day processes (i.e. the magnitude of violations), it 
discarded certain polling stations, because manipulations there would distort the general 
picture. Given the debacle of the PVT operation in Ukraine, this proved to be the most 
consequential decision of all. 
At the end of the Election Day, the group amassed a sufficient number of reports 
from its field observers to declare that "The falsification of election results is not just 
misconduct.. .ISFED believes that what happened during the election... was in fact a 
purposeful obstruction of the voters' will."287 The categorical tone of the assessment was 
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not mere rhetoric. The PVT results, which differed significantly from the official count, 
provided the necessary factual basis to challenge the government. They were a spark 
needed by the opposition to mobilize its supporters. 
Mobilization and participation in the Rose Revolution 
ISFED's participation in the Rose Revolution was limited, but visible and 
consequential. On one hand, the group did not declare an open mobilization of its 
members. On the other, it was assumed that many ISFED observers would take part in 
the demonstrations as private citizens. What seems to make ISFED's performance so 
different from the lackluster response by CVU is the vigor with which it pressed its 
opinion and pursued legally available options to ramify the situation. 
Immediately after the release of the PVT results, Kmara and the Liberty Institute 
printed and distributed tens of thousands of leaflets that contrasted the ISFED PVT with 
the official results.288 Based on its own assessment that "the officially reported turnout 
has been inflated and protocols were forged," ISFED filed 400 appeals and urged the 
Central Election Commission to investigate them and invalidate the fraudulent results.285 
It filed a petition to the Supreme Court on the matter, which annulled the party list 
component of the election results on 25 November 2003.290 
In the end, three things made a difference in the group's performance during the 
Revolution. The first was its willingness to pursue active advocacy through multiple 
channels. Not only did ISFED let its results be distributed by other sources, but it also 
spoke up on its own. Unlike CVU, ISFED took a risk on the revolution and it paid off. 
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The second was a definite success of its PVT initiative. While the effort was criticized 
by having some errors, few could dispute that it presented the right picture. In this 
regard, both ISFED activists and NDI should be credited for providing the group with 
sufficient technical expertise to set up such a complex procedure and assure its smooth 
running throughout the country. The final aspect was the group's ability to find its own 
niche in quickly unfolding events. ISFED knew where its expertise was and did not 
hesitate to use it. Therefore, the prior criticism that all ISFED did was elections and 
nothing more helped rather than hurt the nonprofit. In other words, unlike CVU (which 
had too many eggs in too many different baskets), ISFED had its priorities straight. 
Assessment of the performance 
To measure I SFED's performance during the Rose Revolution, we turn to our 
two indicators— function and contribution. In regard to the first, the group fulfilled its 
stated function by monitoring the parliamentary elections as well as vigorously 
publicizing the result of its efforts. Parallel vote tabulation (PVT) was its most successful 
monitoring initiative. According to PVT, Saakashvili's National Movement had a lead of 
eight percent. Numerous observers indicated that thanks to the trust which ISFED 
enjoyed in the Georgian society PVT bolstered the results of numerous exit polls and 
became the final piece of hard evidence to certify what everyone already knew, but had 
ho factual way of proving - the government tried to steal the vote. 
ISFED also made a major contribution to the success of the Rose Revolution by 
helping resolve the legal impasse that caused the public unrest in the first place. It 
legally challenged the results submitted by more than 150 precinct election commissions 
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and filed numerous complaints against district electoral commissions.292 The fact that 
many of these challenges were satisfied, not least at the level of the national Supreme 
Court, gave legitimacy to the demand to annul the election results. It proved that the will 
of voters was manipulated beyond recognition. Therefore, the situation required either a 
re-vote (something Shevarnadze refused to acquiesce to) or deposition of the regime. 
In the end, ISFED came out a winner from the revolutionary events. The 
prominence of PVT made it the permanent golden standard for future elections in the 
country. It also raised the profile of the group, making it one of the most recognizable 
NGOs in the country. 
Broers, Kandelaki. Khvichia. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The research for this dissertation started with a key puzzle that had to do with the 
much-praised (or vilified, depending on one's political stand during those events) role of 
civic organizations in the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia. 
After reading through numerous assessments of the performance delivered by 
Ukrainian and Georgian groups,1 one is left with the impression that an important piece 
to understand their success is missing. Simply saying that civil societies were strong and 
effective during the color revolutions does not help much, as it does not answer what 
precisely contributed to their strength. Was it foreign funding during the first decade of 
independence, as autocrats in the regional neighborhood assert? Or was it a canny act on 
the part of the NGOs that rode the wave of fame and success on the back of popular 
political parties, as many politicians tend to believe? Getting to the core of the matter has 
been further complicated when many authors offer comprehensive and multiple 
explanations for all the factors that help peaceful revolutions to transpire. While 
contributing to our understanding of the phenomenon, the complexity became so 
overwhelming as to imply that for civil society to ever be effective in a peaceful 
democratization event one has to have a perfect, star-like alignment of variables that 
rarely happens in the sky, let alone in politics. 
1
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This work is advancing a hypothesis, which seems obvious, but yet has never 
been explicitly put forward. Civic groups that have better ties with societies within 
which they operate will also be able to respond better to such critical events as a 
revolution. Having defined such ties in a more abstract manner as organizational 
embeddedness, the dissertation places its work within two bodies of literature on civil 
society and democratization and seeks to answer critical questions about the role of 
NGOs in the "color revolutions" as well as highlight relevance of the concept for key 
debates in each field. 
The findings presented below will address four major debates on the role of civil 
society that were elaborated in Chapter I. First, by analyzing interactions of the four 
NGOs under consideration with political parties we will look at the practical dimension 
of the perennial debate on the differentiation between civic and political realms. The 
main conundrum here is how a civic group distinguishes itself from a political party 
while seeking to impact political life. Second, the analysis of political embeddedness 
will consider state influence on the origins and evolution of civil society, in particular 
how the public and legal space, allotted by the state, impacts the trajectory of civil 
society development. Third, the findings on interactions within nonprofit groups will 
shed more light on the discussion about the nature of exchanges within civil society. 
Specifically, they will answer two questions: a) what kind of exchanges our NGOs 
promote among their members; b) whether embeddedness enhances the benefits and 
mitigates the weaknesses generated by civic groups. Finally, my attempts to look at how 
NGOs members work with each other on a daily basis and what they take away from 
their civic activity speak to the larger issue of a relationship between the individual and 
civil society. 
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After my analysis of embeddeness summarizes the groups' performance, it will 
place civil society within the international context of democratization. In this regard, it 
will concentrate on two critical debates. The first deals with the methods of providing 
better international support for civil society development. The dilemma, which re-
appears on the agenda of all foreign donors, is how to strengthen and support local civil 
societies and their most capable groups without making them chronically dependent on 
aid and detached from domestic publics. The other debate attempts to find a niche for 
civil society in the overall scheme of democratization and make it one of many (e.g. 
impartial judiciary, independent media, real separation of powers) effective components 
that conspire to the consolidation of democracy. 
To fulfill my goals, the chapter will start by assessing the evidence accumulated 
for each group in the case studies. For that purpose, I will use the scale of embeddedness, 
which was elaborated in Chapter II. Based on the obtained results, the study will then 
consider the debates outlined above. The analysis will conclude by suggesting several 
lessons that can be taken from my dissertation by political scientists, NGO activists, 
government officials and Western democracy-promoters. 
ASSESSING ORGANIZATIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS 
The assessment will be conducted separately for each organization. It will follow 
the categories established in the methodology for my study. For every group, it will 
evaluate social, political embeddedness, external influence as well as indicators within 
each sub-category.2 
2
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Pora 
The movement, which translates from Ukrainian as a brave call for action - "It is 
time," has received a total of 77 points on a one hundred-point scale. The result puts it at 
the higher end of moderate embeddedness. Compared to the three other groups, Pora 
took the first place, because it proved to be most powerful in terms of social 
embeddedness as well as the capacity to handle external influence. At first blush, this 
outcome is surprising, given a relatively limited period of Pora's existence. But a deeper 
analysis portrays a movement that attracted a cohort of highly experienced civic leaders 
who put to use the lessons of civic activism learned throughout the first decade of 
Ukraine's independence. 
Social embeddedness 
In social embeddeness Pora scored 42 out of 53 points possible by the scale. Its 
strongest point was the ability to excite ordinary citizens and attract them to its cause. Its 
weakness was a lack of foresight about finances. 
The movement's constituency reminded of a Brownian motion of molecules. 
Recruitment was open to different audiences and strove for diversity. Horizontal 
structures brought a welcome exchange of ideas and participation that involved every 
member. However, the model was not without its flaws, as it did not provide any 
channels for long-term feedback and failed to develop plans for a timely mobilization of 
regional members. In essence, the internal structure was only good for the pre-
revolutionary period when mass sentiments of discontent were brewing and needed a 
release. It was too loose and informal to be sustained over a long period of time. 
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Given its lack of formal organization, Pora performed extremely well inassuring 
that internal normative transfers were communicated to all members and executed with 
precision. Having no officially designated leaders in field offices and in the central 
headquarters, the organization overcame the major risk of its operations becoming a 
game of "broken phone." The group was successful in inculcating and ensuring 
everyone's unwavering allegiance to the ideas of nonviolent protest. That and the shock-
and-surprise effect from its spontaneous activities secured Pora's place as the leading 
civic force in the Orange revolution. 
Unfortunately, on the matters of societal influence, the movement proved to be 
both popular and divisive. Its fiery rhetoric attracted a large segment that was 
disenfranchised by and angry at the Kuchma regime. Its daring actions and the 
government's overreaction turned the group into a household name. However, with the 
popularity came resentment and fear. Pora's early embrace of nationalism turned off 
potential members in eastern Ukraine to the extent that it did not have any declared 
supporters in Donetsk region. Its cooperation with NGOs was limited to sporadic joint 
efforts, dictated by pragmatic interests rather than a deeply shared agenda. 
Finally, the movement scored lowest on financial sustainability. In this area, the 
motto of many activists seemed to be - make up as we go. The consequences of that 
were almost catastrophic, as Pora was on the brink of shutting down in the middle of 
summer 2004. It obtained funds from a variety of sources, but conducted little financial 
planning. It is unsurprising that the money was used with dubious efficiency and no 
accountability. The latter only fueled the rumors of furtive foreign support. In the end, 
Pora was so fixated on a short-term victory that it disregarded completely its long-term 
survival and had to re-build from scratch after the elections. 
314 
Political embeddedness 
When trying to get implanted into the political landscape, any nonprofit has to 
make the best out of the situation that is set up by the force beyond its control - i.e. the 
government and political parties. By scoring 16 out of 27 points, Pora fared modestly. Its 
varied performance was not an accident, but rather a deliberate effort. 
The group had a steep ladder to climb, because Ukraine, as a state, scored 
mediocre on formal embeddedness. Throughout its tenure the government of Leonid 
Kuchma gave a veneer of approval to NGOs without ever bothering to develop a more 
nuanced appreciation of civil society. This harsh assessment is substantiated by the 
incongruity between formally adopted legal instruments and real behavior. Though the 
country had a generally liberal legislative framework on registering and setting up non-
profit organizations, laws on taxation were convoluted and open to bureaucratic 
interpretation, thereby discouraging substantial public giving to NGOs. The government 
record on civil and political liberties also confirms that the country remained partly free 
in both areas and exhibited steady erosion toward authoritarianism since 2001.2 In sum, 
striving to meet only minimal international standards, the Ukrainian government was 
leery of NGOs and their entrepreneurial activity. 
Pora's core goal of achieving a peaceful regime change foreclosed any venues of 
cooperation with the government or pro-governmental parties and drastically lowered its 
informal political rootedness. The group engaged only with one party (Our Ukraine) 
whose candidate represented the opposition. Speaking figuratively, Pora put all of its 
eggs in one basket (that of Viktor Yushchenko) and was going up or down depending on 
his performance. The magnitude of this choice exacted a heavy toll. At the last stages of 
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the campaign, coordination between the two entities became so intimate that it clearly 
violated the tenets of civic impartiality. Having condemned the existing political system 
as fundamentally flawed, Pora sought to embed itself into the political milieu with only 
one goal - to undermine the regime in power to the point of collapse and establish a new 
framework for interactions, In this commitment, it was ready to sacrifice everything, 
including its political neutrality. 
External involvement 
The group rated well in this category, getting 19 out of 20 possible points. Pora's 
success is a story of less (of direct donor's intervention) being more (in terms of the 
group's ability to learn from external sources and avoid financial dependence). 
With respect to normative transfers, Pora did exceptionally well. Having no 
formal backing of one or a group of donors, it was left to its own devices. The absence of 
sponsorship proved liberating in many ways. Pora contacted independently relevant 
international actors (like Otpor and NDI) and sought the information it needed, not the 
one that was deemed better by some donor. Because the normative exchanges were 
initiated consciously, the group was also able to recognize very quickly the limitations of 
their applicability to Ukrainian realities. In the end, it adapted the foreign methodology 
of nonviolence to the theme of human dignity that resonated well within the Ukrainian 
society. Pora's success in this area strongly confirms that external assistance becomes 
very effective when its domestic recipients seek it purposefully and know their local 
societies exceptionally well to adapt the acquired techniques. 
The issue of external influence has received a lot of attention, especially because 
of the accusations that Pora was a puppet in the hands of foreign governments. The 
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accumulated evidence shows a rather different picture. The group was treated by foreign 
governments and donor agencies as a red-haired cousin who may embarrass you during a 
carefully staged wedding ceremony. Foreign entities were afraid of Pora's radicalism 
and of its ability to get them in trouble with the Kuchma government. Therefore, any 
cooperation was mostly technical and related to trainings and seminars. Foreign funding 
was very limited and (starting in fall 2004) non-existent. But, as mentioned before, 
donors' leeriness about Pora made its relationship with them healthy, precisely because it 
was so limited. Pora's domestic fundraising efforts (mentioned in the previous section) 
give a glimpse of a possible mismanagement of international funds, had those been 
available. 
Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) 
CVU showed the weakest performance on the scale of embeddedness among the 
four civic groups under analysis. Its score of 63 points reveals an insufficient level of 
rootedness and a consistently lower showing on the major categories. The result flies in 
the face of much conventional wisdom, because the group, which existed longest and 
was so carefully nurtured by foreign money, was expected to be much more robust. As 
the analysis below proves, money can buy you happiness, but it cannot always buy 
influence or longevity. 
Social embeddedness 
Among the three categories in my scale, CVU received the highest score for 
social embeddedness - 35 out of 53 points or 66 percent. However, even in this area, the 
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group's weakest spots turned out to be its own constituency and the ability to influence 
Ukrainian society. 
Speaking of the constituency, the Committee traded loyalty for diversity, as its 
pool of members was highly and personally dedicated to the organization, but not very 
dynamic in terms of turnover. The leadership abandoned active recruitment strategies in 
favor of internal stability, which consequently circumscribed communication among 
members and foreclosed opportunities for membership expansion. In the end, CVU has 
become somewhat of an elite country club. It had a stable and small base that shared a 
deep attachment to the organizational values, but was unwilling to open the doors and 
provide the perks of belonging to outsiders. 
The organization was a bit more successful in internal normative transfers. From 
the very beginning, it managed to attract people with relevant expertise and a genuine 
interest in the issue area. Thanks to a great deal of selectivity and the length of their 
tenures, its core leaders were highly knowledgeable about election legislation, skillful 
and very strategic in political analysis. The leadership was able to train competent rank-
and-file members. At the same time, normative transfers within leadership were often 
hampered by an overly hierarchical and rigid organizational structure that discouraged 
honesty. So while the NGO was successful in providing basic training, it was terribly 
slow in recognizing its own mistakes because channels for feedback were either closed 
or self-censored. 
The group's second weakness was a rather limited scope of societal influence. 
CVU exhibited a peculiar pattern of behavior. Having been created as an activist 
nonprofit, it often acted more like a think tank. The Committee earned the reputation of a 
respected source in the NGO and expert community, but did little to engage wider public 
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in capacities other than Election Day monitors. The leadership seems to have believed 
the knowledge about CVU among think tanks and media outlets in the capital and 
regional centers would eventually trickle down to the larger public. This expectation was 
only partially fulfilled. Though the Committee's representatives appeared frequently in 
the news, the organization itself was a mere buzzword to an average citizen, who 
frequently confused it with a governmental body. 
In terms of financial sustainability, the group performed better than the three 
other organizations. Though its dependency on the National Democratic Institute 
decreased overtime, it remained so significant that NDI could be labeled as the CVU's 
chief safety net. The nonprofit was forced to diversify its pool of funds for election 
campaigns, but remained unwilling to expand its base of grants beyond elections. Part of 
the unwillingness can be attributed to a kind of fatigue and resignation about the chances 
of securing support in Ukraine's difficult economic conditions. The other explanation 
pertains to the lack of a sustained process for contingency planning in finances. As a 
result, the prognosis about CVU's future is mixed. Without single donor support, its 
chances of survival would be a bit higher than fifty percent since it has an established 
infrastructure. But in order to make it, the group will require tremendous downsizing by 
shutting down nonperforming regional branches and giving up on the luxuries (like an 
office located in a posh downtown apartment complex) that few nonprofits even in 
developed countries are able to enjoy. 
Political embeddedness 
In this category, the group got 15 out of 27 points. As mentioned in the analysis 
of formal political embeddedness for Pora, Ukraine had a challenging climate for NGO 
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development. While the government was declaratively supportive of civil society, it did 
little to facilitate its development and foster a genuine partnership. In the last years of 
President Kuchma, the mask of approval was slowly falling off and revealing nothing 
short of contempt and disdain for foreign-backed "grant-eaters."3 
The difference between Pora and CVU in surviving these conditions and making 
themselves informally embedded in the political landscape was stark. Whereas Pora put 
its faith in one political force, CVU preferred diversification to the extent that many of 
its bids became mutually exclusive. From the beginning, the group embraced the motto 
of incremental, not revolutionary, change within the existing system. It cooperated 
extensively with government authorities (especially the Central Election Commission) in 
training monitors and commissioners and suggesting amendments to election legislation. 
Its activists worked with many political parties by training their observers and gathering 
complaints on legal violations. This strategy of interactions allowed CVU to be heard, 
though not listened to, in the Ukrainian political establishment. As cracks in the political 
system began to widen in 2004, the Committee struggled to take an unequivocal stance. 
The truth was harsh to swallow - many of its leading activists became co-opted by state 
authorities and parties through enduring personal relations, which, in turn, became a self-
censoring mechanism. As a result, CVU's bet on diversifying political friendships did 
not pay off. Having become part of the political architecture, the group was forced to 
make a choice. Without making it explicit, it picked the status quo during the revolution 
and hid behind the adherence to impartiality to avoid taking sides. The words of one 
3
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activist summarize it best - "our leadership got too scared that if we protest, we would all 
be multiplied by zero4 later on."5 
External influence 
The nonprofit received 13 out of 20 points. Its relatively good performance in the 
first indicator was offset by a meager showing in the second one. When it came to 
receiving external norms, the group proved effective, but arrogant. It developed and 
frequently exercised the ability to analyze the advice it received from NDI. The 
Committee was extremely effective in learning and adapting the methodology of election 
monitoring to Ukrainian realities. Within 5-6 years of its establishment, the leadership 
could claim a greater understanding of detail and nuances of the national election and 
political landscape than foreign donors. At this point, the organization stopped seeking 
direct normative transfers on its key competencies and instead asked for assistance on 
organizational management and development. By 2002, a clear pattern in dealing with 
external normative transfers emerged - the group accepted outside advice unless it 
threatened organizational stability or the leadership's preconceived notions of how 
programs should be implemented. As the 2004 elections approached, the Committee 
was growing increasingly insular and on some occasions tended to reject suggestions 
before carefully reviewing them. The dismal performance of the parallel vote tabulation 
program (PVT) serves to confirm this tendency. 
CVU's love-hate dealings with NDI got it the lowest scores on the last indicator 
- the mechanisms of external influence. Both entities developed a complex relationship 
4
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of mutual dependence. To make the matters worse, it was poorly defined and subject to 
continuous bargaining and contestation in terms of where the authority of the donor 
began and the independence of the grantee ended. The differences were fundamentally 
irreconcilable, because NDI and CVU moved at a different pace along the continuum of 
donor-grantee relations that normally start with subservience and end with cooperation. 
Mismatched expectations about the roles of each other and resultant tensions negatively 
impacted the performance of the group as well as its organizational maturation. 
Kmara 
Standing for "Enough" in Georgian, Kmara showed the second highest score 
(and a tie) among our organizations. At 72 points, it can be classified as a moderately 
embedded organization. While the movement's relations with political parties leave 
much to be desired, its performance in social embeddedness is the second best after Pora. 
In a surprising turn, the group places on the same level as another Georgian organization, 
ISFED, which was often the unsung hero of the revolution. 
Social embeddedness 
In this category, Kmara received 3 8 out of 53 possible points. Though it was its 
second best performance on the scale, the obtained result was surprisingly lower than 
one could imagine (especially given all the publicity during and after the Rose 
Revolution). 
To use a movie analogy, Kmara's constituency was "no country for old men." 
The implemented recruitment strategies were wide, but not diverse. As the election 
campaign progressed, the organization implicitly gave up on attracting other age 
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segments of the society. The group's activists combed through many student audiences, 
looking to recruit as many followers as they could. In fact, as many admitted, Kmara 
should have applied stricter membership criteria to avoid random people. In the end, the 
core membership was highly dedicated and capable of mobilizing its peers. Because of 
that, the group was successful in activating the Georgian youth (a slice of the population 
to which its leaders could most closely relate), but it did not reach out to others -
assuming that either they would be covered by political parties or it could not win them 
in the first place because of its radical message. 
The process of internal normative transfers was a creative disorder. However, it 
proved greatly effective in spreading the key principle of nonviolent protest - the 
accomplishment even more praiseworthy because the majority of ordinary members 
spoke only Georgian and thus could not benefit from Western materials. Kmara was also 
superb in generating ideas about specific means of protest on the spot and then quickly 
mobilizing its rank-and-file to implement them. The major caveat of this arrangement 
began to manifest only close to the end of the election campaign, as it became clear that 
Kmara needed a better structure for daily operations, especially ongoing message control 
and media response. Like Pora, Kmara seemed content with the situation for as long as it 
knew it was short-term. 
When it came to societal influence, the group proudly wore the label of l'enfant 
terrible of Georgian political life. It was the infamous squeaky wheel that could be 
greased only by the resignation of Shevarnadze and a profound regime change. Thus, it 
lavished its status of being a household name that made even the admirers cringe at some 
of its public actions. The group was not too picky in using anything that helped to stir up 
people - be it graffiti on government buildings or the burning of Shevarnadze portraits. 
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Its leaders were extremely savvy in exploiting the media's predisposition for 
sensationalism to gain notoriety. Kmara's "take-no-prisoners" approach alienated an 
established civic community that despised its radicalism and flashiness. To conclude on 
the subject, the group's unconventional tactics made its prominence possible, but also 
left few without a strong opinion on its methods. This, in turn, set clear limitations on the 
scope of its influence within Georgian society. 
Kmara got the lowest score for financial sustainability, because from its 
establishment till the revolution the group was living for the day. Though its leaders 
espoused progressive values for civic involvement, the attitudes on financing their 
activities were definitely retrograde. Without realizing it themselves, they became 
completely socialized by the mores of the Georgian NGO sector that they despised so 
much. One of those mores was unabashed dependence on foreign money and refusal to 
seek domestic funding for the fear of political influence. All of Kmara leaders repeated 
numerous times that they saw nothing wrong with relying completely on external funds. 
For them, Kmara was a project for which they had no plans of long-term survival. And 
even if they did, they said, there was nothing they could do in the existing financial 
climate. Therefore, financial sustainability was something that one preferred not to think 
about. 
Political embeddedness 
As mentioned before, in the analysis of political embeddedess nonprofits are 
placed in a tricky position since they have to make the best of what they have been 
offered by the government. For this indicator, Kmara received 17 out of 27 points. 
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The best that the Georgian government could give to its civil society was a "let-
you-be" attitude. Thus in terms of formal political embeddedness, it was neither 
encouraging nor unbearably oppressive. In the middle of 1990s, the Shevarnadze 
government adopted a liberal legislative framework on the establishment and registration 
of NGOs. It muddled through with cumbersome reporting and taxation requirements that 
were the result of lacking civic experience rather than malice. At the end of the decade, 
NGOs were not helped by further deterioration of the country's democratic standing. In 
the realm of civic and political liberties, Georgia continued along a wobbling path. The 
country moved from the lower to the middle end on the scale that still identified it as a 
partly free state.6 A greater vacillation can be observed in terms of political freedoms -
from the higher to the medium end of being partly free. Throughout the first decade of 
independence, the official attitude toward NGOs ranged from indifference (in the early 
1990s), to tolerance (in the middle of the decade) and then finally annoyance and subtle 
attempts of repression at the end of Shevarnadze's tenure. What prevented the 
government to move as swiftly against civil society as authorities did in Russia and 
Ukraine (not to mention neighboring Azerbaijan and Central Asian states) were the 
concern over the president's international reputation and the lack of financial resources 
at the government's disposal. 
In assuring its informal embeddedness in the political system, Kmara chose to 
use a bit more than a half of the available potential. First and foremost, cooperation with 
the government was precluded by the antagonistic nature of its activities and the key 
goal of regime change. The group further alienated itself from possible allies by treating 
everyone that was not vociferously opposed to Shevarnadze as a possible 
6
 See Freedom House annual reports on Georgia, "Freedom in the World," http://freedomhouse.org/template.cfin?page=15. 
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collaborationist. Thus, links with political parties, other than Saakashvili's National 
Movement, were never established. It firmly decided that it had to back one force that 
had the most realistic chance to bring about change, and the National Movement was that 
force. In fact, cooperation between the two entities was so intense on formal and 
personal levels that it raised doubts about Kmara's impartiality, which it did not even 
bother to maintain. In the end, the two presented political and civic sides of the same 
coin and found utility in each other. Having become Saakashvili's "comrade in arms" on 
the civic front, Kmara was given access (previously unavailable to NGOs) to the 
political process, but it lost the credibility among other political forces, which civic 
groups cherish so much. 
External involvement 
Kmara performed best when it came to dealing with outsiders. As with Pora, less 
seemed to be more. The group got 17 out of 20 points. In asking other organizations for 
normative transfers, the group showed civic entrepreneurship at its best. It was extremely 
pro-active and effective in finding foreign groups (like Otpor) and learning from them. 
Its leadership demonstrated the understanding that foreign ideas would have limitations 
early in the process. That is why, it took the foreign methodology (most succinctly 
presented in a documentary, "Bringing Down the Dictator") and translated it for the local 
landscape, by making corruption its main theme. Because the movement had a cohort of 
highly experienced civic leaders (mostly implants from the Liberty Institute), it did not 
seek any normative assistance from foreign donors that were based in Georgia. This 
proved a blessing in terms of giving Kmara a lot of independent space for adapting 
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foreign ideas. In this regard, the organization can serve as a textbook example of how 
civic entrepreneurs from abroad can spread their ideas successfully. 
In relations with donors, the movement was very impersonal and business-like. 
Kmara activists showed a slightly disdainful attitude toward the donor machine that was 
more interested in meeting internal requirements and showing grant reports than real 
accomplishments. This attitude produced an arrangement where donors exerted no 
substantial programmatic influence. So contrary to public perceptions and speculations, 
Kmara did not receive "instructions" from international organizations on how to act. 
Through confidence that often turned into arrogance, it managed to establish a firm 
distance that (regardless of its complete financial dependence) did not allow donors to 
dictate the content of the group's work. 
International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED) 
ISFED shared the second place with Kmara, by scoring 72 points on our scale. 
The organization's moderate level of embeddedness stands in stark contrast with the 
performance of its Ukrainian counterpart on election observation. Even a brief 
comparative look at the scores reveals two key differences in their performances. ISFED 
proved stronger in three areas - greater societal influence, a more open membership base 
and unrelenting neutrality in cooperation with political actors. Regardless of its long 
existence, the NGO escaped the major risk of becoming a part of the existing political 
architecture or turning into a election bureaucracy instead of an activist group. 
Social embeddedness 
In this area, the nonprofit showed mixed results, getting 37 out of 53 points. The 
abysmal performance in the last indicator, financial sustainability, undermined a 
moderately high showing in other categories. 
In terms of constituency, ISFED can be described as a symbol of diversity. The 
group strived for inclusive recruitment that was mostly centered on the networks of 
relatives and friends. Its activists emphasized that a specific effort was made to assure 
societal and gender equality, by recruiting members from different social classes and 
women. From the beginning, the organization established and maintained a democratic 
structure of internal governance with the board playing a strong role. However, absent 
formal mechanisms of feedback, that structure did not live up to its full potential and 
instead frequently produced leadership volatility. Several ISFED directors got fired 
before they could ever figure out what was lacking in their work. Diversity often became 
too much of a good thing. On one hand, it produced a marked difference from CVU with 
its macho culture and a "good-old boys" network. On the other, ISFED members did not 
possess high institutional loyalty due to their constant rotation. Unlike the Ukrainian 
Committee of Voters, ISFED's "revolving door" produced few passionate supporters of 
the organization. Therefore, while being inclusive, mobile and often unintentionally 
diverse, the ISFED constituency frequently suffered the loss of institutional memory that 
retarded organizational growth. 
In conducting normative transfers among its members, ISFED displayed a steady, 
albeit slow progress. It was successful in educating its rank-and-file about election 
procedures and developed rigid training protocols. The leadership was especially 
scrupulous about impartiality of its members. The accumulated evidence makes it clear 
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that the notion of political neutrality was taken so seriously as to become almost 
sacrosanct. All of these actions turned ISFED into the premier nonpartisan voice on 
election monitoring in the country. At the same time, the organization was slow in 
developing its own programs that would cover issues in-between election campaigns. 
There are two reasons for this failure - low funding from NDI and a lack of human 
resources that could be paid to do programming. As a result, though exceptionally good 
at election training and monitoring, ISFED did not succeed in expanding its base of 
activities beyond the core theme. 
The Rose Revolution became a long-needed event that catapulted the civic group 
into the realm of popularity and made its societal influence unparallel. Before the events 
in November 2003, ISFED filled the niche of election observation and managed to 
maintain leadership in this field through consistent NDI backing and its own diligence. 
The group (especially its leaders in Tbilisi) was active in the NGO community, but only 
few ordinary people, who were deeply interested in politics, were aware of its existence. 
Building on its expertise and professional standing, ISFED used the revolution as an 
opening to attract public attention. Because of its initial credibility, the NGO's parallel 
vote tabulation results were trusted by the majority of people and became one of the 
most important pieces of evidence against the Shevarnadze regime. When the dust of 
revolutionary events settled in December 2003, the Society was a household name and 
its PVT procedure had become the golden standard for measuring election fairness. 
While the Revolution showed the group's best side, its attitude toward funding 
and financial sustainability presented ISFED at its worst. For the most part of its 
functioning, the civic group was in a state of denial when it came to its dependence on 
NDI or the future without the American donor. Only after the Rose Revolution, the 
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implicit agreement between the two entities that forbade ISFED to fundraise from other 
sources was re-negotiated by another director. The organization's leadership pursued 
lackluster attempts at diversification of funds and showed a derogatory attitude toward 
funding from business sources. If one were to imagine the nonprofit's survival now 
without American money, the chances would be less than 50-50. Unfortunately, in the 
matters of fiscal independence ISFED was no harbinger for change. Rather it was a 
typical representative of Georgian civil society with its total dependence on donors and 
unwillingness to look for other sources of support. 
Political embeddedness 
In this indicator, ISFED demonstrated its best performance. Indeed, the 
organization has much to offer to others in terms of handling a precarious situation and 
turning it to its advantage. 
As noted before, the Georgian government performed modestly in providing 
formal political embeddedness to non-governmental organizations. It was neither 
welcoming (like Baltic states) nor openly hostile (like neighboring Azerbaijan). Having 
no resources to counteract NGOs and being chronically dependent for its survival on 
international institutions, it chose to tolerate (sometimes barely) the domestic civil 
society. In fact, Shevarnadze noted numerous times in interviews that he regretted not 
having "concentrated" on "pernicious" activities of foreign-funded organizations. In the 
end, the landscape for formal implantedness received 9 out of 13 points - the result, 
which can be summed up as mediocre. 
Under these circumstances, the group performed better than any other 
organization under analysis. In achieving informal embeddedness in the political 
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landscape, it became a friend, but not a buddy for key political actors. It cooperated 
closely with the government on election legislation and yet managed not to become co-
opted. This accomplishment should be attributed not only to the moral stamina of ISFED 
activists, but also to the fact that changes of the top leadership were not conducive to 
personal entanglements. ISFED also managed to achieve a semi-official recognition of 
its importance as a civic authority on election matters when it got an observer-status on 
the Central Election Commission. It endeared itself to political parties because of its 
proven neutrality. As a result, the group's media center became a focal point for 
gathering complaints from political parties on election violations. If there was any 
weakness in its informal rootedness, it was about the scope, as interactions with the 
political establishment were circumscribed mostly to Tbilisi. To summarize, the 
nonprofit received 12 out of 14 points in this category - an almost perfect score, for it 
managed to establish and maintain cooperative relations with political parties thanks to 
the perception of impartiality and due to continuous leadership rotations. 
External involvement 
For this indicator, ISFED obtained 70 percent (its second highest score) by 
getting 14 out of 20 possible points. The group's performance was not balanced. It did 
especially well in absorbing external normative transfers and failed in setting adequate 
outside mechanisms of influence. 
Thus, in terms of the former, ISFED slowly transitioned from completely 
dependent to semi-partnership relations where internal trainings were done by NGO 
members and external assistance was requested on specific issues. For instance, unlike 
CVU, the group was more open to accepting external ideas and recognizing the need for 
help. The notable example here is how masterfully it handled the 2003 parallel vote 
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tabulation where foreign methodological assistance was instrumental. At the same time, 
ISFED activists subconsciously realized the liability of being too closely associated with 
foreign sources and consistently underplayed outside help. The group also had 
surprisingly little contacts with similar organizations overseas, partially because the 
funding for travel opportunities was still tightly controlled by NDI. Thus, with years the 
nonprofit became more independent in accepting external assistance, but remained 
weaker than similar groups in the western part of the former Soviet Union. 
When it comes to external mechanisms of influence, ISFED, as one 
representative of the key donor organization put it, was trying to have it both ways. Its 
relations with NDI were subject to unpredictable push-pull dynamics. The group wanted 
to have more breathing space, but ran to the Institute for help the moment the going got 
tough. In addition, much of the interactions were heavily dependent on specific 
personalities. Those executive directors, who were authoritative and persistent, managed 
to carve out a greater space for themselves. Others, who became stuck in struggles with 
their own board to the point of extreme weakness, had to follow NDI orders more 
closely. Therefore, throughout its later stages of existence, ISFED was going through 
terrible growing pains and did not manage to come up with a workable model for the 
relations with its main donor. It is not clear whether and how the group will come to 
terms with that. One thing is obvious - without NDI's help, it would shrink immensely 
and may discontinue functioning throughout the regions. 
To summarize, the detailed comparisons of the NGOs' performance enable to 
identify which variables are most critical for organizational embeddedness. First, it is 
clear that social embeddedness plays the leading role in assuring that a nonprofit 
establishes sufficient roots in a domestic society. No non-governmental group under 
analysis scored more on the overall scale, while receiving low scores on social 
embeddedness. This variable is also most amenable to influences from civic actors 
themselves, while the two others (political embeddedness and external influence) are 
shaped with powerful inputs from the state and foreign donors respectively. Second, 
when it comes to political implantedness the most influential mechanisms for any NGO 
are informal. In essence, it is the ability of a group to walk a fine line between 
cooperating with political entities for the benefit of a group's cause or getting either 
completely subsumed or entirely shunned by them. Those who do it best, like Georgian 
ISFED, become more politically rooted than others. Finally, a meager showing of the 
four groups on external mechanisms of influence point to the importance of the other 
sub-variable in this category - external normative transfers. As described above, 
complex dynamics that are often at play between donors and their grantees often make it 
impossible to determine who impacts whom and to what extent. Given that, the success 
of foreign influence comes down to whether recipient NGOs are able to effectively 
translate foreign external influences to local circumstances their own agenda. The two 
NGOs (Pora and Kmara) that performed best in this category also proved to be most 
embedded. 
EMBEDDEDNESS AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
Research question and key hypotheses 
The dissertation began with a simple question, "What made the NGOs under 
consideration effective during the "color revolutions" in Ukraine and Georgia?" In an 
attempt to put in perspective the excitement generated by the media and some scholarly 
works, I advanced the hypothesis, which suggested that the more embedded an NGO was 
in domestic social and political landscape, the more successful it was during those 
democratization events. Three subsequent sub-hypotheses asserted that embeddedness 
would be greater if: a) an NGO is able to relate better to the political society; b) it has 
more connections to the society at large and its members in particular; c) it enjoys more 
tailored external assistance. The analysis below will evaluate whether each sub-
hypothesis has been confirmed by the accumulated evidence. This, in turn, will 
determine whether the main assertion stands at the conclusion of my work. 
Sub-hypothesis 1 
Table 1. Sub-hypothesis 1 
Better ties to political society • • greater embeddedness 
OUTCOME: partially confirmed 
• Overall embeddedness more impacted by constituency, societal 
influence 
• State influence as a powerful limitation 
• Higher political embeddeness as a sign of organizational maturity 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. For NGOs: 
• Embrace issue advocacy 
• Cooperate with parties on specific issues only 
• Re-assess political embeddedness based on dilemmas: 
• Political influence v. longevity/public acceptance 
• Incremental v. revolutionary change 
• Ensure internal leadership turnover 
2. For Donors: 
• Remove civic/politics barrier 
• Establish monitoring and compliance mechanisms on impartiality 
• Teach how to process learning experiences 
It is partially confirmed that the better an NGO is able to relate itself to the 
political society, the more embedded it becomes in the domestic landscape. In this case, 
ISFED provides the most positive example of political embeddedness (and thus the 
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highest score). The organization had a significant amount of officially recognized 
influence on the course of the election campaign and voting itself. 
CVU, Kmara and Pora showed weaker examples of political embeddedness and 
fell victims to two scenarios. In the first one, an NGO chose greater cooperation and 
(intentionally or not) cut out others. As a result, Kmara and Pora became a partisan, not 
an independent voice that they were supposed to be. For the second scenario, a civic 
group manifested such a desire to accommodate all political players that it made itself 
irrelevant. This woe betided CVU whose "independence" meant that nothing in reality 
depended on its assessments. 
In the general scheme of results, the sub-hypothesis holds only a partial key to 
explaining organizational embeddedness as a whole concept. Thus, the groups that were 
not sufficiently embedded in the political landscape, managed to be better embedded in 
the domestic landscape through a stronger constituency or greater societal influence. The 
evaluation of evidence has revealed two critical points. First, in societies where the state 
predated civil society, political rootedness will be heavily influenced by existing political 
conditions. The Ukrainian organizations obtained lower scores than the Georgian ones, 
because the regime in Ukraine was more authoritarian and the space for civil society was 
more tightly controlled. The outcome also highlights a sad reality (of which external 
observers of NGOs will need to remind themselves continuously) that sometimes no 
matter how hard a group tries to become part of political landscape, it is doomed to be 
weak in this area. Second, while political embeddedness is not a make-it-or-break-it 
indicator (which is a good thing given the previous point), higher rootedness is a sign of 
an NGO's organizational maturity. In other words, an organization shows it can play in 
the world of decision-makers on its own, and it knows its proper place as a 
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representative of civil society. Pora and Kmara failed because they were too young. 
CVU did not manage to attain it because the years of existence did not translate into the 
understanding of fundamental rules of political behavior for civic organizations. 
This brings us to the set of key questions mentioned at the beginning of the 
chapter. The first of them deals with the perennial challenge for any civic group - how to 
remain distinct from politics, while advocating closely related issues and seeking to 
make political impact. The four nonprofit groups under analysis answered the dilemma 
differently, and each paid a price for finding a more or less successful way to balance an 
inherently political nature of civic demands. Three ways, though, broadly emerge from 
their cumulative experiences. First, it is important for NGOs to embrace open advocacy 
of the issues that pertain to their raison d'etre. If a civic group works on fair elections, it 
should protest vocally against and expose those who seek to discredit the election 
process. By doing this, it will inevitably take sides in a political dispute. Pretending to be 
a mere impartial observer in this case will render the whole existence of a civic 
organization meaningless in the medium and long-term. So, one may ask, should a civic 
organization abandon its political neutrality? Yes, if neutrality means detachment from 
life and from the society in which it lives. No, if neutrality means a wider concept of 
non-affiliation with a specific political force. And this is where the second point comes 
to light. While advocating passionately for the causes it espouses, an NGO should never' 
commit a mistake of associating itself with a political party, no matter how strongly this 
party supports or promotes a certain civic cause. A close affiliation between the two is 
dangerous for one obvious reason. Ideologically, parties are much broader creatures than 
civic groups. They embrace multitudes of issues and a range of political views (even 
within the same broad school of thought - i.e. from moderates to hard-liners). On the 
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contrary to that, non-government organizations work in a certain issue niche. As our first 
chapter noted, issue specification is important for any nascent NGOs to attract 
supporters, since groups that cover everything often end up standing for nothing. If an 
NGO gets too close with a political party, it may be perceived (or may feel forced) to 
support the party on a range of other issues on which its members may have divergent 
views. For instance, many people joined Pora for the need of fair elections. But it does 
not mean that all of them uniformly support Ukraine's membership in NATO, which Our 
Ukraine (the party with which Pora chose to affiliate extremely closely) advocates. 
Finally, the discussion above makes clear how hard it is to define the balance between 
situational agreements with political parties on the issues of common concern and open 
support of those parties' agenda. Based on the experiences of our four NGOs, the only 
cure seems to be staff rotation and leadership turnover. There is something about fresh 
blood that enables new people to see the dividing line between civic and political 
societies sharper and spot a conflict of interest (or an encroachment of the political 
world) quicker. This study supports the theoretical view that civil society is a training 
school for political life. At some point, civic activists tend to outgrow the boundaries of 
civic activism that forbids them to play a more direct role in politics. In that case, those 
people need to be pushed out to seek greener pastures in political party life. The fact that 
this process did not take place in CVU and the Liberty Institute meant that too many 
people had oversized ambitions for being just civic leaders. Staff and leadership turnover 
allows civic activists to realize those ambitions and prevents the formation of enduring 
personal relations between civic and political leaders who are supposed to play different 
roles. 
The second dilemma is more practical, as it pertains to the challenge that 
international donors face in making civil society development an effective component 
within the larger context of democratization The answer here is simple to state, yet hard 
to implement. On one hand, donors need to remove artificial boundaries that often 
separate civic and political worlds and push NGOs to become actively involved in 
politics by advocating their core issues. The disdain that intellectuals within civil society 
feel toward party members and leaders should be fought with vigor. In Ukraine and 
Georgia politicians may not be noble and pure as highly educated civic elite would like 
to see them, but they still remain the product of those societies. If NGOs want to change 
them or the quality of the political discourse, the only way to do that is to engage with 
the people you got, not the ones you want to have. Keeping this in mind, foreign donors 
should encourage NGO involvement in politics, but also insist on establishing 
procedures and compliance mechanisms that would assure civic impartiality. The 
question should be asked not whether NGOs should cooperate with political parties, but 
how. In this case the obvious concern is that despite elaborate mechanisms and 
comprehensive steps to assure impartiality, civic groups will never get it right. To 
assuage the worries they probably will not, but they will have to learn how to balance. 
Civic activists through their own experience or by watching other organizations soon 
discover that NGOs will be taken over by two opposite, but rather natural processes if 
they do not get their cooperation with the political world right. Under one scenario, if a 
group is too political, it will either split and turn into a political party or disband as a 
result of joining an existing political force. The first happened to Pora that produced two 
offspring - a civic organizations "Opora" (meaning support) and a political party, Pora. 
The second was the fate of Kmara, which disbanded after the revolution, letting its most 
prominent members join the Saakashvili government or, in very few cases, return to their 
initial NGOs. Under the second scenario, if a group is too detached, it will be sidelined 
from the political landscape. This is what happened to CVU. Though the organization 
remains active, it is bound to find itself asking a question whether it wants to be a 
professional election think tank. 
The final critical issue speaks to the long-standing debate on the relationship 
between civil society and the state. The accumulated evidence makes it clear that in 
countries where political society preceded civil one, the state would be able to shape the 
beginning of the path to political embeddedness that civic groups will be presented with 
as a fait accompli. However, this should not be a reason to despair since the state cannot 
shape the course along that path or its final destination. The proof to that are differences 
in political embeddedness between Pora and CVU, ISFED and Kmara. Each pair 
functioned in the same formal political environment, yet achieved a different stage of 
informal political embeddedness thanks to its own skill and ability to turn the existing 
political architecture to its advantage. 
As with every rule, this one has its exceptions. In cases where civil society is 
under a direct attack from the state (thereby the state either denies formal 
acknowledgement of any NGO or prefers only GoNGOs), informal political 
embeddedness will be almost impossible to achieve. Under these circumstances, a civic 
group will have three choices. One is to ally itself with the government as its support 
source. The other is to ally itself with any political force that guarantees its future 
recognition when that force comes to power. If (as in many Central Asian states for 
example) political opposition is banned and demolished, a group will have no choice but 
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to rely only on societal support and work to redefine the formal political landscape in a 
way that will provide both formal and informal political embeddedness. 
In conclusion, the discussion on interactions between politics and civil society 
presents every non-governmental organizations with two kinds of dilemmas that they 
have to struggle continuously to resolve individually. First, in relations with political 
parties civic groups have to balance the issues of political influence with their own 
longevity (as an independent civic force) and their wider public acceptance. The price 
for each choice is clear - greater political influence usually comes with a danger of 
dissolving an NGO in a specific party or losing support among the segments of the 
population that disagree with that party's politics. Second, in dealing with government a 
nonprofit has to decide what kind of change it is willing to accomplish - incremental or 
revolutionary. Willingness to settle for piecemeal progress ensures smoother cooperation 
with existing authorities. An ardent desire for a revolutionary breakthrough is likely to 
seal off interactions with most governments that are inherently status quo oriented. These 
dilemmas are presented here as binary challenges. The beauty and complexity of reality 
lie in the ability of each organization to find its own comfort zone on the continuum 
between the two extremes that each dilemma outlined. 
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Sub-hypothesis 2 
Table 2. Sub-hypothesis 2 
More connections to society "^ greater embeddedness 
OUTCOME: strongly confirmed 
• nature of civic interactions: subjective due to practical implementation 
of abstract goals 
• better embeddedness -> greater polarization, especially when: a) other 
channels are closed; b) external agent present 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
1. ForNGOs: 
re-assess social embeddedness based on dilemmas: 
wide recruitment & loose structure v. strict membership & greater 
control 
institutional memory v. staff turnover 
visibility v. substance 
2. For Donors: 
focus on grassroots and field work 
stress the need for personalized appeal and distinctiveness 
It is strongly confirmed that groups with more connections to the society at large 
and its members in particular were more embedded than those who had lower societal 
embeddedness. Pora and Kmara, the movements with higher scores, were most visible 
during the revolutions. Pora (which obtained the greatest number of points for social 
embeddedness) also proved the most rooted of all four. Corollary to that, the Committee 
of Voters performed the worst in terms of its implantedness in the society and was the 
least visible political force in the Orange revolution. A deeper analysis of social 
embeddedness raises four crucial questions on a wider and more fundamental role of 
civil society. 
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The first harkens back to the debate on the nature of exchanges that civic groups 
promote by their functioning. In that regard, there are two interesting points - can NGOs 
be truly neutral and impartial and, if not, do they fuel general polarization within their 
host societies. As activities of Kmara and Pora show, the assessment of NGO exchanges 
is highly subjective. What the two movements promoted, was seen as positive by 
supporters and destructive by opponents and the government. So while abstract goals 
that nonprofits espouse can be neutral and impartial, their practical implementation will 
always produce an inherently political result. For instance, by numerous admissions of 
its activists all Pora ever wanted to do was to assure a fair election - a goal that is neutral 
in terms of supporting a specific political force. However, even Pora members 
acknowledged that the practical application of that goal often meant allowing people to 
express their will by voting for Viktor Yushchenko (a clearly partisan figure) and by 
having their voters count. In the end, what Pora saw as an application of the abstract and 
nonpartisan principle became the death knell to viability of the Kuchma regime, because 
Pora sought to ensure a complete execution of that principle. Even ISFED, the most 
impartial group of all, said its neutrality in observing elections did not translate in a 
neutral stance in the election's aftermath. It was clear that the Georgian government 
falsified the result, and thus there was nothing one could be neutral about. 
So if pure neutrality is not possible in reality, do NGOs then become a vehicle for 
polarization? This is where an NGO's success in embedding itself in the host society 
becomes its enemy. Kmara and Pora, the best performers on this indicator, were also the 
most polarizing. The logical link between successful embeddedness and polarization is 
clear. The more relations a nonprofit has with its own society, the more visible it 
becomes by the sheer fact that its activists recruit and communicate with a greater 
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number of people. Visibility may create a fertile ground for polarization, especially when 
combined with the presence of polarizing external agents (like George Soros in Georgia) 
and the inability of the political system to digest feedback. Our case studies prove that 
the groups with greater embeddedness were also more polarizing thanks to their 
visibility and to the efforts of their national governments pitting regime loyalists against 
those groups, by asserting that the latter's agenda was not politically neutral, but covertly 
partisan. 
The second critical question is how NGOs can become more socially embedded. 
There are no definitive answers since every civic group, like a human, is unique to some 
extent. Therefore, it would be more useful to concentrate on a set of dilemmas that each 
NGO has to address and balance for itself. The first one juxtaposes wide activist 
recruitment and a looser organizational structure against strict membership criteria and 
consequently greater efficiency and vertical control. For instance among our 
organizations, CVU chose the second model, while Kmara and Pora went with the first 
one. ISFED fell somewhere in-between. The advantages and negatives of each approach 
have been described in great detail in the case studies. So it will suffice to say that an 
NGO would be wise to conduct an honest review of its practices (to see where they 
might fall against these two extreme) even if such practices are officially declared as 
open and non-hierarchical, especially as it ages and its structure becomes more settled 
and thus more rigid. 
The second dilemma is the need to balance institutional memory against the 
infusion of new blood that brings innovation and regeneration. Like any organization, a 
civic group has to maintain a core of activists who will remember and learn from 
previous experiences. However, it should also strive to bring new members. Otherwise, 
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the group will remain stuck in the past, as the old cadre grows increasingly cynical about 
politics and chances of success and skeptical about trying anything new or re-trying 
failed projects. Gf the groups under analysis, CVU veered too much toward the first 
extreme with both institutional memory and loyalty turning into powerful impediments. 
ISFED, on the other hand, was perhaps too nonchalant about losing its members. Pora 
and Kmara represent a more appropriate golden middle. While both organizations were 
relatively young, they managed to retain experienced civic leaders and recruit young 
firebrands on the ground. 
The final dilemma is an ongoing struggle between visibility and substance. It is 
worth mentioning that the two are by no means exclusive - there are a lot of substantive, 
sophisticated and well publicized advocacy campaigns. The struggle pertains to a more 
fundamental question that many activist groups (especially those propped up by foreign 
money) have to address and revisit continuously in developing civil societies. It is about 
a balance between deskwork and grassroots. If deskwork overwhelms grassroots 
organizing, the group begins to resemble a think tank. Any democracy practitioner in the 
former Soviet Union can easily name dozens of nonprofits that became analytical centers 
without realizing that or even ever leaving their offices. If the opposite happens, then 
many grassroot activities look like endless demonstrations with no long-term purpose. 
The Ukrainian Committee of Voters was a perfect example of the first extreme. Some 
Kmara activities, as its more critical supporters admit, fall in the second category. Within 
the Georgian movement, there was a great desire to attract attention, but there was little 
willingness and no time to bring more substance to protests. 
To sum up our discussion on the dilemmas, two points should be added. First, 
these challenges are universal to all NGOs at different stages of their development. 
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Second, only conscious attention to them will help an organization choose a more 
nuanced position and avoid drifting toward one or the other extreme. 
The third essential point inquires how to make civil society development an 
effective component within the larger context of democratization. Based on the 
performance of the four NGOs under analysis, the general path lies through grass-root 
organization and fieldwork. 
It is clear from the table of embeddedness that social rootedness occupies the 
central place in assuring that an NGO becomes an integral part of its host society. In 
none of the four cases, a nonprofit was able to get to a higher level of implantedness 
while having lower social ties when compared to its counterparts. Our detailed analysis 
of the groups also revealed that in building more bridges with domestic societies, the old 
prescription of talking directly to people continues to stand and gain even more validity. 
In the complex and multilayered informational highway, it is much easier for citizens to 
ignore civic groups that choose conventional methods. Pamphlets and glossy brochures, 
press releases and expert appearances get quickly lost in the media noise. Therefore, only 
those NGOs that take time and make an effort (sometimes mundane and long-term) to 
talk directly to citizens will be able to develop a following. The attention must thus be 
paid to how (not whether and to what extent) nongovernmental organization can 
distinguish themselves and continue to re-design new ways to appeal to their target 
population. Pora and Kmara were successful precisely because they found a way (often 
not a polite one) to get through to people regardless of a vicious government reaction or 
a purposeful neglect by officially censored media. 
The last question looks at social embeddedness as a tool that may enhance the 
benefits of civil society (e.g. civicness, greater tolerance and trust, higher participation) 
and ameliorate its weaknesses (such as polarization). Unfortunately, the results in this 
area are inconclusive. From numerous interviews it was clear that activists from groups 
with higher embeddedness are more open to general participation and have a greater 
sense of efficacy. However, in statistical terms the evidence does not allow for 
generalization. Therefore, additional research (in particular statistically reliable surveys 
among NGO members) is sorely needed to speak conclusively on the benefits of greater 
rootedness. 
Sub-hypothesis 3 
Table 3. Sub-hypothesis 3 
Better Tailored External Involvement •> Greater Embeddedness 
OUTCOME: Confirmed 
• Less micromanagement on daily routines and specific targets 
• Focus on fundamental dilemmas and indicators of impact 
RECOMMENDATIONS: 
For Donors and NGOs: 
• Pay attention to the signs of dependency 
• Extended length of support 
• Loose terms of assistance 
• Increased visibility of foreign support 
• Focus on normative transfers to diminish dependency 
• Provide stable and consistent funding expectations 
• Conduct a frequent and realistic content assessment 
The dissertation has confirmed that the more domestically tailored the external 
involvement, the more it helps an NGO become embedded. At the same time, the 
accumulated evidence enables us to refine this fairly general proposition by specifying 
what it is meant under rightly tailored involvement. 
Positive experiences of Pora and Kmara (and negative ones of CVU) prove that 
international assistance is successful when it does less micromanagement and instead 
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concentrates on a bigger picture. When donors are preoccupied with technicalities of 
grant agreements that manifest themselves in the urgent need to fulfill artificially set 
indicators (e.g. public hours held per month, volunteers recruited per week) then those 
indicators are the only ones being met. It is worth remembering that in the former Soviet 
societies (where people are wired to misreport the achievement and over-achievement of 
five-year plan, pyatiletka, goals), civic activists feel more at ease with short-term hurdles 
than long-term challenges. Therefore, an internal discussion would gladly concentrate on 
how to establish a declared number of local branches rather than how those branches will 
fit in to the local civil society. Not to be misinterpreted, asking big questions does not 
mean engaging in grand philosophical discussions that have become an abhorrent 
landmark of many round tables and seminars in the region. What it does mean is that 
donors are not afraid to raise constantly big and hard dilemmas - e.g. how do you 
cooperate with political parties, is it effective and how can we make it more productive. 
Such questions transform the overall discourse from lofty abstract speeches (or endless 
whining routines on, for example, how arrogant and corrupt party bosses are) to specific 
measures that can improve the situation incrementally in the medium term. Like any 
researcher who knows how painful the search for adequate indicators to measure 
something is, NGOs should be challenged by donors to think whether their activities 
accomplish what they intend to do - does the campaign to increase female representation 
in power echelons really ensure not only visible gender diversity, but also the diversity 
of opinions? Finally, less micromanagement means letting NGOs decide what their 
needs are and sometimes waiting for them to arrive at recognizing a certain need that a 
donor has long considered essential. From the four available case studies, we see that 
where donors responded to the request of a nonprofit, they were more effective in 
facilitating external normative transfers than in the situations where a transfer (through a 
training) was foist upon a civic group. 
In the end, it all comes down to two critical questions for every foreign donor -
how to avoid making its brainchild dependent and how to fit it into the larger context of 
democratization. Here are some propositions that come out from my research for each 
issue. 
As far as dependency is concerned, four observations should be kept in mind. In 
each case, the longevity of donor support is positively associated with dependency. CVU 
has with a messy relationship with NDI precisely because the Democratic Institute was 
its benefactor since the dawn of time. Furthermore, our research reaches a surprising 
conclusion that the pattern of dependency works both ways. Donors also become 
attached to specific NGOs in order to sustain and justify their institutional agendas. And 
in this case the length of relationships has a pernicious effect, too. The more a donor 
funds a certain group, the more its own reputation becomes related to the success of that 
group. As seen for CVU and ISFED, domestic civic groups are not afraid to exploit 
donors' fears that an NGO failure or dissolution will be a dark stain on the reputation of 
grant-giving institutions. The opposite examples only add veracity to this analysis. 
Donors were more objective toward Pora and Kmara. The harsher treatment pushed the 
Ukrainian group look for other sources of funding - something it did not plan to do. 
The second observation indicates that the looser and more vaguely defined terms 
of support, the greater the dependency. Pora knew that donors would not step in if it 
failed. Its activists had to count only on themselves. At the same time, CVU and ISFED 
seemed to be always willing to see how far they can push the envelope by resisting 
donor control while relying on donor support as a permanently available safety net. In 
other words, if donors are unwilling to set and stick to clear indicators that would be off 
the bounds for their influence or would result in decreasing support, they will find 
themselves in a quagmire of creeping dependency. 
This conclusion is closely linked with our third point - the more visible the 
relationship, the harder it is to let go of it for both sides. CVU serves as a perfect 
example for this situation. The organization, especially in the donor community, was so 
clearly linked to NDI that other funders were leery to engage with it for the fear of 
upsetting the Institute. As a senior international donor staff said, "It would feel like 
dancing with another husband's wife."7 Such a high level of visibility corners both sides 
into a kabuki dance aimed at saving faces and inadvertently exacerbating the existing 
dependencies. It was clear from interviewing numerous NDI sources that the Institute is 
unable to let go or substantially decrease its support of ISFED for the fear that if the 
organization simply collapses, it will tarnish the image of NDI. The Institute's farewell 
with CVU in 2006 was protracted and painful, because the NGO could not believe it 
would be actually cut loose. In an implicit acknowledgement of this highly visible 
relationship, other donors often spoke in whispers and with their eyes down about NDI 
dropping its main grantee in Ukraine. 
The final observation pertains to normative transfers. Their predominance over 
simple funding relations re-defines the relationship into less dependent. If an NGO is 
interested in a foreign donor because of the information and content it can bring, this 
balances (if not decreases substantially) the financial side of the relationship. In other 
words, the grantor is not viewed merely as a cash cow. It is also a provider of valuable 
information mat is directly related to NGO's activities. For example, Pora and Kmara 
7
 Western NGO representative. 
had a healthier relationship with foreign donors because they were interested more in 
their expertise rather than just grants. CVU and, to a lesser degree, ISFED regarded NDI 
as primarily their financial benefactor and political protector. One interviewer used the 
Russian word "krysha" (roof) to describe how NDI would shelter the two organizations 
from undue pressures by the government and political parties. 
Based on the observations above, international donors will need to pay attention 
to the following three indicators in order to make NGOs an effective component within 
the democratization agenda. The first speaks to consistency of funding. Stable levels of 
grant support help avoid short-term dependency, by decreasing the likelihood that NGOs 
will hoard funds or inflate their budgets in the expectation of future cuts. The second is 
about the scope of funding. The more civic groups are funded, the greater positive 
spillover effects. Donors should make peace with the fact that many civic groups they 
fund will die, reorganize or disband. Such things happen in the West, too. What will not 
be lost is the civic potential and experiences that civic leaders will retain even after they 
move to other careers. The last, and definitely not the least, has to do with context. An 
adequate and continuously updated assessment of local conditions is paramount in 
several respects. It assures realistic funding plans. There is no need to fuel a nonprofit' 
funding if it can never be sustained in local conditions. In many post-Soviet states, 
NGOs forgot that they were not-for-profit associations. They should not be competing 
with businesses in terms of their salaries, the luxuriousness of office space or the use of 
expense accounts. Most importantly, the situation assessment will allow aid 
organizations to promote embeddedness of their local partners with the domestic society, 
political parties and government regardless of where each of those entities stands in 
understanding the essence of civil society. 
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To summarize, our discussion has come a full circle to the original argument. 
Effective external involvement that is tailored domestically is also the one that promotes 
NGO embeddedness by tying it to the host society and avoiding dependency patterns that 
in essence substitute stable support at home with good donor relations. 
Alternative hypotheses 
Table 4. Alternative Hypotheses 
1. Greater Western Support '•#• Better NGO Performance During 
Revolutions 
OUTCOME: Rejected 
• Long-funded NGOs proved less effective 
• Previously similar efforts gave no results 
• Western support matters for general long-term effects only 
2. Greater Alignment with Parties •¥ Better NGO Performance During 
Revolutions 
OUTCOME: Partially Confirmed 
• NGO-party cooperation depends on a goodness of fit (i.e. similar 
capabilities, complementary goals) 
• Neutrality abandoned in critical incidents 
The major assertion of my work (i.e. embeddedness as the major factor that made 
NGOs strong during the "color revolutions") is by no means widely accepted. Other 
prominent interpretations attribute the success of non-government organizations to their 
backing (mostly financial) by the West, and their close relations with political parties. It 
is worth examining each of them in greater detail. 
Alternative hypothesis 1 
In explaining the "color revolutions," their opponents blamed the West, in 
particular the United States, for instigating public protests by funding oppositional civic 
groups. The case was made especially eloquently in regard to Kmara, which had close 
financial ties with the local Soros foundation. The sheer number of those who ardently 
support this viewpoint prompted to look at it separately as an alternative hypothesis that 
may help the success of NGOs. Therefore, the dissertation speculates that the more 
support an NGO received from the West, the better it performed during the revolution. 
The gathered evidence provides strong grounds to reject this assertion for a number of 
reasons. 
First, as the scale of embeddedness clearly shows, nonprofit groups that got most 
donor support performed either worse (CVU) or at the same level (ISFED) than the one 
that did not have substantial backing (Pora) or had a one-time grant infusion (Kmara). 
Second, taking further the argument of those who believe that money buys power, one 
could have expected CVU to be the loudest voice among all. After all, the organization 
was on continuous foreign funding, had the most extensive regional infrastructure, and 
believed that NDI would back it under any conditions. Because, as numerous people 
pointed out, the dog did bark and the cannon did not shoot, it means that something else 
was at work. That something apparently was also working in the case of Kmara. As the 
Executive Director of the Soros Foundation in Georgia remarked wryly, his organization 
funded election-related activities for a long period of time, and before the revolution 
nobody rushed to label them as treacherous. Perhaps, the major difference was that in 
2003 such activities were approached seriously not as a part of the usual grant-utilizing 
routine. This brings us again to the central point - the success of Kmara and the failure 
8
 To show how prevalent this viewpoint is especially in the former Soviet Union, one merely has to google "color revolutions" in 
Russian and receive hundreds of pages with relevant articles. Here are some of the available publications: "Kto delaet tsvetnye 
revolutsii?" [Who manufactures color revolutions], Novaya Politika, 15 October 2007, http://www.novopol.ru/text28692.html; 
"'Tsvetnye' revolutsii: kto sleduuschij?" ['Color' revolutions: who is next?], Polit.ru, 30 Marcg 2005, 
http://www.polit.ru/analytics/2005/03/30/revolution.html; "Urazov: NKO i 'tsvetnye revolutsii: k voprosu o 'barhatnyh' 
tehnologiyah" [Urazov: NGO and 'color' revolutions: on the question of'velvet' technologies], CentralAsia.ru, 
http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=l 162806660. 
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of CVU lies not in the fact how much money (or for how long) has been pumped into 
them. It is centered on their ability (or a lack of thereof) to embed itself in the societal 
context and take the most of it to accomplish its goals. 
In summary, money was not central to the success of civic participation in the 
revolution. Having said that, one caveat is in order. While funding was not a make-it-or-
break-it issue, it proved important in two aspects. First, having Western money available 
in the 1990s enabled to build a background upon which a future, more mature civil 
society was able to develop and evolve. Second, continuous Western funds provided 
much needed normative transfers and created overlapping networks of activists who 
could excite others to speak up even without grants. It is easy to imagine a 
counterfactual. If the United States and, to a lesser degree, the European Union had not 
given grants to civil societies in Ukraine and Georgia, the civic component would have 
been absent from those revolutionary events because civic activists a) would be too weak 
to act together or b) would join political parties long ago to have any impact. In that case, 
the transitions most likely would not have happened at all because the government would 
have squelched a small elite group of oppositional politicians with nothing to fear from 
the larger public. 
Thus, as it turns out, the truth lies somewhere in the middle. Contrary to what 
conspiracy theorists believe, there is no direct or immediate connection between funding 
nonprofit groups and having those entities "produce" a revolution. There is, however, a 
relationship between the presence of Western financial support, its longevity and quality 
on one hand and the long-term effects it is bound to generate. 
Alternative hypothesis 2 
The second alternative hypothesis attributes the success of domestic NGOs to 
their alignment with political parties.9 In other words, the more allied a civic group was 
with a major oppositional force (Yushchenko's "Our Ukraine" or Saakashvili's 
"National Movement"), the better it performed during the revolution. Based on the 
accumulated evidence, the hypothesis is partially confirmed. In each country, the leading 
protest movement (Pora and Kmara) was closely tied to the opposition. However, 
ISFED presents a powerful exception. The organization was able to influence the course 
of elections while maintaining its neutrality. 
This mixed result carries a number of critical implications. First, the relationship 
between alignment with parties and NGO success is dependent on the goodness of fit 
that comes from two things - an area of operation and the strength of each entity. In the 
cases where areas of operation overlap and complement and the entities are equally 
strong, cooperation and alignment are more likely and, as a result, will be more 
beneficial. For instance, during the period of the Orange Revolution both Pora and Our 
Ukraine were focused on citizens' mobilization, but targeted complementary audiences: 
the former - activist students, the latter - Yushchenko supporters. The two had an 
equally powerful presence on the ground. Therefore, it made sense for them to join their 
efforts to ensure success of the common project - a large-scale mobilization of 
Ukrainians against election fraud. A similar situation is observed in Georgia where the 
National Movement and Kmara were targeting complementary audiences, but for the 
9
 D'Anieri and Tudoroiu, "Rose, Orange, and Tulip: The Failed Post-Soviet Revolutions"; D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and 
Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions"; Higley and Burton, "The Elite Variable in Democratic Transitions and Breakdowns." 
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same purpose. Like in Ukraine, both entities had a firmly established own standing that 
made one useful for the other in achieving its independent goals. 
Looking at ISFED, it is easier to understand why the NGO did not need 
alignment with a powerful political patron to make a difference. Political parties in the 
region are notoriously weak in election observation. Most of them are so consumed with 
campaigning and obsessed with winning that monitoring the actual voting often becomes 
an after-thought. From that perspective, the National Movement did not have the same 
level of expertise as ISFED. The other difference has to do with the complementarity of 
interests. While the two were broadly committed to democracy and free elections, 
ISFED did not see it as its task to mobilize the population or to appeal to any specific 
group. Rather, it was narrowly interested in communicating the results of election 
monitoring to as many people as possible. To achieve that, it pursued limited cooperation 
with the National Movement and Kmara. Therefore, the group did not need to ally itself 
with any political forces because: a) no party could claim to have as much expertise in 
the field of election monitoring; b) ISFED did not share the immediate goals of political 
parties to mobilize voters for protest. 
The second implication from this hypothesis speaks to the larger issue of how 
NGOs can maintain their political neutrality and when they may abandon it. In all four 
cases, the non-governmental organizations gave up on the most purist interpretations of 
impartiality that assigns civil society the role of a detached observer of politics. The most 
extreme examples were Kmara, followed by Pora and, to a much lesser extent, ISFED 
and CVU (the latter got trapped in a web of conflicting political loyalties). Their 
experiences point that at crucial stages of a democratic transition NGOs may have to 
actively take sides in a political struggle. Such stages include various attempts to 
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challenge the fundamental principles of democratic governance - e.g. election fraud, a 
coup, an introduction of military/direct presidential rule, etc. They can also be described 
as critical incidents that will determine a country's future democratic or authoritarian 
trajectory. At these periods, civic and political components of any society are forced (by 
the nature of events) to come together to defend (or defeat) the existing order. 
The final implication bears on the ongoing debate on how NGOs can remain 
distinct from the political society, especially taken into account that in an emerging 
democracy there may be times requiring cooperation more intimate than usual. The only 
reasonable prescription for these groups is to learn from iterative experiences how to 
distinguish between critical incidents and a routine (albeit often over-dramatized) daily 
political struggle. This internalized knowledge will enable NGO leaders and members to 
identify situations when overstepping normal bounds of neutrality is needed to salvage a 
long-term democratic future. Through their own mixed performances, groups will also 
begin to feel where they stand on the blurred line that separates civil society and political 
parties, and how to avoid those patterns of cooperation that may lead to internal collapse 
or absorption by a party. 
In summary, the performance of NGOs at critical stages of a democratic 
transition is enhanced by their close cooperation with political parties when the two 
forces share a common agenda, possess similar organizational capabilities and work on 
complementary goals. At the same time, NGOs can be equally effective without close 
alignment with a political force when they possess a strong and self-sufficient capacity 
that fills the void in the competencies of political parties. 
Anteceding variables 
Numerous studies have speculated that the strength of civil society is 
significantly influenced by three intervening variables. The first is domestic political 
culture that creates a general milieu, which enables or disables pluralism at the ground 
level. The second is the capacity of the state to carry out its policies. And the third is the 
ability of external forces to influence state leaders by tying civic freedoms to other 
policies. The discussion below will review the performance of each variable and its 
impact of NGO embeddedness. 
Table 5. Anteceding Variables 
1. Political Culture: More Participatory Culture •• Greater Embeddedness 
OUTCOME: Modified (to subject-participant) and Confirmed 
• Change possible if significant portion (1/3) carries participant attitudes and 
another part is undecided 
• Groups with participant attitudes: Westernized youth, middle-class, old 
intelligencia 
2. State Role: More Powerful State + More Challenging Embeddedness 
OUTCOME: Confirmed 
• Semi-authoritarian regimes in consolidation or equilibrium as culprits 
• Ukraine: moderate to high capacity in elite organization, power control, 
governance experience; low capacity in national identity 
• Georgia: weak capacity in elite organization, power control, governance 
experience; moderate capacity in national identity 
3. Leverage Politics: Greater Western Leverage + Easier Embeddedness 
OUTCOME: Confirmed 
Ukraine: High reputational and moderate economic costs -> Moderate 
responsiveness to Western pressure 
Georgia: High reputational and high economic costs -> High responsiveness 
to Western pressure 
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Political culture 
In his seminal research on civic culture, Sidney Verba asserts that citizens are 
most engaged in the matters of governance in a participant culture that encourages public 
involvement and interest.10 Extrapolating from this finding, my dissertation hypothesizes 
that nongovernmental organizations will be better embedded in a participant culture 
because it provides a fertile ground for active citizenry, which civic groups can utilize to 
plant their roots in a host society. 
Our analysis confirms this hypothesis partially and requires its modification 
based on the two countries under analysis. As the data below will show, neither Georgia 
nor Ukraine has a fully-fledged participant culture. But both are a classical example of 
the subject-participant culture where "a substantial part of the population [in Ukraine -
youth and the new middle class, in Georgia - mostly youth and intelligencia] has 
acquired specialized input orientation and an activist set of self-orientations, while most 
of the remainder of the population continue to be oriented toward an authoritarian 
governmental structure and have a relatively passive set of self-orientations."11 
For instance, in Georgia and Ukraine one-third of the population supports protest. 
In Georgia, 66 percent believe in democracy and 34 percent have a medium to high level 
of interest in politics.12 In Ukraine, the support toward the Communist Party declined 
from 22 percent in 1998 to 7.4 percent in 2005; over one-third of the society recognizes 
the need for a multiparty system. What these statistics persuasively show that while 
democratic and participatory attitudes are not yet overwhelming, they have taken a rather 
strong root in at least one-third of the society. Both countries also have large segments of 
10
 Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture. 
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 Ibid., 24-25. 
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 Panina, 25; GORBI, "Survey of Political Attitudes in Georgia," June 2003. 
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 Panina, 26; GORBI, June 2003 survey. 
undecided individuals who can be swayed by either side. And this is precisely what the 
pro-democratic parties and NGOs were able to do during the "color revolutions." By 
framing the issue in a way that spoke to the domestic society (corruption in Georgia, 
human dignity in Ukraine), they drafted a large number of uncommitted citizens to their 
cause. 
This finding brings both good and bad news to democracy promoters. On the 
good side, countries without a developed participant culture are not doomed to decades 
of authoritarianism. Change is possible there with the presence of two important factors 
- a segment of the population that carries participant attitudes and another group of 
people whose political preferences are fluid or immediately indeterminate. This is where 
the bad news comes in. The two countries under analysis make it clear that three groups 
can play the role of a conduit for change - youth with Western education or experience 
of living in the West, new middle-class with its addiction to Western consumerism and 
standards of living, and old intelligencia with its highly ethical and progressive outlook. 
In many authoritarian states, it is hard to develop either of these groups to a sizeable 
proportion for different reasons. Youth may be either indoctrinated early on15 or choose 
not to return after education abroad. Middle classes are negligible in size and/or 
subservient in attitude because benefits are distributed through a patronage system.16 
And old intelligencia is vigorously jailed or exiled.17 Thus, fostering any of these three 
agents of change may be a difficult long-term task, especially if efforts are sabotaged by 
14
 For example, in Ukraine 40 percent of respondents are not certain whether a direct presidential rule is a good idea and in Georgia 
over 60 percent have low or no interest in politics. 
15
 Consider the case of Russia where young people hold more nationalist and anti-Western attitudes than the older generations. For 
scholarly works, please see Taras Kuzio, "Ukraine is not Russia: Comparing Youth Political Activism," SAIS Review 26, no.2 
(Summer-Fall 2006): 67-83. More evidence can be found on the websites of two prominent, pro-government youth organizations: 
Nashi [Ours is a counter-response against Pora and Kmara] (http://nashi.suA and Molodaya Gvardiya [the Young Guard is a youth 
wing of the government party United Russia] fhttp://www.molgvardia.ru/). 
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 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan come to mind. 
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local governments. The second part of bad news concerns the undecided segment of the 
population. If authoritarian governments are good at anything, it is intimidation and 
indoctrination, as they try to make sure that citizens have a firmly held opinion on 
everything and that opinion always coincides with the party line. To conclude, the 
immediate challenge seems to be not what authoritarian regimes fear most - the export 
of "color revolutions" but the need to develop independently thinking sectors within 
populations that can embrace key notions of participant culture. 
Role of the state 
While one of my indicators considered the formal landscape that the state created 
for NGO operation as a part of political embeddedness, it is important to evaluate 
broadly the role of the state and its impacts on civil society and rootedness. A more 
general look will ameliorate the highly legalistic and narrowly sectoral approach that the 
evaluation of formal implantedness for each NGO under analysis was bound to produce. 
In this regard, my initial hypothesis asserts that the more powerful the state, the harder it 
is for NGOs to get embedded. 
State powers are assessed through a set of indicators originally offered by Bunce 
1 ft 
and Wolchik. Those include elite organization, authoritarian powers of control, 
experience in governance and a perception of the incumbent's national identity. The 
acquired information is then used to classify the Ukrainian and Georgian regimes by the 
extent of their semi-authoritarian strength. In doing so, the research relies on the 
18
 Bunce and Wolchik, 297-298. 
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classification developed by Marina Ottaway that distinguishes such governments as 
those in consolidation, decay, change and equilibrium.19 
Based on the analysis below, our hypothesis is confirmed - in states with semi-
authoritarian regimes that are on the path of consolidation or in the equilibrium stage 
nonprofit organizations will experience more trouble getting embedded in the domestic 
fabric of society. Regardless of visible similarities in the shape and nature of "color 
revolutions," Ukraine and Georgia were at different points in the evolution of 
authoritarian rule in each country. 
Ukraine was an authoritarian regime on the path of consolidation. All the four 
indicators of state strength show a significant increase between 1992 and 2004. Elite 
organization improved from low to moderate. Whereas at the collapse of the Soviet 
Union President Kravchuk faced a tough reality when informal ties of the Communist 
party network no longer worked, President Kuchma managed to concentrate power and 
establish networks of enhanced regime loyalty through tightly managed privatization of 
state assets. State authoritarian powers grew from low to moderate. To their dismay, the 
first president, Leonid Kravchuk, and during his first term the second president Leonid 
Kuchma discovered that they had few real instruments of control over key societal 
actors. Vertical control (over subordinates) was weak. The state was financially impotent 
and thus unable to offer any rewards or punishments. Initial rounds of privatization 
created powerful oligarchs who did not yet feel any loyalty to the state. The situation 
began to change at the end of the 1990s. Improved finances bought more loyalty. 
Kuchma mastered the game of playing various oligarchic groups against each other and 
used further privatization as a tool to secure personal obedience. The experience of 
19
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governance grew from low to high. In the early 1990s, no Ukrainian politician knew how 
to govern or even function in a pluralist system. By 1999 the Ukrainian government 
learned how to manipulate the public opinion and secure the necessary outcome in 
elections. To summarize, while the government was by no means omnipotent, its 
capacity in the key areas has risen from low to moderate (or even high). Furthermore, 
realizing the inevitable reversal of fortunes, the regime was determined to consolidate 
gains by promoting an insider to succeed president Kuchma. 
The situation in Georgia was qualitatively different. First and foremost, president 
Shevarnadze started with a steeper decline in the four sectors of control. There was a 
total breakdown in elite organization that resulted in violent internal challenges for 
leadership. In the early 1990s Georgia politicians had few common ties to each other -
Gamsakhurdia, Ioseliani and Kitovani all hailed from the intelligencia class and had no 
experience of political interactions among themselves that went back to the Communist 
days. State power was virtually non-existent as the country plunged into the abyss of 
disintegration. South Ossetia and Abkhazia claimed independence, Ajara (a south-
western area) operated as a feudal part of Georgia. The powers of central government 
stretched no further than the capital. Georgian nationalist leaders had no experience how 
to run a state, and their Communist opponents had no idea how to be democratic. By the 
end of the 1990s, the situation changed. State powers became moderate in the areas of 
elite organization and governance experience. President Shevarnadze established small 
patronage networks and eliminated non-state paramilitary units. He also gained 
experience in manipulating elections, but remained afraid to use it to the fullest extent 
not to damage his international reputation of a reformer. However, unlike Ukraine, state 
authoritarian power remained rather weak. State finances were in a sorry state, relying on 
substantial flows of aid. Feudahzation of governance and centrifugal tendencies 
continued. The government was operating mostly in the survival mode. To sum up, the 
authoritarian regime in Georgia was in a state of decay, seeing no clear path how to 
consolidate gains and eliminate dissent with limited financial resources. 
Given the analysis above, it should not be surprising that Ukrainian NGOs had a 
greater difficulty (than their Georgian counterparts) embedding themselves into the 
domestic society because of the moderate authoritarian capacity of the state and its 
experience in suppressing dissent. However, they managed to survive unlike many 
nonprofits in Russia. What helped them in this situation was a widespread nationalist 
resentment of Kuchma within the population and even among the disunited pro-
democratic elites. Unlike in Georgia, where neither Gamsakhurdia nor Shevarnadze was 
ever seen as a Russian stooge, by the end of his term Kuchma was viewed as a traitor of 
national interests by the populations in central and western Ukraine and pro-Ukrainian 
intelligencia (the latter constituted the core of many national NGOs). 
To conclude the discussion, our case studies make it clear that an overly powerful 
state is an obstacle to NGO embeddedness. However, the ingenuity of Ukrainian NGOs 
in dealing with this situation shows that state power should not always be treated as a 
death sentence to civil society, especially in countries with dual/split national identity. 
Leverage politics 
The debate on the importance of leverage politics in international relations has 
been long and prolific. In the area of democracy promotion, it has taken a clearly 
predictable shape. It speculates that the greater the Western leverage and, concomitantly, 
elite responsiveness to that leverage, the easier it is to promote democracy and, in our 
case, for NGOs to get embedded. 
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The evidence presented by the four cases studies strongly confirms this 
hypothesis for Ukraine and Georgia. Non-governmental groups in the former had a more 
difficult time surviving because the Kuchma regime was not as responsive to 
international pressures as the Shevarnadze government. However, in both cases the 
international leverage was sufficiently high. Thus neither Ukrainian nor Georgian 
leadership could afford to suppress or ignore the role of NGOs. The reputational and 
foreign policy costs trumped the desire of Kuchma and Shevarnadze to clamp down on 
NGOs completely. 
As the hypothesis at the beginning of this section indicates, the evaluation of 
Western leverage should be approached by reviewing not only the tools, which Western 
states have in possession to influence foreign governments, but also the vulnerability of 
domestic regimes to external impacts. The example of many post-Soviet states (among 
which Russia figures prominently) shows persuasively how some instruments have 
failed to work as well as provoked a sharp backlash because of their low capability to 
influence political elites. That is why, in reviewing the outcome for the intervening 
variable of leverage politics, the discussion will concentrate on both leverage 
mechanisms and elite responsiveness to them. 
In Ukraine, Western leverage included high reputation and moderate economic 
costs. As the Kuchma regime grew progressively authoritarian, Western governments (in 
particular the U.S. and EU) sought to freeze their diplomatic contacts at high-level with 
official Kyiv. From 2001 Leonid Kuchma met mostly with Polish President Alexandr 
Kwasniewski and infrequently with German chancellor Gerhardt Shroeder. Those close 
to the president rumored of his obsession to secure a meeting with George W. Bush. The 
20
 Way and Levitsky, "Pigs, Wolves and the Evolution of Post-Soviet Competitive Authoritarianism, 1992-2005." 
364 
public humiliation of the Ukrainian regime went as far as a change of alphabets (from 
English to French) to avoid sitting the Ukrainian president between George Bush and 
Tony Blair at the 2002 NATO summit in Prague. In the meantime, the West continued to 
press for change by denying visas to key oligarchs who were allies of the regime, 
suspending portions of the U.S. foreign assistance to Ukraine and publicizing monitoring 
reports that were highly critical of the government. While the reputation costs were high 
and visible, economic ones were modest. Ukraine was not yet heavily integrated into the 
Western economic space. The major bulk of cooperation remained with Russia. Its share 
and importance continued to increase as Ukraine became increasingly dependent on 
cheap Russian gas to fuel the growth of its reinvigorated industrial sector. 
Because of that, the responsiveness of the Ukrainian government to Western 
pressures was rather moderate. Kuchma officials increased their anti-American rhetoric, 
which in the months preceding the revolution turned into an outright hysteria. The 
government also did its best to impede the functioning of Western nonprofit 
organizations, such as IRI, NDI and Freedom House, by threatening to suspend their 
accreditation in the country. At the same time, the regime continued to emphasize multi-
vectoralism. Kuchma insisted on attending personally the NATO summit in Prague and 
developed a very close bond with the Polish leadership, which helped a historic 
reconciliation of the two peoples. Although President Kuchma did not answer repeated 
phone calls from U.S. State Secretary Colin Powell during the events of the Orange 
revolution, his government accepted a foreign mission to mediate discussions between 
the opposition and pro-governmental forces. In other words, a much stronger internal 
capacity of governance (see the previous section) and an ability to re-orient to Russia 
and tap into the fears of instability from Ukraine's immediate Western neighbors (like 
Poland and Lithuania) to avoid complete isolation gave the Kuchma government a 
greater degree of autonomy in handling foreign criticism than Eduard Shevarnadze ever 
had. 
Western leverage in Georgia was high both in terms reputational and economic 
costs. Shevarnadze was heavily invested in his image of a reformer that lingered from 
the times of Gorbachev. He was also interested in maintaining the reputation of a 
national savior that he acquired domestically and abroad after coming back in the middle 
of the 1990s to war-torn Georgia. Therefore, initially his government had much less 
space for maneuvers and forays into the authoritarian realm. That autonomy was even 
further undercut by high economic costs, which any slide into dictatorship risked to 
impose. As acknowledged by numerous interviewees and government officials 
indirectly, Georgia was completely dependent on foreign aid to maintain the political 
system and make debt repayments. Without Western support, the government would 
have been unable to pay even meager salaries to state employees and social payments to 
retirees. 
When combined, the two factors determined a high level of responsiveness to 
foreign interference. Shevarnadze was willing to show openness (albeit fake and 
temporary) and bow to international advice. For instance, he accepted foreign mediation 
from Jim Baker to resolve the dispute over the composition of the Central Election 
Commission. Overall, the government was never as repressive toward NGOs and 
independent media as in Ukraine. Rustavi-2 covered freely numerous protests by Kmara. 
ISFED was allowed to maintain its representation on the CEC - something that was 
never even under consideration in Ukraine, regardless of formal pleas from the 
Committee of Voters. 
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To summarize, both states were responsive to Western pressures but the extent of 
outside influence depended on the governments' concern for their reputations and the 
damage that could be done by Western isolation to their economies. In Ukraine, 
Kuchma's willingness to accommodate the West was moderate. He still cared about his 
reputation and did not want to be completely cornered into cooperation only with every 
former Soviet republic to the east of Ukraine. Therefore, the government did not kick out 
Western foreign groups, did not conduct massive arrests and never used torture against 
political activists. These were the red lines that Kuchma knew would make him 
"nevyjizny" (oinable to exit the country - a Soviet term for those who could never leave 
the country). Unlike Yanukovych, he also shirked from the use of force against Orange 
demonstrators, understanding that it would land the Ukrainian government in permanent 
isolation from the West. However, the second Ukrainian president was no pushover. He 
had and used resources to silence his most annoying critics. He actively played the 
Russian vector to compensate for the lack of contacts with the West. But in essence, it 
was Ukraine's geopolitics - its location between East and West and thus its permanent 
attachment to each of those poles - that did not allow Kuchma to lapse into excesses. 
In Georgia, the government's willingness to accommodate the West was high for 
it understood that without Western moral and financial backing the country may not 
survive. Again, the position seems to have been detennined by the country's geopolitical 
location and economic strength. Before the viability of pipelines bypassing Russia 
became too obvious, Georgia was considered a far and remote country for close Western 
interest. 
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LESSONS LEARNED 
The dissertation has proved that organizational embeddedness plays a critical role 
not only in helping nascent civil societies survive and thrive in new democracies, but 
also in facilitating the overall process of democratization. This central finding bears a 
number of implications for four key audiences that are concerned with civil society 
development as part of their agendas. I will review below what lessons each of these 
groups should take from this work. 
For political science theorists on civil society and democratization 
My dissertation contributes to our understanding of civil society by serving 
empirical proof that in nascent democracies societal embeddedness is the key in turning 
civic groups from a witness to a participant in the democratization process. It, therefore, 
adds to the existing knowledge on the role of civic groups in the "color revolutions." 
Most studies on the subject talked about the NGOs, which participated in those 
events, without providing a substantial previous background that would help explain 
how those groups emerged so strong on the day of elections. That is why, it was not clear 
what a group needed to do in order to become a strong voice in the process of democratic 
transition. It seemed puzzling why some NGOs stood out of the crowd, while others 
disappeared in the general picture. My dissertation provides a resolution to this puzzle 
through its most significant discovery - societal embeddedness as an explanatory factor 
of the successful performance of non-governmental organizations during the "color 
revolutions." By assessing the degree of embeddedness, one is also able to see the 
difference in performance among the four groups under analysis as well as the difference 
between them and the rest of NGOs in their countries. 
The second substantial finding of this research pertains to a series of alternative 
arguments. My analysis shows that the arguments about Western financial backing or 
party alignment as the key explanatory factors carry either no or much less (and more 
conditional) weight than previously assigned. 
A new research agenda emerges from my dissertation and focuses on five points. 
The first emphasizes the importance of micro-level analysis. A large number of previous 
works were pre-occupied with assessing general trends (i.e. macro level) of civil society 
development in the former Soviet Union. This led to concentrating on either simple 
numeric measurements, or legalistic aspects of civil society functioning, or on painting 
too broad of a picture (e.g. the portrait of a national NGO sector) to gauge what actually 
needs to be done. As my dissertation shows, there is a need for more works on specific 
NGOs that would detail their successes and failures, let us refine our understanding how 
civil society really works and improve our policy recommendations. The second point 
pertains to the need to consider societal embeddedness in the framework of analysis. By 
doing so on macro- and micro-levels, scholars will be more inclined to see the 
performance of civic groups on the continuum of the embeddedness dilemmas rater than 
in dichotomous terms. This process will produce more nuanced suggestions and avoid 
two biggest pitfalls in recommendations - one that regurgitates common sense ideas (e.g. 
work with parties, cooperate with government), which read like truisms at this point, and 
the other that slides into highly judgmental and often condescending propositions of 
what is right and what is wrong. The third aspect is about re-focusing on normative 
transfers at the micro-level to see how foreign, mostly Western, ideas are re-constructed 
in other societies. It combines previously successful research on normative transfers with 
the attention to micro-level analysis of specific NGOs. The benefit of such endeavors is 
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more data that is available to all interested parties (but most importantly to democracy 
promoters on the ground) on what works and what does not, and how the process of 
transfer occurs. The fourth part of the agenda should break the analytical wall of 
separation between NGOs and other societal actors. This wall exists both literally (in too 
many texts there are separate section on parties, government, media and civil society) 
and figuratively, as there is no attempt to see how these actors interact with each other 
and how their interactions change internal dynamics within each of them. The analysis of 
my dissertation makes it clear that in order to be effective, these assessments need to be 
intertwined. The final point is about an existing research gap. There are very few studies 
on attitudes within civil societies. Due to that, it is impossible to know if civic 
participation makes any difference for NGO activists or if such people are just another 
type of bureaucrats, albeit internationally funded. If the latter is the case, this would be 
another sign (at the macro level) that NGOs are not sufficiently embedded. 
To conclude, it is important to identify what my work signals for current trends 
of the discipline. In essence, it suggests a refinement of existing approaches that brings 
together a micro-level analysis of NGOs, makes embeddedness the cornerstone in 
assessment and places NGOs under review within the general process of 
democratization. 
For NGO activists in nascent democracies 
Three key lessons come out of the dissertation for local activists. First, the need 
to concentrate on domestic societies should be a paramount and overarching priority in 
their work. In this regard, nothing will replace grass-root outreach and fieldwork. Only 
when these two are effective, a civic group is capable to de-Westernize the concept of 
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civil society and the specific norms it is advocating among the population. Unless such 
de-Westernization happens, there will be no local ownership in their project and no local 
interest in their future. 
Second, non-governmental organizations must recognize and revisit the 
dilemmas of embeddedness. Only a continuous assessment of where an organization 
falls on the spectrum of choices in its relations with government, parties and public will 
make it aware of red flags, which may be pointing that the group is going off-course. 
Embeddedness should be recognized as a continuous balancing act, not a one-time event 
where major decisions are made once and forever. 
Finally, civic groups need to become serious about domestic funding. Unless 
there is a minimum level of financial support at home, they may not be able to survive 
changing currents of foreign aid as well as a volatile economic situation. 
To summarize, though each of these recommendations is not new, they look at 
the problem from a different angle - what an organization needs to do to transform itself 
from a body, implanted by foreign forces, into a natural entity in the domestic society. 
For governments in nascent democracies 
Much has been already said about the need for a larger and more systematic 
discussion within governments and between a government and an NGO sector on how to 
work together. Unfortunately, in most former Soviet states, this discussion seems 
necessary, but is unlikely to be helpful in enhancing cooperation in practical terms. The 
major reason for this grim assessment is that most individuals, who populate those 
governments, have little understanding about the concept of civil society. And even if 
they do (something that may be believed about Georgia's President Mikheil 
Saakashvili), they are all too willing to ignore it in order to pursue their own agenda 
without having to overcome the hurdles of civic scrutiny and criticism. 
In these circumstances, workable solutions should aim for a medium-term 
impact. To achieve it, governments need to recruit a new generation of citizens to mid-
level bureaucratic positions. Such people are more likely to understand civil society and 
have participatory attitudes that come from three factors - no upbringing in the Soviet 
system, Western education and possible prior involvement in civil society. However, the 
arrival of this generation is not a matter of time. It ties directly to the ability of a 
government to pursue a larger democratization agenda that would fight corruption and 
nepotism and launch a progressive civil service reform. Without these changes, 
governments in nascent democracies will remain the last resort for an ambitious youth to 
work. Instead they will be what they are right now - a graveyard for ideas and a 
monument to passivity and incompetence. 
Another point within the democratization agenda that governments have to 
consider is the need for greater institutional predictability. It is next to impossible for 
civil society to structure its interactions with a state that continues experimenting with 
various forms of government - parliamentary, presidential or mixed. Institutional 
unpredictability is usually a corollary of the political struggle among many factions that 
often results in a constant rotation of mid-level bureaucrats with whom civic activists are 
most likely to work on a regular basis. Therefore, in a situation when the political mega 
framework shifts all the time, NGOs prefer to retreat to their own civic domain until the 
system settles and the roles of each player can be clearly deduced. 
Governments in nascent democracies need to advance economic reforms. Their 
success will have indirect positive results on the functioning of civil society. As wealth 
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spreads from the privileged few, NGOs will be able to fundraise more widely without 
fearing for political dependence on their patrons. Public donations and volunteering will 
increase, too. 
To sum up, to help civil society it is more productive for newly democratic 
governments to engage in a larger political and economic reform whose positive 
externalities will assure both a better cooperation between NGOs and state, and greater 
chances for the nonprofit sector's financial survival. 
For Western promoters of democracy 
The dissertation advances a number of lessons that should be put to use in the 
effort to improve the delivery of foreign aid for democratization. The first of them 
stresses the need for an ongoing assessment of limitations for democracy promoters. As 
the case studies make it clear, geopolitical considerations alter the leverage of external 
democratic agents - sometimes for the better (where other states become interested in 
fostering democracy in a critical country for the sake of stability), but mostly for the 
worse (where immediate tolerance of authoritarian regimes is often advocated). Robust 
domestic economies, however flawed their model may be, may further circumscribe the 
channels through which pressure can be exerted on local governments. This does not 
mean that any attempt to build civil society is doomed if the country is high on the U.S. 
totem poll and its economy makes it less receptive to outside criticism. 
In fact, the opposite may be true in a lot of cases, which brings us to the second 
lesson. In authoritarian regimes, it is possible to promote democracy and plant future 
(albeit very remote) seeds for civil society without providing a direct sponsorship of 
NGOs. Instead, foreign donors may concentrate on three types of citizens who 
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potentially carry participatory attitudes. Such groups include youth, middle-class and 
intelligencia. In this case, the goals are for the first group to get exposure to Western 
education, for the second group to form as a class regardless of hostile economic policies 
and for the third group to survive purges. 
In the societies where host governments are willing to accept external assistance 
and stay on the path of democratization, donors should follow three general 
prescriptions. The first is to concentrate on bottom-up initiatives from the field as a 
means to avoid funding fads in Western capitals and better tailor normative assistance. It 
often means taking up non-conventional projects like Pora and being skeptical of long-
standing civic associations whose membership pool can fit in a telephone booth. The 
next advice is to develop greater responsiveness to a host society's social needs. The 
major obstacle to greater relevance of nascent civil societies is the abstract nature of their 
activities at the time when people are suffering very concrete economic needs. 
Therefore, donors need to balance the funding for NGOs that deal with pure advocacy 
and those that provide social support. As patterns of foreign support become entrenched, 
external democracy promoters need to work hard to avoid dependency of their grantees. 
My dissertation suggests a number of ways to do that, most important of which is the 
assessment of how embedded a funded organization is in the societal and political 
environment. 
Finally, much has already been written about the need of reform in the United 
States that would give foreign aid the priority it deserves. When applied to civil society, 
this suggestion means that any reform should be undertaken in order to better coordinate 
long-term efforts on civic and political fronts, thereby enabling a more organic transition 
from a foreign-sponsored to more independent nonprofit sector. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
My dissertation has demonstrated that societal embeddedness is critical for civic 
organizations in nascent democracies to survive and thrive as a natural and strong 
component in their host societies. The initial success of the "color revolutions" in 
Georgia and Ukraine left some wondering about a role for NGOs in the "new" 
environment where the governments are openly committed to democracy. The sense of a 
long-awaited victory put many civic activists in a state of stupor about reality. A lot of 
them hit the speaking circuit and went to rest on laurels. Others quickly joined the new 
governments. As a result, in Ukraine and Georgia civil society has not yet become an 
active participant in the new stage of state building and democratization. Its failures have 
been glaring in both countries. First, the NGO sector was a watchdog that did not bark or 
barked not loud enough when the Saakashvili and Yushchenko governments began 
moving away from democracy by creating a super-presidential structure of governance 
(in Georgia) and eroding already weak institutions for the sake of personal gains (in 
Ukraine). Second, civic groups were unable to deal with the reorientation of international 
aid flows toward the Middle East and Afghanistan. More broadly, Ukrainian and 
Georgian civil societies failed to take advantage of the propitious post-revolutionary 
environment to build on the existing civic activism and increase the number of people 
with participatory attitudes. After the revolutions, most demonstrators returned to their 
homes, believing it was not theirs but the government's turn to build a new country. 
The democratic stalling after the "color revolutions" indicates that civil society 
remains critical to ensure a return to democratization in Georgia21 and to push for 
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national reconciliation in Ukraine. Furthermore, it remains central to combating the 
Soviet political culture that treated people as subjects, not equal actors, of political 
process. There are a number of short-term tasks civil society needs to accomplish. NGOs 
should exercise their watchdog capacity more vigorously to ensure government 
accountability for the economic stabilization program (which Ukraine has received from 
the IMF) and the post-war reconstruction fund (which Georgia obtained from the U.S. 
and the EU). Civic groups must continue monitoring the observance of democratic 
freedoms and principles especially during these dire times - the war's aftermath in 
Georgia and a profound economic collapse in Ukraine when publics may yearn for a 
"strong hand" and leaders may advocate less democracy for more stability. 
Participation of civil society is also important in the medium and long term. Ukraine and 
Georgia are facing profound questions in terms of foreign and domestic policies - what 
to do on the international arena now as EU and NATO memberships are out of reach, 
how to interact with Russia after the August war with Tbilisi and the gas dispute with 
Kyiv, how to re-structure the domestic economies to avoid similar financial shocks in the 
future, and how to maintain the countries together, given the loss of South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia and centrifugal tendencies in the Crimea. Civic groups can and should take an 
active part in forging a common societal agenda by engaging with other actors and 
developing ways for a wider public involvement. Civic groups will be capable to meet 
these challenges only if they are perceived as a natural element of domestic societies. 
The relevance of their societal embeddedness at the present stage stems from three 
factors. First, Western governments will have no (or very limited) funds for lavish aid 
programs. Therefore, most nonprofits will have to tighten their belt, fend for themselves 
and find other sources if they do not want to go extinct in this economic ice age. Second, 
domestic public will hunger for concrete initiatives rather than round-tables on abstract 
topics and glossy brochures. This will demand more grass-root work and greater re-
orientation toward social programs. Third, governments and political parties will be 
much less tolerant of a meddlesome voice from the so-called civil society when that 
voice does not have public support. 
To conclude, a vibrant civil society in Ukraine and Georgia is a necessary 
component to achieve further democratic consolidation and address the fragilities that 
both states are currently experiencing. The vibrancy can be achieved only if non-
governmental organizations are deemed as a natural participant in unfolding social and 
political processes. 
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APPENDIX I - INDEX OF EMBEDDEDNESS 
Societal Embeddedness - 53 Points 
• Constituency (16) 
• Internal Normative Transfers (11) 
• Societal Influence (14) 
• Financial Sustainability (12) 
Political Embeddeness - 27 Points 
• Formal Legitimacy (13) 
• Informal Legitimacy (14) 
External Involvement - 20 Points 
• External Normative Transfers (11) 
Scale of Embeddedness 
Highly Embedded: 90-100 
Moderately Embedded: 65 - 89 
Insufficiently Embedded: 40 - 64 
Weakly/Marginally Embedded: 0 -39 
• External Mechanisms of Influence (9) 
Potential Total - 100 Points 
APPENDIX II - USAID COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN UKRAINE AND GEORGIA 
Year 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
Country 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
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Georgia 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
Ukraine 
Georgia 
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en
er
al
 
4.2 
3.4 
4.1 
3.8 
4.4 
4.0 
4.3 
4.0 
4.0 
4.2 
3.9 
4.1 
3.8 
3.9 
Le
ga
l E
nv
 
4.6 
3 
5 
3.5 
5 
3 
5 
4 
4.5 
3.9 
4 
3.7 
3.6 
3.5 
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3.7 
4 
3.5 
3.5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3.5 
4 
3.9 
4 
3.9 
3.8 
Fi
n
 
V
ia
bi
lit
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4.6 
4 
5 
4.9 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4.9 
4.8 
4.6 
4.6 
4.8 
A
dv
oc
ac
y 
4.4 
4 
5 
3.5 
4 
2 
4 
4 
3.5 
4.3 
3.4 
4 
3.1 
3.7 
Se
rv
ic
e
 
Pr
ov
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2.5 
4 
4 
5 
3 
4 
3 
4.2 
3.3 
4.4 
3.3 
4.1 
In
fr
as
tr
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tu
re
 
3.5 
3.5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
3.5 
4 
3.5 
3.8 
3.8 
3.9 
Pu
bl
ic
 
Im
ag
e
 
3.9 
2 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4.4 
4.4 
4.4 
4.1 
3.7 
Scores: 
Consolidation of Civil Society: 1 - 2 
Midway Transition: 3 - 4 
Early Transition: 5 - 6 
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APPENDIX III - POSTERS 
no PA* 
K*MII3IH.||£ """* 
www.kuchmizm.info 
8-4504855906, 8-067-9756677 
A/C 49, KHIB 01030 
Figure 1. Pora poster: "Kuchmism - tse beznadia" 
[The era of Kuchma is hopelessness]. 
nopa AOBecTM, 1140 TM 
He K03en! 
nOPA neKae Ha Te6e! 
www.kuchmizm.info 
Figure 2. Pora poster: "Pora dovesty, shcho ty ne kozel!' 
[Time to prove that you are not a moron] 
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APPENDIX IV - EMBEDDEDNESS SCORES 
Social Embeddedness 
• Constituency 
• Internal normative transfers 
• Societal influence 
• Financial sustainability 
Political Embeddedness 
• Formal 
• Informal 
External Influence 
* External normative transfers 
• External mechanisms of influence 
Totals 
UKRAINE 
cvu 
35 
9 
9 
9 
8 
15 
8 
7 
13 
9 
4 
63 
Pora 
42 
13 
11 
12 
6 
16 
8 
8 
19 
11 
8 
77 
GEORGIA 
ISFED 
37 
10 
10 
11 
6 
21 
9 
12 
14 
9 
5 
72 
Kmara 
38 
11 
9 
12 
6 
17 
9 
8 
17 
11 
6 
72 
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Old Dominion University 
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• Research and write on issues with a potential for conflict in Central Asia. 
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• Taught courses in general education and political science. 
• Evaluated students' performance. 
2001-2002 National Democratic Institute, Civic Program Assistant 
• Cooperated with Ukrainian nonprofit organizations on election-related issues. 
• Monitored and reported on political and civil society developments. 
2000-2001 Soros Foundation (Ukraine), Scholarship Programs Coordinator 
• Managed scholarship programs in Ukraine. 
• Monitored operations of seven regional advising centers. 
1996-1999 Soros Foundation (Ukraine), Debate Program, National Coordinator 
• Launched the program throughout Ukraine through trainings and presentations. 
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